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Written by Paul Harvey on 27 March 2015 12:40

The 2015 OECD report on States of Fragility proposes a new way of measuring and classifying fragility that is really exciting and ground-breaking, but it’s less exciting once it gets to the policy prescriptions. We seem to move from a bold new attempt to re-classify and re-think fragility to some pretty standard orthodoxies on what to do about it...

Paul Harvey, SLRC Director

Written by Richard Mallett on 02 March 2015 16:29

The Ugandan government, buoyed by aid dollars and NGO activity, is trying to make the livelihoods of northern Ugandans better. Every year millions are poured into schemes like vocational training, microfinance and enterprise support with the intention of helping young people get into the labour market and make a decent living. But are their efforts falling short?

SLRC Researcher, Richard Mallett 

13 January 2015 16:02


Sometimes we forget that the state is not a thing, but a set of institutions made up of people. People can shape how the state functions and can trigger changes in the way it provides services and makes itself accountable to the population.

SLRC DRC PhD Student, Aembe Bwimana

12 August 2014 14:09


Post-war development initiatives need to combine bottom-up and community-led as well as state-led approaches. The former is central to empowerment, but so are robust institutional frameworks that can deliver effectively. However, an over-emphasis upon state-led approaches and institutions will fail in the absence of legitimacy or confidence by the people.

Mira Philips, Centre for Poverty Analysis

25 June 2014 15:49

The Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium has started to publish baseline survey reports for Uganda, Nepal and Pakistan, with more in the pipeline. These are attempts to catalogue people's attitudes and perceptions of livelihoods support, access to basic services and economic opportunities, and governance.                        

Alyoscia D'Onofrio, IRC's Senior Director for Governance & Rights programming

Maybe it’s the multi-disciplinary, multi-agency, multi-country, multi-method, multi-year research programme focused on how people survive and recover from conflict that I find so compelling and full of potential.

Or maybe I’m just attracted to yellow and black logos.

Either way, the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium has started to publish baseline survey reports for Uganda, Nepal and Pakistan, with more in the pipeline. These are attempts to catalogue people’s attitudes and perceptions around three basic but incredibly important themes.

  1. Their livelihoods (how they make ends meet, how they compromise when they can’t)
  2. Their access to economic opportunities and essential services (health, education, water, social safety nets);
  3. Their views of government (national and local).

These are a baseline because the researchers will be going back to track changes two to three years later. This makes for an even more valuable resource as we’ll go from having a snapshot of people’s opinions to being able to view trends over time...

Read the full blog: What’s yellow, black and tantalising?

25 June 2014 15:08

What we are doing to convince people of the importance of gender in development isn't working. We need to go beyond ‘target women’ approaches and bring back a focus on empowerment - and we really shouldn't be afraid to be political.                 

Rebecca Holmes, ODI researcher, and Rachel Slater, SLRC Research Director

When progress is slow and difficult, we often talk about how we are able to move two steps forward but then tend to slide one step back. When we were invited to write this opinion piece, we started to wonder whether, if we are really going to get gender taken seriously in fragile and conflict-affected situations, we might need to go back a bit in order to make progress – back to the concepts of the early ‘women in development’ approaches which were radical, politicised, heavily activist and feminist in nature...

Read the full blog: One step backwards two steps forward? Unlocking gender equality in fragile and conflict-affected situations

Read the working paper: Gender-responsive budgeting in fragile and conflict-affected states - a review

Written by Paul Harvey on 25 April 2014 14:26

How resilient will the New Deal prove to be in the face of renewed conflict in South Sudan?      

Paul Harvey, SLRC Director

The tragic resumption of conflict in South Sudan has highlighted a concern with the current state-building focus of so much international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected places. As embodied by the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, the current emphasis of international support is very much on country ownership with ‘state-building as the central objective’. There is much to commend this process, rooted as it is in fragile states starting to assert their sovereignty and ownership of their own development through the G7+ forum. It’s also an understandable reaction to international engagement that in fragile states has too long ignored national systems and capacities and too quickly substituted for the state.

But there’s a danger that the pendulum has swung too far back the other way. The New Deal works well in contexts where the fragile state and its donors have good relationships and when things are going well. What’s less clear is how resilient it is in the face of renewed conflict, as we are currently seeing in South Sudan. If the New Deal approach, and the shift in international modes of engagement that lies behind it, isn’t well adapted to cope with places where conflict resumes or never really stops, then this presents a major problem because fragile states are, well, fragile and so prone to relapse into conflict and violence. There’s a risk that the emphasis on working through national systems implies an ‘all your eggs in one basket’ approach to supporting post-conflict recovery. International actors may need to think more about how to maintain a critical distance from particular regimes, how to maintain the capacity for independent humanitarian action when needed and how to engage the state and non-state actors at multiple and particularly local levels – not just the national level. As Pantuliano argues, international engagement has, ‘too often followed textbook prescriptions and overlooked the political and social realities of the country, treating it instead as a technical exercise in state building.’

There is potential to look at events in South Sudan and ask whether the aid transition after Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) got the balance and timing right in moving away from international actors financed through humanitarian windows to new funding streams and different actors. As Wendy Fenton argued back in 2008, there was a need for a better mix of aid instruments, accessible to NGOs and focused on immediate service delivery and longer-term state building.

When the immediate humanitarian situation (hopefully) starts to improve it will be important to ask whether the post-CPA investments in state building have proved at all resilient in the face of the current conflict, how local-level governance institutions have responded to conflict and what has happened to peoples’ views about the legitimacy and role of the state. These are questions which we’ll be looking to explore in the SLRC South Sudan research programme.

Written by Rachel Slater on 18 March 2014 15:08


Is it possible to deliver basic services effectively and efficiently, and at the same time enhance state legitimacy in fragile states?

SLRC Research Director, Rachel Slater

I should admit to being highly sceptical of ‘win-win’ situations. I’m reminded of the agricultural economist, Michael Lipton, telling me very early in my career: ‘Rachel, I have never in my entire career seen a single case of two birds being killed with one stone.’ And I work predominantly in the social protection sector where, albeit slowly, we are learning that if you heap too many objectives on to a simple instrument like cash transfers or school feeding, you risk not achieving any of them satisfactorily.

I have similar concerns about the common mantra that we hear in development agencies about fragile states: deliver basic services, especially health, education, water and sanitation, and (hey presto!) enhance the relationship between citizens and the state. Is it possible to deliver basic services effectively and efficiently, and at the same time enhance state legitimacy? I’m not sure. We know that some programme design and implementation choices that focus on, for example, building state legitimacy, lead to sub-optimal outcomes for the development of human capital and, therefore, for the reduction of poverty . Put more simply, trade-offs are everywhere. So what more did I learn about this at the WDR 2004 10th Anniversary Conference in Washington D.C. last week? And what continues to niggle and remains unresolved?

One lesson was some food for thought about the role of the private sector in delivering services in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Richard Batley stressed the need to recognise that the private sector is often the main service provider in many fragile countries and, rather than replacing a government-provided service that has collapsed during conflict, the private sector has always been the main provider in some places – the Kivus in eastern DRC are a good

example. Paul Collier suggested that governments should take overall responsibility for the delivery of services but not the function itself. Derek Brinkerhoff, Egbert Sondorp and Jacob Shapiro focused more on how to manage resources and funds to deliver services and provided some important insights about the kinds of changes needed in the roles and approaches of development agencies and governments, especially around resourcing, leadership and

accountability.

My second lesson was that we must not be too simplistic in the way we portray thinking by donor agencies about the service delivery – such as my own caricatured description of the common mantra of development agencies on services and state-building above! We too often set up a straw man to knock it down (we oversimplify donors’ positions and then we prove the actual situation is more complex). For example, Alan Whaites stressed that the OECD’s message about service delivery and statebuilding has somehow been distilled to focus on the actual delivery bit, when, in actual fact, the OECD posited that meeting people’s expectations in relation to service delivery (not just delivering services) was a mechanism that might increase state legitimacy. And we need to heed Jacob Shapiro’s experience in Pakistan where he found that, while the delivery of services following floods in 2010 didn’t lead directly to increased state legitimacy, it did increase participation in elections in targeted areas.

And the unresolved issues? Well, I’m left with a concern that the current approach to building (state) institutions and delivering services in post-conflict situations pushes for a transition from humanitarian assistance to building state capacity far too quickly. This is problematic because of the lack of absorptive capacity and access to remote areas –Egbert Sondorp described how large health infrastructure projects in South Sudan were only able to build hospitals just outside Juba and failed to expand health infrastructure much further than that.

But I have a deeper concern – one that emerges from the last week’s discussions about the roles of state and non-state providers, the extent to which there are trade-offs between enhancing state legitimacy and delivering services, and what sorts of transitions are required post-conflict. My concern is whether, in the current push to move rapidly to state delivery of services following a conflict, and to build the capacity of state at speed (rather than have non-state provision) we are investing in services in conflict-affected situations that are not even vaguely conflict-proof.

Conflict and violence rarely come to a full stop right after a peace agreement, and many countries slide back into conflict or remain fragile, but how far does our programming insure against that? Rebecca Winthrop pointed out that in the education sector, too much attention is paid to who is delivering services, and far too little to whether children’s education is able to continue, uninterrupted and without disruption, during conflicts.

Ultimately, I came away from the WDR 2004 anniversary meeting wondering about South Sudan, and how much of the millions of dollars of investment in building services there has survived the violence of December 2013 and remains intact? Rather than prioritising state-building objectives in relation to services, should we not focus more on ensuring that our programming is conflict sensitive and will be sustained even in the face of further violence?

This piece was originally published in "Public services at the crossroads: Ten years after the World Development Report 2004: reflections on the past decade and implications for the future".

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12 February 2014 11:33

A visit to a village in the North three years after the fighting ended provides insights on the challenges of resettling the war displaced.

Aftab Lall - SLRC Sri Lanka Researcher

It's been five years since the Sri Lankan military declared victory over the LTTE. Many people displaced by the war have been able to return home, access basic services and restart their lives and livelihoods. However, many remain displaced and are in urgent need of personal security, safe housing, and access to basic services.

We have just published a paper looking at how the politics of the Sri Lankan state underpins the resettlement of people displaced during the last stages of the war, particularly focusing on the state’s approach to post-war development, security, and international relations.

The paper started to take shape after we visited the North in the warm month of July 2012 and met with those who had been displaced and resettled, as well as officials from the government administration, representatives of (I)NGOs and religious organisations. We wanted to find out about the government’s post-war resettlement process, which had been underway since the end of the war in 2009. Three years later, there were a significant number of people who continued to live in displacement - such was the situation for the people of Mullikulam in North West Sri Lanka. When we spoke to them they told us that the greatest threat to their lives at present were the elephants that roamed about in close proximity to their camp. They would light small fires at night to keep them at bay. Exposure to the unrelenting sun; heavy rain; swarms of flies; and of course the elephants - were just some of the conditions the people of Mullikulam were willing to put up with until they can return to their homeland, which had been appropriated by the Sri Lankan Navy.

The people of Mullikulam were living in extremely poor conditions. Living spaces were demarcated by tiny stretches of earth that had been cleared of undergrowth. Some had loosely strung tarpaulin sheet roofs, while others trusted the dense foliage for shelter. Their belongings (a few suitcases and bags) doubled up as furniture. Yet their destitute living conditions stood in stark contrast to their energy, assertiveness and the optimism with which they shared their story with us, as well as their hopes of going back home.

In 2007, with the fighting taking place exclusively in the North, the people of Mullikulam were evicted from their homes by the Sri Lankan armed forces for security reasons and they were told they would be allowed to return in a few days’ time. Having no other option, they left with a few belongings expecting to return in a few days and carry on with livelihoods activities, mainly farming and fishing. After five years of continual displacement, many decided to try and move back, but were prevented from doing so by the Navy. There have been a number of allegations suggesting that Navy personnel have in fact moved into people’s homes. The decision by the Mullikulam people to live in the jungle on the outskirts of the Naval base was in protest to a perceived injustice. They also hoped the protest would grab the attention of anybody willing to listen and help them get their land and livelihoods back. Our conversation was cut short by a visit from the Bishop of Mannar, accompanied by two politicians - one from the government and another from the opposition, and a man with a large video camera. An entourage of government security personnel and members from the Red Cross tailed them. We were told that the Bishop was in dialogue with local political and military actors attempting to broker a deal for the people of Mullikulam.

I remember getting increasingly anxious. We knew of the sensitivities around issues of displacement and the evictions that have taken place due to the establishment of high security zones (HSZs) all over the North of Sri Lanka, both during and after the war. We were also well aware of the omnipresence of the military, often in plain clothing- keeping a close eye on visitors. My colleague, familiar with government actors, managed to extract us from further interrogation (what are you doing here? how did you hear about these people? etc.). Our interviews and conversations with civil servants in the northern administration revealed a strong control over information around the resettlement process. We were told that information on the resettlement process could only be shared after getting approval from the Presidential Task Force (PTF). 

What is the PTF? When was it set up? Why was it set up? What role do such government organisations play in the resettlement process? How do these organisations and actors facilitate and mediate issues of displacement and resettlement? Looking into these questions can provide us with some insight into how things have been functioning on the ground since the end of the war, and what more needs to be done to ensure people can return home.

We also wanted to know how broader political, economic and social trends in Sri Lanka influence the destiny of people in similar circumstances: why they remain displaced from their land; why high security zones continue to function after the withdrawal of the emergency and how local, national and international actors shape the post-war landscape and the lives and livelihoods of people affected by violent conflict. Since the time of research and writing the paper, the context in the North has changed in some aspects, yet remains the same in others. We met the people of Mullikulam a month into them living in the forest on the outskirts of the navy base. Since then, some have been resettled in another settlement, and have been given access to some of their land to practice their traditional livelihoods, however, many continue to voice their wish to return to their original lands.

Over the coming months the SLRC team in Sri Lanka will be looking into how those who have been resettled, as well as those who continue to be displaced, access basic services and social protection, and re-build their livelihoods.

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22 December 2013 17:19

Political loyalties in South Sudan are never set in stone, nor are they simply “tribal”. Allegiances may be complex, conflicting, and ultimately dependent on whatever seems to offer the best chance for survival at any given moment.

Rachel Gordon - SLRC South Sudan Researcher

The descent of South Sudan from relative stability to virtual chaos has happened with breathtaking speed over the past week. While tensions within the ruling political party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), had certainly been brewing for months, it remains remarkably unclear exactly what happened on December 15 to set this crisis in motion.

Did SPLM Deputy Chairman and former Vice President Riek Machar try to stage a coup? Did Machar conspire with former first lady Rebecca Garang and a group of resentful former cabinet ministers and governors to unleash rebellion within the SPLA (the national army) and overthrow President Salva Kiir? Did an escalated dispute involving presidential guards present Kiir with an opportunity to lay mutiny charges at the feet of his opponents, thereby taking down his opposition and avenging recent challenges to his leadership? Are these political leaders literally and figuratively rallying their “tribal” troops and inciting violence along ethnic lines in service of their own designs on power?

Those questions and more have been extensively debated elsewhere, but the answers remain murky. Less clear still is how this will all play out, and whether the situation will get worse before it gets better. Despite the return of an uneasy calm to Juba, and government declarations of normalcy and control, the situation has already "mutated into something that threatens the whole country". Violence has spread to multiple states, including the oil-rich northern states such as Unity, and ever-restive Jonglei in the east.

As we write in a forthcoming—and suddenly even more timely—conflict analysis of ongoing tensions in Jonglei for the SLRC South Sudan project, “[n]ational political dynamics have also shaped conflict at the local level. The struggle between Dinka and Nuer elite for political and economic dominance is regularly highlighted as a major potential flashpoint of larger national conflict, and Jonglei is widely expected to be a major source of violence if such a conflict were to erupt.”

That conflict has now certainly erupted, and Jonglei is indeed a battleground. General Peter Gadet, a rebel leader turned (and un-turned, and re-turned…) SPLA commander, has reportedly defected again with a contingent of SPLA soldiers, and has taken Bor town, the capital of Jonglei. Approximately 14,000 civilians have sought shelter at the UNMISS base in Bor, and tens of thousands more have been displaced from the town. An attack yesterday (December 19) on the UNMISS base in Akobo county, which neighbors SLRC study sites in northern Jonglei, resulted in the deaths of two Indian UN peacekeepers and at least 11 civilians. Sporadic fighting has been reported all over the state, including Akobo, Gumuruk, Likuangole, Pibor town, Pochalla and Waat.

Perhaps the most unsettling question of all is not where the crisis came from, but whether anyone is actually in charge. The government and media continue to attribute skirmishes across the country to “rebels” and “forces loyal to Machar,” but there is little evidence that it is an organized or cohesive movement. It is unclear whether Gadet and Machar have even spoken to one another, much less that they have put aside their historical animosities and gone into cahoots. Most of the fighting appears to be between factions of SPLA troops—though the attack on UNMISS in Akobo has been blamed on “Nuer youths” (approx. 2,000 of them)—and all of it is currently taking place in remote reaches of the country where communication can only occur by satellite phone (and the remarkably efficient rumor mill).

The arm of the state in South Sudan has never been long, and its authority over even nominally loyal troops in the field is now uncertain. Under such circumstances, the “rebel movement” framing is even more questionable. Unity and coordination among disparate groups under leaders with a variety of grudges against the government and one another is possible, but seems improbable. A simpler and more plausible explanation is that the fighting factions on the ground are answering to a variety of national or local actors, or no one at all.

In the meantime, framing these developments as an organized rebellion with Machar at its head, with an arrest warrant out for him and 13 other leaders of the SPLM opposition in prison already, may actually be pushing the former VP to fulfill the role of rebel leader in order to shore up his negotiating position. The international community is pinning its hopes on dialogue, with a delegation of ministers from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda now in Juba, but it is unclear that even sincere negotiations between Kiir and Machar—not yet a given, by any means—could actually result in a cessation of hostilities between actors on the ground.

Further worrying is the relative silence thus far from other groups not known for staying out of the fray. That includes Murle rebel leader David Yau Yau, who is allegedly responsible for numerous attacks and hundreds of deaths in Jonglei over the past several years. As Luka Biong Deng, a prominent South Sudanese academic and an SLRC advisor, pointed out, it also includes the Sudanese government in Khartoum, whose own economy and stability are dependent upon the continuing flow of oil from the fields in Unity and elsewhere in South Sudan, and who may therefore be unlikely to sit idle while violent developments in those areas threaten such a vital source of income for both countries.

As the forthcoming SLRC conflict analysis highlights, political loyalties in South Sudan are never set in stone, nor are they simply “tribal,” despite the ease with which that explanation fits into popular narratives about conflict in Africa. Allegiances may be complex, conflicting, and ultimately dependent on whatever seems to offer the best chance for survival at any given moment. The survival of individuals and families has never been assured in areas like Jonglei, where the lack of security, services, and infrastructure created a situation of immense vulnerability long before the current crisis. But it has perhaps never been as precarious as it is today.

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13 August 2013 17:55

The view that informal economies are detrimental must be reassessed in the face of examples which show the importance of such jobs in economically-challenged conflict affected situations.

Ruth Canagarajah, Researcher at US-Sri Lanka Fulbright Commission.

When we think of conflict and its impact on employment and livelihoods, we tend to talk about the inevitable loss of job security and employment opportunities. Conflict impairs the functions and legitimacy of state institutions and creates an environment where transparency and accountability are non-existent. On the one hand, this climate creates a permissive setting for shadowy, unregulated activities, which can be exploited and manipulated, both by perpetrators of civil unrest, as well as victims. On the other hand, this climate is being utilised in less insidious ways; one of which is the increase in informal employment opportunities, allowing people to better secure their livelihoods in conflict affected situations.

When the state can’t ensure access to basic livelihoods and provisions, the informal sector will often step in and harness local resources, skills, and networks. Yet there is limited analysis on how informal employment works in conflict-affected countries, and especially in areas affected by militarization, movement restrictions, and displacement.

It would be too simplistic to think of informal and formal economic activities as unambiguous given the complex, mixed-mode labor arrangements between both sectors. So what does the informal sector actually look like? It is usually characterized by individual or household enterprises that are unregistered entities, thereby avoiding regulation and license requirements. The general belief is that these types of unregulated, untaxed jobs are a widespread phenomenon in countries affected by conflict, and the bigger the informal sector, the more it signals underlying problems of governance and security. This sector acts as a “coping economy”, i.e. an economy in which people diversify their livelihood strategies in order to survive, and it typically offers irregular income and doesn't provide the legal benefits or the labor rights protection you would normally find in the formal employment sector. In a context where private sector investment is seen as a risky business, and can actually agitate conflict, informal employment can work as a positive means for providing job opportunities. Due to the general lack of regulation and low growth in formal enterprises, unofficial job creation initiatives flourish and tend to utilize social networks and the communities’ financial capital.

When a business closes down due to inadequate resources and destroyed infrastructure, laid-off workers may feel it’s too risky to jump straight back into formal employment. In this situation, home-based work and self-employment offer more autonomy and less vulnerability. In conflict situations, “informality” becomes an adaptive or coping strategy to secure livelihoods and survive. If we take Sri Lanka as an example, the official end of the 25 year civil war in 2009 saw the informal sector boom. The closing of the A9 road meant that the north of Sri Lanka was virtually inaccessible, which forced businesses in areas once considered to be economic hubs to relocate. Faced with an economic embargo for nearly three decades, northern Sri Lankans resorted to finding informal jobs as both coping and adaptive strategies. Renuka, now a 30-year old self-employed shop owner and house cleaner, once worked for a prawn manufacturing company. In  2000, her father, the family’s main breadwinner, suffered from severe injuries caused by shelling during the conflict and passed away. Soon after, Renuka  lost her job in the prawn company. Whilst searching for work she made use of her religious community ties to advertise her availability for housework, which she has continued to do for the last 13 years, whilst running a small shop attached to her house. Renuka is now hoping to increase her self-employment activities.

As we can see, some people who have lost their jobs in the formal sector have adopted informal employment as a permanent means for survival, whereas others are utilizing it as a temporary coping mechanism. The same can be seen in the fishing sector in the north of Sri Lanka. Years of conflict, displacement and isolation from markets, along with the seasonality of fishing, forced many families to seek out informal employment opportunities and they have continued this coping strategy post conflict.  Amongst vulnerable fish workers, there is evidence of a small trend to supplement fishing activities with masonry, construction work, paddy farming, and by setting up small shops when times are exceptionally tough. Since conflict affects the long-term strategies of big businesses and investment, the post-war period continues to see a reliance on informal employment.

A question that has yet to be addressed is: should there be incentives to pull a country out of its conflict economy and set up a more formal economic order to promote growth? Or is the informal sector a boon that post-conflict job creation plans can utilise? On the one hand, the informal sector can depress GDP growth, because it decreases tax revenues and public spending. The jobs in themselves are also known to offer less in terms of social security and are largely ignored by government agencies. On the other hand, the sector’s impact on livelihoods could be significant during the early phases of transition in conflict-affected situations. It may even make the post-conflict economy more stable and efficient than one that’s solely dependent on the formal sector.

This “coping economy” in conflict situations demonstrates a pragmatic judgement made by people who, in the face of little alternatives, rely on themselves and their social networks to find a means of securing their livelihoods, as opposed to putting themselves at the mercy of often malfunctioning formal and state-run employment schemes. The view that these “shadow economies” are detrimental must be reassessed in light of examples that show the necessity for such jobs in economically-challenged conflict affected situations, not only for the survival  of a household but also to support the transition towards community stability.

*This blog is the first of two installments; the first, above, provides a theoretical and broad look at informal employment in war environments; the second will analyze how specific sectors, such as fishing and agriculture play a role in the trend.

This is a guest post by Ruth Canagarajah, a Fulbright fellow in northern Sri Lanka who is researching the intersection of natural resources, livelihoods, and post-war challenges.

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14 February 2013 13:56
  "It’s very important that development initiatives – as important as they are – do not result in displacing people from fertile agricultural lands, otherwise they risk having far-reaching negative effects on the health and well-being of the entire nation"

SLRC partner, CEPA

SLRC partners, CEPA, looks at the boom in the number of infrastructure projects, as well as private sector initiatives, in the tourism industry and many industrial sectors in Post-war Sri Lanka. These activities create livelihood opportunities in areas that had been deprived of development for many decades. However, a number of these ventures continue to displace people from their homes as well as from rich lands that provide food and nutrition.

Read the full article: http://lmd.lk/2013/01/01/food-security/


Written by Richard Mallett on 12 November 2012 12:55
"For me, the volume is more than anything about the blurring of boundaries – analytical 

and spatial – and the (increased) hybrid nature of politics and power during and after 

conflict."

SLRC Research Officer, Richard Mallett
Read more: http://africanarguments.org/2012/08/24/big-men-african-conflicts-and-informal-power-a-review-by-richard-mallett-odi/

Welcome to SLRC's blog.

This blog will feature reflections from our team of researchers on the practicalities of actually conducting research in conflict-affected situations. We will also be posting guest blogs written by key researchers and practioners working on livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict-affected situations.