

Researching livelihoods and
services affected by conflict

On the political economy of data collection

Lessons from the unaccomplished
population census (Democratic
Republic of the Congo, 2006-2018)

Working paper 72

Cyril Owen Brandt and Tom De Herdt

March 2019



Written by
Cyril Owen Brandt and Tom De Herdt

SLRC publications present information, analysis and key policy recommendations on issues relating to livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict affected situations. This and other SLRC publications are available from www.securelivelihoods.org. Funded by UK aid from the UK Government, Irish Aid and the EC.

Disclaimer: The views presented in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the UK Government's official policies or represent the views of Irish Aid, the EC, SLRC or our partners. ©SLRC 2019

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from SLRC for their own publications. As copyright holder SLRC requests due acknowledgement.

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
203 Blackfriars Road
London SE1 8NJ
United Kingdom

T +44 (0)20 3817 0031
F +44 (0)20 7922 0399
E slrc@odi.org.uk
www.securelivelihoods.org
[@SLRCtweet](https://twitter.com/SLRCtweet)

Cover photo: A partial aerial view of the town of Bukavu, capital of South Kivu province, DR Congo.
© MONUSCO/Force.

About us



The Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) is a global research programme exploring basic services, and social protection in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Funded by UK Aid from the UK Government (DFID), with complementary funding from Irish Aid and the European Commission (EC), SLRC was established in 2011 with the aim of strengthening the evidence base and informing policy and practice around livelihoods and services in conflict.

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is the lead organisation. SLRC partners include: Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA), Feinstein International Center (FIC, Tufts University), Focus1000, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Wageningen University (WUR), Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), Busara Center for Behavioral Economics, Nepal Institute for Social and Environmental Research (NISER), Narrate, Social Scientists' Association of Sri Lanka (SSA), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Women and Rural Development Network (WORUDET), Claremont Graduate University (CGU), Institute of Development Policy (IOB, University of Antwerp) and the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS, Erasmus University of Rotterdam).

SLRC's research can be separated into two phases. Our first phase of research (2011 - 2017) was based on three research questions, developed over the course of an intensive one-year inception phase:

- State legitimacy: experiences, perceptions and expectations of the state and local governance in conflict-affected situations
- State capacity: building effective states that deliver services and social protection in conflict-affected situations
- Livelihood trajectories and economic activity under conflict

Guided by our original research questions on state legitimacy, state capacity, and livelihoods, the second phase of SLRC research (2017-2019) delves into questions that still remain, organised into three themes of research. In addition to these themes, SLRC II also has a programme component exploring power and everyday politics in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). For more information on our work, visit: www.securelivelihoods.org/what-we-do

Acknowledgements



Research for this paper was made possible by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) through funding provided by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID). We would like to thank Thea Hilhorst, Kris Berwouts, Wim Marivoet, Clara Barnett and Anya Achtenberg for comments;

interviewees for time and insights; and participants at the Development Policies and Practices conference in Kinshasa (November 2018) for helpful questions and remarks. The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the UK Government's official policies or represent the views of SLRC or other partner organisations.

Acronyms and glossary



AfDB	African Development Bank
AMI	Avis de Manifestations d'Intérêt (Expression of Interest)
BCECO	Bureau Central de Coordination (Central Coordination Office)
BCR	Bureau Central du Recensement (Central Census Office)
CAID	Cellule d'Analyses des Indicateurs du Développement (Unit for the Analysis of Development Indicators)
CENI	Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (Independent National Electoral Commission)
CISO	Commission Internationale de Suivi des Opérations (International Monitoring Commission)
DFID	Department for International Development
DHS	Demography and Health Study
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
GIS	Geographic Information System
GPRSP-II	Second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
GRID³	Geo-Referenced Infrastructure and Demographic Data for Development
GTT	Groupe Technique de Travail (Technical Working Group)
IGC	Institut Géographique du Congo (Congolese Geographic Institute)
INS	Institut National de la Statistique (National Institute of Statistics)
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
ONIP	Office Nationale de l'Identification de la Population (Department for the Identification of the Population)
METTELSAT	Agence de Météorologie et de Télédétection par Satellite (Agency for Meteorology and Remote Satellite Sensing)
MinPlan	Ministère du Plan et de la Mise en Œuvre de la Révolution de la Modernité (Ministry of Planning and Monitoring of the Implementation of the Revolution of Modernity)
PAI-STATFIN	Projet d'Appui Institutionnel en Statistique et aux Finances Publiques (Statistics and Public Finance Institutional Support Project)
PARDBS	Projet d'Appui au Recensement Général de la Population et au Renforcement des Bases de Données Sociales (General Population Census and Social Databases Consolidation Support Project).
PARIS21	Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century
PDA	Personal Digital Assistant
PDS	Projet de Développement des Statistiques (Statistics Development Project)
PRINS	Projet Catalytique pour le Renforcement de l'Institut National de la Statistique (Catalytic Project to Strengthen the National Statistical Institute)
Prodoc	Project Document
RGPH2	Deuxième Recensement de la Population et de l'Habitat (Second Population and Housing Census)
SINFIC	Portuguese consortium SINFIC/Quatenus Congo/Novageo
SNDS	Stratégie Nationale du Développement des Statistiques (SNDS) (National Strategy for the Development of Statistics)
SRF	Statistics for Results Facility
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

Contents



Executive summary	v	Table 1: Census budget (2009 vs. 2013)	13
1 Introduction	1		
2 From the memory of the 1984 census to the authorisation of a new census	3		
2.1 Preparing for a new census	3		
2.2 Formal authorisation and first Project Document	4		
3 Rising to the concrete (2011-2012)	6		
3.1 Involvement of national and international partners	6		
3.2 Tensions around the digital character of the census	7		
4 The 'Matata momentum' (2012-2014)	11		
4.1 The Central Census Office and a new Project Document	11		
4.2 New support by UNFPA and the African Development Bank	13		
4.3 Disputes around the extent of the cartography	14		
4.4 Uncoordinated government investments	14		
4.5 A private consortium	15		
4.6 Approval of World Bank project	17		
5 Politicisation (2014-2015)	19		
5.1 The census and elections	19		
5.2 ONIP and BCR: joining forces?	21		
5.3 New appointments at INS and BCR	22		
6 New international money and agency (2015-2018)	23		
6.1 The African Development Bank acting on informed ignorance?	23		
6.2 A new World Bank project	24		
6.3 Seeking culprits for slow progress	25		
6.4 A contested pilot cartography	27		
6.5 Continuing with the private consortium	30		
6.6 A new player: GRID	30		
7 Conclusion: Managing fragility	32		
Appendix 1: Main actors in the census	38		
Appendix 2: Census-specific donor projects	39		
Appendix 3: Data surveys in the DRC	40		
Appendix 4: Interviews	41		

Executive summary



Research Question

In 2018, twelve years after a working group began to prepare a population census in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the census project has still not been implemented. We therefore ask, 'How have different stakeholders shaped the census project since 2006?'

Approach

The latest census in the DRC dates back to 1984. The administrative records are in poor condition, so surveys and evaluations since are increasingly imprecise. The need for a new census is thus uncontested. The unaccomplished census, as we understand it, is a large project carried out by a complex group of national and international public and private decision-makers. In this document, we try to reconstruct the history of the unaccomplished census. We analyse the project in light of low domestic capacities, a politicisation of the census, unmet funding promises by the government, and fragmented and inconsistent donor activities. Conceptually, our analysis draws on the ethnography of development interventions (Li, 2005, 2007b; Mosse, 2004; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). The concept of assemblage (Li, 2007a: 265) helps us to explore how the census project was kept together over time and space. Ultimately, the question is not so much why the project has failed (or, more precisely, why it has still not been accomplished after 12 years); rather it is to understand how it actually unfolded and whether things could have gone differently. What were the missed opportunities?

Methods

This working paper is based on several months of qualitative fieldwork in 2018: analysing census news reported on the internet (e.g. Radio Okapi); carrying out 39 semi-structured interviews – including repeated interviews with key stakeholders (Appendix 4); and gathering and scrutinising laws, government and donor project documents, and PowerPoint presentations.

Main Findings

- 1 Different and sometimes contradictory forces have shaped the census project over time.** Various Congolese ministerial departments, bilateral and multilateral donors, and private companies were involved at different periods. Of the 21 stakeholders, no national-level actor was present throughout. There is, we conclude, no mastermind behind the slow progress; no single actor stands out as particularly malevolent. Rather, too many cooks spoiled the broth.
- 2 The census project has continuously enrolled supporters despite contradictory forces and little evidence of its success.** We found that donor projects disregarded risks revealed by their own analyses. Project documents discursively constructed an environment that seemed open for interventions, which has not been the case. Furthermore, donors hardly sanctioned non-compliance with conditions. Regarding donors, we conclude that 'future positive' thinking (Mosse, 2004), hope and enthusiasm are at least equally important drivers of development interventions as evidence and results. As for domestic actors, the *Institute National de la Statistique* (INS, National Institute of Statistics) has undoubtedly benefitted from census activities. Its portfolio has grown, and new forms of rent-seeking have emerged. The INS has become a broker of the global developmental urge for data and benefits from international projects, successful or not.
- 3 There has been major tension around technology with little domestic ownership.** The tension has been between an alliance of international actors who quasi-imposed the global standards of a digital census and the census office's core team in 2011, who had never organised a census, let alone a digital one. Ultimately, this tension also explains the participation of a private international company whose involvement created a series of other problems. *There is no easy solution to this tension, but simply recognising that would perhaps be helpful.*

4 It is difficult to implement projects in which donors need the state as much as the state needs them.

Donors require knowledge from the census not only to build state capacities but for their own organisational purposes, such as evaluating their programmes. The census would also play a major role in making the election process more transparent. However, formally speaking, the state remains sovereign over its population and a census cannot be conducted without its agreement.

Implications

Based on our findings, we suggest three implications for international actors who are, in particular, supporting census activities and, more generally, involved in activities to strengthen partner countries' statistical systems.

- **When you need to work with government actors, take the value of the partnership seriously and learn how to deal with your partner.** Imposing a fully-fledged, ambitious digital census on a poorly resourced and

funded INS, habituated to surviving on externally-financed projects (Thontwa et al., 2017), is unlikely to produce positive results. Your 'partner' is not only dependent on your funding and expertise, it is also a heterogeneous entity with varying interests that can change over time. International organisations are also a multiplicity; they operate with high staff-turnover, which increases the challenges of learning the tacit skills needed to negotiate a workable arrangement.

- **A census can only be successful if it keeps a degree of distance from the political process, yet stays close enough to garner sufficient support.** Keeping an eye on the timing is thus crucial. The census project was seriously disturbed every time the DRC passed through an election phase.
- **If the census is too big to succeed, try a good-enough census.** The World Bank's idea to use the cartography phase for a nearly complete enumeration can be seen as a good-enough census. In the meantime, it is possible to use all currently existing sources and databases to narrow down the margin of imprecision about population figures (Marivoet and De Herdt, 2017).

1 Introduction

Even the Machiavellianism - and there was a bit of that - was not pursued vigorously enough to let us designate a mastermind or a bad guy. Lined up together, all the accusations - and there were many, some of them pretty potent - cancel each other out (Latour, 1996, 290f).

Providing an accurate answer to the questions ‘how many are we?’, ‘who are we?’ and ‘where do we live?’ is of paramount value for evidence-based public action. While in many countries, this detailed information can be found by combining different types of administrative records, other countries need to conduct a census, i.e. a systematic questioning of every household to collect information on all individuals. The United Nations (UN) recommend a new census at least every 10 years (*United Nations Statistics Division, 2017*).

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the need for a new census goes uncontested. Due to unreliable or incomplete administrative registers, the 1984 population census remains the reference for estimating population numbers in the DRC. Given the country’s turbulent history and many competing priorities – DRC was seen as a ‘post-conflict setting’ around the 2006 elections – this reference point leads to hopelessly imprecise and unreliable knowledge, even on the total population (Thontwa et al., 2017).

The Prime Minister formally authorised a new census in 2009: the *Deuxième Recensement de la Population et de l’Habitat* (RGPH2, Second Population and Housing Census). In this paper, we tell the story of what preceded this decision and, more specifically, what happened and did *not* happen next. While a census usually contains four stages (preliminary, preparatory, enumeration, post-census activities), after 12 years, the DRC has been stuck in the second, preparatory, phase. For example, the 1984 census needed much less time: only four years passed between the ‘authorisation’ and the ‘enumeration’ phase. We set out to understand why the census did not significantly proceed, asking: *How have different stakeholders shaped the census project since 2006?*

We understand the unaccomplished census as a large project carried out by a complex group of national and international public and private decision-makers. Having such a complex mix of actors is certainly not unique for this kind of project nor for development projects in the DRC. While the production of statistics remains under the INS’s authority (Bédécarrats, Cling, and Roubaud, 2016), in contemporary ‘internationalised states’

(Schlichte, 2018) in low-income countries, international organisations frequently commission and fund data collection (Glassman et al., 2014). While this might seem helpful, donors can also press their own goals on the government (Glassman et al., 2014; Krätke and Byiers, 2014). This is especially relevant when considering the low domestic capacities that exist and the government's unmet funding promises. Devarajan (2013) further points to the risk of increased fragmentation and lack of coordination, identifying such fragmentation as a key reason behind what he calls 'Africa's statistical tragedy'.

The DRC's unaccomplished census is an opportunity to check on a project meant to address this statistical tragedy. In this paper we try to understand the project's intricacies in all its (observable) details, taking inspiration from the ethnography of development interventions (Li, 2005, 2007b; Mosse, 2004; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). We learn from Mosse and Lewis's (2006: 13) work on development projects, how they 'become real through the work of generating and translating interests, creating context by tying in supporters and so sustaining interpretations'. Tanya Murray Li too (2007b) argues that all types of public action, lest they would be imposed by force, need to be *socially, technically and politically* situated. First, 'there are processes and interactions, histories, solidarities and attachments, that cannot be reconfigured according to plan' (Li, 2007b). Second, Li points to 'available forms of knowledge and technique' (ibid.). And a third limit is formed by the practice of critique, or 'politics, the possibility to challenge its diagnoses and prescriptions' (ibid.). The possibility of contesting a policy's rationale, in whatever way, obliges policymakers to respond, but political contestation is, in itself, a patterned practice. Taken together, Li proposes to look at the realisation of a particular policy as an assemblage of heterogeneous elements, material and non-material. Li (2007a) uses the concept of assemblage to highlight how reforms, policies and projects are kept together over time and space: 'Assemblage flags agency, the hard work

required to draw heterogeneous elements together, forge connections between them and sustain these connections in the face of tension'.

In other words, according to this literature, a project is always fragile, and it is especially fragile when the number of stakeholders becomes heterogeneous, as with the census. The notion of assemblage incorporates the idea that a project is literally achieved through a multiplicity of choices made by a variety of actors in complex circumstances. This also implies that the project as *it is actually functioning is neither inevitable nor rational* (Harari, 2014: 216). Assemblages harbour tensions and fissure; as such, there will always be a potential for failure. The question is thus not so much why the project has still not been completed after 12 years; but whether alternative ways to deal with these tensions would have led to a different assemblage? What were the missed opportunities?

The research was constrained by difficulties in accessing the Congolese administration and international donors, both people and documents. This working paper is based on qualitative fieldwork one of the authors, Cyril Brandt, carried out, analysing news of the census reported on the internet (Radio Okapi, etc.); 38 semi-structured interviews, including repeated interviews with key stakeholders (Appendix 3); and the collection and close reading of laws, project documents and PowerPoint presentations – often received through personal contacts. We shared a draft of this paper with major stakeholders to give them the opportunity to respond to our findings. In our analysis, we are careful to point out whenever a lack of data does not allow us to arrive at convincing conclusions.

In what follows, we describe the history of the as yet unaccomplished census, structuring our account chronologically, starting with the precedents of the official announcement and ending in 2018. It is clear this history is still in the making, and we would hope this report will be part of it.

2 From the memory of the 1984 census to the authorisation of a new census

2.1 Preparing for a new census

If this paper's focus is on the RGPH2, the most important preceding census is the scientific census of 1984 (PNUD and INS, 1991).¹ A law from 1980² authorised the census and it was carried out by the *Commission Nationale de Recensement*³ (National Census Commission) and the *Institut National de la Statistique* (INS, National Institute of Statistics) which has existed since 1978⁴. More precisely, 28,151 census-takers identified 30.7 million people (Lopez-Escartin, 1992: 6). Topographers and cartographers from the *Institut Géographique du Congo* (IGC, Congolese Geographical Institute) were responsible for the maps in 1984 (Int. 13). While 100% of the household data was analysed, only 10% of the wider survey was analysed at the time (Richard, Kapagama and Marcoux, 2014).⁵

The 1984 census remains the only scientific census in the country's history. According to Waka-Sakrini (2003) and the INS (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009: 9), in view of the elections, the INS repeatedly reflected on a new census (1992, 1994, 1995 and 1998), as did the Interministerial Technical Commission for the Preparation of Elections (1993 and 1999), the National Elections Commission (1996-1997) and the Commission for pre-electoral and electoral organisations (1998). These reflections, however, had no real impact.

In the meantime, a number of national-level surveys took place. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the Ministry of Planning successfully conducted two rounds of a Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) in 1995 and 2001. In 2004-2005, international donors financed the INS to conduct a 1-2-3 Survey on employment, the informal sector and household living conditions. All of these surveys stood on shaky empirical ground, referring to the 1984 census to determine a representative sample. As the country has been through enormous demographic changes (especially since the 1990s), representativity remains a moot point (Marivoet and De Herdt, 2014; Thontwa et al., 2017).

¹ Other authors provide a detailed discussion of past censuses (LeSoftOnline, 2014; Lopez-Escartin, 1992; de Saint Moulin, 1974, 1990, 1991).

² L'Ordonnance-Loi n° 80-013 du 05 septembre 1980 prescrivant un recensement scientifique de la population.

³ The was created by Ordonnance-Loi n° 80-013 from 05 September 1980 and organized the 1984 census.

⁴ Ordonnance n° 78-397 du 3 octobre 1978 portant création de l'Institut National de la Statistique.

⁵ Canadian and Congolese partners recently archived the 1984 census (ODSEF, 2014; Richard, Kapagama, and Marcoux, 2014; UNFPA, 2011).

In 2003, things gradually started to change. Two years into Joseph Kabila's reign, representatives of armed groups and civil parties met in Sun City, South Africa, for the *Dialogue Inter-Congolais*. One resolution demanded that a census be conducted.⁶ The INS subsequently began preliminary preparations (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2005, 2009). The First Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (2006), written in the framework of the debt relief process, also envisaged reinvigorating the statistical system and demanded that a population census be carried out every 10 years, according to UN guidelines (DRC/Government, 2006: 58). The census's major objective was to set-up a master sample frame for analysing data surveys. Accordingly, a decree⁷ from January 2006 created the interministerial *Groupe Technique de Travail* (GTT, Technical Working Group), in charge of a new population census. This step was in line with United Nations Population Fund's (UNFPA) country plan 2002-2007, co-led by the Planning Ministry's *Direction de Population et des Ressources Humaines* (Population and Human Resources Department) and included demographers from the INS, many of whom were involved in the 1984 census (Int. 7). Since the beginning, the IGC and the *Agence de Météorologie et de Télédétection par Satellite* (Mettelsat, Agency for Meteorology and Remote Satellite Sensing) have participated in census preparations.

The process of post-conflict reconstruction and democratisation that started in 2004 did not only bring good news for the census, however. The preparatory census activities halted in 2006, as the November elections were not thought to be a good context to organise a census (Marriage, 2018). A law on voter registration⁸ detached the elections from the census and explicitly went against the declarations made in Sun City. The *Commission Electorale Indépendante* (Independent Electoral Commission) registered voters without an underlying census.⁹

After the successful elections, the census preparations took more shape. INS representatives visited international conferences to present census activities

(Ndiba Kayumba, 2006, 2007, 2008; Ntambwe Wenda, 2006). They presented an agenda for 2006-2011, with the actual census intended to take place in 2009. In January 2007, the GTT organised the so-called *Atelier Kisantu 1*, bringing together key stakeholders to prepare the census (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009). *Atelier Kisantu 2* followed in September 2008 (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009). Trips to advocate for the census in Bas-Congo and Katanga followed in April and September 2009. Reportedly, the GTT finalised a series of preparatory documents (Mukunda, 2013: 22).¹⁰

2.2 Formal authorisation and first Project Document

In 2009, the Minister formally authorised the census. The first *Document de Projet* (Prodoc, Project Document) was published in the same year. In August 2009, Prime Minister Muzito officially authorised¹¹ the census and charged the Minister of Planning at the time (Kamitatu) with its execution. In October 2009, the Minister of Planning announced the census for 2011 (Radio Okapi, 2009). This announcement was linked to the publication of the first Prodoc in December 2009, and adopted by the Ministerial commission in June 2010 (Mbiydenyuy, 2012: 37). The Prodoc also reveals that the full enumeration was planned for June 2011, with 20 June 2011 the reference night (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009). All census operations would end in March 2013 with the dissemination of results.

In the years to come, the census also became one of the standard ingredients of a variety of other strategic documents. First, a decree¹² on the *Système Statistique National* (National Statistics System) spelled out the major elements and actors in the production and use of statistics in the DRC in February 2010. Article 2 in the decree reiterated that the INS is in charge of censuses. Second, the second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP-II) from 2011 announced census cartography activities for 2012 and data collection for 2013 (DRC/MinPlan, 2011: 105). The strategy paper

⁶ Résolution n° DIC/CPR/03 du *Dialogue Inter-Congolais* relative à la problématique de la nationalité au regard de la réconciliation nationale.

⁷ Arrêté N°003/CABMIN/PL/2006 du 21 janvier 2006.

⁸ Loi n°04/028 du 24 décembre 2004 portant identification et enrôlement des électeurs.

⁹ Two sub-commissions were in charge of the identification (Loi n°04/028, Art. 13).

¹⁰ The overarching methodology, field documents for the census mapping, documents for data collection, handbooks for administrative and financial procedures, a budget, a strategy to sensitise and mobilise the population, and other relevant documents. Due to methodological changes that occurred later on, many of these documents would soon be outdated.

¹¹ Décret nr 09/32 du 8 août 2009 prescrivant un recensement général de la population et de l'habitat en RDC.

¹² Décret N°10/05 du 11 Février 2010.

positions the census within statistical, informational and governmental objectives.¹³ Within a wider information system, the census was seen as a key means of providing data for policy evaluations. Finally, the census also occupied a pivotal role in the *Stratégie Nationale du Développement des Statistiques* (SNDS, National Statistical Development Strategy), already envisaged by the GPRSP-II (DRC/MinPlan, 2011). Result 3.2.1 of the SNDS is the realisation of the census (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2012: 52). The census accounts for 21% of the entire SNDS and is seen as ‘the finality of the strategy’ (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2012).

The Prodoc also made clear that the census implied a substantial investment of human and financial resources. According to population estimates at the time, 70,000 census takers would be required, including many teachers (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009). The estimated budget was slightly above \$170 million. Two Congolese ministers pledged the government’s contribution of \$20 million at an executive board meeting of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNFPA in New York (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009). The full enumeration (*dénombrement exhaustif*) made up more than one third (38.25%) of the entire budget. The second highest expenditure was the cartography with 17.33% (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009).



Picture 1. Logo of current population census

¹³ An integrated information system ‘will be developed through: (i) the conduct of a population census and wide household surveys, (ii) development of statistical tools for steering the economy (national accounts, Outlooks of the economic situation, etc.), (iii) reactivation of administrative statistics in several key sectors, and finally (iii) the establishment of the IMIS Base (Integrated Information Management System) that will consolidate the results of all major surveys conducted and facilitate access to data (web interface)’ (DRC/MinPlan, 2013b: 60).

3 Rising to the concrete (2011-2012)

3.1 Involvement of national and international partners

The census project's initial documents also identify the major players involved in setting out the first steps towards the project's execution. These were both national and international players, and they were unequal in strength.

At the national level, the INS was singled out as a major player, but it was also in great need of restructuring¹⁴. To a former senior INS employee, the INS was a 'poor child, very disorganised, unpaid staff, it hasn't worked since the looting in the 1990s, received no funding from donors, overaged staff' (Int. 9). Another employee told me 'there was nothing. I even had to buy my chair for \$10' (Int. 10). Similar stories would probably be shared by officials from other government bodies. After years of looting, war, hyperinflation and no investments, all public bodies were haunted by unpaid, underqualified and overaged personnel (World Bank, 2014b). In the absence of sufficient government funding, the mentioned data surveys have been important sources of revenue for the INS as they secured per diems, international travels, training and acquisition of basic equipment. Thontwa et al. (2017) state that the INS's executed annual budget in 2014 was \$1.9 million whereas costs for one survey range between \$2-\$6 million. However, support attached to surveys does not target the INS holistically, it only ensures successful surveys.

As testified by a mention of the census in the GPRSP-II in 2011, international actors have been involved in the census project from the very beginning as it was part of the debt relief process. At the international level, donors are also interested in it as part of a wider agenda of strengthening the capacity for evidence-based governance. This interest is further shaped by a number of global initiatives around statistical capacity building and data for development, such as the Marrakech Action Plan for Statistics from 2004, the Statistics for Transparency, Accountability, and Results: A Busan Action Plan for Statistics from November 2011, or the Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21).

¹⁴ The Décret nr 09/45 du 3 Décembre 2009 fixant les statuts d'un établissement public dénommé Institut National de la Statistique en abrégé « INS » can be understood as an administrative answer to the problems suffered by INS.

In 2009, the first international organisations began to support the census. UNDP and UNFPA funded a consultant for five months between July and December 2009 (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009; UNDP, n.d.). UNDP's project *Appui au système statistique national* (Support to the National Statistical System) ran between 2008-2012 with a budget of slightly over \$1.4 million (UNDP, n.d.).¹⁵ While documentation on UNDP is scarce – we only found one document and many more attempts to obtain information from UNDP failed – an evaluation of UNDP's activities in the DRC reports that UNDP made \$250,000 available in 2008 (Kalambayi, 2012). A tangible result of this support was a cartography test in Kinshasa and Kasangulu in 2009 (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009).

Advocates of the census requested support from other donors¹⁶ and embassies¹⁷ (Kalambayi, 2012) without much success. While UNDP stopped supporting the census, UNFPA continued to provide assistance. At the time, UNFPA also supported activities around the census at the University of Kinshasa's Demography and Development Department and the Planning Ministry's Population and Human Resources Department (Kalambayi, 2012). UNFPA made further investments in human resources and equipment. It funded long-term statistical training for nine INS employees working on the census and the second Demography and Health Study (DHS), instead of the 70 that were targeted. It also funded short-term training for 20 employees, and trips to international events for seven employees (Kalambayi, 2012). The first notable infrastructural investment by UNFPA was \$56,000 for rehabilitating a building for the envisaged *Bureau Central du Recensement* (BCR, Central Census Office) within the INS compound in Kinshasa-Limete in October 2009 (Radio Okapi, 2009). UNFPA equipped the offices with IT material and funded two cars. Furthermore, UNFPA co-funded the rehabilitation of provincial statistical offices in the former provinces of Bas-Congo, Katanga and Province Orientale, aided by the *Banque Africaine du Développement* (BAD, African Development Bank) that funded IT and telecommunication equipment (UNFPA, 2011). These INS offices were designed to also function as provincial census bureaus.

Clearly, donors underlined their interest in the census through investments. Overall, however, an evaluation

of UNFPA's work in the DRC between 2008-2012 concluded that the relationship between UNFPA (the main donor at the time) and the Congolese government was unsatisfactory: 'the lack of dialogue and harmonisation about certain points between UNFPA and INS regarding the prioritisation did not facilitate a proper design of the strategies' (Kalambayi, 2012).

Despite, or because of, slow progress, a new actor entered the census assemblage around 2010. Late that year, the World Bank began preparing a project: the *Projet Catalytique pour le Renforcement de l'Institut National de la Statistique* (PRINS, Catalytic Project to Strengthen the National Statistical Institute; World Bank, 2011, 2014b). The World Bank's documents reveal that they anticipated a request for support for the population census in 2010 via the multi-donor *Statistics For Results Facility* (SRF). The SRF was managed by the World Bank and funded by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The SRF Council approved a grant of \$11.8 million in November 2010. This approval is probably linked to a meeting of the Statistics Group in the DRC in November 2010 (Mbiydzanyuy, 2012). The PRINS envisaged support of 'the census mapping phase, planned for 2013' (World Bank, 2011b). Hence, after the Minister's announcement in 2009, the census operations were rescheduled from 2011 to 2013. The World Bank made its support conditional on complementary government funding and announced reallocation of financial resources if the government failed to provide the required funding. Reports at the time expected project appraisal and approval to take place in 2011 (World Bank, 2011b, 2011a). While it would take another four years until the project became effective in January 2015, the World Bank and other partners already started to shape the census project in 2011-12. They prepared the ground for their project and tried to ensure they would be supporting a census that was organised according to their vision.

3.2 Tensions around the digital character of the census

The tensions between national and international actors became most visible around the issue of digitalising the census methodology. The INS Technical Working Group preparing the census had envisioned printed maps and a paper-based census, mirroring the experiences

¹⁵ The only available document to us mentions the support of census operations as one activity among others (UNDP, n.d.).

¹⁶ UNDP, United Nations Office for Project Services, World Bank, DFID, European Union, USAID, Belgian cooperation, Japanese cooperation, German technical cooperation.

¹⁷ Germany, South Africa, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, South Korea, Egypt, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, India, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey.

of the core team that was involved in the 1984 census (Int. 11). The census Prodoc from 2009, however, remained indecisive about digital methods. Though the census was conceived as a paper-based census (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009), the document stated that at least 400 computers and 1200 people would be needed for data-entry, as well as a few hundred supervisors and controllers to oversee the work. It stated the desire for the main census institutions to ‘familiarize themselves with new mapping technologies’, such as satellite images in urban areas and GPS in rural areas (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009). Furthermore, it stated that ‘it would be desirable to take into account the use of PDA [Personal Digital Assistant] with GPS in order to avoid the manual filling of several technical documents. Controllers could also make use of this instrument during the actual enumeration’ (ibid.). This Prodoc and its ambiguous assessment of digitalisation occurred at the same time as the mission of an external consultant (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2009; UNDP, n.d.).¹⁸

Donors at the time, however, followed global norms and quite vigorously pursued a digital census (Dekker, 2001; United Nations, 2009). This became very clear when the World Bank, UNFPA, the Department for International Development (DFID), AfDB and Afristat undertook a joint mission in the DRC in June 2011 (Afristat, 2012; Mbiydenyuy, 2012). Participants discussed digital solutions for all stages of the census, including using digital maps, GPS, computer-assisted analyses and satellite images (Afristat, 2012; Munsala Buakasa, 2011). They particularly focused on the upcoming cartography phase, essential for a reliable census. The census cartography ‘will serve to partition the country into distinct, non-overlapping units that fully cover the territory. These units are the census enumeration areas – the work areas for individual enumerators – that will be part of the base for future survey sampling (primary sampling units)’ (World Bank, 2014b).

From the World Bank’s perspective, the shift to digitalisation contains only advantages:

The proposed approach modernizes DRC’s cartography and data collection methods by promoting the use of digital data collection in the field with geo-referencing instead of paper-based questionnaire and manual data entry. Moving to digital data collection represents the potential to

collect information locally but to share it nationally at lower cost and with greater quality than other methods, especially given DRC’s difficult context (World Bank 2014b).

Likely due to the joint mission of several donors in June 2011, the BCR received a consultant in cartography in 2011, funded by UNFPA; the second consultant since UNDP and UNFPA funded one in 2009 (DRC/MinPlan, 2013c: 5; Mbiydenyuy, 2012; UNFPA, 2011). This consultant was hired to support the digitalisation and to facilitate the DRC benefits from other countries’ experiences (UNFPA, 2011), such as Brazil, as we will discuss. A report from a mission by the African Centre for Statistics – belonging to the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa – to the DRC in March 2012 highlights the breadth of material needed for the shift to digital mapping.

Next to digitalising the cartography phase, a paper-based census and subsequent scanning was seen as a thing of the past. A UNFPA employee chose the following words: scanning ‘is like a factory, the noise, and the machines’ and scanners are not always reliable; ‘we know that we will leave scanning’. He strongly advocated technical solutions, like the World Bank staff. At the time, Brazil was the most advanced country in digital censuses. It was the first to carry out a digital census in 2010, using PDAs. Subsequently, the Brazilian Geographical Institute received requests from several African countries for census support, but was unable to respond to all of them. Cabo Verde received support for their 2010 census, and São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal carried out digital censuses in 2012 and 2013 respectively, with the help of Brazil and Cabo Verde. Senegal and Cabo Verde then supported Ivory Coast for its digital census in 2014. Positive experiences in other African countries where technology transfer was successful, nourished a modernist, optimistic approach. However, things moved less smoothly in the DRC. In 2012 and 2013, government documents mention potential support from Brazil (for example DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2013b). The World Bank also alluded to Brazil when it discussed the shift from a paper-based census to a tablet-based census in the DRC:

South-South knowledge exchange with the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, who have indicated an interest in providing broad technical assistance. With support from partners, the

¹⁸ The consultant was involved in writing the Project Document, which might explain this ambiguity (Int. 7).

Government of DRC intends to move to digital data collection (away from the current paper-based, hand-entered approach) to improve quality and timeliness of data (World Bank, 2012b).

A government employee involved at the time remembers the attempt to involve Brazil:

The Brazilians finished their digital census with tablets around 2012, we sent a team funded by UNFPA ... there was an event for an international audience to communicate the results, it was in English/Portuguese, how does this help? UNFPA attempted to establish a contact with the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography, to see how they could support us, we went to the Brazilian embassy in Kinshasa (Int. 19) (DRC/MinPlan/BCR 2013b).

Apart from this visit, the DRC did not directly benefit from Brazil's experience. A member of the delegation of the European Commission in the DRC had the impression that the Congolese government did not pursue the contacts with the Brazilian embassy (Int. 26). Another explanation is that the Brazilians were reluctant to engage in the census given the DRC's political and infrastructural challenges (ibid.). Whatever the reasons, neither Brazil – nor any of the countries that had obtained support from Brazil – got involved in the Congolese census. Given the limited development funds and presence of these countries in the DRC, their absence is not that surprising. There is, however, another important lesson for partnerships: Brazil's involvement and support was presented as 'very likely' by the World Bank and government documents. The global momentum around digitalised censuses, and Brazil's leadership in that area, can be seen as a justification for digitalising the DRC census.

However, while the shift to digitalisation is understandable from a technical perspective, statements such as 'With support from partners, the Government of DRC intends to move to digital data collection' (World Bank, 2012b) need to be taken with a pinch of salt. While international actors such as UNFPA and the World Bank pushed for digitalisation, Congolese staff were hardly prepared for this tectonic shift. Technical staff from donor organisations consider that technology is

unavoidable: 'It's normal, human beings don't want to change, but it's so easy' (Int. 25). While new technologies have merits (World Bank, 2016a), it is important to consider how a technologically ambitious project could be viably implemented in a country devastated by economic depression, armed conflicts and lootings, poor cross-country physical infrastructure, and low levels of electricity coverage, with an administration that is underpaid, under-resourced, under-skilled and systemically corrupt. Who were the people supposed to implement a digital census in the DRC, and under what conditions did they work?

During many of the activities mentioned, the temporary GTT was in place, but a definite institution in charge of the census did not exist. Someone involved at the time reported that the GTT 'was only a small structure' (Int. 19). The GTT had regrouped around 11 people. Among them were five cartographers from the INS who had been enumerators and supervisors in the 1984 census, but did not have knowledge on census preparations (Int. 7). Eventually, there were 'issues of corruption and embezzlement' within the GTT (Int. 19). This impression was echoed by another former employee who stated that 'the GTT prepared the methodology, the team from 1984. As there were problems with poor management, the Minister preferred to set up the BCR and to sideline that team' (Int. 7). Indeed, a decree¹⁹ from August 2011 clarified the census modalities by setting up five institutions,²⁰ most importantly for this study, the BCR and the *Commission Internationale de Suivi des Opérations* (CISO, International Monitoring Commission). The CISO should have served as a platform for government-donor and donor-donor exchange but has never become effective. The BCR was placed under INS supervision, thus under the authority of the Ministry of Planning. A demography professor became head of the BCR. The core team consisted of a small group of people:

The BCR began with nothing, we needed terms of reference to hire people, a building, salary scales. We began but we didn't know who would be paid through which scale. Well you were told that the government chose you, so that's where you work. (Int. 7)

Documents prepared by the GTT had disappeared (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2013b). Another member of

¹⁹ Decree nr 11/36 from 31st August 2011 portant organisation et fonctionnement du RGPH2.

²⁰ (1) La Commission Nationale du Recensement (National Census Commission), (2) La Commission Technique du Recensement (CTR) (Technical Census Commission), (3) Le Bureau Central du Recensement (BCR, Central Census Office), (4) La Commission Internationale de Suivi des Opérations (CISO, International Monitoring Commission), (5) Les Bureaux de Représentants au niveau de Entités Territoriales Décentralisées (Provincial Census Offices).

the core team remembers: 'We started to look for resources ... The government began to pay the operational costs for the BCR, we began at the INS in 2012, and then started to rent another building'. It took a couple of months before they were able to hire new staff (Int. 19). In March 2012, a decree²¹ clarified the BCR structure and legitimised the following recruitment process. While financial GTT administrators were not recruited, at a round of recruitment in July 2012, 'the entire cartography team was kept, some of whom are ready to take their retirement' (Int. 7). This decision was made by the head of the INS at the time (Int. 7). In fact, these people were the only cartographers in the INS. Hence, the original cartography team from 2011-2012 was made up of people who participated in the 1984 census. They had worked as enumerators and supervisors with printed maps and were not particularly familiar with new technologies. As one former INS employee argues:

Staff in the BCR office do not have concrete ideas, they adapt their ideas when you tell them to. Even the head of INS at the time told the Minister: these people are not capable, in 1984 they were only supervisors, not involved in the design, they followed a given model, you go to the field and you do this and that, but they did not prepare the cartography back then. (Int. 7)

Yet, these were the national mapping experts. How did they react to the digitalisation of the census? These Congolese professionals give some indication:

Finally, this option [digitalisation] was chosen. It was so ambitious that support was needed. Internally, the staff was afraid of losing everything. They did not want to do something they had never done before... To obtain the digitalised map, you had to push these old men who hardly know how to use a computer. This needs to be said. Everyone who speaks about technology, these men, they do not even know how to install an antivirus. They don't know how to use Word. Speaking about your IT-knowledge becomes a semi-taboo, they wanted to use maps, on paper, and this has remained until today. (Int. 7)

Some employees saw technology as a threat to their habits and skills:

There's a certain methodological approach that some people want to impose, and the others want to take a different road, that's a fight, new school against old school ... In the beginning, people were afraid of the new application, it's atypical, it's your first time to hold a table t... Staff in the BCR office do not have concrete ideas, they adapt their ideas when you tell them to. (Int. 7)

There was a gap between the donors' vision and local realities. Ideas around partnership and ownership translated, in practice, to an unequal dispersal of power. The fact that donors pushed for this change does not mean that no Congolese desired digitalised maps and data collection (Int. 13), but overall, the Congolese did not appear to have much influence in the decision-making.

²¹ Arrêté Ministériel 008/12 du 05 mars 2012.

4 The ‘Matata momentum’ (2012-2014)

In the meantime, *Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante* (CENI, Independent National Electoral Commission) organised contested presidential elections in 2011, without a prior census. A new government was formed in May 2012, bringing in a prime minister known to have a thirst for data. Augustin Matata Ponyo brought a certain dynamism to policy-making in general, and data collection in particular. According to someone from INS, there was ‘Matata momentum’ (Int. 9). Two exemplary policies that he initiated or helped to shape were modernising civil servants’ payments (*bancarisation*) and setting up the *Cellule d’Analyses des Indicateurs du Développement* (CAID, Unit for the Analysis of Development Indicators). Furthermore, the INS conducted three large data surveys between 2012-14: an Out-of-School Children survey, a 1-2-3 Survey, and a DHS. These surveys included between 72,000 – 111,000 people.

In the first month of his mandate, Matata’s attention was drawn to the census. Member of Parliament and the President’s sister, Jaynet Kabila, asked the Prime Minister to organise a census (Radio Okapi, 2012). An interview claimed that the close collaboration between BCR and the Prime Minister’s office was particularly strong during the first Matata government from 2012-2014 (Int. 9). Adding to the dynamic environment, the envisaged National Statistical Development Strategy was finalised in September 2012. Also in September, the World Bank and IMF published an advisory note on the second GPRSP. As previously noted, the census was important for the entire strategy as it delivers necessary data for its evaluation. The note simply states that the ‘cartographic works and pilot census are expected in 2012 and data collection in 2013’ (World Bank 2012a: 121). These words are copied and pasted from the original GPRSP (DRC/MinPlan, 2011), at a time when the census had not significantly evolved.

4.1 The Central Census Office and a new Project Document

With Matata’s attention and evolving donor interest, how did the BCR perform? We already discussed that it struggled to hire people with adequate knowledge of census preparations. As indicated above, this mismatch between capacities and international expectations created problems for several years. The mismatch was reinforced by the fact that none of the people in charge had actively participated in managing the 1984 census. As one of them explains:

Most of us were young without any experience in a census, we hadn't participated in 1984 ... There were multiple problems, not only financial, also technical. First, concerning the people, most of us had never managed a census, nor any large-scale project, even the coordinator of the BCR. Participants of the GTT had lost their reputation due to the financial issues at the GTT, they were side-lined. We began with a handicap, even if we are statisticians and demographers, and we know what a census is, but management is another issue altogether. (Int. 19)

Practical problems followed soon:

There was also a problem of vision. With all due respect, the coordinator was not a manager. I asked him 'How do you want to hire all the people at the same moment, we first need an accountant' he didn't understand and replied, 'we hire now'. So, by December 2012 we had only hired the heads of key departments, and we already managed a budget. In October 2013, we ended the second recruitment phase, people working on operational issues ... it took us two years to recruit. (Int.7)

In March 2013, for example, the BCR published 21 job offers. While there were practical issues around the recruitment and financial processes, the BCR was a very attractive employer. It was conceived as a three-year project, and its staff received significantly more money than at the INS. It did so in the form of primes, with an average of \$1,200 per month (Int. 15). At the same time, the INS made sure to receive its share as well. It received a monthly census bonus (*prime censitaire*) from BCR's budget. While some funding was available for wages and operational costs, one former employee believes that 'BCR was built on promises' that hardly materialised (Int. 7). For example, salaries and operational costs in 2012 were only paid from November on (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2013b).

Under these circumstances, the team tried to provide a new Prodoc conforming to a digital census. In October 2012, a workshop took place in Mitendi where the BCR and its domestic and external partners continued to prepare the methodology (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2013b). Subsequently, the BCR began to publish technical documents: the general methodology for the census cartography, the methodology for data analysis, and the

methodology for the post-cartography phases. A BCR report argues that the new Prodoc should have been finished by then (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2013b). It blames an international consultant, funded by UNFPA, who was in charge of the document. In January 2013, a meeting with government actors and donors took place at the *Hotel Fleuve Congo*,²² most likely to disseminate a first version of the Prodoc from December 2012. An updated version of the Prodoc – maybe due to comments at the meeting in January – was finally published in April 2013. The Prodoc from April 2013 included the shift towards a digital census, complying with the UN's recommendations.

Using an estimated population of 75 million, the Prodoc derives a number of 75,000 census-takers, 18,750 controllers, 3,000 supervisors, and a reserve of 6,000, adding up to more than 100,000 required fieldworkers (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2012: 30). The census thus requires a number of (especially temporary) workers comparable to CENI's work (The Carter Center, 2011: 54; also Int. 4). All census-takers and controllers would be equipped with tablets or PDAs, meaning 93,750 tablets would be needed (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2012). The following table compares the 2009 and 2013 budgets, revealing significant changes in the budget allocations per activity as shown in Table 1.

Most strikingly, despite the shift to a digital census, the Prodoc envisages a budget of \$140,487,214, which is almost \$30 million less than the budget anticipated in 2009. The pivotal aspect 'Cartography' was reduced from almost \$30 million to slightly less than \$18 million. We will later see that subsequent World Bank documents again use \$30 million for their calculations.

In April 2013, the month the Prodoc was published, Vunabandi, Minister of Planning, had to answer a question from Senator Raymond Ramazani about the census (Mbuyi, 2013: 20). Vunabandi stated that the cartography would be finished in June 2013, thus allowing for the pilot census to start before the end of 2013. 2014 was announced as the census year. Also in April, Vunabandi and the key donors met in the Grand Hotel to discuss funding for implementing the National Statistical Development Strategy and the census. Following the meeting, Vunabandi announced that the cost of the Priority Action Plan of the Strategy was estimated at \$733.33 million, of which the census makes up about 19%. He further claimed the government would invest \$32.6 million in the census in 2013 (Mbuyi, 2013).

²² Letter by the Ministry of Planning from 19 January 2013 (N° 0115/CAB/MIN/PL.SMRM/INS/BCR/RS/, 2013).

Table 1: Census budget (2009 vs. 2013)

Activity	Budget 2009		Budget 2013 (USD)		Difference
	(USD)	(%)	(USD)	(%)	
Full enumeration	64,810,222	38%	93,010,781	66%	+28,200,559
Cartography	29,363,690	17%	18,065,399	13%	-11,298,291
Analysis	21,298,418	13%	4,053,534	3%	-17,244,884
BCR operational costs	21,095,092	12%	14,326,698	10%	-6,768,394
Sensibilisation	14,673,373	9%	6,749,035	5%	-7,924,338
Transport of material to provinces	12,047,077	7%	n.a.		n.a.
Post-census survey	3,236,275	2%	4,091,861	3%	+855,586
Reconstruction of offices	2,101,037	1%	n.a.		n.a.
Pilot census	796,361	0%	189,907	0%	-606,454
Total	169,421,545*		140,487,214		-28,934,331

* Prodoc 2009 speaks of 169,438,490, which does not follow from the numbers above.

Together with the Prodoc, the BCR published and shared a *Note de Plaidoyer* in April 2013 (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2013a; first published in January, then updated). The 16-page document provides accessible answers to the most common questions about the census. Already by 2012, the communication team had begun to advocate for the census at the parliamentary commission in charge of the budget and, for example, via television and radio announcements (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2013b). Advocacy also included public sessions to explain the census; for example, at the University of Kinshasa in July 2013 (Mbuyi, 2013). The government's *Programme d'Actions Prioritaires 2012-16* (Priority Action Programme) from May 2013 also included the census (DRC/MinPlan, 2013a: 165ff). In summary, the government took important steps towards realising the census, and donors followed suit.

4.2 New support by UNFPA and the African Development Bank

The BCR's advocacy campaign targeted all major donors in the DRC. For example, the Delegation of the European Commission took part in various meetings in 2012 and 2013 (Int. 26). However, although the European Delegation seemed interested in supporting census activities, its funding structure made such support impossible until late 2015 (internal communication). In June 2013, the BCR published a *Rapport d'activités 2012-2013 et feuille*

de route 2013 and the *Synthèse de la méthodologie cartographique*. The documents claim that Brazil included support to the census in their activities in the DRC. While Brazil's support did not manifest, UNFPA's DRC Action Plan for the years 2013-2017, published in March 2013, foresaw technical support for the census through capacity building of the BCR and the organisation of the sensitisation campaign. The document promised \$10 million over five years (UNFPA, 2013: 24). Other sources spoke about \$14 million (AfDB, 2014a). According to the BCR, UNFPA planned to make \$4.5 million available in February 2013 (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2013b). UNFPA's promises have remained subject to complaints: 'We haven't seen any of it, except for a few consultants' (Int. 19). As mentioned above, UNFPA 'channelled their resources to [support] the provincial census offices' (Int. 12).

Two decrees from September²³ and October²⁴ 2013 authorised provincial census offices. The AfDB indirectly supported this phase via its *Projet d'Appui Institutionnel en Statistique et aux Finances Publiques* (PAI-STATFIN, Statistics and Public Finance Institutional Support Project)²⁵. The project was intended to run between 2013-2016 and 'provides for the rehabilitation, equipment and interconnection of provincial statistical production centres'. These centres should also be used as Provincial Census Bureaus, as every provincial INS director would also function as BCR provincial coordinator, accompanied by a team of three (to be recruited) (Int. 11).²⁶

²³ Arrêté ministériel n°030/CAB/MIN/PL.SMRM/2013 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Bureau Provincial du Recensement.

²⁴ Arrêté interministériel nr 175 du 03 octobre 2013 fixant les modalités de fonctionnement des bureaux de représentation du RGPH2 en provinces.

²⁵ Statistics and Public Finance Institutional Support Project (see AfDB (2013b)).

²⁶ On a side note, as BAD's support began before découpage, it supported only the eleven old offices.

4.3 Disputes around the extent of the cartography

Clearly, there was momentum: the Prodoc and technical documents were published, sensibilisation had begun, and some donors were attracted by the census. The next critical step was the census cartography. Cartography that includes enumeration areas is a precondition for a successful and reliable census. Enumeration areas show the space where one census-taker enumerates 600 people in rural areas, and up to 1,000 people in urban areas. According to the Project Document, the cartography was supposed to start between April-June 2013. Minister of Planning Vunabandi repeated this plan during the Parliament session in April 2013 (Mbuyi, 2013). The initial BCR team planned three-six months for a sample-based cartography and UNFPA planned to provide support (Int. 7). The World Bank, however, envisioned a comprehensive cartography with a quasi-enumeration, as existing population data was seriously unreliable:

The cartography results are used as infrastructure for other statistical purposes. A key output of the cartography phase, as designed in the DRC, will be a master sampling frame for future surveys (Figure 1B). Indeed, while in many population censuses the household survey sample frame is only available after the completion of the enumeration phase, the methodology developed in the DRC for the cartography phase includes not only the collection of geographical coordinates of all settlements and social infrastructure, but also the counting and the size of all households living in the identified dwellings. This will guarantee the availability of a reliable sample frame for household surveys upon completion of this phase. (World Bank, 2015b)

To achieve the quasi-enumeration, household heads would be asked to provide information about the number of people living with them. The report suggests a clear course of action and does not address who took decisions about these activities. However, according to a former BCR employee, the World Bank was not willing to fund a sample-based cartography, it was a 'take it or leave it' (Int. 7) situation. He adds:

The World Bank desired a comprehensive cartography in the entire country, which they also wanted to use for enumeration, which would produce a good estimation of the population number. UNFPA argued that this would require too many resources.

The World Bank wasn't happy about the international consultants hired by UNFPA ... Given the different opinions, INS and BCR were not able to launch the cartography. (Int. 7)

An internal document of the European Commission from August 2013 underlines this impression:

Cartography should have started in June but is being delayed due to a disagreement between the World Bank and the government about the methodology ... The costs of the cartography (\$18 million) can be ensured, but not those of the enumeration (about \$90 million) ... The World Bank wants to ensure that the cartography is meaningful. In order to prevent a lack of funding for the enumeration, the Bank suggests a sort of mini-enumeration during the cartography.

The World Bank used the quasi-enumeration not only as a methodological solution, but also as a safeguard for its own investment, in case the full enumeration did not take place.

4.4 Uncoordinated government investments

Until now, governments and donors had only invested small sums in the census: wages and operational costs of the BCR by the government, equipment and consultants by UNFPA and World Bank, and provincial support by the BAD. The government took the next leap by investing in material infrastructure. Naturally, a census that covers the entire territory requires mobility: bikes, motorbikes and cars. Reportedly, in its preparatory phase, the World Bank's PRINS promised to buy vehicles; there were already tenders (Int. 7). Yet, as the World Bank's board had still not approved the PRINS project due to the methodology conflict, no money was available. The Congolese government was initially supposed to cover 100% of personnel costs. However, in 2012, the government made \$5.4 million available, which lay untouched in bank accounts. Not wanting to wait any longer, the government, led by Prime Minister Matata Ponyo, provided 81 all-terrain vehicles and 20 pick-up trucks to the BCR in September 2013 (Int. 19). A former BCR employee recounts what happened:

The Minister decided to go ahead and buy cars as they were the only symbol that could convince the population that things advance, he did not want to wait, cars are bought, and the World Bank realizes that the cellule de passation de marchés du Ministère used an 'urgency acquisition', which means that all

cars were there after 2-3 months, whereas the Bank would have used an international call, given the high amount, which would be cheaper ... they progressed and the Bank did not accept the urgency acquisition, so it was not able to reimburse, the amounts were too high compared to the Project Appraisal Document ... so the Bank decided to pay field staff, but on the condition that the government pays the first tranche, and the Bank the rest ... I think it was due to this rush and the bad preparation. (Int. 7)

Given the data available to us, it is difficult to understand in more detail why the Matata government was in a hurry to fund these vehicles. The World Bank subsequently adapted its funding. The PRINS budget from February 2014 included \$4.5 million for 'Field staff (cartography)' as part of the component 'Production and distribution of statistics' with a budget of \$7.3 million. The \$4.5 million represents 30% of the total PRINS budget. These numbers demonstrate that the World Bank adapted quickly from funding vehicles to funding personnel costs to achieve the cartography. Also, in September, the Minister of Planning, Vunabandi, adapted his earlier statements and announced that the pilot census would take place between November 2013-October 2014, and the actual census would take place in early 2015 (Radio Okapi, 2013b).

Meanwhile, 'some seven hundred delegates participated in a national "consultation" (concertation in French) to promote national cohesion, peace, and development' (Englebert, 2016: 5) from September-October 2013. While the consultation's major outcome was the formation of a new government one year later, the final report of the *Concertations Nationales* from October 2013 also explicitly demanded that the census be carried out (Le Présidium des Concertations Nationales, 2013: 21f). Likely as a direct result of this, in a 'lettre de mission' from October 2013, Prime Minister Matata Ponyo asked the Minister of Planning to launch the scientific census. Furthermore, the *Concertations Nationales* demanded the instauration of a government of national cohesion. The future of Matata's government was unclear, which might have motivated him to ask his Ministers to 'expediate ongoing affairs until the formation of the new government' (Radio Okapi, 2013a).

Until now, the government had invested while, for various reasons, donors continued at a slow pace. Former

employees perceived that 'The government invests \$5 million, the World Bank, BAD, UNFPA, nobody is ready' (Int. 7). The 'Matata momentum', however, was short-lived. In the coming years, the lack of government funding despite formal contracts would turn out to be a major impediment of the census. Yet the point remains that all involved parties failed to align their activities and jointly fund the right activities at the right moment. Donors were unable to capitalise on the short period of increased political will. Beyond the normative tone surrounding 'partnership', organisational agendas and poor coordination impeded progress.

4.5 A private consortium

The inclusion of a private actor added more difficulties. By October 2013, acquisitions had been made and the *Concertations Nationales* demanded action. In this dynamic environment, the World Bank 'recommended the Minister of Planning select a firm' (Int. 11), probably due to the INS's low capacities at the time (Int. 19). The Congolese government asked the BCR to 'urgently select a company' to act as consultant for the cartography (DRC/MinPlan/Cellule de Gestion des Projets et des Marchés Publiques, 2013; author translation). While there were supposedly 'many firms [Huaima, (South Africa), Smartmatic (France), SINFIC/Quatenus Congo/Novageo], at least seven that offered revolutionary solutions using new technologies' (Int. 7), ultimately 'there were not many responses' (Int. 19).

In November 2013, the Minister of Planning invited three firms that had responded to the Terms of Reference. One firm renounced and one did not achieve a sufficient score. Hence, the choice automatically fell on the only remaining company: the Portuguese²⁷ consortium SINFIC/Quatenus Congo/Novageo, henceforth referred to as SINFIC. An UNFPA employee and a former BCR employee stress that donors were involved in the selection process (Int. 7 and 11), but we found no further confirmation of this. Negotiations between SINFIC and the government took place around the quality of maps and the division of the country in enumeration areas (DRC/MinPlan/Cellule de Gestion des Projets et des Marchés Publiques, 2013). SINFIC had to guarantee to organise the pilot census five months after the beginning of the cartographic work. The agreed sum of the contract was less than \$11 million instead of the initially budgeted \$17 million.

²⁷ It is only a coincidence that the digital census pioneers were Lusophone countries (Brazil and Cabo Verde). The Portuguese consortium was not involved in their censuses (Int. 25b).

In January 2014, the Minister of Planning and the Portuguese consortium signed a contract (DRC/MinPlan, 2014). Once the consultancy work would effectively begin ('day zero'), the contract would last 14 months. According to the contract, SINFIC's main tasks were: setting up a cartographic database and a geographic information system, and organising the pilot census (DRC/MinPlan, 2014). According to an internal PowerPoint presentation, the consortium provides IT-equipment, consultants, and training. The contract names three 'comparative advantages' of the situation at the time. First, there is no 'historical antecedent that could cause cultural inertia around the methodology, which suggests that new concepts will be well accepted'; second, 'BCR staff has a solid cartographic culture, from a time when technological resources were scarce, as well as young technicians with a desire to understand and use new technologies, which ensures an equilibrium between innovation and process security', and third, 'almost the entire cartographic work needs to start from zero, which is an immense advantage'. Later developments reveal that these were barriers rather than advantages.

The biggest questions concerned the availability of maps and satellite images. The contract states that the BCR does not have a systematic and complete set of satellite images. As mentioned above, the contract argues that mapping needs to start almost at zero. To constitute such an overview, the contract proposes web solutions (e.g. Google Earth and OpenStreetMap) as well as non-web solutions. High-resolution satellite images are proposed for urban and semi-urban (*villes et cités*) areas to locate buildings. The contract gives two reasons why this cannot be used for the entire country: first, high costs; second, there are 'unknown areas' for which satellite images cannot deliver the necessary information. The contract document uses an image of a rainforest to illustrate the problem. One can only see a river and trees from above but no villages, let alone individual buildings. Low-resolution images that shall be complemented by fieldwork are proposed as an alternative to costly high-resolution images. Drones are also mentioned as a possible solution for specific cases.

The document prescribes three steps for the mapping exercise. First, the basic maps that contain information about accessibility (e.g. roads.), natural boundaries (e.g. rivers), and relevant infrastructural endowments (e.g. hospitals). In some cases, these maps cannot be prepared solely in the lab but must be complemented by fieldwork. Second, the administrative map should contain the geographical limits up to the level of sectors and

chiefdoms. The enumeration areas will be subdivisions of the sectors and chieftaincies. The third and final step is the census map that includes the actual enumeration areas. Enumeration areas must meet two criteria: ensure efficiency by allowing the census teams to meet 600 (rural) or 1,000 (urban) people and allow the teams to clearly and unambiguously identify the limits of their enumeration areas. Once all enumeration areas are prepared, the BCR can select areas for the pilot census, still accompanied by SINFIC. These activities already require a massive amount of technological equipment, including 1,700 tablets, 1,680 GPS, 35 computers, 80 laptops and six servers. The complete enumeration would require much more equipment, given the INS's population estimates of 83,197,000 for 2014 (DRC/MinPlan/INS, 2015).

While SINFIC presented technical solutions, people involved at the time shared their concerns with us. In fact, there were two moments in our interviews when people asked to stop recording. Each time it was about SINFIC, first about political reasons behind its selection and second about their low performance. Someone else said that it was a 'loss of time, not the best choice, I had the impression that the team we received did not correspond to our needs'. (Int. 10). The most critical person said:

Finally, SINFIC was judged 'acceptable' compared to the others, the lesser evil, SINFIC was hired to support the cartography but didn't have much experience in that domain. That's where the problems began ... Right away when the firm arrived there were confrontations, I am being honest ... Bricolé, taking consultants in Portugal, here and there, there was a main consultant ... hardly spoke French, he came, he was old, with a certain conservative mind, he says he wants something in a given way and that's it, we are young we say something else, many conflicts, it got very complicated. (Int. 19)

A former BCR employee said that he was against the firm: 'They had never worked on censuses ... The Minister of Planning proposed that firm. I talked to friends from Angola who told me that the firm does not work on such issues' (Int. 9). A UNFPA employee underlined this impression (Int. 25).

To add nuance, another former BCR employee stated: 'Well, the main consultant didn't speak proper French, but he made himself understood. He talked in the meetings and people understood what he had to say' (Int. 7). He also added that 'SINFIC matched the DRC context best' (Int. 7). Moreover, as reported by SINFIC, SINFIC had participated in the Angolan census cartography in

2013 and several times in the electoral registration in Angola between 2006-2017 (Int. 28). Therefore, while the accusations about SINFIC's lack of experience in cartography do not seem justified, there were concrete cases when SINFIC and other partners had differing views. For instance, SINFIC claimed that the BRC ensured the sufficient quality of available maps during the contract negotiations (Int. 28). In May 2014, SINFIC evaluated the quality of available maps for the census cartography. The evaluation concluded that available maps do not have the required quality or were outdated. Thus, the objectives were redefined to allow for the map renewal. SINFIC cooperated with the BCR, METTELSAT and the IGC to propose a new vision for the cartography. The 'Concerted Methodology' was signed on 23 May 2014.

There were too many technical discussions about the methodology, we couldn't agree with SINFIC, although they should lead the project, there were different points of view not only with BCR staff but also with UNFPA ... We felt that the firm was very limited, we realised that it might not be the right firm for this project ... For the INS the map should be something simple, the census map is not complicated, it does not require strict and very detailed limits, but SINFIC adopted a map that you could call 'general map'... there was no progress. (Int. 19)

While this interviewee claims the INS desired simple maps, other information suggests that, in fact, the BCR also went for the most complicated solution.

4.6 Approval of World Bank project

In this atmosphere, on 31 March 2014, the World Bank's board finally approved a new project, the mentioned PRINS. Methodological impositions, disputes and a challenging political climate meant project approval took four years (Int. 7). The Project Appraisal Document was published in May 2014 (World Bank, 2014b) and the original closing date was 30 June 2017 (World Bank, 2014a). The statistician in the World Bank office left in April 2014, before the project really took off. The envisaged project cost was \$11.80 million, of which almost 62% was earmarked for statistical production and dissemination, including the following elements:

(a) Supporting census cartography (population and housing census); (b) improving the national accounts through the implementation of the enterprise census; and (c) improving access to, and interpretability of, statistical information. (World Bank, 2014a)

Hence, supporting the population census was one component amidst a larger attempt to build the INS's capacity to generate and disseminate statistics. Support for the population census accounted for 55% of the project's total budget, thus \$6.49 million. The entire cartography was expected to cost about \$30 million: UNFPA would contribute \$1.8 million (for the chief census technical advisor and field equipment for the census cartography phase); ADB was expected to contribute \$5 million (for the rehabilitation and equipment of provincial offices; see PAI-STATFIN above); Japan \$5 million (for the digital equipment for data collection and the hiring of a private firm to provide technical and organisational support to the Bureau of the Census); and the Congolese government \$11.7 million for financing gaps. The largest chunk of the World Bank money was directed at the census cartography (\$5.74 million); \$0.18 million was earmarked for the pilot census and \$0.56 million for technical assistance for SINFIC's overhead costs. As is common among development organisations, the World Bank uses technical, optimistic language:

The proposed approach modernizes DRC's cartography and data collection methods by promoting the use of digital data collection in the field with geo-referencing instead of paper-based questionnaire and manual data entry. Moving to digital data collection represents the potential to collect information locally but to share it nationally at lower cost and with greater quality than other methods, especially given DRC's difficult context. The output of the census cartography is a Geographic Information System (GIS) database of dwellings, social infrastructure, and population distribution that will serve to partition the country into distinct, non-overlapping units that fully cover the territory. These units are the census enumeration areas -- the work areas for individual enumerators -- that will be part of the base for future survey sampling (primary sampling units). The project will finance technical assistance for the organization of the field work, field staff training in the use of the hardware and software, technical assistance for the design and implementation of the GIS database. (World Bank, 2014b)

Again, the World Bank stressed that 'another key output of the cartography phase will be a new master sampling frame for future household surveys' (2014c).

The Project Appraisal Document further provides an assessment of the low level of qualifications in the INS.

The document stated that only 44% of the 319 staff have some university education, ‘7% have degrees from the *Centre de formation professionnelle*, 16% have only secondary education, and 29% only have primary education” (World Bank, 2014b). Only 17% of total INS staff had degrees in statistics, economics, demography or computer science. Finally, the document remarked that ‘34% of the qualified staff across all offices are near retirement age’ (World Bank, 2014b). The document, however, does not regard the attempted leap to digitalisation and the low level of capacity as a contradiction or problem. Both aspects can sit side by side. In fact, soon after, the Bank hired an expert on census cartography and a demographer to support the BCR.

A former high-level INS bureaucrat stated that ‘At the time, no one imagined that the census would not take place’ (Int. 9). While this statement mirrors how some people felt about the census, one former high-level employee shares another point of view: ‘When we went to the embassy of country ... there was an economic counsellor, he told us “I pity you, you are in a complicated country, if you finalise the census it would be feasible anywhere, we will even decorate you with medals”, and he was right’ (Int. 19). Another former employee said the following: ‘I have the impression that donors knew. Some ambassadors didn’t believe that the census would take place before the elections’ (Int. 10). Indeed, the elections would turn out to be a massive barrier for the census operations, as the following section demonstrates.

5 Politicisation (2014-2015)

In this section, we discuss two aspects that can be subsumed as a ‘politicisation’ of the census. First, the setup and political use of an administrative census in 2014-2015 (probably the part of the census history best known to a wider public). Second, people affiliated to the Prime Minister replacing leading INS and BCR figures who did not have formal political ties.

5.1 The census and elections

Since 2003, elections were formally linked to a new census. For pragmatic reasons, this link was neglected in 2006 and 2011, and elections took place without a prior census. In 2014, however, the situation was different. President Kabila was about to reach the end of his second (and constitutionally last) term. Trying to link the 2016 elections to a census was branded by the opposition as an attempt to cling to power.

The linking of elections to a census is also related to the absence of identity cards in the DRC (Waka-Sakrini, 2003). To be sure, local registry offices should exist in all communes, but the quality of this data is difficult to assess, and it is irregularly sent to the national level (Int. 6). For both purposes – establishing a general population register and producing identity cards – an institution under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior²⁸ was created by decree²⁹ in December 2011: The *Office National d'Identification de la Population* (ONIP, National Bureau for the Identification of the Population). ONIP did not immediately become operational, however. The *Concertations Nationales* from September and October 2013 demanded that the *état civil* be reinstituted and strengthened via ONIP. The main document of the *Concertations Nationales* described ONIP as important for the collection of information to prepare local, municipal, urban, provincial and senatorial elections (Le Présidium des Concertations Nationales, 2013).

In 2014, ONIP would take centre stage in discussions on the link between census and elections. In October 2014, a new legal act³⁰ put into place the leading staff of ONIP. Political heavyweight Adolphe Lumanu became *Directeur Général* and Geneviève Inagosi Kasongo was also on board. Lumanu

²⁸ The Ministry of Interior is indeed charged with administrative censuses (Ordonnance n° 08/074 du 24 décembre 2008 spécialement en son article 1er, litera b point 1; as well as later versions of that law: Ordonnance n° 12/008 du 11 juin 2012, Ordonnance n° 15/015 du 21 mars 2015, Ordonnance n° 17/ 025 du 10 juillet 2017).

²⁹ Décret n° 011/48 du 3 décembre 2011 portant création et fixation des statuts d'un Etablissement public dénommé « Office National d'Identification de la Population », « ONIP » en sigle.

³⁰ Ordonnance n° 14/066 et 14/067 du 15 Octobre 2014.

used to be Director of the office of the Secretary General of Kabila's *Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie* and Vice Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, while Inagosi Kasongo had been Member of Parliament and Minister of Gender and Family. In fact, Lumanu was Minister of the Interior and his name can be found at the bottom of the decree that created ONIP in 2011.

In a long speech, Lumanu lays out BCR, CENI and ONIP's responsibility to sustain the importance of an administrative census (LeSoftOnline, 2014).³¹ He outlined the history of the administrative census: In 2008, Minister of the Interior Kalume demanded authorisation from the Prime Minister for a public-private initiative to conduct an administrative census and provide the population with biometric identity cards,³² and Prime Minister Gizenga gave his authorisation.³³ After discussions between ministers about generating revenues through selling identity cards for funding the national elections in 2011, BCECO published a first call (*avis de pré-qualification*).³⁴ On 16 December 2011, Lumanu reports that he – then Minister of the Interior – signed a contract for an administrative census with the Chinese company Huawei³⁵ over \$498 million. Eximbank was the envisaged lender and selling identity cards would generate the profit. According to his report, the contract did not become effective (LeSoftOnline, 2014). In sum, Lumanu offered to finish the census within one year for \$498 million – more than two and a half times the budget of the population census. Moreover, Lumanu initiated ONIP as Minister of the Interior and went on to lead the organisation.

Lumanu's description of the events is puzzling and opaque. Did he create the organisation to ensure rents for himself? Did the plan to delay elections via a census exist long before 2014? We did not find a single source able to confirm Lumanu's claims. More crucially, the following excerpt by an anonymous source underlines the ONIP's dubious nature:

I was even menaced here, by Adolpe Lumanu, he came to my office with three to four people ... he gave me a lesson: 'ONIP is well equipped to do the census and not INS, so don't give resources to INS but support ONIP'. So I listened, once I talked he was mad, for two hours he and his team talked, I was like a student.

According to a *Jeune Afrique* journalist, European ambassadors were highly sceptical that this partnership would really take shape (Boisselet, 2015). Along similar lines, Jason Stearns reported that 'according to two sources with intimate knowledge of the contract, EximBank has been reluctant to fund the project and Huawei appears to be out of the running' (Stearns 2014). The 'plan immediately came under heavy criticism by the opposition. They feared that the census would take many years because of logistical and financial constraints and so would be used as yet another means to delay presidential elections for many years' (Simons, 2015: 218).

Indeed, on 5 January 2015, the government introduced a new electoral law to the House of Parliament. Struggles around that law ensued for the month of January. The major proposed modification was Article 8, that would have made the census a condition for future elections. The article stipulates that a census needs to be conducted to update the list of voters. Thereby, the proposed law would discard CENI's arrangement that detached elections from the census. The proposed law implicitly returned to the *Résolution n° DIC/CPR/03* from 2003 which made the census a requirement of elections. Along similar lines, the number of parliamentarians per province would no longer be attached to the number of enrolled voters, but to the total number of inhabitants per province. After intense debates in both houses in a tense atmosphere of protest in major cities in the DRC, the final modified electoral law did not include that sentence.

No one we talked to was able to reveal anything about ONIP's actual activities since then (see also Forum des As, 2017): 'ONIP? People don't want to hear that name ... For the population, ONIP was only there to delay the elections' (Int. 6). This is echoed by another public servant: 'The leaders are political, it [ONIP] doesn't work ... We always set up new organisations ... There are probably still people on payroll' (Int. 4). When one of us asked an anonymous source why the government set up ONIP, instead of using the BCR to delay the census, he said that it is easier to set up a new entity with new heads rather than replacing the heads of INS and BCR.

³¹ Administrative censuses collect data from existing sources, such as administrative registers. The last and only comprehensive administrative census in the DRC took place in 1970 (de Saint Moulin, 1974).

³² Letter n° 25/CAB/MINETAT/MININTERDESEC/ 358/2008 du 08 mars 2008.

³³ Letter n° RDC/GC/PM/R95/2008 du 18 mars 2008.

³⁴ n° 001/CEI/MINTBCCO/DG/DPM/JPKM/2011 from 11 January 2011.

³⁵ Contrat n° 2865B/MININT/BCECO/DG/DPM/JPKM/2011.

5.2 ONIP and BCR: joining forces?

Understanding how the National Census Bureau reacted to ONIP gives insight into the population census's future path. The BCR had already existed, it had received funding and hired a firm, and donor programmes were being designed. The BCR head at the time invented the so-called *mutualisation* strategy: 'We worked on a mutualisation document to link the administrative and the population census in order to share fieldwork data with the administration' (Int. 9). Apparently, these strategic thoughts already began in 2011: 'Another reason for the mutualisation were the elections, as ONIP and BCR were created in 2011, the same year of presidential and parliamentary elections which were funded by the DRC government' (see Int. 10). From this perspective, the mutualisation was envisaged to counter the possible lack of funding of the 2011 elections. The idea of mutualisation then re-emerged in 2014. As a former INS employee recounts:

The former heads of INS and BCR did not manage to get the right political support. ONIP absorbed the BCR discursively, the partners began to see ONIP, the head of ONIP stated that he had a few hundred million dollars, the head of BCR wanted to benefit from that attention and link BCR to ONIP. Donors didn't support ONIP, they wanted a scientific population census. (Int. 7)

While the term 'mutualisation' suggests a common strategy, this statement rather suggests that ONIP created a momentum and BCR wanted to benefit from it. Indeed, while ONIP's role in trying to delay the elections became well-known, the practical implications for the census preparations have not been widely discussed.

The Portuguese consortium, the World Bank, UNFPA and BCR were preparing the cartography. The biggest challenge in 2014 was the low quality of existing maps. SINFIC suggested completely redoing these maps. Subsequently, a UNFPA expert raised doubts as s/he considered it too detailed, arguing that it would cost too much time and money. S/he proposed to use older analogous maps and suggested testing the two alternatives. The BCR eventually decided to test only the more ambitious version. In September 2014, the test *Lunzadi 1* took place for 10 days in urban and rural areas (Le Phare, 2014; Quatenus, n.d.; Int. 28). Two teams of six people were in charge of the test (Quatenus, n.d.). The mutualisation strategy had become so influential that the test included two questionnaires – one for the

BCR's scientific census and one for ONIP's administrative census. Discussions between BCR and ONIP continued (see, for example, DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2014). SINFIC reports that discussions between BCR and ONIP took place without including SINFIC. Soon after, however, ONIP disappears, as reported above. ONIP's disappearance was presented to SINFIC as a *fait accompli* without any explanations (Int. 28).

So, what were the results of the mutualisation strategy? The main consequence was that the link to ONIP blurred the differences between the various censuses. According to one interviewee, 'The so-called mutualisation caused many problems. The differences between population census, electoral census/registration and administrative census were not clear to everyone' (Int. 11). Another former public servant argued that ONIP's 'leaders, unfortunately, were politicians. They made mistakes ... At that point, the problem became even more complicated. No one believed in that census' (Int. 9). Another former BCR employee summarised the atmosphere at the time:

We were looking for resources, ONIP had just arrived, a big organisation, I said that they would have plenty of resources, they worked on identification, there were even political motives behind, let's not go there, so we were trying to make the best of our resources ... In the beginning it went well, but then nothing more, as it was highly politicised, when objectives were not reached, I was wondering 'does this organisation exist?', and yes, people are on payroll but I don't think it works ... Political motives are behind it. So, we were even afraid of being associated with them, as the population census needs to be independent. (Int. 19)

Arguably, ONIP damaged the public image of a census. Moreover, it blurred the lines between administrative and scientific census, and Lumanu's census simply became 'the census' (Boisselet, 2015). Creating ONIP was a political move to legitimise an extension of Kabila's mandate. ONIP was the structure created to convince the population that the new Article 8 was being taken seriously and that a census was underway. However, ONIP discredited the very idea of a census and attracted the BCR's attention. ONIP and the electoral law need to be situated within a much wider and ongoing set of activities to delay elections or extend Kabila's mandate. It sits alongside changes of the constitution, lack of funding of the election process, negotiations (e.g. *L'Accord de Saint-Sylvestre*). In 2014-2015, several months were lost due to the census's politicisation – at a time when donor projects were finally making progress.

5.3 New appointments at INS and BCR

Around 2015, there is a second aspect that could be interpreted as ‘politicisation’.

To begin with, there were strikes and protests against the management and after an audit by the Prime Minister’s office, the head of the INS had to take his leave at the end of 2014 (Int. 6 & 19). In the words of someone who witnessed the events:

Senior INS staff believed that a World Bank project means posts. After the recruitment, there was a bad atmosphere. The civil service union got involved. They put locks on the doors. The Minister was unable to find a solution [to the struggle between senior INS staff and director of INS] and the head of INS was dismissed. (Int. 12)

The mentioned World Bank project is possibly the PRINS project linked to the census. It had been approved in March 2014. Following a clientelist logic – similar to the functioning of the Technical Working Group between 2006 and 2011 – INS staff felt entitled to positions that they expected to follow from such a project. According to Int. 7, such protests were nothing special, given the nature of the civil service. In November 2015, Roger Shulungu Runika then became interim head of the INS.³⁶ He used

to be Vice-Minister of Finance under Matata since April 2012. One interviewee claimed that he is a ‘frère de Matata’, from the same village (Int. 6).

Furthermore, around the same time, Homère Ngoma Ngoma took over the BCR.³⁷ One interviewee suggested that Ngoma Ngoma, the BCR’s current head, is supposedly ‘closer to power (political party)’ than the former head (Int. 10). Indeed, two sources suggest that he used to be financial counsellor at the Ministry of Finance in May 2011 (DRC/ARMP, 2012; WSP and World Bank, 2011). As a reminder, Matata Ponyo was Minister of Finance until he became Prime Minister in 2012. Ngoma Ngoma thus worked under him and obtained his new position in 2015 (Int. 6).

Two other BCR employees involved at the beginning moved to the INS and to the World Bank, respectively. Thus, the Congolese people who initiated or developed the census activities were completely replaced. Shortly before, the World Bank project leader was also replaced. This is not uncommon and by no means Congo-specific. Nonetheless, it reveals that such a supposedly technical development project is tightly linked to political currents and organisational issues. International development projects face such challenges that certainly do not help to build up expertise and relationships.

³⁶ Arrêté ministériel n° 032/CAB/MIN/PL.RM/2015 du 24 novembre 2015 portant nomination du Directeur général et du Directeur général adjoint de l’Institut National de la Statistique, INS en sigle.

³⁷ Arrêté ministériel n° 031/CAB/MIN/PL.RM/2015 du 21 novembre 2015 portant nomination du Coordonnateur et des Coordonnateurs adjoints du Bureau Central du Recensement, BCR en sigle.

6 New international money and agency (2015-2018)

The story of ONIP also left a trace as a symbolic reference and justification for an AfDB project. Around the same time, the long-awaited World Bank project becomes effective. However, for various reasons, the project does not make significant progress, the World Bank restructures it and launches a follow-up project. In the meantime, the government continues the recruitment process. All major actors involved in the census align on one goal: launching the pilot cartography, which takes place in January 2017, but delivers questionable results. Our analysis in this section ends with the arrival of a new international partner to solve (virtually) everything.

6.1 The African Development Bank acting on informed ignorance?

ONIP, the institution in charge of the administrative census, no longer attracted attention after the attempt to condition elections on a census had failed. All data, commentators and interviewees suggest that ONIP was created entirely with that political purpose. I've already shown that the ONIP's setup affected the BCR's functioning. However, there is another impact of ONIP and it puts the AfDB in the spotlight. Until 2014, the AfDB was a marginal component within the census assemblage. Around 2011 and 2012 it took part in early donor roundtables that focused on the census. It had supported provincial statistical offices since at least 2011 (UNFPA, 2011) and again through its PAI-STATFIN project. The AfDB's 2013-2017 DRC country strategy included the output 'The general population census is organized' (AfDB, 2013a, Annex 1, p.4).

At the end of 2014, in the midst of discussions around ONIP, the AfDB launched a new project: the *Projet d'Appui au Recensement Général de la Population et au Renforcement des Bases de Données Sociales* (PARDBS, General Population Census and Social Databases Consolidation Support Project). Its name already reveals the support for the census. PARDBS was supposed to run between August 2014 and December 2017. The AfDB considers itself a key player in the statistical realm and 'the PARDBS project will strengthen the Bank's [AfDB] position as lead donor of the Statistics Thematic Group within the donors' coordination group in the DRC' (AfDB, 2014a). According to the project document, the project's main rationale is the need to set up a new data-based Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (AfDB, 2014a). The main objectives are statistical capacity building and setting up

databases disaggregated by gender on vulnerable groups, education, health and employment. The budget was allocated to three components:

- 5 Component 1 (training 100,000 people, procuring equipment): \$19.1 million
- 6 Component 2 (setting up databases, training, yearbooks and reports): \$3.1 million
- 7 Component 3 (procuring documents, reports, etc.): \$0.8 million

Component 1 entails support for the actual census and makes up 83% of the entire budget (about \$23 million). 'Procurement of equipment' implies, among other things, acquiring tens of thousands of tablets for the census-takers. These project documents, produced before the start of the project, reveal two insights about making there appear to be a functioning census: producing coherence through thin evidence and disregarding critical knowledge. First, the main project document reports a total cost for the RGPH2 of \$140 million (AfDB, 2014a). These costs are distributed as follows between different donors:

- 1 BAD: \$23 million
- 2 UNFPA: \$14 million
- 3 World Bank: \$6.5 million
- 4 Japan: \$9 million
- 5 China: \$74.5 million
- 6 Government: \$13 million

Overall, the AfDB would fund 16% of the envisaged census costs. The costs are taken from the BCR's project document from 2013. There is one point in the list that raises particular questions: China's participation in the population census was not mentioned in other sources. The project document further states that China is planning a total investment of \$400 million for the 'Administrative Census Support Project' (AfDB, 2014a) of which \$75.5 million shall be used for the scientific census. 'Administrative census support project' is another way to describe ONIP. The document explicitly acknowledges that the 'total budget of GPHC2 [RGPH2] will be finalized with financing (loan) from China, which has not yet been approved. However, this loan represents 53% of GPHC2 budget. This situation is a risk for the operation'. The project document offers the following solution: 'The Government ought to present a letter of comfort prior to signature of the Grant agreement' (AfDB, 2014a). Indeed, the government signed the letter (Int. 27).

Our prior analysis of ONIP suggests that China was nowhere close to providing hundreds of millions of dollars for either census. An employee of the AfDB strengthens this impression:

I always said that this won't work, we received a letter from the government before the project, the project could not be approved without the letter. I refused to consider that letter, but the board of the AfDB does not know the DRC, they only see that there was some progress in the process, but ... I said that 'it's a lie'. (Int. 27)

It therefore seems like the AfDB knowingly drew on China as a symbolic funding resource to create a coherent context for its own support. The AfDB apparently also decided to ignore another source of critical information. An evaluation of the earlier PAI-STATFIN project from 2013 revealed that the 'overall financial management risk level remains high due to INS' delay in implementing the fiduciary arrangements necessary for smooth project implementation' (AfDB, 2014a); see also AfDB (2013b). The AfDB proposed an action plan for PAI-STATFIN. The new PARDBS project document reports that the INS had not respected this action plan six months after the first pay-out from May 2014. The PARDBS project document also states that the INS has not made the complete budget available, and that the INS annual report does not comprise all elements required by decree n°9/45 from 03 December 2009 (AfDB, 2014b: 17). Finally, the report states that 'no financial report is available at INS' (AfDB, 2014b). In other words, a report that allocates some \$23 million to the INS concludes that INS is under-resourced, and that its financial operations are neither reliable nor transparent. Yet, despite these shortcomings, the Congolese Ministry of Finance and the AfDB signed a contract for a grant for the PARDBS over 15 million *unité de compte* – about \$23 million – in May 2015. How to explain this oxymoronic state of informed ignorance? Has the AfDB been captured by national interests?

6.2 A new World Bank project

Next to the AfDB, the World Bank also made progress: PRINS became effective in January 2015, almost four and a half years after the grant was approved (World Bank, 2014a). As a reminder, the PRINS project intended to contribute \$5.74 million to the census cartography. The project hired an international cartographer, an international logistics expert and announced the

recruitment of a demographer jointly with UNFPA. Methodological questions remained contested in mid-2015. In July 2015, a new Chief Technical Advisor and a cartographic expert from UNFPA requested a second test of the maps, *Lunzadi 2*. This test led to the signature of the 'Concerted Methodology v2' on 23 June 2015. The same consultant who had worked for UNFPA in 2009 returned to approve the methodology (Int. 7). According to this methodology, the basic cartography would have to be completely redone with the help of SINFIC³⁸ (Int. 28). The lack of funding for the census project, however, remained the biggest hurdle. The World Bank was about to offer a partial solution for this problem. Already in 2013, a report announced the World Bank's consideration of a new project supporting statistics (World Bank, 2013). In 2014, discussions between INS staff and World Bank leaders took place. An INS employee recounts his negotiations with the World Bank:

We should absolutely prioritise the census. I went to the World Bank, 'you've already invested money, but it's not going anywhere'. I told them: 'If we could only do the cartography, it would be an enormous achievement for our statistics and for future surveys ... For the characteristics we could again use surveys. They said 'okay, we are going to have a second project. (Int. 19)

As explained above, the World Bank envisaged a mapping process that not only would lead to a map of the country but also to a full enumeration of the people living there. The census would then be an in-depth verification and include a socio-economic survey. Although the INS employee's influence on project approval might not have been as straightforward as he suggests, the new *Projet de Développement des Statistiques* (PDS, Statistics Development Project, see World Bank, 2015b) took shape. The grant agreement between the World Bank and the Congolese Government was signed on 27 October 2015 with a total budget of \$45 million. The project's objective is to strengthen the capacity of the INS to generate and disseminate statistical information through specific activities. In particular, PDS intends to fill the financing gap of the cartography – budgeting the cartography at \$33 million (not \$18 million as in the 2013 Prodoc).

The World Bank funding was based on two conditions:

(i) a detailed program of activities for the cartography of the population and housing census issued by BCR; and (ii) evidence that the total budget for the cartography of the population and housing census has been secured by BCR; all in form and substance satisfactory to the Association. (World Bank, 2015b)

Regarding the second condition, two aspects remains unclear: First, do the government's \$7 million include the \$5.4 million used in 2013? Second, which development partners fund the \$6.2 million? In any case, the World Bank, in effect, relaxed its conditions. The project became effective on 20 June 2016, one week before the World Bank's deadline (World Bank, 2016b).

6.3 Seeking culprits for slow progress

Despite the donor projects in place, the census made little progress. While the PRINS' capacity-building measures for the INS progressed, the 'statistical production and dissemination component continues to face implementation delays, especially for the cartography of the population census' (World Bank, 2016c: 14). Who might be responsible for the slow progress? The World Bank and domestic actors offer two opposing explanations. The World Bank's 2016 annual report mentions three reasons for the slow pace: changes in leadership, low domestic capacities and problems with SINFIC. First, it speaks of too 'frequent changes in leadership at the National Statistical Institute (INS) and changing priorities' (World Bank, 2016c). This corresponds to the replaced heads of INS and BCR discussed above. Second, the 2016 annual report highlights low capacities within INS and BCR: 'shortage of adequately skilled staff for planning and managing a complex activity, as well as the lack of financial resources for complementary tools needed to implement the cartography, mainly IT equipment and generators'. (World Bank, 2016c).

Third, the report attributes the slow pace of progress to the Portuguese firm SINFIC. The World Bank initially wanted to use SINFIC to pay enumerators. Half of the budgeted \$5.74 million was earmarked for their salaries. Comparing documents from 2014 and 2015-2016

³⁸ SINFIC would have needed a contractual amendment, which was however always postponed (Int. 28).

reveals the World Bank's doublespeak. A 2014 report explicitly appreciates SINFIC³⁹, acknowledges SINFIC's expertise in relevant fields and highlights the firm's context-specific experience. This assessment changed over the course of two years. Another World Bank report accuses SINFIC of three shortcomings: First, 'the hiring of the firm has not followed the DRC national procurement procedures' (World Bank, 2015a). Second, 'the firm does not meet the necessary requirements to manage the project's fund' (World Bank, 2015a). Therefore, the World Bank suggested that a 'new arrangement is to be identified for the payment of the enumerators of the census cartography' (World Bank, 2015a) and, in fact, claims that 'the government is considering recruiting an independent entity to pay the census enumerators' (World Bank, 2016c). Third, the same report accuses the government and SINFIC of a lack of transparency and demands that SINFIC's contract be shared with all partners (World Bank, 2016c).

Can the World Bank's accusations of procedural shortcomings, a lack of capacities and missing transparency be upheld? The World Bank reports were surely correct about the changes in leadership and the low technical capacities of INS and BCR. As for SINFIC, several sources pointed out it was a questionable choice. Its software posed problems (Int. 11), SINFIC had never worked on a census (Int. 25), its staff was based in Portugal and more than one interviewee implied benefits for the Congolese officials who were in charge of signing the contract.

On the other hand, the accusation that selecting SINFIC did not follow the DRC national procurement procedures is strange, as the World Bank was itself involved as some interviews suggested.⁴⁰ Furthermore, it needs to be noted that SINFIC had to struggle with the poor coordination between government and donors: 'The BCR didn't have a sufficient budget, UNFPA withdrew its promised \$14 million, the World Bank wasn't ready to pay. Therefore, SINFIC couldn't do its job properly' (Int. 7). On top of funding issues, SINFIC claims that the government did

not respect several contractual agreements, including a pilot committee (*comité de pilotage*) that includes all major actors⁴¹, equipment of the laboratory, issues around recruitment, several technical issues surrounding the installation of servers, and many others (Int. 28). Furthermore, while 'there were problems with transferring data from the tablet to databases' in SINFIC's application (Int. 7), when SINFIC was finally able to transfer that data, the BCR had changed to a new version of the receiving software, and SINFIC again needed to modify it.

The World Bank's claim that SINFIC does not meet the requirements to manage the project's funds also needs to be reconsidered: handling the payments of enumerators of the cartography was not part of SINFIC's original contract (Int. 28). 'After the beginning of the project, and extra contract, the World Bank proposed that the consortium should manage this budget. With this purpose, the World Bank listed a set of requirements that the Consortium did not really meet' (Int. 28). It thus seems the World Bank decided to first include SINFIC, and *then* evaluate whether SINFIC matched the actual requirements. Other stakeholders' negative assessment of SINFIC is also put in perspective by SINFIC's claim it convinced the Japanese cooperation to co-fund its activities. This was facilitated by SINFIC using Japanese (Fujitsu) technology: 'The project started because the Japanese Fund funded the project without a national counterpart' (Int. 28). In February 2016, SINFIC obtained the complete advance of \$7.5 million, of which the Japanese cooperation had paid \$4.2 million and the government paid \$3.3 million (World Bank, 2016c).

In sum, attributing responsibility for failure is more nuanced than the World Bank's reports suggest. What might instead have motivated the World Bank's shifting opinion is the replacement of their project leader who participated in SINFIC's recruitment (Int. 7: 28). It seems he envisioned a different approach and thus did not continue working with SINFIC. One main factor seems to be ownership and appropriation. While SINFIC, a private firm, also trained BCR staff, it apparently worked on the

³⁹ 'In addition, the project includes a special feature with the recruitment of a private firm to support the organization of the digital data collection operation and to process the results of the population census. In this regard, the government has hired a private firm, SINFIC, of dual nationality (Congo-Portugal) to work closely with the Census Bureau to provide the expertise and technical assistance necessary to help organize the complex field activities, the data transfers from the field, and data processing. The firm was selected out of eleven other firms, based on proven logistical expertise in field operations and its expertise in programming digital data and results of national digital data collection operation, as well as its knowledge of the region. The firm, already contracted by the government, will also be responsible for providing field staff and technical experts for the SRF mapping exercise and will thus receive reimbursement for its contribution from the SRF'. (World Bank, 2014c)

⁴⁰ One interviewee elaborates that the Prime Minister gives his preliminary approval before the signature of the Minister of Planning, all according to the *Loi Marché Publique*. Also, the Ministry of Budget's *Direction Générale Contrôle Marché Publique* (DGCMP) gave its *avis de non-objection* to the terms of reference and SINFIC's recruitment. This is the normal procedure for that type of contract. The Prime Minister's office gave son *avis favorable* after the signature. After the signature the Prime Minister again received the document and was in favour (Int. 7).

⁴¹ The Ministry of Planning, Presidency, Prime Minister's office, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Budget, World Bank, UNFPA and INS/BCR.

software without significant contribution from Congolese actors. Hence, there was no ‘spillover’ of technical capacities; SINFIC was mainly delivering services, not building domestic capacities. Reportedly, the new World Bank team leader envisaged a more active role for the INS/BCR (Int. 7).⁴² A closer look at SINFIC’s contract suggests that SINFIC was indeed charged with developing the application, as well as other activities, and was only asked to train BCR staff in its use (DRC/MinPlan, 2014). Finally, it is notable that the ‘Matata momentum’ had passed and government and donors had been unable to harmonise their funding: ‘When donors were ready, the government was not ready anymore’ (Int. 7).

This paper suggests a wider variety of reasons for the census’s failure to progress than the World Bank’s report claims. While the World Bank’s accusations are not completely false, they are only part of the story. The accusations seem to be motivated more by a wish to discredit SINFIC and change the overall modalities than by an objective assessment of the situation, particularly regarding the World Bank’s own flaws and shortcomings. We suggest in this paper that searching for a single culprit is futile. Instead, the World Bank continues its unilateral management, as we demonstrate in the following section.

6.4 A contested pilot cartography

In the second half of 2015 it recommended organising a pilot cartography. This pilot had not been included in the census project before and the newly created budget line was insufficient (Int. 28). Terms of reference for the pilot cartography had been discussed in September 2015 (Int. 28). The World Bank eventually set 15 December 2016 as the deadline to start the pilot cartography. Meeting this deadline was a condition for the World Bank to continue to financially support it. While no public document mentioned it (Int. 28, corroborated by our own analysis), a precipitated pilot cartography with contested results was about to reshape the census project.

Next to the three donor projects – PAI-STATIN, PRINS and PDS – government institutions also continued preparing the census. In April 2015, INS/BCR and *Bureau Central de Coordination* (BCECO, Central Coordination Office)

signed an agreement and BCECO subsequently recruited 510 people (DRC/BCECO, 2016).⁴³ Also in June 2016, the BCR installed a server in the Congolese Central Bank (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a: 7). In the same month, a modified law on voter registration was passed.⁴⁴ Like its predecessor, the law detached the census from elections. By October 2016, the World Bank’s PDS ‘project has disbursed 6.6% of the overall budget’ for fieldwork equipment and consultants (World Bank, 2016b). A financial audit details the acquisition of 260 motorbikes and 1,400 helmets out of the contractually agreed 450 motorbikes and 1,800 helmets for \$1.5 million. Initially, the crucial condition for PDS funding was for the government to provide ‘evidence that the total budget for the cartography of the population and housing census has been secured by BCR’ (World Bank, 2015b). After conditions by the World Bank were withdrawn on 29 May 2017 – probably, but not explicitly, the mentioned conditions – \$890,000 were paid (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017: 3). No publicly available report explains why the conditions were withdrawn. The World Bank was determined to achieve the cartography. It was, after all, the type of cartography that it pushed in 2013, which would deliver a very good estimate of the Congolese population. One wonders whether the World Bank was fully interested in the complete enumeration, or if it was ready to settle on this second-best alternative.

In December 2016, the BCR received support from the AfDB to organise a workshop of four days for provincial census coordinators, especially for the methodology of the cartography (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a). According to the head of BCR, the cartography operations would take eight to nine months and he affirmed that the census – which takes only three or four weeks – would begin early 2018 (Agence Congolaise de Presse, 2016). On 20 January 2017, the BCR launched the pilot cartography. The pilot cartography serves to test the material, the organisation of data collection, the IT-system, the links between field workers and the laboratory, as well as logistics and sensitisation of the population (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a). As explained above, the census uses satellite images to demarcate enumeration areas and tablets for data collection. All households were to be visited and all infrastructure should be geographically

⁴² Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain any response from the team leader, despite numerous emails.

⁴³ Avis de Manifestations d’Intérêt n° 595/BCR/BCeCo/DPM/RNBB/2015/SC and n° 596, n° 597, n° 598, n° 613. The BCECO annual report 2016 envisaged another protocol for 2017 for 1588 cartographic operators and 33 employees for the eleven provincial offices.

⁴⁴ Loi n° 16007 du 29 juin 2016 identification et enrôlement électeurs, which replaces the Loi n° 04/028 du 24 décembre 2004 portant identification et enrôlement des électeurs.

registered. Groups of 26 people each visited eight sites, two sites in Kongo-Central⁴⁵ in January and six sites⁴⁶ in April (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a). The eight sites are said to represent the different characteristics of the Congolese territory and inhabitation patterns.

While practical preparations of the census continued,⁴⁷ between 21-26 August 2017 the BCR organised an expert meeting in Kola, Mbanza-Ngungu, to evaluate the pilot cartography and discuss and adapt the methodology for the census (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017b). Plenty of institutions were represented: the Prime Minister's office, the Ministry of Planning, INS, BCR, UNFPA, World Bank and BAD (Bukasa, 2017). After this meeting, the head of BCR announced that the census cartography would begin in December 2017, his team would be on the ground by March 2018 and stay until December 2018 to carry it out. While we have a copy of the Kola report (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017b), the long list of annexes, including technical reports, has remained inaccessible to us. Our main insights on the pilot cartography stem from the evaluation report, public World Bank documents, and interviews. The evaluation report identified the following problems that occurred during the cartography: transferring data from the field to the servers due to a lack of reliable GMS connection, unclear administrative limits, and software issues (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a). A donor representative claimed that 'SINFIC wanted to reinvent the wheel, the application was very complicated, so you need SINFIC experts who correct the application'⁴⁸ (Int. 27). The BCR did not formally recognise the cartography as the final pilot cartography as it was not fully prepared. For example, not all servers were installed (Int. 7).

The World Bank, however, brought forward a much more essential criticism of the pilot cartography. The annual report for the SRF from May 2017 by the World Bank reported achieving the following: 'the SRF project financed the preparation of the census cartography (including the design of data collection tools, the methodology of the cartography, and the planning of a work program) and its pilot phase' (World Bank, 2017b).

A July 2017 report pertaining to the second World Bank project, written under the auspice of the same project leader, adopted a very different language:

The pilot cartography was completed in eight sites. All data processing and management activities were outsourced to a firm hired by the Government, with the INS and the Census Bureau ... having no control on the process. The firm delivered the dataset with two months delay although the data were collected with tablets. A data quality assessment highlighted lots of flaws in the software designed by the firm. None of the expected results from the pilot cartography were achieved. (World Bank, 2017a)

While the evaluation meeting in Kola also revealed technical flaws, the World Bank also pointed to a lack of government ownership and a complete lack of results. Regarding the first accusation, interviews suggest that data has never been shared outside the country and that it has always been in the government's possession (Int. 7). This interpretation is sustained by SINFIC:

The pilot data was always available to the government. The data was in SINFIC's cluster servers because the government/BCR still did not have the data-center facilities ready. The data was provided on disk to the government. The government's external consultants did not have the expertise to analyse the data in a SQL database format; an additional contract was requested to develop an interface that would allow those external consultants to analyse in a CS-pro format, which was done and the pilot database was provided in the requested format. (Int. 28)

This statement suggests culpability lay not only with SINFIC but is part of a wider problem of lacking preparation and harmonisation. As to the second accusation – the absence of results – other sources again provide a more nuanced image. We do not have the terms of reference for the pilot cartography, but a key interviewee suggested there

⁴⁵ The quartier Dibua Nsakala and the secteur des Assolongo in Matadi and Moanda.

⁴⁶ The Quartier du 30 juin in Kikwit (province of Kwilu), and the rest (sector Lukenie in Mai-Ndombe, Chefferies Kaziba (Sud-Kivu), Kiona-Nzini (Haut-Katanga), Azanga (Haut-Uélé), sector Mbari in Sud-Ubangi. Two sites in Kinshasa were intended but not achieved (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a).

⁴⁷ In June 2017 a SINFIC consultant provided training to BCR staff, which facilitated updating collected data, drawing limits for the enumeration areas and controlling data quality (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a). BCECO engaged in another round of recruitment for the BCR (AMI n° 653/INS-BCR/BCECO/DG/DPM/RNBB/2017/PI and n° 654, n° 655 and n° 656). In July, the government paid for a new IT-office (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a). The BCR reports that the AfDB made equipment available in July 2017, such as 104 computers and other IT equipment for the provincial census offices (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a).

⁴⁸ This approach was against donors' expectations. The common gold standard for digital census are tablets with CSPro [Census and Survey Processing System] Android, 'a kind of program used by the US Bureau of Census, free on the net ... Android becomes the tool for surveys and census, it goes fast, everyone who undertakes census, you just go to the web, and the people fix it, now it's the best of the best ... We want countries themselves to create their applications and to load their questionnaires in the devices' (Int. 25). The employee contrasted this with PDA that contain 'pre-programmed stuff inside, things you cannot change, even if you want to, it's not like Android as we know now' (Int. 25).

was a different understanding of ‘results’. For the World Bank, it means pre-enumeration areas, but in the pilot cartography’s terms of reference it means testing the chain of activities, which was indeed achieved (Int. 7). He also suggested that ‘the BCR did not provide the administrative limits,’ but that ‘without them it’s difficult to establish the pre-enumeration areas,’ and that the ‘BCR did not make the survey-dictionary available, which is necessary to make collected data via CSPro (Census and Survey Processing System) available to other software (e.g. Excel)’. He summed up that the BCR was not ready, which did not allow SINFIC to deliver the application on time. In fact, a SINFIC representative also argued that the BCR only had pre-enumeration areas for three sites, which explains why only three sites could be fully completed (Int. 28). Regarding the fieldwork, a key interview further attributes responsibility to the BCR’s Technical Coordinator who failed to correctly plan the fieldwork schedule. This meant not all enumeration areas could be finalised. Nonetheless, ‘three out of eight sites were completed. Since three were completed, we know that the application works. It was a time and planning problem’ (Int. 7). According to him, the INS reinterpreted the pilot cartography’s purpose, in the sense that it should provide pre-enumeration areas, to avoid losing the funding of the World Bank’s PRINS project. Pre-enumeration areas are necessary for the pilot census PRINS would co-fund. Finally, another donor representative argues that ‘It’s the World Bank experts who were in charge of the cartography, so that [the statement that there were no results, CB] seems a bit contradictory’ (Int. 27).

What was really at the base of the disagreement between the World Bank and other actors? If technical reasons can be nuanced, a look at human reasons can be helpful:

The person in charge at the World Bank entered the kitchen, although there had already been a chef ... It then depends more on a person than on an institution, in my opinion. Someone who comes from an institution, he needs to follow a thread that was there before he came ... He shouldn’t come and oppose the approach because he has new ideas, it then becomes too complex. (Int. 7)

Constructive challenges, change management, and constant adaptations to the context based on solid evidence can be productive. However, unilateral decisions on fundamental changes – in an already difficult context with many stakeholders – does not seem like a strategy rooted in values around partnership. Indeed, as a SINFIC employee claimed:

One of the great problems of this project was the indecisions. Or sometimes decisions that ran counter to previous decisions. Each chief technical advisor or consultant who arrived, had ideas of his own and questioned all that had been done. (Int. 28)

To substantiate his argument, he added that the World Bank’s change of leadership around 2014-2015, the changes and temporary absence of chief technical advisors – at least four until 2018 – and changes at the head of the BCR posed problems for a consistent methodological approach.

There is a fourth side that goes beyond the World Bank’s criticism, criticism of the World Bank, and high staff-turnover. As argued, the digitalisation process entailed massive changes for Congolese staff. People were exposed to technical elements they had little or no knowledge of and might struggle to increase their technical knowledge. Unfortunately, we were unable to speak to many BCR employees due to a restrictive environment. One insider described the atmosphere:

They wanted to go back to what they did in 1984, and that didn’t work. When you look at the IT-department in the BCR, there are many young people. These young people understand the cartography better than the cartographers ... They know how to deal with IT-equipment ... The cartographers complain that they have the impression that the IT-staff surpass them. It’s because the IT-staff understands the issues better than they do ... In the future, you have to overcome problems related to individuals, people who are afraid or who are proud, everyone wants results, but they do not want to cooperate to achieve these results. On top of the technical issues, there is a certain false passion and fear of the unknown. (Int. 7)

All of these aspects paint a more nuanced picture of the pilot cartography’s results than the World Bank’s report suggest. Nonetheless, the World Bank decided the following:

The mission has concluded that continuing working with the software developed by firm is risky and might not guarantee good quality data from the cartography. The project has hired international consultants that are working with the INS and the BCR to fix the above-mentioned problems. Another pilot is planned for September before the launch of the cartography at a large scale. (World Bank, 2017a)

6.5 Continuing with the private consortium

Nonetheless, at the beginning of 2018, the government continued to work with SINFIC. Both parties signed an accessory contract (*avenant*) on 15 January 2018, as SINFIC's requirements had significantly changed since the original contract from 2014 (Int. 7). The accessory contract covers \$5.1 million and carries the same name as the original contract.⁴⁹

However, SINFIC has been unable to take up new activities. Day zero, when SINFIC would effectively begin, did not arrive because several conditions were not met: 'One example among many, the BCR has not recruited all fieldwork staff. They are close to finishing; the government still has to pay BCECO. That's it, but it's been four months' (Int. 7). Although SINFIC did not progress significantly, they incurred various costs for their activities and travels. SINFIC advanced money; for example, to buy and install servers, which the government now has to reimburse (Int. 27). Indeed, 'there are outstanding bills to be paid to SINFIC, before that, nothing new will happen' (Int. 11). From the original contract over \$11.9 million, the government still owes SINFIC \$4 million (Int. 28). Indeed, SINFIC claims that the major reason why the census has not been achieved is indeed the government's lack of funding (Int. 28). Yet the BCR's reports from the end of 2017 reveal that the budget for the census had considerably changed. It increased from about \$140 million in 2012/2013 to about \$194 million, and the costs of the cartography increased from \$18 million in 2012/2013 (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2012) and \$33 million in 2014 (World Bank, 2015b) to \$44.5 million (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a). The World Bank's initial claim (World Bank, 2012b) that digitalisation would be cost-neutral was surpassed by reality.

6.6 A new player: GRID

Despite, or rather due to the lack of progress, a new player joined the census assemblage: 'Geo-Referenced Infrastructure and Demographic Data for Development' (GRID³). In December 2017, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and DFID awarded a grant to UNFPA, Flowminder/WorldPop and Columbia University's Center for International Earth Science Information Network for GRID³. After a first visit to the

DRC in November 2017, GRID³ undertook a mission between 9-13 February 2018 (UNFPA, 2018b). Subsequently, the BCR organised a 'review of pilot cartography' from 30 April-9 May 2018. UNFPA describes this trip:

Technical cartographic work was carried out with the team of cartographers of the BCR and a field visit was organized in Matadi from 6 to 8 May 2018, in the district of Dibua-Nsakala, where Enumeration Areas had been obtained in 2017. This fieldwork allowed the delegation to carry out geographic coordinates of structures as well as the boundaries of enumeration areas. Several strategies have been identified in the context of the improvement of future cartographic work, including: (i) the pursuit of outreach and proximity communication on the population census, (ii) the integration of benchmarks physical data on enumeration area maps, especially in densely populated areas, (iii) good distribution of work in field teams and (iv) tablet and computer security in sensitive areas. (UNFPA, 2018a)

In other words, the team verified enumeration areas that had been established automatically, according to population estimates (Int. 12). However, the available satellite images still were still not satisfactory (Int. 12). SINFIC also took part in this 'optimised mapping test exercise' (Int. 12) that 'requires that the entire chain works as stipulated in the methodology, i.e. servers installed, software completed and installed on the servers' (Int. 7). Usually GRID offers so-called hybrid censuses (Int. 12; see also Wardrop et al., 2018). However, the Congolese Ministry of Planning rejected a hybrid census and asked GRID to continue the normal census (Int. 12). A new consultant at UNFPA was very optimistic about GRID's involvement:

The census mapping was planned for 2018. In September/October the elections will already be felt in the country. We would like to finish our optimised tests before. They will take two, three months, including the reports. July, August, September, we will be done, everything will be ready, of course. (Int. 12)

While the entry of new players into the census assemblage implies continuous optimism, the World

⁴⁹ Prime Minister's Office: Fiche d'approbation Des Marchés Conclus, N° CAB/PM/CGPMP/ELN/2018/ Du 13 Février 2018

Bank is currently considering withdrawing the PDS's funding for the census cartography (Int. 7), due to a lack of progress. A World Bank report from April 2018 foreshadowed this development, downrating the project towards 'moderately unsatisfactory' (World Bank, 2018: 2). An AfDB employee claimed this was also due to the

fact the government had not paid SINIFIC's bills. Along similar lines, he complained the government has not significantly invested in the census for several years: 'We are punished ... We are about to sign contract for IT material [for the cartography], but does it make sense? I don't know' (Int. 27).

7 Conclusion: Managing fragility

Projects do not fail, they are failed by wider networks of support and validation (Mosse, 2004).

Twelve years after a working group began to prepare a population census in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the census project has still not been implemented. We therefore asked in this paper 'How have different stakeholders shaped the census project since 2006?

One interpretation is that the unaccomplished census project is a census project in name only: in reality, the census is perhaps not at all a public endeavour, rather a case of private interests vying to capture international resources. Indeed, a respectable string of literature on development projects proposes to explain such initiatives by *following the money at the moment the investment takes place*. In the DRC, this literature features Willame's (1986) analysis of white elephants like Inga or the metallurgy in Maluku or recent analyses of reform failure in the DRC (Englebert and Kasongo, 2016; Marysse and Megersa, 2018; Trefon, 2011).

And indeed, there are arguments for the view that, seen from this angle, we narrated the story of a highly successful project: BCR's monthly wages in 2018 make up around \$150,000 and monthly operational costs are at \$20,000-\$30,000 (Int. 6 and 7). The INS too, accumulated significant material resources through external support and the government's investment: According to online media, in August 2018 the Minister of Planning, Bahati, examined depots and reported about 100 4×4 cars, over 4,800 motorbikes, more than 5,000 bikes, 1,600 tablets and other equipment (ACPCongo (La Rédaction), 2018). More generally, the DRC accumulated a significant project portfolio around the census: \$13 million from the SRF Fund via the PRINS, \$45 million from the World Bank's PDS, \$12 million from the BAD's PAI-STATFIN, \$25 million from the BAD's PARDBS, and irregular funding through UNFPA.⁵⁰ The INS, for its part, received a so-called monthly census bonus (*prime censitaire*) of \$60,000 from BCR's budget. This funding came on top of other donor-funded support to the INS: since 2004 they financed at least nine surveys (see Appendix 2), each costing between \$2-\$6

⁵⁰ As mentioned, several people have shown resentments vis-à-vis UNFPA's support. Other than GRID3, UNFPA has made different contributions, such as funding consultants (a senior consultant/team supervisor, chief technical advisor and a consultant for the census mapping) (UNFPA, 2015), the training of staff, or the acquisition of sensitisation material (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a; UNFPA, 2015), but is nowhere close to spending the promised \$10-\$14 million on the census. On a side note, the Korean cooperation funded some technical training for the BCR (DRC/MinPlan/BCR, 2017a), but we cannot clearly show the time and purpose of this funding.

million (Thontwa et al., 2017). Regarding data-surveys, the INS has interacted with at least 25 private, donor and government actors (Thontwa et al., 2017). In fact, the DRC was a top recipient of statistics funding and obtained \$87 million between 2014-2016 (PARIS21, 2018: 21).

Yet, the census project is more than just a gigantic scam. First of all, whether the Congolese side got a net inflow of money is not at all certain. The details of a follow-the-money approach would also reveal that, to the extent the census mobilised international money, it also mobilised international quasi-public agents and private consultants to be paid by this money – or at least expecting to be paid by it. Secondly, most of the money consented by international donors was not disbursed and, in the end, the DRC government was perhaps the biggest finance source for Congolese salaries earned in the process. If the census was just a ‘masquerade’, hiding ‘the true human nature of personal and political intrigue’ (Trefon, 2011), the masquerade would have lured the Congolese partners, not the international donor community.

In this paper, we proposed to consider the project as an evolving assemblage of heterogeneous material and non-material elements. There is thus no need to explain the project’s *failure*: assemblages do indeed harbour all kinds of tensions and fissures, and the potential for failure is, as it were, built in. What needs to be analysed is how these tensions and fissures have been overcome.

The census was, in effect, not really a simple project. Purely by the number of actors involved, the census assemblage grew even more complex over the years. While some partners opted out, such as UNDP, others were made to join symbolically, such as China, and again others joined later on, such as GRID. In total, the INS interacted with more than 15 foreign agencies, more or less intensively. The INS has become a broker of the global developmental urge for data. But beyond the international public and private partners, there were other national-level partners. All of these agencies undoubtedly contributed to the census project with particular resources. However, they also have their own modes of functioning and their own agenda which can change over time, if only because individuals are replaced.

Furthermore, we would like to highlight three major

tensions that profoundly marked the trajectory of the census project.

The first tension revolved around **technology**.

Interestingly, if the initial Prodoc expressed a consensus, this consensus was also built on an ambiguity about the digital census methodology. A second Prodoc was drafted to specify this, and an alliance of international actors won the *discursive* battle about the contents of this new Prodoc. Their view also translated in the formal abolishment of the INS’s GTT and in the foundation of a new BCR though, *in practice*, things are less likely to change quickly. Eventually, the BCR was staffed with the same enumerators from the 1984 census (formerly employed at the GTT), hardly able to manage ITC equipment and many at retirement age. None of the census office’s core team in 2011 had ever organised a census, let alone a digital one. This tension also explains the involvement of a private international company, which led to a series of other problems.

There is no easy solution to this tension, but merely recognising there is no easy solution would perhaps already be helpful. As Latour’s protagonist argues, ‘People who talk about autonomy, irreversibility, and inertia in technology are criminals – never mind the purity of their motives’ (Latour, 1996).

The tenuous relation between the census and “**capital P politics**” (Janks, 2010) is a second obvious source of instability. We have analysed how the issue of the census (in actual fact, conditioning the elections on an accomplished census) became so hot that people demonstrated against it in 2015. The theme of the census already played an important role in the 2006 and 2011 elections. When he auto-proclaimed himself as the only rightful president after the rigged 2011 elections, Etienne Tshisekedi also announced organising a census⁵¹. Even in 1991, a kind of census with the goal of voter registration for municipal and provincial elections was supposed to ‘solve’ the problem of the ‘Banyarwanda’ in the East though, in actual fact, it had the opposite effect (Lubala Mugisho, 1998; Willame, 1997).

The census has frequently found itself at the centre of national political attention each time elections came up. While many might see such attention as a sign of political will or a sense of urgency that many other projects sorely

⁵¹ <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/59878/politique/rdc-tshisekedi-autoproclame-president-elu-veut-former-un-gouvernement/>. Thanks to Zoë Marriage for this remark (Marriage, 2018).

miss, the census makes clear that ‘capital P politics’ complicates it to the point of causing it to deviate too much from its initial goals. Indeed, when the project was defined as a condition for the 2016 elections, in reality, that would have meant it would have been postponed for an indeterminate period. In a sense, the political contestation of this coupling not only saved the electoral process, it also safeguarded the social space for a proper census. In any case, the ONIP story demonstrates the always-present risk of capture by outside interests, be they political or economic. *A high-quality census needs a healthy lack of political attention, even though it also evidently needs sufficient interest to invest resources in it.*

Thirdly, there is institutional heterogeneity, but there is also **personnel turnover**. The census project was haunted by problems that can only be understood by looking at this issue too. Staff turnover at state-level institutions is high and difficult to anticipate. There is, of course, no obvious necessity that government reshuffles should imply changing the heads of both the BCR and the INS. These changes occurring at the same time added to the problem. But at the side of international organisations, staff turnover is usually higher. *A change in international donors’ practices towards more lengthy expatriate mandates might allow more continuity and a better build-up of expertise.*

A change in the person in charge at the World Bank implied, for example, that the private partner was suddenly questioned and new elements were introduced in the methodology. But rapid personnel turnover is also problematic at a deeper level. According to Murray Li, ‘hard work’ is required ‘to draw heterogeneous elements together’. In part, this may be a question of ‘future positive’ thinking (Mosse, 2004) and enthusiasm, but in part, the hard work requires serious action. Mosse (2004) claims that ‘heterogeneous elements ... are tied together by translation of one kind or another into the material and conceptual order of a successful project’. Translation pre-supposes both the ability to identify different actors’ agendas and the active search for an overlap in these agendas. This kind of tacit knowledge is context-specific, it is difficult to transmit, and it takes time to build.

Latour argued that Aramis did not ‘die’ because technology failed, but because the actors were eventually *lost in translation*:

... you didn’t love me. You loved me as an idea ...

But in reality no one, during those years, could hold on to any trace of the reasons for producing me. You got yourselves all mixed up in your goals and strategies. Of what ends am I the means? Tell me! (Latour 1996)

In the census, a variety of state and non-state actors have upheld it as a valuable project for one and a half decades. Naïve ‘future positive’ thinking seems to be the most probable explanation for the additional investments by both the World Bank and the AfDB in 2015, in the face of substantial counter-evidence that their investments would be effective. To the extent that this was indeed the case, the census project was kept together for the wrong reasons. In this era of evidence-based development projects, donors do require knowledge from the census to build state capacities as well as for their own organisational purposes, such as evaluating their programmes. In other words, donors need the DRC state at least as much as the state needs them. But in circumstances where donors’ interests are important too, it is all the more important they are represented by experienced staff, both motivated and capable of engaging in the hard work of translation.

Finally, one might question the idea of the census as such. In a meta-evaluation of big dam projects all over the world, Ansar et al. (2017) argue that ‘big is fragile’ because big capital investments have a disproportionate exposure to all kinds of uncertainties. *Nevertheless, one way to realise big projects is to redesign them as a conglomerate of smaller projects.* Following this reasoning, the World Bank’s idea to use the cartography phase for a nearly complete enumeration can be seen as a *good-enough option* in this difficult context. We also reported the current involvement of a new actor, GRID, trying to add its expertise to the already high number of stakeholders involved. Another idea would be to evaluate the quality of territory-level administrative offices and then work upward – the idea of an administrative census. Unfortunately, this idea has fallen into disgrace due to ONIP’s activities in 2014/2015 and its resurrection would probably require serious investments in sensitisation. Alternatively, awaiting the completion of the census itself, researchers could try to use all existing sources and databases to gradually *narrow the range* within which the Congolese population can be situated. This includes, for example, national-level datasets like the UNICEF-vaccination study, voter registers, or data on schooling. Marivoet and De Herdt (2017) recently proposed this route for correcting the sampling frames of different recent national-level surveys.




- ACP Congo (La Rédaction) (2018) "Détermination Du Gouvernement Congolais à Réaliser Le Deuxième Recensement Général de La Population." *Agence Congolaise de Presse*. <http://acpcongo.com/acp/determination-du-gouvernement-congolais-a-realiser-le-deuxieme-recensement-general-de-la-population/?wpapppushconfig=1>.
- AfDB (2013a) *Democratic Republic of Congo. Country Strategy Paper 2013-2017*. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/CAMEROON_2010-2014_COUNTRY_STRATEGY_PAPER.pdf.
- AfDB (2013b) "Projet d'appui Institutionnel En Statistique et Aux Finances Publiques (PAI-STATFIN). RDC. Rapport d'évaluation."
- AfDB (2013c) *Rapport d'évaluation. Projet d'Appui Institutionnel En Statistique et Aux Finances Publiques (PAI-STATFIN)*.
- AfDB (2014a) *DRC General Population Census and Social Databases Consolidation Support Project*.
- AfDB (2014b) *Projet d'Appui Au Recensement Général de La Population et Au Renforcement Des Bases de Données Sociales (PARDBS). Annexes Techniques*.
- Afristat (2012) *Projet de Rapport d'activité 2011*. <http://www.afristat.org/contenu/pdf/afristat/rapact2011.pdf>.
- Agence Congolaise de Presse (2016) "La RDC En Quête Des Données Sociodémographiques Fiables et Actuelles." <http://acpcongo.com/acp/rdc-quete-donnees-sociodemographiques-fiables-actuelles/>
- Ansar, A. Flyvbjerg, B. Budzier, A. and Lunn D. (2017) "Big Is Fragile: An Attempt at Theorizing Scale." In *The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 60–95.
- Bédécarrats, F. Cling, J.-P. and Roubaud, F. (2016) "Gouverner Par Les Nombres. Révolution Des Données et Enjeux de La Statistique En Afrique. Introduction Thématique." *Afrique contemporaine* (258): 9–23.
- Boisselet, P. (2015) "RDC : Et Maintenant, Le Recensement ?" *Jeune Afrique*. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/34196/politique/rdc-et-maintenant-le-recensement/>
- Bukasa, T. (2017) "Mbanza-Ngungu : Réunion d'experts Pour Définir Une Nouvelle Méthodologie de Recensement de La Population." *Actualité*. <https://actualite.cd/2017/08/22/mbanza-ngungu-reunion-dexperts-definir-nouvelle-methodeologie-de-recensement-de-population/>
- Dekker, A. (2001) *Adapting New Technologies to Census Operations*. New York, NY: Symposium on Global Review of 2000 Round of Population and Housing Censuses: Mid-Decade Assessment and Future Prospects; Statistics Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/docs/symposium_06.htm.
- DRC/Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics (2012) *Évaluation Du Système de Passation Des Marchés Publics En République Démocratique Du Congo Selon Méthodologie OADR*.
- DRC/BCECO (2016) "Rapport Annuel 2016."
- DRC/MinPlan/BCR (2012) *Deuxième Recensement Général de La Population et de l'Habitat En RD Congo. Document Du Projet (Décembre 2012)*.
- DRC/MinPlan/BCR (2013a) *Deuxième Recensement Général de La Population et de l'Habitat En RD Congo. Note de Plaidoyer (Avril 2013)*.
- DRC/MinPlan/BCR (2013b) *Rapport d'Activités 2012 (Pour La Commission Nationale Du Recensement)*. Kinshasa: Ministère du Plan et Suivi de la mise oeuvre de la Révolution de la Modernité. Institut National de la Statistique. Bureau Central du Recensement.
- DRC/MinPlan/BCR (2014) *Compte Rendu de La Réunion Entre Les Cadres de l'INS/BCR et de l'ONIP Du 10 Décembre 2014*. Kinshasa: Bureau Central du Recensement.
- DRC/MinPlan/BCR (2017a) *Bulletin Du RGPH2*. Kinshasa: INS/BCR.
- DRC/MinPlan/BCR (2017b) *Procès-Verbal de l'atelier d'examen et d'adoption de l'approche Définitive de Mise En Oeuvre de La Cartographie Du RGPH2. Du 21 Au 26 Août, Kola (Mbanza-Ngungu), Province Du Kongo-Central/RDC*.
- DRC/MinPlan/Cellule de Gestion des Projets et des Marchés Publics (2013) *Procès-Verbal Des Négociations Relatives Au Recrutement d'un Consultant En Appui Au Bureau Central Du Recensement Pour l'Organisation Du 2ème Recensement Général de La Population et de l'Habitat (RGPH2)*.
- DRC/MinPlan/INS (2005) "Feuille de Route Pour l'élaboration de La Stratégie Nationale de Développement de a Statistique En République Démocratique Du Congo." <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/dnss/docViewer.aspx?docID=2237%0A%0A>.
- DRC/MinPlan/INS (2009) *Deuxième Recensement Général de La Population et de l'Habitat En RD Congo. Document Du Projet (Décembre 2009)*.
- DRC/MinPlan/INS (2012) *Stratégie Nationale de Développement de La Statistique (SNS) 2012/13-2017*. Kinshasa: Institut National de la Statistique.
- DRC/MinPlan/INS (2015) *Annuaire Statistique 2014*.
- DRC/MinPlan (2011) *Document de La Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de La Pauvreté (DSCR 2, 2011-2015) [Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper] Volume 1*. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/RDC_-_2011-2015_-_Document_de_stratégie_de_réduction_de_la_pauvreté.pdf.
- DRC/MinPlan (2013a) *Programme d'actions Prioritaires 2012-16 [PAP Renforcé]*.
- DRC/MinPlan (2013b) *Second Generation Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, October 2011*. Washington, D.C.: IMF. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13226.pdf>.
- DRC/MinPlan (2013c) *Synthèse de La Méthodologie Cartographique (Juin 2013)*.
- DRC/MinPlan (2014) *Contrat de Prestation Intellectuelle Nr 001/2014. Recrutement Du Consultant En Appui Au Bureau Central Du Recensement Pour l'organisation de La Cartographie Censitaire et Du Recensement Pilote Du RGPH2*. MinPlan. Cellule de Gestion des Projets et Marchés Publics.
- DRC (2006) *Document de La Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de La Pauvreté [Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper]*.
- Englebert, P. (2016) "Congo Blues. Scoring Kabila's Rule." *Atlantic Council Africa Center. Issue Brief May*. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/congo-blues-scoring-kabila-s-rule>
- Englebert, P. and Kasongo, E. (2016) "Misguided and Misdiagnosed: The Failure of Decentralization Reforms in the DR Congo." *African Studies Review* 59(1): 5–32.
- Forum des As (2017) "Vingt Ans Après La Chute de Feu Le Maréchal Mobutu. Toujours Pas de Carte d'identité Nationale En RD Congo !" <http://forumdesas.org/spip.php?article13857>

- Glassman, A. et al (2014) *Delivering on the Data Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa. Final Report of the Data for African Development Working Group*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.
- Harari, Y. N. (2014) *Sapiens. A Brief History of Humankind*. London: Random House.
- Janks, H. (2010) *Literacy and Power*. New York: Routledge.
- Kalambayi, B. (2012) *Evaluation Du 3ème Programme Pays de l'UNFPA En RDC (2008-2012)*. Kinshasa: UNFPA; Département de Démographie de l'Université de Kinshasa. <https://web2.unfpa.org/public/about/oversight/evaluations/docDownload.unfpa?docId=122>.
- Krätke, F. and Byiers, B. (2014) "The Political Economy of Official Statistics. Implications for the Data Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa." *PARIS21 Discussion Paper* 5.
- Latour, B. (1996) *Aramis or the Love of Technology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Le Soft Online (2014) "L'Office Nationale de l'Identification de La Population. Lumanu Recherche Un Demi-Milliard de Dollars Pour l'ONIP."
- Li, T. M. (2005) "Beyond 'the State' and Failed Schemes." *American Anthropologist* 107(3): 383–94.
- Li, T. M. (2007a) "Practices of Assemblage and Community Forest Management." *Economy and Society* 36(2): 263–93.
- Li, T. M. (2007b) *The Will to Improve. Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Lopez-Escartin, N. (1992) *Données de Base Sur La Population : Zaïre*. Paris: Centre Français sur la Population et le Développement.
- Lubala Mugisho, E. (1998) "La Situation Politique Au Kivu: Vers Une Dualisation de La Société." In *L'Afrique Des Grands Lacs 1997-1998*, Paris: Harmattan, 307–33.
- Marivoet, W. and De Herdt, T. (2014) "Reliable, Challenging or Misleading? A Qualitative Account of the Most Recent National Surveys and Country Statistics in the DRC." *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 35(1): 97–119.
- Marivoet, W. and De Herdt, T. (2017) "Tracing Down Real Socio-Economic Trends From Household Data With Erratic Sampling Frames: The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 53(4): 532–552.
- Marriage, Z. (2018) "The Elephant in the Room: Offshore Companies, Liberalisation and Extension of Presidential Power in DR Congo." *Third World Quarterly* 39(5): 889–905.
- Marysse, S. and Megersa, K. (2018) "Real Governance in the DRC (2003-2016): Between Reforms and White Elephants." *IOB Working Paper* 8.
- Mbiydzanyuy, A. G. (2012) "Supporting Census Cartography in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)." In *African Statistical Newsletter*, Economic Commission for Africa. African Centre for Statistics, 37–39.
- Mbuyi, B. (2013) "Recensement. Le Gouvernement Décide de Réussir Le RGPH2." *Emergence [édité par le Ministère du Plan et suivi et mise en oeuvre de la Révolution de Modernité]* 1: 18–20.
- Mosse, David (2004) "Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice." *Development and Change* 35(4): 639–71.
- Mosse, D. and Lewis, D. (2006) "Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage and Translation in Development." In *Development Brokers And Translators: The Ethnography of Aid And Agencies*, eds. David Lewis and David Mosse. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian, 1–26.
- Mukunda, P. (2013) "La DPRH En Amont." *Emergence [édité par le Ministère du Plan et suivi et mise en oeuvre de la Révolution de Modernité]* 1: 21–22.
- Munsala Buakasa, D. (2011) "L'état d'avancement Du Recensement de La Population Passé Au Peigne Fin." *patcox21*. <https://patcox21.wordpress.com/2011/06/27/letat-davancement-du-recensement-de-la-population-passe-au-peigne-fin/>
- Ndiba Kayumba, M. (2006) "Expérience Du Recensement Passé et Projet Pour Le Prochain Recensement En République Démocratique Du Congo." *Atelier des Nations-Unies sur le Programme Mondial de 2010 concernant les Recensements de la Population et de l'Habitat (RGH2), Bamako, Mali, du 6 au 9 novembre 2006*. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/censusb20/Attachments/2006COD_Report2-GUID9d6bcb71b61541879bb526c5422466d7.pdf.
- Ndiba Kayumba, M. (2007) *Etat Des Lieux de La Préparation Du 2ème Recensement Général de La Population et de l'Habitat En RDC*. 2007 Africa Symposium on Statistical Development (Kigali, 15-19 January 2007). <https://www.slideserve.com/aimee/2007-africa-symposium-on-statistical-development-kigali-rwanda-15-19-january-2007>.
- Ndiba Kayumba, M. (2008) "Etat de Préparation Du 2ème Recensement Général de La Population et de l'Habitat En RDC, Bamako, Mali, 3-7 Novembre 2008." *Atelier régional des Nations-Unies sur le traitement des données du recensement : les technologies modernes pour la saisie et correction des données*.
- Ntambwe Wenda, N. (2006) "Quelques Réflexions Sur La Méthodologie Relative à l'application de Principes et Recommandations Concernant Les Recensements de La Population et de l'habitation. 2ème Révision En République Démocratique Du Congo." *Atelier des Nations-Unies sur le Programme Mondial de 2010 concernant les Recensements de la Population et de l'Habitat (RGH2), Bamako, Mali, du 6 au 9 novembre 2006*. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/censusb20/Attachments/2006COD_Report-GUID51cf4414d409c8cb599f1adf69499.pdf.
- ODSEF (2014) "Numérisation En RDC : Mission Accomplie." *Observatoire démographique et statistique de l'espace francophone*. https://www.odsef.fss.ulaval.ca/Num_RDC_Accomplie
- PARIS21 (2018) *Partner Report on Support to Statistics* Press 2018. Secretariat of the Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century.
- Le Phare (2014) "Recensement : Les Opérations de Cartographie Démarrent Ce Lundi." <http://www.lephareonline.net/recensement-les-operations-cartographie-demarrent-ce-lundi/>
- PNUD, and INS (1991) "Zaire: Un Aperçu Démographique. Résultats Du Recensement Scientifique." *Zaire-Afrique* (255): 229–61.
- Le Présidium des Concertations Nationales (2013) *Les Concertations Nationales. Rapport Général Des Travaux. Palais Du Peuple, Kinshasa, 05 Octobre 2013*.
- PricewaterhouseCoopers (2017) *Rapport de l'Auditeur Indépendant Sur Les Etats Financiers Du Projet de Développement Des Statistiques Au 31 Décembre 2016*.
- Quatenus (n.d.) "Census Project in D.R.Congo Starts Its Crucial Methodological Testing Phase." http://www1.quatenus.co.mz/quatenuser/display?numero=36641&opt=36525&news_23.
- Radio Okapi (2009) "Un Nouveau bâtiment Pour Le Bureau National de Recensement." <https://www.radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2009/10/15/kinshasa-un-nouveau-batiment-pour-le-bureau-national-de-recensement>.
- Radio Okapi (2012) "La Députée Jaynet Kabila Recommande Matata Ponyo de Recenser La Population." <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/05/10/rdc-la-deputee-jaynet-kabila-recommande-matata-ponyo-de-recenser-la-population/>
- Radio Okapi (2013a) "Matata Ponyo Demande Aux Ministres de Gérer Les Affaires Courantes." <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/10/26/rdc-matata-ponyo-demande-aux-ministres-de-gerer-les-affaires-courantes>.
- Radio Okapi (2013b) "Recensement En RDC. Le Ministère Du Plan Annonce Le Début de l'élaboration de La Cartographie." <https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/09/12/recensement-en-rdc-le-ministere-du-plan-annonce-le-debut-de-l-elaboration-de-la-cartographie>
- Richard, L. Kapagama, P. and Marcoux, R. (2014) *Préservation Des Données de l'unique Recensement de La République Démocratique Du Congo : Une Action Internationale de Sauvegarde Du Patrimoine Démographique [Congrès de l'ACFAS, 15 Mai 2014, Université Concordia, Montréal]*. Observatoire démographique et statistique de l'espace francophone.
- de Saint Moulin, L. (1974) "La Répartition de La Population Du Zaïre En 1970." *Cultures et Développement* 6: 331–49.
- de Saint Moulin, L. (1990) "What Is Known of the Demographic History of Zaïre since 1885?" In *Demography from Scanty Evidence. Central Africa in the Colonial Area*, ed. Bruce Fetter. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 299–326.
- de Saint Moulin, L. (1991) "Note de La Rédaction : Présentation Synthétique Du Document INS-PNUD Sur Le Recensement de 1984." *Zaire-Afrique-Afrique* (255): 227–28.

- Schlichte, K. (2018) "A Historical Sociological Perspective on Statehood (Not Final Version)." In *The Oxford Handbook on Governance and Limited Statehood*, eds. Tanja Börzel, Anke Draude, and Thomas Risse. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Simons, C. (2015) "Democratic Republic of the Congo." In *Africa Yearbook. Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2014*, eds. Sebastian Elischer, Rolf Hofmeier, Andreas Mehler, and Henning Melber. Leiden: Brill.
- Stearns, J. K. (2014) "A Controversial Census with a Hefty Price Tag." *Congo Siasa*. <http://congosiasa.blogspot.de/2014/>
- The Carter Center (2011) *Presidential and Legislative Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. Atlanta: The Carter Center.
- Thontwa, S. K. De Herdt, T. Marivoet, W. and Ulimwengu, J. (2017) "National Datasets on Livelihoods in the DRC : Precisely Wrong or Vaguely Right ?" *IOB Working Paper 12*.
- Trefon, T. (2011) *Congo Masquerade. The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure*. London: Zed Books.
- UNDP (n.d.) *Appui Au Système Statistique National [DRC, 2008-2012, Two Pages of Project Description]*.
- UNFPA (2011) *Rapport Annuel 2011 [RDC]*. Kinshasa: UNFPA-RDC.
- UNFPA (2013) *Quatrième Programme de Coopération RDC-UNFPA. Plan d'Actions Du Programme Pays 2013-2017*.
- UNFPA (2015) *Democratic Republic of Congo. Key Results: Fourth UNFPA Country Programme*. New York, NY: UNFPA.
- UNFPA (2018a) "2nd General Census of Population and Housing in DRC: Evaluation of Pilot Cartography." <http://drc.unfpa.org/en/news/2nd-general-census-population-and-housing-drc-evaluation-pilot-cartography>
- UNFPA (2018b) "Estimation de La Population Dans Les Pays sans Recensement Récent de La Population Mission GRID, Kinshasa Du 9 Au 13 Février 2018." <http://drc.unfpa.org/en/node/30874>
- United Nations (2009) *Handbook on Geospatial Infrastructure in Support of Census Activities*. New York, NY: UN, Studies in Methods, Series F No. 103.
- United Nations Statistics Division (2017) *Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses - Revision 3*.
- Waka-Sakrini, A. (2003) "Problématique Du Dénombrement et de l'identification Démographique Pré-Électorales." *Journal of African Elections* 2(1): 99–104.
- Wardrop, N. A. Jochem, W.C Bird, T.J. Chamberlain, H.R. Clarke, D. Kerr, D. Bengtsson, L. Juran, S. Seanman, V. and Tatem, A.J. (2018) "Spatially Disaggregated Population Estimates in the Absence of National Population and Housing Census Data." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115(14): 3529–37.
- Willame, J.-C. (1986) *Zaire, l'épopée d'Inga. Chronique d'une Prédation Industrielle*. Paris: Harmattan.
- Willame, J.-C. (1997) *Banyarwanda et Banyamulenge: Violences Ethniques et Gestion de l'identitaire Au Kivu*. Bruxelles: Institut Africain/Harmattan.
- World Bank (2011a) *Project Information Document (PID), Concept Stage. Strengthening the DRC Statistical System. Report No. AB6494*. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/133081468246639109/Congo-Democratic-Republic-of-Strengthening-the-DRC-Statistical-System-Project>.
- World Bank (2011b) *Statistics for Results Facility. Catalytic Fund. Annual Report 2011*. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/data/statistical-capacity-building/statistics-for-results-facility-catalytic-fund#5>.
- World Bank (2012a) *Democratic Republic of Congo. Joint IDA-IMF Staff Advisory Note on the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper 2011-15 [Report No. 72059-ZR]*. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/665501468026111694/Democratic-Republic-of-Congo-Joint-IDA-IMF-staff-advisory-note-on-the-second-poverty-reduction-strategy-paper-2011-2015>.
- World Bank (2012b) *Statistics for Results Facility. Catalytic Fund. Annual Report 2012*. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/data/statistical-capacity-building/statistics-for-results-facility-catalytic-fund#5>.
- World Bank (2013) *Statistics for Results Facility. Catalytic Fund. Annual Report 2013*. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/data/statistical-capacity-building/statistics-for-results-facility-catalytic-fund#5>.
- World Bank (2014a) *Implementation Status & Results, DRC Catalytic Project to Strengthen the INS (P125509). Report No: ISR16704*. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/454631468261919579/Congo-Democratic-Republic-of-DRC-Catalytic-Project-to-Strengthen-the-INS-P125509-Implementation-Status-Results-Report-Sequence-01>.
- World Bank (2014b) *Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of US\$11.8 Million to the Democratic Republic of Congo for a Catalytic Project to Strengthen the National Statistical Institute, May 16, 2014*. Local copy, unavailable online.
- World Bank (2014c) *Statistics for Results Facility. Catalytic Fund. Annual Report 2014*. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/data/statistical-capacity-building/statistics-for-results-facility-catalytic-fund#5>.
- World Bank (2015a) *Implementation Status & Results Report, DRC Catalytic Project to Strengthen the INS (P125509). Report No.19456*. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/434861468026105557/Congo-Democratic-Republic-of-DRC-Catalytic-Project-to-Strengthen-the-INS-P125509-Implementation-Status-Results-Report-Sequence-02>.
- World Bank (2015b) *Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 32 Million (US\$45 Equivalent) to the Democratic Republic of Congo for a Statistics Development Project*. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/901781468000617438/pdf/PAD1142-PAD-P150148-IDA-R2015-0225-1-Box393177B-OUO-9.pdf>.
- World Bank (2016a) *Digital Dividends (World Development Report 2016)*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- World Bank (2016b) *Implementation Status & Results Report, DRC Statistics Development Project, No.ISR24800*. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/711011475524501873/Congo-Democratic-Republic-of-DRC-Statistics-Development-Project-P150148-Implementation-Status-Results-Report-Sequence-02>.
- World Bank (2016c) *Statistics for Results Facility. Catalytic Fund. Annual Report 2016*. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/data/statistical-capacity-building/statistics-for-results-facility-catalytic-fund#5>.
- World Bank (2017a) *Implementation Status & Results Report, DRC Statistics Development Project, No.ISR28656*. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/322511499737907112/Congo-Democratic-Republic-of-DRC-Statistics-Development-Project-P150148-Implementation-Status-Results-Report-Sequence-03>.
- World Bank (2017b) *Statistics for Results Facility. Catalytic Fund. Annual Report 2017*. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/data/statistical-capacity-building/statistics-for-results-facility-catalytic-fund#5>.
- World Bank (2018) *Implementation Status & Results Report, DRC Statistics Development Project, No.ISR31431*. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/604651523557028721/Disclosable-Version-of-the-ISR-DRC-Statistics-Development-Project-P150148-Sequence-No-04>.
- WSP, and World Bank (2011) *Delivering Water Supply and Sanitation in Fragile States. Conference Report, 3rd-5th May, 2011, Nairobi, Kenya*. <https://www.wsp.org/sites/wsp/files/publications/Delivering-WSS-in-Fragile-States.pdf>.

Appendix 1: Main actors in the census



The timeline provides only a rough overview. For some actors it was difficult to indicate a time. For example, South Korea also contributed financially, but we were unable to identify the year(s). The *Primature* was involved more frequently than 2013, but 2013 was by far the year of its strongest involvement. The World PRINS is funded through a multi-donor trust fund that includes, among others, investment by DFID. Finally, the blue areas relate to actors whose envisaged involvement remained marginal or did not materialise at all.

Appendix 2: Census-specific donor projects



World Bank

Catalytic Project to Strengthen the National Statistical Institute (*Projet Catalytique pour le Renforcement de l'Institut National de la Statistique, PRINS*)

November 2010	Approval of grant by Statistics For Results Facility Council
2011	Project Information Document
February 2013	Project appraisal
March 2014	Approval by the board of the World Bank
May 2014	Project Appraisal Document
January 2015	Project becomes effective
February-October 2017 [unclear]	Type Two Restructuring (Results framework)
June 2017	Type One Restructuring and end of support to census
30 June 2017	Expected closing date (as of 2015)

Statistics Development Project (*Projet de Développement des Statistiques, PDS*)

August 2015	Project appraisal document
October 2015	Grant agreement
June 2016	Project effectiveness
October 2018	Reflections about withdrawing / freezing funding

African Development Bank

General Population Census and Social Databases Consolidation Support Project (*Projet d'Appui au Recensement Général de la Population et au Renforcement des Bases de Données Sociales, PARDBS*)

August 2014	Supposed beginning
May 2015	Signature of contract
2016	Decision to co-fund the cartography
December 2017	Supposed end
June 2019	New end after extension

n.b.: UNFPA, the third major donor, does not work through projects.

Appendix 3: Data surveys in the DRC



Year	Name
1988	Budget and consumption study
1995	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 1
2001	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2
2004-2005	Survey 1-2-3
2007	Demographic and Health Survey 1
2007-2008	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
2010	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 4
2011-2012	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
2012	Out-of-School children
2012-2013	Survey 1-2-3
2013-2014	Demographic and Health Survey 2
2018	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 5 [envisaged]
2018	Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire [envisaged]

Source: Thontwa et al. (2017) and interviews

Appendix 4: Interviews



The list of interviews is anonymised. As the number of key people involved in the census is limited, to ensure maximum anonymity, we decided not to list functions or posts, but only the organisation. Also, we only provide the months in which we conducted the research and not the precise date. The letters 'a-e' behind interview numbers imply interviews with the same person.

No.	Date (2018)	Organisation
1	January	INS
2	January	CAID
3	February	UNICEF
4	March	UCC
5	March	INS
6a	March	Ministry of the Interior
7a	March	World Bank
8	March	IFOD
9	March	INS
10	March	BCR
6b	March	Ministry of the Interior
11a	March	BCR
7b	March	World Bank
12a	March	UNFPA
13	March	Agency for Meteorology and Remote Satellite Sensing
14	March	Congolese Geographic Institut
15	March	BCR
16	March	AfDB
6c	March	Ministry of the Interior
17	May	IFOD
18	May	Institut Géographique du Congo
19a	May	INS
19b	May	INS
20	May	BCC
21	May	Independent
7c	May	World Bank
22	May	BCR
11b	May	BCR
12b	May	UNFPA
7d	May	World Bank
23	July	DFID

On the political economy of data collection

24	July	GRID
25a	October	UNFPA
25b	October	UNFPA
7e	November	World Bank
26	November	Commission of the European Union
27	November	African Development Bank
28	November	SINFIC



SLRC publications present information, analysis and key policy recommendations on issues relating to livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict affected situations. This and other SLRC publications are available from www.securelivelihoods.org. Funded by UK aid from the UK Government, Irish Aid and the EC.

Disclaimer: The views presented in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the UK Government's official policies or represent the views of Irish Aid, the EC, SLRC or our partners. ©SLRC 2019

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from SLRC for their own publications. As copyright holder SLRC requests due acknowledgement.

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
203 Blackfriars Road
London SE1 8NJ
United Kingdom

T +44 (0)20 3817 0031
F +44 (0)20 7922 0399
E slrc@odi.org.uk
www.securelivelihoods.org
[@SLRCtweet](https://twitter.com/SLRCtweet)

Cover photo: A partial aerial view of the town of Bukavu, capital of South Kivu province, DR Congo.
© MONUSCO/Force.