Researching livelihoods and services affected by conflict

Livelihoods, basic services and social protection in South Sudan

Working Paper 1
Daniel Maxwell, Kirsten Gelsdorf and Martina Santschi
July 2012
About us

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) aims to generate a stronger evidence base on how people make a living, educate their children, deal with illness and access other basic services in conflict-affected situations (CAS). Providing better access to basic services, social protection and support to livelihoods matters for the human welfare of people affected by conflict, the achievement of development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and international efforts at peace- and state-building.

At the centre of SLRC’s research are three core themes, developed over the course of an intensive one-year inception phase:

- State legitimacy: experiences, perceptions and expectations of the state and local governance in conflict-affected situations
- State capacity: building effective states that deliver services and social protection in conflict-affected situations
- Livelihood trajectories and economic activity under conflict

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is the lead organisation. SLRC partners include the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Sri Lanka, Feinstein International Center (FIC, Tufts University), the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Pakistan, Disaster Studies of Wageningen University (WUR) in the Netherlands, the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

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<td>AREU</td>
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<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Building Resources Across Communities</td>
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<td>BSF</td>
<td>Basic Services Fund</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Conflict-affected Situation</td>
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<td>CBS</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<td>CBTF</td>
<td>Capacity Building Trust Fund</td>
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<td>CEPA</td>
<td>Centre for Poverty Analysis</td>
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<td>CFSAM</td>
<td>Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>CIAT</td>
<td>International Center for Tropical Agriculture</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Management Information System</td>
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<td>EMOP</td>
<td>Emergency Operation</td>
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<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Educational Management Information System</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FEWS NET</td>
<td>Famine Early Warning System</td>
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<td>Food for Training and Income Generation</td>
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<td>FSTS</td>
<td>Food Security Technical Secretariat</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>HSBA</td>
<td>Human Security Baseline Assessment</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>JAM</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MAF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry</td>
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<td>Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-donor Trust Fund</td>
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<td>MICS</td>
<td>Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey</td>
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<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
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<td>MoEST</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Science and Technology</td>
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<td>MoGCSW</td>
<td>Ministry of Gender, Culture and Social Welfare</td>
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<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>MOHADM</td>
<td>Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management</td>
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<td>National Baseline Household Survey</td>
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<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>NER</td>
<td>Net Enrolment Ratio</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>Norad</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>NCCR</td>
<td>Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research</td>
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OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OLS Operational Lifeline Sudan
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PSDP Private Sector Development Project
RIEP Rapid Impact Emergency Project
RRC Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
RRP Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme
SAF Sudan Armed Forces
SAS Small Arms Survey
STCM Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation
SDPI Sustainable Development Policy Institute
SHHS Sudan Household Survey
SIFSIA Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action
SLRC Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises
SPA Strategic Partnership Arrangement
SPLA/M Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement
SRF Sudan Recover Fund
SSCCSE Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation
SSRRC Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SSSA South Sudan Seed System Security Assessment
SSLC Southern Sudan Land Commission
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNEP UN Environment Programme
UNFPA UN Population Fund
UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR UN High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF UN Children's Fund
UNMIS UN Mission in Sudan
US United States
USAID US Agency for International Development
USIP US Institute of Peace
USDA US Department of Agriculture
VAM Vulnerability Assessment Mapping
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WCS Wildlife Conservation Society
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
WNPOC White Nile Petroleum Operating Company
WRAPP Water for Recovery and Peace Programme
WUR Wageningen University
Preface

This paper is one of a series of evidence papers produced by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) as part of its inception phase (January 2011 – March 2012). Seven country evidence papers have been produced (Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Uganda and DRC) and are supported by two global evidence papers focusing on social protection and basic services, and growth and livelihoods respectively. Each paper systematically explores and assesses the available evidence about livelihoods, social protection and basic services in the country. The papers do not attempt to generate new data, nor produce new analyses. Rather they assess what is already known and review the quality of the current evidence base. The papers, along with a series of global and country-based stakeholder holder consultations, have been used to formulate the future research agenda of the SLRC.

This paper was written by Daniel Maxwell, Kirsten Gelsdorf and Martina Santschi. The authors are grateful to John Parker, Gogi Grewal, Melita Sawyer, Kimo Adiebo and Emily Spears-Meers for research assistance provided during the development of the paper and for their comments on earlier versions of the paper. Responsibility for the arguments and views presented in the paper lie with the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of SLRC partner organisations or the UK Department for International Development (DFID) which funds the SLRC.
Executive summary

On 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became the world’s newest country. The realisation of the South’s independence came after nearly four decades of a civil war that devastated the lives and livelihoods of the South Sudanese. The consequences of the long conflict on people’s lives, livelihoods and access to basic services were devastating, and the new country faces massive challenges in overcoming these.

This paper summarises the existing literature on livelihoods, basic services and social protection in South Sudan; presents a brief analysis of this literature, its strengths and its gaps; and lays out potential research questions for the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC). It provides a brief overview of the country and the impact of the conflict with the North between 1955 and the present. Some 2 million people were killed in the conflict, and twice that many were displaced — either internally or internationally as refugees. These groups have been returning to South Sudan since 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, making return and reintegration one of the major policy concerns of the new government in Juba. But the war also took a heavy toll on the lives and livelihoods of those who were not displaced, or who were displaced locally.

And the legacy of the conflict lives on. Militias, widely believed to be supported by the regime in Khartoum, continue to harass local populations in South Sudan, and recent fighting in the ‘three areas’ — areas close to the border of South Sudan but not within its current border (particularly Abyei and South Kordofan) — has increased tensions with Khartoum and, in some cases, led to refugee crises in border areas.

Against this background, livelihood recovery has begun across South Sudan. Livelihood systems were mapped out during the war, under a joint arrangement between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). This mapping continues to serve as the basis for analysis in the post-war period. Beyond the lingering conflicts, several major factors impinge on livelihood recovery. The first of these is rapid urbanisation, especially among youth, males and returnee populations. The second is a major influx of foreigners after the war, looking for economic opportunity. While in some ways an asset in terms of the skills they have brought, these actors are quickly coming to be perceived as crowding less educated Southern Sudanese out of the labour market in their own country. The third is the limited capacity and major demands made on the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). The new government has, in many ways, coped well with the tumultuous situation, but faces many capacity constraints. Fourth, the majority of the oil in Sudan is in South Sudan, but the pipeline goes through the North. This is a cause of ongoing tensions. And, while oil serves as a source of badly needed revenue, its impact on local livelihood systems is mixed, and largely not positive. Fifth, there are multiple customary land tenure systems in the new country and, while land is relatively plentiful, the issue of access and tenure — as well as land dispute resolution — remains significant. Other factors include limited rural infrastructure and markets; a very challenging communications infrastructure; and limitations to the rule of law in remote parts of the country. On the positive side, land under production has expanded rapidly; the informal economy, particularly in urban and peri-urban area, has grown quickly; new policies are being crafted and put into place (although implementation of these remains an unknown); and the country enjoys international goodwill and donor support.

Livelihood recovery initiatives are underway — mostly led either by government or by aid agencies. The private sector is very limited, however. People-led initiatives include the massive spontaneous return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees: while there are formal return programmes that provide assistance, most South Sudanese have returned to their place of origin without the benefit of these. Basic services are minimal: South Sudan has some of the worst recorded statistics globally for basic health. The new Constitution guarantees the right to an education, but implementation of this is a major challenge, with currently less than 2 percent of the population having even completed a primary school education. The provision of access to potable water is a similar challenge. GoSS is clearly

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1 During much of its history, the current Republic of South Sudan was a region within the Republic of Sudan, variously referred to as Southern Sudan, South Sudan, ‘the South,’ etc. For the purposes of consistency, we use South Sudan throughout this paper.
prioritising the provision of some of these services, but is still preoccupied with security — and indeed the provision of security is viewed as a basic service.

In this context, social protection programmes have largely not yet taken off, in spite of the clear need for them. There have been several successful pilot programmes utilising cash transfers to vulnerable households, explicitly about addressing chronic vulnerability (i.e. not in response to a humanitarian emergency), and these could perhaps chart a course for future social protection interventions. Other initiatives focus largely on improving access to basic services and, again, are mostly either government led or implemented by external agencies (UN and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)).

For a new country just emerging from nearly a half century of violent conflict, South Sudan has relatively good data systems and analytical capacity. But major challenges remain in terms evidence on which to base policies and programmes. Good monitoring systems on food security and livelihoods were developed during the war, but these tend to remain focused on fairly short-term outcomes. A national household survey has been conducted, and an annual statistical yearbook is now available, but the utilisation of these data for policymaking and the generation of other, complementary research that fleshes out some of the issues behind statistical indicators remain challenges. Since the war, there has been only limited research into people-led initiatives, for example little comparative analysis of livelihoods or social protection and very little assessment of the impact of the various initiatives being undertaken to rebuild livelihoods.

This raises several questions for further investigation. There is little evidence for use in policy and programme formulation, and numerous questions around the nature of return and reintegration. With regard to social protection-type programmes, there are fears about returning to an ‘OLS approach’ that is equated with free handouts — and a concern that such approaches can lead to dependency and the undermining of people’s own initiatives to rebuild their livelihoods. Many questions persist about the best way to deal with land access and tenure questions, and about the impact of rapid urbanisation on both rural livelihood systems and the nature of urban life and demands on urban services. In-depth, longitudinal studies using common approaches and common definitions will be required to delve into these questions more deeply, rather than simply tracking changes in indicators. Impact assessment has been an important gap and, until there are convincing data on what works and what does not, and why, important lessons from programme implementation may not be captured fully. Lastly, the issue of research uptake — the ability to utilise empirical findings in the formulation of policies and programmes — is a constraint that the consortium must address, along with the production of valid and reliable research. A number of more detailed potential research questions are outlined in Annex 1 to the main report.
1 Introduction

On 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became the world’s newest country. The realisation of the South’s independence came after nearly four decades of civil war that devastated the lives and livelihoods of the South Sudanese. As a consequence of the war and the history of neglect that lay behind it, South Sudan continues to suffer from extremely low levels of human development. As such, while the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) faces great opportunities in creating a new nation, it also must confront tremendous challenges in improving the lives of its citizens.

This paper synthesises current evidence on how people are recovering their livelihoods and accessing basic services and social protection interventions in conflict-affected regions of South Sudan. Its objective is to help pinpoint strategic opportunities for future research on how best to promote improvements in the quality of life of conflict-affected populations. It does this by presenting evidence on three fronts.

First, it gives an overview of livelihoods in South Sudan and the various factors supporting and challenging livelihood recovery. This includes a review of existing responses in support of livelihoods on the part of government institutions, aid agencies, local populations and the private sector. Second, it summarises the population’s access to basic services and social protection interventions. As with the livelihoods section, this also includes a review of existing responses, in this case those in support of access to basic services and social protection. Finally, it presents an analysis of the data, evidence and methodologies in the literature reviewed.

The paper is based on a rigorous review of existing literature on livelihoods and the delivery of basic services and social protection interventions in South Sudan. Literature reviewed included published academic literature such as journal articles, books and periodicals; available ‘grey’ literature, including reports, policy papers and evaluations; and unpublished documents gathered in-country. In all, about 116 documents were read, summarised and incorporated into this synthesis.

The Feinstein International Center produced this paper as a member of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), a unique collaboration between a number of leading institutions seeking to improve the response to the world’s foremost humanitarian and development challenges. The paper will be complemented by a similar paper on other conflict-affected states (CAS). Together, this composite body of work will provide critical insights into how best to promote improvements in the quality of life of people affected by conflict and related challenges.

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2 During much of its history, the current Republic of South Sudan was a region within the Republic of Sudan, variously referred to as Southern Sudan, South Sudan, ‘the South’, etc. For the purposes of consistency, we use South Sudan throughout this paper.

3 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) also covers populations in the transitional areas, the so-called ‘three areas’, whose challenges were to be addressed by the CPA (but so far have not been). These areas include the part of the state of Southern Kordofan known as the Nuba Mountains, the state of Southern Blue Nile (now Blue Nile) and contested Abyei. According to the CPA, only Abyei would have had the chance to vote in a referendum to join South Sudan. In Blue Nile, popular consultations are underway. However, neither popular consultations in Southern Kordofan nor the vote in Abyei (on whether or not to join South Sudan) have taken place up to now.
2 Country context

2.1 Overview

The Republic of South Sudan is located in East Africa, and borders Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Kenya. It covers an estimated 644,329 km². The country has a population of 8.26 million people, half of whom are under the age of 18. Slightly more than one-fourth of all households are female headed. It is estimated that 83 percent of the population is rural, and 78 percent of households rely on agriculture or animal husbandry as their primary source of livelihood (Livelihoods Analysis Forum, 2006). South Sudan, inhabited by members of more than 50 ethnic groups, features high socio-cultural diversity.

The majority of the population (50.6 percent) lives below the poverty line (approximately $1 a day). Poverty is concentrated in rural areas, with 55.4 percent of the rural population living below the poverty line. In urban areas, the figure is 24.4 percent (World Bank, 2011a).

As of 2011, some 9.7 percent of the population of South Sudan was severely food insecure, while 26 percent was moderately food insecure (FAO and WFP, 2010). Prevalence of acute malnutrition in South Sudan is relatively higher than would be expected from food security figures. According to the 2006 Sudan Household Health Survey (the most recent comprehensive health survey in Sudan), 22 percent of children in South Sudan are acutely malnourished and over 4 percent of children suffer from severe acute malnutrition (Harvey and Rogers-Witte, 2007).

2.2 Impact of the conflict

The civil wars in Sudan combine to account for the longest war in modern African history. They have claimed over 2.5 million lives and affected the livelihoods of tens of millions of people (MOHADM, 2010).

The contemporary civil war between the North and South Sudan can be divided into two periods. The first period (1955–72) witnessed the war between the government in Khartoum and the Anya-Nya Movement in the South. The second period (1983–2005) was characterised by a conflict between the government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and its allies. This was largely regarded as a North–South conflict for control over resources and, from the perspective of the SPLA/M, for political autonomy, self-determination and secularism. When oil was discovered in the South and oil exploration increased in the 1980s, the conflict intensified (Khadiagala, 2008).

During, and in addition to, the North–South conflict, a second parallel conflict was conducted between factions in the SPLA/M, or independent militias (Mackenzie and Buchanan-Smith, 2004). These groups fought for control of the South, and for control over territory and resources. In 1991, the SPLA split into two opposing forces, and by 1997 there were three main factions: the ‘SPLA-Mainstream’ faction, led by John Garang, and those led by Kerubino Kuanyin and by Riak Machar. Smaller militias and factions were also formed, as officers defected and loyal troops went with them. During the North-South conflict,
the Government of Sudan (GoS) exploited these divisions by funding and arming these splinter groups. By the mid-1980s, GoS was arming Arab pastoralist militias known as the *murahaleen*, who attacked Dinka and Nuer civilian populations in SPLA areas of Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile. Many of the large number of militias and inter-tribal groups switched sides during the conflict in an effort to gain more power, resulting in a conflict that ‘little resemble[d] a war in the traditional sense, with national armies fighting over a contested border’ (Martin, 2002: 117).

These wars brought terrible devastation to the lives and livelihoods of the South Sudanese. In the civil war period from 1983 to 2005, more than 2 million South Sudanese are estimated to have died; while some of these deaths were the direct result of fighting and violence, 97 percent died from disease and malnutrition. Additionally, 4 million people were displaced from their homes. According to the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), about 90,000 South Sudanese refugees are still abroad and 330,00 have returned since 2005. But the effects of the conflict have outlasted the actual war: mortality and morbidity rates remain high — for example, the child mortality rate is 135 deaths per 1,000 live births (World Bank, 2011a).

The conflict also took a devastating toll on livelihoods. Farmers reduced their plantings, especially on land distant from their homes; access to markets and social facilities was disrupted; and diversified livelihood activities, such as fishing and hunting, were constrained (FAO and WFP, 2010; WFP, 2010). Livestock losses as a result of the conflict were especially severe during the 1990s. An estimated 40 percent of families in Northern Bahr el Ghazal lost all of their animals, which was a significant factor behind Bahr el Ghazal’s famine in 1998 (Catley et al., 2005). The Upper Nile region (i.e. Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states) in particular suffered from the GoS ‘scorched earth’ policy in oil-producing regions. Consequently, this area remains one of the most devastated in the South, and the process of recovery has been slower here than in other areas (Mackenzie and Buchanan-Smith, 2004).

The war altered socio-political structures and relations. War-induced poverty, displacement and trauma weakened kinship and community ties and negatively affected social support mechanisms and inter-communal collaboration (Deng, 2010). In addition, the armed conflict had an impact on intergenerational relations: during the war, some youth became empowered through militarisation (Jok, 2005). Moreover, the war weakened traditional authorities, which were exposed to coercion, violence and manipulation by GoS and armed groups, including the SPLA (Leonardi, 2007). In 2005, the CPA was signed between GoS and the SPLM/A, finally bringing an end to the civil war. This was designed to address sources of South Sudanese grievance and anxiety. Given that ‘many leading southerners consider the war the SPLA fought since 1983 to be a struggle to defend the customs, languages, religions, and communal property of the South Sudanese against projects of Arabization, Islamization, resource extraction, and land alienation emanating from successive governments in Khartoum’ (USIP, 2010: 11), the CPA contained provisions on the separation of religion and state, a referendum on secession, autonomy during the interim period, a permanent internationally monitored ceasefire and a separate army for the South (SAS, 2006).

The signing of the CPA also marked a shift on the part of external agencies from a primarily relief/humanitarian focus towards one on longer-term development. The formation of GoSS and state governments marked a definitive stage of political and socioeconomic development in the history of the people of South Sudan (MOHADM, 2010).

Following the agreement in the CPA for a referendum on secession, in January 2011 nearly 99 percent of South Sudanese voted to secede from the Republic of Sudan. The outcome was widely considered to be a legitimate reflection of the population’s wishes; the North accepted the results. On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became an independent state and the rocky six-year interim period, characterised by

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10. However, it must be noted that internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and refugees, and even seasonal labour migrant numbers, are often mixed (and sometimes double counted), and even were during the war years. Additionally, some local movements of pastoral groups were recorded in IDP figures when they were following seasonal patterns.
delays and political tensions between the SPLM and the National Congress Party (the NCP — the dominant party in North Sudan), came to an end.

The new state faces many challenges, including those related to state consolidation, improving the security situation and delivering basic services to the population. In addition, several key issues not addressed in the CPA remain unresolved, including the status of the ‘three areas’ (Abyei, South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Upper Blue Nile state), oil transport and allocation of oil revenues, border demarcation, citizenship of Southern Sudanese in North Sudan and North Sudanese in South Sudan and assets and debts (International Peace Institute, 2011). Fighting broke out in Abyei and South Kordofan just prior to independence, and it is clear that the conflict with the North did not end with the birth of the new state.

Recent studies have analysed the impact of international engagement on conflict dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan (Attree, 2012; Bennett et al., 2010), highlighting in particular the politics of oil and the role of China. While the role of international diplomacy has been largely positive, particularly during the CPA process and the transition to independence for South Sudan, these studies find a broad convergence of relief, development, state-building and peace-building agendas within the foreign engagement of Western countries, but a very different agenda of ‘non-interference’ — as well as a distinct strategic positioning vis-à-vis oil resources — on the part of China. The latter may ‘diminish national stakeholders’ need to listen to western perspectives’ (Attree, 2012: 15). In the meantime, China’s investment has protected its oil interests, but has not benefited communities in oil-producing areas. This highlights the need for more coordinated approaches to diplomacy and international engagement in South Sudan.
3 Livelihoods and growth

3.1 Livelihoods overview

Livelihoods in South Sudan have often been cited as linked to both ‘rich and abundant natural resources and the terrible consequences of [violent] civil conflict’ (Livelihoods Analysis Forum, 2006: 18). Agriculture and pastoralism are the two main livelihood activities in all regions of the country. It is estimated that, of households in the poorest quintile, 83.7 percent are working primarily in agriculture or livestock rearing. The wealthiest quintile has a more diverse livelihoods portfolio, with 57.4 percent working in agriculture and 27 percent living mostly on wages and salaries (World Bank, 2011a). While South Sudan is considered to have considerable agricultural potential, only 4 percent of its arable land is cultivated. Similarly, livestock production is estimated at only 20 percent of its potential (WFP, 2010).

South Sudan can be divided into six livelihood zones: the Greenbelt Zone, the Arid Zone, the Hills and Mountain Zone, the Western and Eastern Flood Plain Zones, the Ironstone Plateau Zone and the Nile and Sobat Rivers Zone (Livelihoods Analysis Forum, 2006). Table 1 provides a brief overview of each livelihood zone.

Table 1: Livelihoods and challenges in different zones in South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihood zone</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenbelt Zone</td>
<td>Households rely mainly on agriculture. In dry years, they increase their</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dependence on root crops and exchange. This is the traditional surplus-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>producing agricultural region, also known as the ‘bread-basket’ of South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arid Zone</td>
<td>Households practice mainly pastoralism and migrate seasonally for water,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pasture and trade opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hills and Mountains Zone</td>
<td>Households practice both agriculture and pastoralism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western and Eastern Flood Plain</td>
<td>Households rely on livestock and agriculture, supplemented by fish and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zones</td>
<td>wild foods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ironstone Plateau Zone</td>
<td>Households rely mainly on crop production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nile and Sobat Rivers Zone</td>
<td>Households rely on crops, livestock, wild foods and fish.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Livelihoods Analysis Forum (2006)

Agriculture and pastoralism are not separated clearly from one another, and many households in South Sudan combine the two activities (Pantuliano et al., 2009). In general, the South Sudanese rely on cattle rearing, crop production, fishing, wild food collection and trade, with various combinations of these elements making up specific household economies depending on each zone’s agro-ecological conditions and tribal traditions and culture (FAO and WFP, 2010).

Livelihood systems in South Sudan are highly dependent on mobility and trade. Although households have traditionally been able to survive mobility and trade restrictions caused by regular occurrences such as seasonal flooding through coping strategies (such as fishing and gathering of wild foods), restrictions resulting from years of prolonged conflict have significantly disrupted livelihoods and food security. Continuous fighting over the past 20 years and its attendant consequences have continually undermined access to markets and migration, and denied households the opportunity to effectively address structural seasonal food deficits (Livelihoods Analysis Forum, 2006).

Livelihoods are also shifting, as many households — especially those of returnees — are choosing to settle in urban and peri-urban areas in South Sudan rather than in rural areas. While there are no overall statistical trends on urbanisation trends in South Sudan, there is clear evidence that cities and towns are growing rapidly (Bailey and Harragin, 2009; Forojalla and Galla, 2010; Pantuliano et al.,
Reasons for migrating to urban areas and especially Juba include a combination of better economic and employment prospects owing to the presence of regional government, international organisations and private businesses; perceptions of better access to health and social services; the location of SPLA headquarters in Juba, attracting soldiers and their families; having relatives in town; drought in rural areas; and insecurity owing to Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attacks and cattle raiding (Martin and Mosel, 2011; Matus, 2007; Maxwell and Burns, 2008).

Young males in particular tend to migrate to Juba to look for work, which partly explains the rise in the number of female-headed households in rural areas (Martin and Mosel, 2011). Many of those who migrated to urban and peri-urban areas during the conflict have now elected to stay, largely because of difficulties in accessing land in rural areas and readapting their livelihoods after having lived in urban areas for so long (Matus, 2007; Maxwell and Burns, 2008).

Since the signing of the CPA, South Sudan (and Juba in particular) has experienced a large influx of both skilled and unskilled foreign workers, most of whom have arrived from Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and the DRC in search of new economic opportunities. While there are no precise statistics on the size of the immigrant labour force in South Sudan, it is estimated that approximately 100,000 foreign workers (excluding international aid workers) are living and working in South Sudan, with up to 40,000 Ugandans and 15,000 Kenyans working in Juba alone (World Bank, 2009). Immigrant workers make up the large majority of Juba’s skilled labour force; it is estimated that over 85 percent of skilled labour in Juba is provided by foreigners from neighbouring countries (ibid.). While no comprehensive assessments have been carried out on the impact of these foreigners on South Sudan’s labour markets, there have been reports that the large presence of foreign workers in Juba has created animosity among some Southern Sudanese, who feel they are being deprived of employment opportunities (Martin and Mosel, 2011). Incidents of harassment, extortion and intimidation of immigrants have been reported in Juba, many of which have been directed towards Ugandans (Kron, 2011).

3.2 Support to livelihood adaptation and recovery

The literature provides limited evidence of specific examples of successful livelihood recovery, and few insights into the processes that have helped bring this about. However, in general, it is believed that livelihood recovery in South Sudan has been especially rapid in areas that have been least affected by conflict and where populations have gained greater access to arable land, infrastructure and services (Matus, 2007). Livelihood recovery has also been rapid for IDPs who return home with cash and skills and are able to access land (ibid.). Some specific conditions for and trends of livelihood recovery include the following.

Crop production has expanded. Despite the risks and constraints facing agricultural production and food security in South Sudan, the South Sudan Seed System Security Assessment (SSSSA) (2011) found that South Sudanese farmers were eager to expand crop production. Of the farmers interviewed during the assessment, 70 percent planned to maintain or increase the amount of seed sown across crops. Farmers who planned to increase production intended to expand sowing amounts by approximately 80 percent across crops. The SSSA found that, even vulnerable groups, including IDPs, returnees and refugees, planned to increase sowing amounts by over 60 percent (CIAT et al., 2011).

New natural resource management policies have been introduced. Efforts to conserve biodiversity and improve natural resource management should have subsequent benefits in terms of enhancing livelihoods. South Sudan has one of the highest levels of biological diversity in Africa, as well as a number of rare and endangered species, such as white-eared kob, tiang and eland (WCS, 2010). Much of South Sudan’s biodiversity is located in the trans-boundary region between South Sudan and Uganda. The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) with support from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has identified four potential ‘Conservation Landscapes for Peace’ in this area. GoS and the government of Uganda have signed a memorandum of understanding for trans-boundary cooperation and, in coordination with these governments and other partners, WCS has been implementing the South Sudan–Northern Uganda Trans-boundary Landscape Project with the goals of conserving biodiversity, improving natural resource management, enhancing livelihoods and increasing security (WCS, 2008).
Access to credit and microfinance services has improved. The biggest constraints to livelihood security in urban areas, as reported by interviewees, are a lack of access to financial capital, education and skills. To address the first of these, microfinance has been employed as a strategy through organisations such as Building Resources Across Communities (BRAC), Finance Sudan Ltd. and Sudan Microfinance Institution, which provide micro-loans mostly to women. While it seems this has been positive for some women, who report that start-up loans have been helpful, there is inequity in distribution, as women living in urban slums on the periphery of Juba are often not able to fulfil the conditions attached to loans (conditions include requiring women to have land or to produce a photo and paperwork indicating nationality) (Martin and Mosel, 2011). Meanwhile, although most microfinance institutions in South Sudan focus on serving urban clients, lack of access to capital and finance is a significant constraint in rural areas as well, yet there is currently very low penetration of microfinance institutions in such areas. The main factors limiting the expansion of microfinance institutions into rural areas include lack of security and limited transport (Attil, 2009).

Family composition has helped maintain social capital. According to Harragin and Chol (1999) in their study of vulnerability in Southern Sudan, families with larger numbers of family members tend to be more resilient and have greater adaptive capacity than smaller families. Larger families are more capable of pooling their labour and resources, which enables them to carry out a wider range of livelihood activities and coping strategies (ibid.). Similarly, households with stronger kinship and clan networks are more capable of restarting livelihood activities (Bailey and Harrigan, 2009; Harragin and Chol, 1999).

Women’s participation in non-farm economic activities has increased. The combined effects of increased urbanisation and presence of international organisations has changed attitudes regarding women and their livelihoods. There has been an increase in the participation of women in small businesses, with one woman reporting that greater ‘social freedom’ and cross-cultural learning has led to positive gains for women in the economy. According to the Archdiocese of Juba, ‘women are playing a more prominent role in development and peace-building activities, and are demanding they be treated equally’ (Martin and Mosel, 2011: 29). However, Martin (2010: 4) believes that, despite the increased participation of women in development, non-farm economic activities and politics, gender roles have not fundamentally changed in South Sudan: ‘For the majority of women […] these trends do not mean that attitudes towards gender roles and behaviours have made a clear break with tradition, or led to a better quality of life.’

Although no accurate data exist, South Sudan has a large informal economy that is a significant source of employment (Toh, 2009; World Bank, 2009). Since the signing of the CPA, the informal sector has undergone significant growth in South Sudan’s urban areas, not only in Juba but also across most urban and peri-urban areas. Informal sector activities that are especially thriving include small-scale construction of homes and lodging, retail trading and transportation services (Toh, 2009). The informal sector often fills service delivery gaps in credit, wholesaling and marketing and distribution, particularly in locations which public or formal private sector mechanisms are unable to reach (World Bank, 2009). A 2010 World Bank rapid market survey in South Sudan found that survey participants estimated that only 14 percent of their supplies were sourced from a formal shop or market (World Bank, 2009). In peri-urban areas of South Sudan, the informal sector even fills gaps in the provision of essential basic services, such as the provision of household water supplies (World Bank, 2009). While the informal sector in both rural and urban areas is capable of absorbing some of South Sudan’s returnee labour supply, there is an urgent need for increased public and private investment in the formal sector of the economy in order to generate employment opportunities and accelerate economic growth (Toh, 2009). The availability of employment opportunities for returnees in urban and peri-urban areas has also been constrained by the influx of skilled and unskilled foreign labourers in South Sudan, especially in Juba (World Bank, 2009). There are also livelihood challenges which result from the growth of the informal economy, as noted below.

3.2.1 Challenges to livelihood recovery
The literature provides limited evidence of specific examples of successful livelihood recovery, and few insights into the processes that have helped bring this about. However, in general, it is believed that livelihood recovery in South Sudan has been especially rapid in areas that have been least affected by conflict and where populations have gained greater access to arable land, infrastructure and services
Livelihood recovery has also been rapid for IDPs who return home with cash and skills and are able to access land (ibid.). Some specific conditions for and trends of livelihood recovery include the following.

Despite support to return and reintegration, coverage has been incomplete. An estimated 2 million IDPs and refugees have returned to their area of origin in the South since 2005 (Pantuliano et al., 2008). Returnees frequently find their village occupied by other groups, who were often displaced locally and moved in after the original occupants fled. Conflicts often arise, especially in instances where IDPs and returnees belong to different ethnic groups (Shanmugaratnam, 2010). Another challenge is that the conflict has changed the demographic landscape to such a degree that ‘reintegration’ is perhaps a misleading term. It is more accurate to speak of ‘integration’, as more diverse communities must learn to coexist and adapt to a new environment. This is particularly true in Juba (Pantuliano et al., 2008).

Meanwhile, returnees and residents express very similar priorities, including security (disarmament in particular), improved access to services, strengthened infrastructure and support to livelihoods. However, to date, GoSS’s priority has been return rather than reintegration, even though, despite independence having just been granted, the South Sudanese have been returning for many years. The SPLM/GoSS encouraged populations to return ahead of electoral and referendum registration, and at the same time numerous South Sudanese left the North ahead of the referendum and independence because they felt insecure and feared they might not have access to services once the South Sudanese voted for independence. Despite these large population movements, GoSS had only limited support available for reintegratation.

Returnees face significant challenges restarting their lives, including very few employment opportunities, especially for unskilled labour; intensive labour and time required to clear farmland; inadequate basic services; and lack of access to credit, land and agricultural inputs (Bailey and Harragin, 2009). Many returnees have also become more urban and appear to have lost rural livelihood skills. Therefore, while large numbers of people have already returned, the population remains largely at subsistence levels and is extremely vulnerable to shocks (Pantuliano et al., 2008). Few reintegration programmes are actually being implemented, many have an unrealistically short timeline and even fewer have practical livelihood recovery aspects (Shanmugaratnam, 2010). In addition, the targeting of return and reintegration programmes is prone to serious exclusion errors, often neglecting ‘spontaneous’ returnees (who make up the large majority of returnees) as well as vulnerable individuals within the communities that receive returnees. It is often the case that returnees receiving reintegration assistance are no worse off (and in some instances are significantly better off) than ‘receiving’ community members for whom no assistance is provided (Maxwell and Burns, 2008).

Despite the war having ended, insecurity continues to be a constraint. Conflict continues to be the most damaging hazard for livelihoods and basic food security in South Sudan. The Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Survey, conducted in Lakes state in 2006, shed light on the continued insecurity in which South Sudanese live (SAS, 2006). Armed violence is extremely commonplace, and less than 50 percent of those surveyed felt their personal security had improved since the CPA was signed. In that time, on average a household had experienced ‘at least 1 robbery, nearly 2 fights, and close to 1 armed attack since the signing of the CPA’. Even after the CPA was signed in 2005, many states continued to suffer from insecurity along their borders with the North. In addition, inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts, which have always existed, are increasing owing to the expansion of crop cultivation and permanent settlements, which has further constrained access to land and water resources and restricted the mobility of livestock (GoSS, 2011; Pantuliano, 2007; Pantuliano et al., 2009). Unclear demarcation of community and payam boundaries and larger numbers of livestock populations are also important contributing factors (Forojalla and Galla, 2010).

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11 In terms of timelines, reintegration programmes are usually implemented over one year. The first three months are supported by GoSS and its partners in terms of food and other support, with the remaining period supported by the respective states. Returnees are expected to integrate into their communities after the 12-month period. This is often an unrealistic timeframe.

12 In addition, some interventions have been criticised for not paying enough attention to local customs and supporting host communities, leading to tensions.
Finally, GoSS must consolidate its control over its territory, and quieten the militia groups which challenge its authority. Many of these militias are believed to be supported covertly by Khartoum. Clashes between the militias and GOSS have caused civilian death and displacement, particularly in Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile (International Peace Institute, 2011). Overall, an estimated 67 percent of conflict incidents recorded by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2010 were related to tribal conflicts, 21 percent to armed incidents and 10 percent to LRA attacks (FAO and WFP 2010). These trends continue to have a negative impact on livelihood recovery, and more than 2,300 persons were killed in violent conflict or crimes in Southern Sudan in the first half of 2011 alone. There has been a recent surge in violence in the contested North–South border region. Since May 2011, clashes in Abyei between the SAF and SPLA have displaced an estimated 120,000 people, resulting in a large influx of refugees in Warrap, Unity and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal states (FEWS NET, 2011). In South Kordofan, fighting between the SAF and SPLA-North since June 2011 has affected an estimated 1.4 million people and displaced over 75,000 people (ibid.). Many of the displaced are hiding in the Nuba Mountains and are dependent on support from host communities, which has placed considerable stress on household resources. As of July 2011, the World Food Programme (WFP) had distributed food to approximately 110,000 affected people in South Kordofan (ibid.).

Small arms are linked to continued insecurity (SAS, 2006). In the HSBA in 2006, 35 percent of those surveyed in Lakes state reported owning weapons. Weapons range from AK-47 automatic assault rifles (31 percent of those reporting arms possession), to revolvers and pistols (26 percent) and even rocket-propelled grenade launchers (1 percent) (ibid.). The proliferation of small arms is considered a significant factor in the increasing violence and frequency of cattle raids (Catley et al., 2005). Given people’s everyday experiences of violence, disarmament was identified by those surveyed in Lakes state as a top priority: ‘more than one-fifth of respondents contended that firearms were South Sudan’s most pressing concern — outranking even access to education, poor health facilities, and unemployment as the region’s most urgent priorities’ (SAS, 2006).

Oil exploitation in South Sudan has been a source of both optimism and concern. Oil income comprises the majority of South Sudan’s (non-aid) revenue. While it is hoped that oil extraction will help increase trade and that oil revenues will be able to finance improved access to basic services, the impact of oil on local communities in oil-producing areas has thus far, on balance, been negative (Keen and Lee, 2006; Livelihoods Analysis Forum, 2006; Pantuliano et al., 2009). Pantuliano et al. (2009) find that oil exploitation has had a particularly detrimental impact on pastoral livelihoods and the environment, with oil facilities often designed and constructed without considering impacts on local populations and pipelines constructed on agricultural land and in grazing areas, which has greatly obstructed access to water sources and disrupted the flow of water into farms and pasture areas. Few new labour opportunities accrue to the populations residing in such areas, and there are large underlying uncertainties as to who is going to benefit from the oil (Keen and Lee, 2006). Approximately 75 percent of Sudan’s oil is located in the South, but all refineries, pipelines and ports are in the North (USIP, 2011). Port Sudan on the Red Sea is the only port through which Sudan exports its oil. Although the CPA did address sharing of oil wealth and access to and control over oil resources, this wealth-sharing agreement is now no longer valid. While currently the North and South are in the process of negotiating how they will deal with oil transportation and oil revenues, the North still seems reluctant to relinquish control over some oil-rich areas, including Abyei, which still has an unresolved ‘status’ (Khadiagala, 2008).

The impact that shocks have on families in South Sudan is highly dependent on family composition, which is an important determinant of whether households are vulnerable or resilient (Harragin and Chol, 1999). According to Harragin and Chol (1999), examples of vulnerable families include those who have experienced the loss of several family members owing to death or displacement; families without daughters (and, conversely, families without sons); families where all children are too young to be

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13 During the past few years, the LRA seems to have been based mostly in northern DRC and CAR, from where it attacks mostly Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal. There is a history between the Sudanese civil wars and the LRA: the Ugandan government has supported the SPLA/M, whose members, as well as international groups, accuse GoS/the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of still arming the LRA.

14 A total of 44% of recorded conflict incidents occurred in Jonglei, followed by Warrap, Unity, Upper Nile and Western Equatoria (11%) and Lakes (10%) (FAO and WFP, 2010). Approximately 80% of recorded incidents in 2010 occurred during the dry season, which coincides with periods of mobility, limited food supply and scarcity of pasture and water (ibid.).
economically productive; and families that experience sickness or death of the mother or father. Most of these examples result in an insufficient pool of labour to carry out livelihood activities effectively, which increases vulnerability and causes the entire family to suffer.

There have been multiple initiatives to address livelihood recovery, but limited coordination. Many different recovery strategies are being promoted by international agencies and GoSS, focusing on the needs of IDPs, private investors, agriculturalists, pastoralists, urban areas, etc. (Matus, 2007). Many of these are in competition with one another and, if not properly managed, could worsen inequities and exacerbate conflicts (ibid.). Despite attempts to coordinate aid through the World Bank-managed multi-donor trust fund (MDTF), there has been limited success, owing to weak government capacity, ineffective donor and agency coordination and a low recipient presence (Norad, 2008). Another factor contributing to this is reported to be an element of corruption whereby people with power can override the system and coordination efforts (Cook, 2007).

The timing of inputs for livelihood recovery has been erratic. While in some instances the distribution of seeds and tools has helped farmers reinitiate farming activities, seed aid distribution has often been poorly timed (i.e. not in time for the planting season) and has generally failed to take into account farmers’ needs and preferences and local seed systems (CIAT et al., 2011; Longley et al., 2006; Shanmugaratnam, 2010). In Western Equatoria, aid agencies distributed a modern variety of sorghum that was developed with tannin in order to control bird damage on early-planted crops. However, the tannin resulted in the sorghum having a bitter taste, which most farmers and household members disliked. Despite repeated seed aid distributions of this sorghum variety, farmers continued to plant their preferred local seed varieties (Longley et al., 2006). The SSSA of Southern Sudan (2011) found that farmers sowed less seed than normal not due because of a lack of available seed, but mainly because of health issues, insufficient income and constraints on labour. Despite this, there have been repeated large-scale emergency and development seed aid distributions in South Sudan (CIAT et al., 2011).

The issue of land and land ownership in South Sudan was a significant factor behind the war between GoS and the SPLA, and it continues to be a major driver of ongoing inter- and intra-tribal conflicts (Shanmugaratnam, 2008): land rights are increasingly contested, as refugees and IDPs return to their area of origin and oil exploration continues in new areas (Sorbo and Strand, 2009). Customary law has governed land use in South Sudan for centuries, despite numerous attempts by governments in Khartoum to alter this system throughout colonial and post-colonial periods (Forojalla and Galla, 2010). With over 50 ethnic groups in South Sudan, there is often wide variation in the customary land tenure system between communities (Pantuliano, 2007). Meanwhile, customary tenure does not guarantee that all groups have access to land: the system tends to discriminate against women and rights are defined by rules of descent and ethnicity (ibid.).

During the peace negotiations, the GoS stance was that all land belonged to the state, whereas the SPLM/A contended that land in South Sudan belonged to the community. While the CPA did not deal with land issues directly, it authorised the establishment of the Southern Sudan Land Commission (SSLC) to address these. A principal function of the SSLC is to design policies that resolve differences between different land tenure systems, as well as to address other interests (private sector, government, etc.). The SSLC developed the Southern Sudan Land Bill, which was passed into the Land Act in January 2009. The latter identifies the people of South Sudan as owners of all land, and vows to guarantee that all groups have access to land: the system tends to discriminate against women and rights are defined by rules of descent and ethnicity (ibid.).

15 The MDTF is described later on in this paper.
16 Similar to the ongoing debate on the link between food aid and dependency (see Section 4), there are reports that large-scale seed distributions have caused dependency in rural communities, particularly in Northern Bahr El-Ghazal, Warrap and Unity states (Silvestro and Oketayot, 2008). The SSSA recommends a major adjustment of agricultural recovery strategies in South Sudan that moves ‘well beyond helping farmers access seed, based on recognition that giving free seed will not help farmers solve agricultural problems in the majority of cases documented by the SSSA’ (CIAT et al., 2011: 12). The SSSA suggests the increased use of vouchers could address income constraints while market development could facilitate increased seed use among farmers.
17 In 1970, the GoS passed the Un registered Land Act, which attempted to abolish customary land rights. De Wit (2001: 8) describes this as ‘a government tool to facilitate the acquisition of large tracts of land for agricultural schemes, at the expense of rural dwellers and especially pastoralists’. 
With assistance from USAID, the SSLC drafted a Land Policy in February 2011, which aims to provide tenure security under a diversity of tenure systems (GoSS, 2011). This requires that government agencies and traditional authorities recognise and protect land and property rights equally between men and women. It is still in draft form and is highly contested. The ability to uphold the provisions of the Land Act and the draft Land Policy, particularly as they pertain to protecting customary land rights, is increasingly being challenged by the growing number of large-scale land acquisitions in South Sudan. A 2011 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) report found that, from 2007 to 2010, foreign companies, governments and individuals sought or acquired approximately 2.64 million ha of land, mainly for agricultural production, biofuels and forestry, with many of these investments located in highly populated areas (Deng, 2011).

Another key element of the Land Act entails addressing the issue of resettlement and reintegration of IDPs and refugees whose land rights have been affected by the civil war. The post-conflict poses significant challenges: some returnees are trying to assert rights that existed before the conflict; others are attempting to protect rights that came into being during the conflict (Forojalla and Galla, 2010). Traditional authorities are generally capable of dealing with indigenous returnees who seek rights to their ancestral land; however, they are particularly challenged by the arrival of returnees who are not originally from their communities (ibid.). Shanmugaratnam (2010) describes a situation in Nimule between Madi returnees and Dinka IDPs who occupied their land during the war. This conflict has been particularly challenging for the local institutions that govern land resources, such as the Land Board and the Landlord Committee, because of the ‘open disregard for these institutions displayed by the Dinkas, who wield political and military power because of their close alliance with the SPLA, and who have reconstituted their own community institutions to manage their affairs’ (ibid.: 26).

Particular challenges arise as a result of migration: many IDPs settled in towns during the conflict and have decided not to return to their original villages. Meanwhile, individuals who fled to other areas during the conflict are returning and attempting to reassert their land and property rights. The demand for land is especially high in Juba, which has resulted in situations of land grabbing by individuals looking for settlements or investment opportunities (Forojalla and Galla, 2010). In towns such as Juba and Yeï, SPLA soldiers are occupying urban plots, challenging the return of IDPs and refugees (Pantuliano, 2007).

Limited awareness of laws and policies and weak institutional capacity are preventing the proper resolution of these situations (Forojalla and Galla, 2010). Because land management institutions have limited human resources and often do not have enabling laws, the land acquisition process often does not follow the principles of the Land Act (ibid.). The issue of gender relations is particularly important in the context of land rights. Under customary law, land rights for women are commonly mediated through male relatives (ibid.). Legal provisions exist that recognise equal rights of women to land; however, there is limited awareness and protection of these rights throughout South Sudan, which creates a situation in which laws and practice diverge, especially in rural areas (GoSS, 2011). The fact that women head almost half of all returnee households (given the large number of male deaths during the conflict) makes addressing this issue especially urgent (Forojalla and Galla, 2010). Further research on this is important: there are research gaps on whether women returnees are being granted rights to land and property in rural and urban areas of South Sudan.

Rapid urbanisation and the growth of the informal economy is a mixed blessing. The urbanisation trend is causing large growth in demand for land in urban areas in order to expand housing, businesses and public services (Pantuliano et al., 2009). Much of the growth of Juba is occurring on land through informal arrangements of tenure that are inconsistent with the provisions of the 2009 Land Act (Forojalla and Galla, 2010). As the urban population grows, landowners return and housing prices increase, poor, landless people are tending to be pushed towards the more densely populated outskirts of the city, while international humanitarian workers, foreign business people and landowners move inwards to the centre where services are better. Most residents of Juba remain involved in semi-skilled 18

18 Accurate population data does not exist for Juba (Pantuliano et al. 2009; Forojalla and Crispo Galla 2010) but it is estimated that the population has grown from 10,600 in 1956 to an estimated 250,000 by the 2005 signing of the CPA (Martin and Mosel 2011) to more than 500,000 in 2010 (Martin 2010).
or unskilled work and, as the population grows as a result of migration from rural areas, there is increased pressure on infrastructure and resources as well as more competition for these types of work. Competition for scarce jobs is made worse by the tendency to hire more skilled East Africans for cheaper wages (Martin and Mosel, 2011). This trend will likely alter the dynamics of food insecurity in South Sudan, as there will be increasing numbers of food-insecure people within urban and peri-urban settings (WFP, 2010).

Although market linkages are improving because of renewed attention to rural road infrastructure, the linking of production areas to markets remains poor (FAO and WFP 2010). This hinders the flow of commodities from surplus regions to deficit areas. Improved accessibility of market information, through media or transport networks, would help enhance knowledge of where demand exists for agricultural products (Silvestre and Oketayot, 2008). Given the limitations of market information systems in South Sudan, most traders access price information informally through contacts with other markets. However, such information often does not get disseminated down to the level of farmers (Brown et al., 2009). Aid agencies are working to enhance the development and accessibility of market information in South Sudan through initiatives such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action (SIFSIA), USAID’s Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) and WFP’s Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM) (Brown et al., 2009). Despite the existing limitations of market information in South Sudan, with the overall improvement of road infrastructure, traders are beginning to increase the number and type of goods they sell, and some have diversified into processing agricultural products into other commercial goods, such as flours, pastes and alcohol (CIAT et al., 2011).

There are considerable opportunities in South Sudan for cross-border livestock trade with Uganda, Kenya, DRC and North Sudan. However, this potential is being undermined by insufficient quarantine stations or holding grounds, high rates of taxation and a shortage of watering points along stock routes (Catley et al., 2005). In addition, cross-border trade is highly sensitive to political disruptions, making it extremely unreliable. Moreover, the 2010–11 Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment (ANLA) of South Sudan reported that the April 2010 elections resulted in a significant shortage of trade from Uganda, causing food prices to spike, especially in Juba and Rumbek, which depend on cross-border trade with Uganda. And ongoing conflict has fuelled a trade blockade from North Sudan to the South since May 2011, which has had a significant impact on supply routes, causing food and fuel shortages and rising commodity prices in much of South Sudan (FEWS NET, 2011). Cross-border trade has also been negatively affected by a lack of security in border areas owing to the presence of LRA activities, especially along the border with northeast DRC and Kenya (Yoshino et al., 2011).

Linked to the challenges above, Silvestre and Oketayot (2008) argue that attempts to address rural recovery by aid agencies and policymakers have focused mainly on the distribution of seeds and tools and have not taken into account the comprehensive needs of local farmers. For example, there has been little attention to enhancing agricultural productivity, improving infrastructure and establishing market linkages.

Capacity limitations in natural resource management are an additional constraint. Natural resource management in South Sudan is linked intimately to complex political, economic and social-cultural issues. While conflicts over resources are by no means new occurrences in the country, tensions have increased as environmental conditions have become degraded and the availability of water and land resources has become constrained (UNEP, 2008). Human and livestock population growth, growing urban areas, policies favouring large-scale expansion of rain-fed and irrigated agriculture in the North causing many pastoralists to move South and climatic variability are all contributing to diminishing supplies of water, land and forest resources available for pastoralists, farmers and rural communities (Pantuliano, 2008). Less available land has had an impact on traditional shifting practices of smallholder farmers, which has reduced overall land productivity through heightened levels of erosion and loss of topsoil. As one report notes, rather than conflict emerging from tribal or ethnic divisions, regional conflicts are generated by ‘the combination of resource scarcity with a crisis of governance that is particularly evident in transitional areas like the Kordofan region’ (IFPRI, 2007: 7).

Traditionally, such conflicts between farmers and herders were resolved satisfactorily through customary land tenure systems but, as mentioned above, these systems are now weaker (ibid.). This is,
of course, now complicated significantly by the fact that the border with South Kordofan is now an international boundary. Scarce natural resources are one cause of the ongoing conflict in Jonglei: in December 2011, allegedly more than 600 persons were killed in one incident of inter-communal violence (Saferworld, 2012). The continuing conflict between members of Nuer, Dinka and Murle groups is rooted in different aspects such as competition over scarce natural resources (water and pasture), the political economy of cattle raiding, militarisation and inter-ethnic tensions (related to the past war), proliferation of small arms and a disfranchised armed youth (Harrağin, 2011).

Finally, creating a rule of law and a justice system has also been constrained by limited capacity. Since signing the CPA, GoSS has worked to do this in a way which reflects the values and perceptions of justice of the South Sudanese. This process is viewed as critical not just for dispute resolution and mediation, but also as a mechanism for consolidating the national identity. The key challenge is how to harmonise different bodies of customary law with each other and with statutory law. Military law and international humanitarian and human rights law are also key influences. The chiefs’ courts and the government courts operate in parallel, and generally this is positive, as parties can seek resolution in the forum most appropriate to them and their dispute. However, the relationship between the two systems remains undefined, and the borders are blurry.

GoSS is working to clarify the situation through the ascertainment of customary law and legislation. The Judiciary Act (2008), the Local Government Act (2009) and the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure (2008) have helped to articulate the roles of different actors in the justice system, but have also created some uncertainty at the level of the local courts (USIP, 2010). Overall, at the local level, some customary law courts have been working, but many South Sudanese tend to ‘heavily criticise’ higher-level courts for the perceived prevalence of bribery, favouritism and excessive delays, which significantly disadvantage the poor (ibid.). The process of written ascertainment of customary law is planned, and is intended to define and document in writing customary law as currently practised. However, one strength of customary law is its ability to be adapted to a particular case in a particular context; it is not a fixed body of law, but is constantly evolving and adapting. Many people fear this strength could be lost through ascertainment, as ‘any attempt to codify, document or reduce these laws to writing [...] would severely limit their flexibility’ (Jok and Leitch, 2004: 23).

3.3 Overview of livelihood support initiatives

3.3.1 Government-led initiatives

There is little discussion in the literature on government-led livelihood recovery initiatives and their impact. Since the Nimeiri regime (1969–85), government initiatives have focused mainly on large-scale agricultural expansion and promoted the settlement of migratory pastoralists (Deng, 2002; Fahey, 2007). Sudan attracted World Bank loans and investment from oil-producing countries for large-scale export-oriented agricultural development (ibid.). Land was often sold to private sector corporations to implement mechanised agricultural schemes, which forced smallholder farmers and pastoralists to cultivate marginal lands, triggering livelihood-related conflicts (Fahey, 2007; Pantuliano et al., 2009). More recently, in July 2006, the NCP introduced the ‘Green Alert Programme’, a four-year $1.4 billion agricultural development programme focused on increasing crop and livestock production (Fahey, 2007). There is no discussion in the literature of the impact of this. Large-scale land acquisitions in South Sudan have continued at an accelerated pace in recent years, facilitated in part by actions of GoSS, which has sold or leased large amounts of rural land to foreign companies and governments for agricultural, forestry and biofuel investments (Deng, 2011).

On the structural level, GoSS institutions that support livelihoods have existed since 2005; however, their institutional capacity is still weak. Institutions are poorly staffed and require significant capacity building (Shanmugaratnam, 2010). For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries (MARF) have suffered from limited technical and managerial capacity (Silvestro and Oketayot, 2008). MAF programmes have focused mainly on the distribution of seeds and tools, with limited support to research and extension services, and many programmes and policies for agricultural recovery have not yet been adequately understood by farmers (ibid.).

In addition, competition for donor resources has had an impact on coordination. For example, loss of funding for the Livelihoods Analysis Forum, under the SSCCSE, meant the weakening of the strong
assessment and analytical capacity of GoSS and resulted in a decision to revert back to UN cluster groups. This undermined the strengthening of a government institution that had been nurtured carefully prior to the CPA (Feinstein International Center, 2011).

In 2011, GoSS created the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MOHADM), charged with policy oversight in relation to the return and reintegration process of IDPs and refugees from neighbouring countries (MOHADM, 2010). The longstanding Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), renamed the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), remains the implementing body, in coordination with the ministry, in humanitarian operations in South Sudan (ibid.).

3.3.2 People-led initiatives

There are few formal examples in the literature of formal people-led interventions to support livelihood recovery. One of the most widespread is ‘spontaneous’ return, a term used to describe returnees who plan and organise their own return without external assistance. Spontaneous returnees make up the overwhelming majority of all returnees. In Juba, where data on spontaneous returnees are the most widely available and considered the most accurate, UNHCR estimate that at one point 80 percent of refugees who returned to Juba were spontaneous (Pantuliano et al., 2008). Maxwell and Burns (2008) note that, out of 358,000 returnees assisted by WFP in 2007, an estimated 286,000 were spontaneous — and WFP did not, by any means, assist all spontaneous returnees, because the systems in place could not automatically track them to ensure they received reintegration assistance. Bailey and Harragin (2009) estimate that only 13 percent of all returnees are in officially sanctioned programmes — the rest are spontaneous. Spontaneous returnees nevertheless have been found to be adapting — often helped, in many cases, by both the host community and other returnees receiving some assistance (Maxwell and Burns, 2008). Pantuliano et al. (2008) find that, in Jonglei state, the most immediate concerns among spontaneous returnees in terms of restarting livelihood activities include access to food, cooking utensils and shelter, followed by seeds and tools.

Traditionally, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and farmers have all developed adaptive strategies to cope with complex climatic conditions, especially drought. Agro-pastoralists and farmers often plant crops that are resilient under dry conditions, such as sorghum, millet and sesame, and often send family members to dry season grazing areas in order to exploit available wild foods and fish (Livelihoods Analysis Forum, 2006).

Pastoralists have adopted strategies such as ‘tracking strategies’, in which ‘the variable variability of grass is matched with livestock numbers and feed supplies are tracked in time and space’ (Pantuliano et al., 2009: 11). As mobility has decreased, pastoralists have transitioned towards increased sedentarisation. Women and children often remain in villages and towns and increasingly engage in agricultural activities (ibid.).

In the Western Flood Plains zone, wealthier households have begun to rely more heavily on crop production, in part to offset the risks associated with having all one’s ‘food’ derive from a source (cattle) that can be raided or slaughtered in battle, and in part to reduce the number of cattle exchanged for grain. With livestock markets disrupted during the war, the latter reason has assumed greater weight. Migration to more favourable areas is another option for these groups, which tend to have stronger links with neighbouring areas. Poorer groups tend to expand wild food collection and sales, and fishing when possible. Local and long-distance labour opportunities are also expanded on, depending on seasonal availability. Other income options that may be expanded include the sale of local beer, grass, mats, wild foods and dried fish (SSCCSE, 2006).

In terms of coping with conflict, in Bieh, in the Eastern Food Plain zone, despite persistent cattle raiding and insecurity, households have managed to cope through long-distance trading with government-controlled towns and Malakal especially, or through increased exchange with Bor and Phou. In Akobo, where insecurity is common, fish and cross-border trade with Ethiopia often help relieve pressure (SSCCSE, 2006).
Remittances coming from kin living abroad and in North Sudan are also cited as a livelihood recovery strategy. However, with the independence of South Sudan, remittances from the North are thought likely to diminish sharply (SSCCSE, 2006).

Local community-based institutions, composed of traditional authorities (principally chiefs and elders) in charge of customary land governance, have generally recovered well from the conflict and carry out essential tasks in resettlement, livelihood recovery and reintegration (Shanmugaratnam, 2010). However, their roles and responsibilities have increased greatly since the conflict, and they now require assistance in order to be able to address complex resettlement and land rights issues (ibid.). In certain instances, particularly in rural areas, the Native Administration and tribal chiefs no longer have the capacity to prevent and mediate land conflicts (Pantuliano, 2007). At the central level, records and data have been lost within survey departments, affecting the reliability of information for granting land allocations and securing tenure rights (ibid.). This is creating the opportunity for corrupt practices. The undermining of local chiefs could lead to growing resentment and possible division at a time when national unity is of paramount importance (Feinstein International Center, 2011).

Local traditional institutions have also played an important role in building adaptive capacity and household resilience. Alinovi et al. (2007) describe how Nuba organisations in Sudan tried to discourage short-term aid responses, such as general food aid distributions, which were undermining local production systems. In addition, in response to ongoing conflict, the Nuba adapted their agricultural systems by cultivating land in more secure areas in the hillsides. However, these types of adaptive responses can have negative impacts on livelihoods given fragile agro-ecological conditions that are unable to support traditional cultivation systems (ibid.). Other traditional institutions, such as kinship and clan networks, are important sources of support for livelihood recovery in South Sudan. Returnees with already established social networks are more capable of restarting livelihood activities (Bailey and Harragin, 2009; Harragin and Chol, 1999).

The 2010–11 ANLA found that the number of households using adverse coping strategies declined from 28 percent in 2009 to 6 percent in 2010. The most frequently cited adverse coping strategies included skipping meals, reducing adults’ food consumption and reliance on natural resource extraction for food and fuel. Households also depend on consumption coping strategies, such as dietary adjustments (WFP, 2010).

3.3.3 Aid agency-led initiatives

During the conflict, aid agency initiatives focused mainly on emergency relief (Pantuliano et al., 2009), mainly through the Operational Lifeline Sudan (OLS) initiative. Following the 1988 famine in South Sudan, OLS was launched in April 1989 after the UN negotiated an agreement between GoS and the SPLM, enabling humanitarian assistance to reach civilians on both sides of the conflict. OLS was an umbrella organisation that consisted of over 40 aid organisations led by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

WFP has been providing food aid in South Sudan since the start of OLS. Prior to the CPA in 2005, general food distribution was the principal modality of food aid programming, and there was little targeting beyond geographic regions. The objective of WFP’s programming during this period was to ‘save lives, protect nutritional status and protect community assets’ (Maxwell and Burns, 2008: 9). Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, food aid programming has shifted. WFP South Sudan has expanded its programming to four categories: general food distribution for emergency-affected populations; food for work (which includes food for recovery); food for education; and nutritional programme support. Unlike earlier programmes, the general distribution modality is now targeted, which has increased the administrative management of food assistance and made it less participatory (ibid.).

Programmes for the local purchase of food aid, such as WFP’s Purchase for Progress, have also been initiated in South Sudan. There are reports that local purchase has provided market incentives for smallholder farmers in surplus-producing areas to support them in increasing agricultural production and to stimulate the local economy; however, up to 2006, there had been no impact assessments or evaluations of these programmes (Maxwell et al. 2006).
There has also been an ongoing debate on food aid causing dependency among beneficiaries (see Bailey and Harragin, 2009; Maxwell et al., 2006). Many aid agency and government officials believe food aid should be limited as it reduces people’s incentives to work, and interventions should focus instead on recovery and development (ibid.). However, some evidence refutes this idea: Bailey and Harragin (2009) argue that food aid is too little and its distribution too unreliable to cause dependency in South Sudan. Maxwell et al. (2006) note that, for much of its history in South Sudan, food aid has been too erratic and unreliable to lead to a serious undermining of initiative at the individual or household level. Little additional research has been carried out in South Sudan on the unintended impacts of food aid beyond the issue of dependency. For example, there is very little in the literature on the impacts of food aid on trade, markets and local agricultural production or on migration patterns.

During the OLS era, there were cases of interventions that moved beyond the conventional approach of short-term humanitarian relief. One of these innovative approaches was the OLS Livestock Programme, which began as an alternative approach to rinderpest eradication in South Sudan and was expanded into a large-scale community-based animal health worker system (Alinovi et al., 2007; Catley et al., 2005). The programme was able to introduce participatory approaches to bring about impressive results in rinderpest eradication and the provision of primary animal health care (Catley et al. 2005). Among the most important factors in its success were recognising and building local knowledge and skills and supporting local institutions (despite the relief setting); incorporating elements of sustainability, such as payment for clinical services; creating space with donor agencies to use funds in innovative and unconventional ways; establishing strong links with global programmes; and engaging communities in participatory impact assessments, in addition to programme design and implementation (ibid.). These approaches continue to be built on.

Since shortly after the signing of the CPA, humanitarian agencies have been transitioning activities from short-term humanitarian response to livelihoods recovery. However, longer-term strategic planning and investments have been constrained by relatively short-term donor financing instruments, which owes in part to the six-year timeframe established for recovery after the signing of the CPA (Harvey, 2009). One of the main sources of external funding to South Sudan is the World Bank-administered MDTF, established in 2006, with the US, the UK, Norway and the European Union (EU) the main contributors among 14 donors and other financing mechanisms (Benjamin, 2010). This funding mechanism, which emerged from the UN Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and is meant to support projects and programmes that promote peace, development and poverty reduction by giving grants to GoSS, has been criticised for being very slow to get going. For example, although donors had given $392 million to the MDTF for South Sudan by 2008, spending on projects via this fund was only $134 million ($264 million if you include the GoSS-financed part) (Foster et al., 2010). Also there have been criticisms that interventions have been restricted mainly to ‘partial interventions of an unsustainable and quasi-humanitarian nature’, such as distribution of various supplies such as schoolbooks and bed nets (ibid.: 20).

In addition to the MDTF, there has been a wide range of pooled and bilateral financing instruments in South Sudan. These include the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), administered by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and established in 2006 to ensure early, predictable and coordinated funding to address humanitarian needs; the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF), which began in 2004 and was administered by UNICEF to help build the capacity of GoSS and provide funding for short-term programmes in the private sector; and the Strategic Partnership Arrangement (SPA), which was administered by UNDP and ended in 2009, to provide funding for governance and early recovery (Harvey, 2009).

Most recently, and linked to enhancing security, the USAID-funded Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation (STCM) programme has been working to enhance community security, reduce conflict and promote long-term stability in areas of South Sudan with limited government presence and high levels of violence, including the Sobat River Corridor, the Wunlit Triangle and the North–South border region. The programme has helped build the capacity and extend the reach of local and traditional authorities in these areas by providing them with transportation and communications equipment, equipping early warning posts and rehabilitating critical community infrastructure. It also provides support to youths by engaging them in training, education and productive economic activities. It works mainly through a grants programme and, as of October 2009, had provided 120 grants totalling over $11.8 million. The
programme reported significant impacts related to the de-escalation of conflict in Akobo county between 2009–10; however, there have been no impact assessments of the programme to date (USAID, 2011).

Other large livelihoods programmes include the Food, Agribusiness and Rural Markets (FARM) programme, a five-year $55 million agricultural rehabilitation programme launched by USAID in 2005. This programme aims to increase agricultural productivity and trade while building the capacity of producers and institutions in South Sudan’s agriculture sector. It intends to increase crop production and food availability by strengthening linkages between South Sudan’s high potential agricultural zones and markets, targeting South Sudan’s Greenbelt zone, which includes Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria states (USAID, 2010). The lead implementing partner is Abt Associates. To date, no evaluations have been conducted.

USAID and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) have also been working to build community-level capacity in land governance and management. These initiatives began with a long-running IFAD community-based natural resource management and empowerment programme and a USAID community land tenure security programme implemented through the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) (Matus 2007). USDA and USAID have been providing guidance and support on land law best practices and are assisting communities with customary rights claims through negotiation processes with other communities (Matus, 2007).

International aid agencies continue to lead processes of resettlement and livelihood recovery, even though these depend on local ownership and building the capacity of local institutions and communities (Shanmugaratnam, 2010). Aid agencies have striven to meet basic needs through a ‘reintegration package’, which consists of a three-month food ration, along with seeds, tools and non-food items (Bailey and Harragin, 2009). This package is often poorly coordinated, and few returnees actually receive all of its components. The three-month duration is also considered insufficient for beneficiaries to rebuild their livelihoods (ibid.).

On paper, UNCHR’s return and reintegration strategy in South Sudan has attempted to address the issue of creating local ownership through programmes that aim to build the capacity of returnees and the communities in which they are resettling (UNHCR, 2005). UNHCR has been implementing community-based reintegration projects, which aim to empower communities to identify their own needs and agree on projects that support livelihoods, strengthen community recovery and build local institutional capacity. Also part of UNHCR’s return and reintegration strategy are ‘livelihoods and self-reliance’ and ‘coexistence’ projects. Livelihoods and self-reliance projects aim to support skills building in areas such as microfinance and entrepreneurship. Coexistence projects strive to bring divided communities together to identify and develop participatory projects which are then executed by local associations and community-based organisations (ibid.). However, a 2008 evaluation of UNHCR’s returnee reintegration programmes in South Sudan found that, although these initiatives had been implemented to a certain extent, the wide range of reintegration interventions initially envisaged has ‘mainly translated into [...] focusing on the construction or rehabilitation of schools, medical facilities and community boreholes’ (Duffield, 2008: 13).

Additional capacity-building and livelihood support interventions include the Food for Training and Income Generation (FFTIG) programme, being implemented by BRAC South Sudan in collaboration with WFP. FFTIG aims to utilise the distribution of food rations as an entry point for the provision of skills development training, the establishment of savings groups and the implementation of microcredit programmes to initiate income-generating activities (BRAC, 2008). An impact evaluation of this programme was scheduled to be carried out by BRAC East Africa and the London School of Economics and completed by 2010; the results of this have not yet been made publicly available. In addition, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has been active in urban areas and IDP camps in the South.19

The focus of their jobs development programmes has been training, and activities have included skill surveys, rebuilding and staffing vocational training centres and microcredit programmes (ILO, 2007).

19 http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/_new/research/sustainable_transition.asp.
One example of an intervention that has supported value chain development in South Sudan is the USAID-funded Lulu Livelihoods Programme, which focused on utilising South Sudan’s indigenous shea nut tree, known in Arabic as lulu, for the development of a value chain for shea butter production for local and export markets. An assessment of the shea butter value chain in South Sudan identified a series of key factors to consider when selecting industries for value chain development in conflict-affected environments. These include the possibility for competitiveness (in both the short and the long term); the potential for equitable distribution of benefits; viable linkages to a functioning market for the industry’s products; the ability to utilise and support existing capacities and skills of the local population; and the potential to achieve results over a short timeframe (Armstrong et al., 2008). The shea butter value chain in South Sudan was able to successfully involve and utilise the skills of women, demonstrating that, despite ongoing conflict, value chain initiatives can effectively support vulnerable groups (Parker, 2008). However, the case also showed that results and sustainability for value chain programmes in conflict-affected settings take time: ongoing NGO and donor support has been provided for seven years and an estimated ten years are needed before external support and subsidies can be withdrawn (ibid.).

USAID is making a concerted effort to incorporate gender analysis into as many of its programmes in South Sudan as possible, recognising that the needs of males and females are different and the impacts of programming are variable (Benjamin, 2010). Also, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) is acting as the lead agency on gender efforts, and coordinates both the Gender Task Force and the Gender-based Violence Working Group in Juba (ibid.). There are no independent assessments of the impact of either of these efforts.

Finally, a critical programme to ensure livelihood recovery is the Southern Sudan disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme supported by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Given people’s everyday experiences of violence, disarmament was identified by those surveyed in Lakes state as a top priority (SAS, 2006). While critical, though, the DDR programme has advanced very slowly. The CPA mandated that the SPLA and the SAF conduct DDR of their forces; however, six years later, only 13 percent of the SPLA’s ‘targeted adult caseload’ of 90,000 people has begun the DDR process (SAS, 2011). Many DDR participants are deemed ineligible for the programme because they joined the army after 2005 or left the army before trying to enrol in DDR. One success of the DDR programme has been the provision of livelihoods training to women who fought in the SPLA (ibid.).

### 3.3.4 Private sector-led initiatives

There is very limited evidence of private sector-led initiatives in livelihood support, although the government and donors are trying to boost private sector involvement. In May 2007, GoSS received a grant co-financed by the MDTF to implement the Private Sector Development Project (PSDP). This five-year project aims to increase formal employment opportunities in South Sudan and to develop an enabling environment for private sector growth. It aims to achieve 20 percent annual increases in employment by formal, registered private sector firms (GoSS, 2007) and to generate employment opportunities through fostering entrepreneurship, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and increasing access to commercially viable microfinance services. The four main activities within this project are ‘policy and regulation, access to finance, market development, and capacity-building within the government’ (Martin and Mosel, 2011: 14). Microfinance is being used to create small businesses as a way to support livelihoods and income generation, financed through the PSDP. A department to oversee the project has been created within the Ministry of Commerce.

There is a lack of long-term investment in industry and infrastructure, in part because of a lack of policies and regulations for investors, which leads to much of the profit from the international private sector having little positive impact on the South Sudanese economy because it does not get invested locally. Private sector investment is being encouraged by the Central Equatoria state government through strategies such as tax exemptions and profit repatriation guarantees to investors (Martin and Mosel, 2011).

Private sector investors have benefited in both the past and the present from special relationships with the government (Pantuliano, 2007). In many rural areas throughout Sudan, with the support of the
government, commercial investors have taken possession of large tracts of land for agricultural development activities (Fahey, 2007; Keen and Lee, 2006). A similar situation has occurred in the context of oil exploration. Interestingly, however, Pantuliano et al. (2009) report that, out of all the outside interventions provided to Misseriyya communities during the conflict period, the only interventions the Misseriyya feel positively about are projects provided by Chevron and a Canadian oil company, focusing on vocational skills training for youths and community development activities.

While are no data available specific to South Sudan on the macroeconomic impact of oil exploitation, the economies of North and South Sudan have changed dramatically since oil exports began in 1999 (World Bank, 2009). Over the period 2000–8, oil revenues in the whole of Sudan enabled an expansion of road infrastructure from 3,358 km in 2000 to 6,211 km in 2008, as well as the doubling of electricity generation from 2,569 MW to 5,506 MW (ibid.). However, the contribution of the oil industry to total employment in North and South Sudan has been minimal. A 2011 study on the labour market in Sudan found that oil industries represented only 0.52 percent of total employment in North and South Sudan (Nour, 2011). In addition, as GoSS relies on oil revenues for over 95 percent of its total revenues, there is increasing concern about the threat of ‘Dutch Disease’ if South Sudan’s economy does not become more diversified (World Bank, 2009).

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20 The majority of this is happening in North Sudan.

21 Presumably, this does not include employment being paid for by oil revenue such as infrastructure development, payment of civil servants, etc.
4 Basic services and social protection

4.1 Basic services overview

Populations in South Sudan suffer from extremely poor access to basic services. As President Salva Kiir stated on 3 November 2010, ‘There has been no development in South Sudan. We have no roads, no bridges, no water, no power, nothing at all, no hospitals, and no schools – everything is at zero’ (The Brenthurst Foundation, 2010: 6).

It is widely felt by both the population of South Sudan and GoSS that GoSS should prioritise the delivery of services and construction of infrastructure (Cook, 2007). Not only are these components important for economic development, but also ‘service delivery must be understood as a strategic as well as a practical contribution to peace’ (Pantuliano et al., 2008: 4). However, it must be remembered that South Sudan had to start to rebuild from almost no infrastructure and services after the war. In this context, the achievements made over the past six years need to be acknowledged.

Returnees are aware that many rural areas are nearly bereft of access to basic services. Therefore, overcrowding is occurring in areas where more economic opportunities are believed to exist and service delivery is perceived to be more consistent and of higher quality, for example in Juba and other cities and state capitals, like Bor. However, even in these areas, service delivery — including health services and education — has not expanded to keep pace with the influx of people, and quality is actually deteriorating (Pantuliano et al., 2008). Juba, with an estimated population of 500,000 people, can afford access to safe water for about 150,000 (The Brenthurst Foundation, 2010).

The poor status of basic service provision is especially evident when looking at specific sectors. South Sudan has some of the worst health indicators in the world. In 2006, it was estimated that there were only 36 doctors and 3,600 primary health care workers for a population of approximately 7 million (Rietveld and Waldman, 2006). One out of every seven children dies before their fifth birthday. Nearly one in every seven women who become pregnant dies from pregnancy-related causes, and only 10 percent of deliveries are attended by a skilled professional (compared with 70 percent of deliveries in the North). The infant mortality rate is 170 per 1,000 live births (compared with 70 per 1,000 live births in the North) (The Brenthurst Foundation, 2010). Health accounts for only 3 percent of household expenditures in South Sudan (WFP, 2010).

GoSS never managed a health system before 2005, and the Ministry of Health (MoH) was ill-equipped to build the health sector, necessitating the involvement of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank in the development of policies and programmes (Cometto et al., 2010). Although the Interim Constitution stated that primary health care services should be provided freely, lack of government capacity has been a challenge.

The provision of safe water and sanitation continues to be an urgent need in South Sudan. Diarrhoeal disease and malaria rank in the top causes of mortality and morbidity (Goyol, 2003). South Sudan also remains one of the few countries in which guinea worm remains a significant public health problem. The provision of safe water and sanitation is an important public health intervention to decrease rates of illness. This importance is especially highlighted by recurring outbreaks of cholera in urban areas of South Sudan (Welle et al., 2008). Even in Juba, only 30 percent of the population has access to safe water (The Brenthurst Foundation, 2010). Furthermore, lack of water and sanitation facilities in schools likely acts as a deterrent to school attendance. According to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) (2009), 51 percent of all schools have no latrines or drinking water source. Finally, the prevalence of pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods in South Sudan means water sources are key

As Slaymaker (2004) points out, the main benefits of improving access to water and sanitation generally fall within the categories of improved health, savings in time and energy for those who would normally be fetching water and income generation related to water. Slaymaker identifies household water security as pivotal in reducing the vulnerability to migration of entire households that has occurred during the dry season in search of water in lowland swamps. When entire families are forced to move in search of water, children are exposed to elevated dangers of guinea worm, malaria, wild animals such as snakes and abduction.
factors in the movement of and conflicts between these populations, and so humanitarian agencies must consider the implications of interventions that provide water sources in planning water and sanitation projects (Slaymaker, 2004). Slaymaker cites the lack of any substantial tax base, insufficient community mobilisation and a lack of a coherent policy framework as key barriers to sustainable provision of basic services and development of the water and sanitation sector.

South Sudan has the unfortunate distinction of having one of the lowest literacy rates in the world — 24 percent as of 2007 compared with 49.9 percent in North Sudan (Kett and Trani, 2007). Fully 92 percent of women cannot read or write. While 1.3 million children are enrolled in primary school, only 1.9 percent of these complete a primary education, and only 27 percent of school-aged girls are enrolled in school. Education accounts for 1 percent of household expenditures (WFP, 2010). In 2006, only 16 percent of classrooms in the South were permanent structures, and the vast majority of teachers had received no training and worked as volunteers (GoNU and GoSS, 2008).

In Juba, basic service provision is also linked to land issues. Neither the state nor humanitarian agencies want to invest in services that might not endure if a particular area of the city is replanted. Non-demarcated areas do not have formal roads, limiting access to services (Martin and Mosel, 2011). The development of rural roads in South Sudan began to receive greater attention after the 2005 CPA (FAO and WFP, 2010). As a result, trade flows of food and other household items between rural and urban areas have improved, at least in some regions, and there are considerable differences between regions. Whereas in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, all-weather roads link the state capital with the county headquarters, in Jonglei state there is little road accessibility during the rainy season. In addition, many areas’ feeder roads are poor and are a major impediment to household access to food and farmers’ access to inputs (ibid.).

Finally, in terms of security provision, the South Sudan Police Service has been in operation since taking over from the SPLA in 2008, but has neither the training nor the equipment to intervene in armed conflict (HRW, 2009). The lack of infrastructure and sufficient police and justice institutions, for instance in Jonglei state, as with most of South Sudan, leads to difficulties in maintaining law and order, particularly with the proliferation of arms (ibid.). With the influx of people into urban areas, crime has also increased, with land conflicts the most common causes of this (Martin and Mosel, 2011). The inter-communal violence between the Nuer and Murle ethnic groups that killed more than 1,000 people in Jonglei state in March and April 2009 highlights the gaps in civilian protection by both GoSS and UNMIS (HRW, 2009). Human Rights Watch (HRW) learned through interviews that local, state and regional GoSS authorities knew attacks were likely to occur, and yet there was no attempt to prevent these or to protect civilians (ibid.). HRW recommends that GoSS recruit more police, provide better training that includes human rights and speed up deployment to the most volatile areas of the region. In the meantime, the SPLA should be trained to protect civilians and deployed in mixed ethnicities, and UNMIS should step up to its mandate of civilian protection (ibid.). In April/May 2011, interviewees from the state government of Jonglei explained that they planned to enhance security through community policing.

4.1.1 Gaps in basic services
Local governments must play a central role in basic service delivery, but the power given to them remains insufficient for them to fulfil this role, resulting in service gaps across regions and sectors. The Local Government Act of 2009 attempted to promote decentralisation, and included structural, institutional and legal reforms (USAID, 2009a). However, capacity at the local government level is extremely low, owing to factors such as a lack of resources, corruption, lack of infrastructure and geographical isolation, and more training and capacity building are necessary before local government units are capable of delivering basic services such as health and education, or of conducting basic operations like tax collection (ibid.).

Corruption is a serious problem in Sudan. In 2010, Transparency International rated Sudan the fourth most corrupt country in the world, although this was before South Sudan split off and became an independent country: there are no figures yet on South Sudan. A study conducted by the National Democratic Institute in 2007 explored South Sudanese citizens’ views, and found that people understood corruption to mean both tribalism/nepotism and the misuse of public funds. Citizens were very concerned about corruption in their government: the embezzlement of public funds was perceived
to be pervasive and, along with tribalism that promotes public employment for members of a particular tribe, was viewed as extremely detrimental and a main form of abuse of public office. All forms of corruption were viewed as hindering basic service delivery and development, and increasing divisions between the South Sudanese. In fact, many people felt that the level of corruption in the government was making service delivery and development impossible. While people appreciate that GoSS is working to reduce corruption, they have seen little progress. Interestingly, while corruption brought down officials serving under President Kiir, his personal reputation as a man of integrity has remained intact (Cook, 2007).

Lack of human resources is a major constraint to improvement in service provision generally, and especially to the development of the health sector. Health services cover only about a quarter of the population, and are provided mostly by local and international NGOs (Rietveld and Waldman, 2006). Cometto et al. (2010) report that over 70 NGOs and faith-based organisations have been providing most health services in South Sudan. Services are mainly project based and often focus on particular communicable disease interventions, such as malaria campaigns. Compounding a general lack of human resources throughout South Sudan is the inequity in geographic distribution of infrastructure.

There is very low coverage by targeted therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes — less than 10 percent of malnourished children are covered (FAO and WFP 2010). Almost all of these programmes are run by NGOs, and they are concentrated in only a few regions. Improvements in nutrition are affected by limited institutional capacity and political will in South Sudan. Nutrition is a low priority within the MoH (ibid.). The Nutrition Directorate was recently abolished and reassigned under the Directorate of Community and Public Health. This may affect the coverage of nutrition programmes and the ability to effectively implement and deliver nutrition-related services.

Another obstacle is the lack of infrastructure such as roads and communications, which hinders the movement of supplies throughout the country (Rietveld and Waldman, 2006). Movement of medical supplies such as drugs is also affected by insecurity along any main transport routes. A USAID report on the health sector in South Sudan recommends developing a procurement system for drugs and other medical supplies, as well as partnering with the private sector for the provision of services, as has been done in other post-conflict states such as Cambodia and the DRC (ibid.).

Many populations live in remote and inaccessible areas, which creates a barrier to adequate provision of water and sanitation facilities. The lack of roads means there is no way to transport basic well construction materials such as gravel and cement casing other than by air, which is expensive and also requires air strips to be accessible year-round, which they are not, given long periods of heavy rain (Goyol, 2003; Welle et al., 2008). Ongoing conflict up until 2005 also limited efficiency in drilling boreholes, as drilling equipment could not be left on site for extended periods (Goyol, 2003). Inter-communal conflict in pastoral areas and around oil fields can still prove a disruption to the drilling of wells (Welle et al., 2008). Alternative strategies, such as digging wells by hand, may be unwelcome for the community, as they may have observed nearby communities being assisted with drilling, and some claim insufficient strength to dig at times of food shortage or that is simply too time intensive (Goyol, 2003).

The most notable gap in education services relates to the dramatic difference between male and female enrolment. In 2009, there were 508,776 girls enrolled in primary school compared with 871,804 boys (MoEST, 2009). In secondary school, there were 12,050 girls and 31,977 boys (ibid.). There is also a large drop-off of enrolment beyond primary schools evident from these figures. According to current projections, only 9 percent of females who entered Grade 1 in 2008 will complete Grade 8, whereas 15 percent of males will (ibid.).

The most recent data from South Sudan’s Educational Management Information System (EMIS) highlights these gaps in educational services. EMIS was developed with donor support in 2006 and compiles information on enrolment and school infrastructure. In 2010, EMIS data reported a gross enrolment ratio (GER) for primary education of 72 percent and a net enrolment ratio (NER) of 48 percent (Mehta, 2010). South Sudan’s NER for primary education is the second lowest out of 123 countries (UNESCO, 2011). EMIS data for 2010 show school-aged girls are less likely to be enrolled in primary education than boys. The NER for male students enrolled in primary education is 55 percent,
whereas this figure is only 40 percent for female students (Mehta, 2010). Training of primary school teachers in South Sudan remains low, with only 13 percent of primary school teachers having received training. Only 12 percent of teachers are female, which further reinforces gender disparities in South Sudan’s educational system (UNESCO, 2011).

Another gap that exists is in the inclusion of children with special needs in education services. An exploratory report on this topic points out that the current revamping of the education system in South Sudan provides an opportunity to promote the needs of disabled children by incorporating inclusive education. The authors identify a clear lack of data on children with special needs in the country, and thus assume that most of these children are currently not accessing schools (Kett and Trani, 2007).

Regional differences in service provision can be large. Primary net enrolment rates (children aged 6–13) are highest for Upper Nile state (60 percent) and lowest in Lakes and Central Equatoria (both 42 percent) (MoEST, 2009). For secondary school (those aged 14–17), the net enrolment rate was highest for Western Bahr El-Ghazal (14 percent) and lowest for Northern Bahr El-Ghazal, Unity and Lakes (ibid.). During the second civil war up until 2005, enrolment in the Upper Nile and Bahr El-Ghazal was especially low compared with North Sudan, and international NGOs were providing most education services. The higher concentration of NGOs in Equatoria — and near Juba in particular — has meant a slower rate of development in other areas (Faye, 2010).

A study to determine socioeconomic and cultural barriers to primary schooling in the Upper Nile, Western Bahr El-Ghazal and Lakes states found that the main barriers to accessibility and quality of primary schools were a reduced government budget (from $134 million in 2006 to $100 million in 2008); limited ability to pay for teacher salaries and construction and improvement of facilities; economic barriers at the household level that prevent children from completing school as they are important contributors in the home, which includes the temptation for children to seek a part in the cash economy of local markets; and cultural barriers such as early marriage and gender bias against girls. Other problems include violence in schools and early pregnancy; lack of qualified teachers as well as a high pupil to teacher ratio; inadequate school infrastructure, including latrines and water points; psychosocial barriers involving varying ages of students and sexual maturation of girls in school; and curriculum change from Arabic to English without consultation with communities, some of whom stated that it was more useful for their children to learn in Arabic as they reside in states closer to Khartoum, and are thus more likely to go there seeking services than they are to Juba (UNICEF, 2009). Bogh (2010) also reports a significant reduction in teacher salaries in 2009, resulting in qualified teachers leaving South Sudan or seeking other employment with international NGOs or elsewhere with more attractive pay. Only 13 percent of all teachers in the 2009 education census had ever received formal training (MoEST, 2009). Other, more literal barriers, to accessing education include heavy rains that cut off lowland areas with swamps and rivers, preventing passage of children to school (Bogh, 2010). Common reasons for dropout include sickness, seasonal work, lack of drinking water and extreme poverty (ibid.).

4.2 Social protection overview

In general, there is very little evidence on social protection programming in South Sudan, in terms of description of both social protection interventions and the government’s stance on social protection activities. Under the Social Development pillar of the draft National Development Plan, one segment is devoted to social protection. The aim is that at least 20 percent of households will receive cash transfers within the first three years of statehood. This is to be accomplished through an as-yet unnamed new programme. The responsible institution is also unnamed, but will probably be the Ministry of Gender, Culture and Social Welfare (MoGCSW). The target is to have a social protection system in place by 2013 (Feinstein International Center, 2011).

The largest social protection intervention proposed was by the 2005 World Bank/UN JAM to Sudan, which included a Livelihoods and Social Protection cluster. This cluster assessed needs in relation to four areas: IDPs and refugees; community-driven recovery; DDR; and mine action. The JAM stated that social protection interventions should focus on achieving three overall objectives:
- Reduce the vulnerability of low-income households with regard to basic consumption and services;
- Allow households to shift income efficiently over the life-cycle, thus financing consumption when needed; and
- Enhance equity particularly with regard to exposure to, and the effects of, adverse shocks (UN and World Bank, 2005)

While the JAM stressed the importance of linking social protection interventions to medium- and long-term economic growth activities, the report does not elaborate on how this might actually be achieved. A list of recommended social protection programmes includes a wide range of interventions from provision of inputs (e.g., tools, seeds, fertiliser) for subsistence farmers returning to rural areas to transport support for some of the most vulnerable groups involved in an organised voluntary return programme (UN and World Bank 2005).

In addition to this, there are also a limited number of cash transfer initiatives run by UNDP and Save the Children, which are looked at in greater detail in Section 4.3.3.

4.3 Overview of basic service and social protection initiatives

4.3.1 Government-led initiatives

Now, GoSS is attempting to ‘take towns to the people’, meaning GoSS is promoting a decentralised approach that will use oil revenues to fund access to basic services and livelihood opportunities in smaller towns and rural areas (Martin and Mosel, 2011). In an effort to slow the rapid rate of urbanisation and entice people to return to rural areas, for the past several years, GoSS has been implementing a policy of creating two ‘model towns’ per state. These towns are designed to better deliver services, and each has a primary school, a health centre, water and electricity, a market and a community centre (Pantuliano et al., 2008). It is unlikely that the high rate of growth in Juba will slow, however.

The JAM process was agreed to by GoS and the SPLM after the signing of the CPA, as a way to promote peace and create a framework for development in the South. But while expectations were high at the beginning of the JAM process in 2006, by 2008 it was widely felt — even within GoNU and GoSS — that implementation had fallen short of expectations and that there was little visible development progress on the ground (GoNU and GoSS, 2008). The perception was that the JAM had underestimated the difficulty of rebuilding a civil service and other institutions that had been utterly destroyed; without these institutions and structures functioning to some degree, basic service delivery was not possible (ibid.).

In response to these shortcomings, the Sustaining Peace through Development Plan of GoNU and GoSS, which laid out the peace and development framework for 2008—11, prioritised the delivery of tangible benefits to the population, as a way of combating ‘the growing cynical attitude around the lack of peace dividends’ (GoNU and GoSS, 2008: 6). Projects that delivered ‘quick peace dividends’ were prioritised, such as building schools, water points and health clinics. Infrastructure was seen as critical to both development and the perception of positive development (ibid.). In all, six medium-term priorities were articulated for 2008—11: improved security; improved road infrastructure to promote socioeconomic and private sector development; provision of primary health care; promoting access to primary education; improved coverage of water and sanitation in rural areas; and improved production in rural areas (Martin and Mosel, 2011).

In terms of access to water, although GoSS developed a draft rural water supply and sanitation policy in 2007, the international NGO PACT has been the main contributor to work on improving access to potable water, sanitation and hygiene and building capacity for community-managed water projects since 2005 within the Water for Recovery and Peace Programme (WRAPP) (Welle et al., 2008).

Since the CPA, GoSS has prioritised improving access to and quality of education as well as promoting gender diversity. MoEST states that the ‘main aim is to ensure that all individuals have access to a primary school education regardless of age, special needs, and gender’ (MoEST, 2009: 8). The Interim Constitution of South Sudan indicates that ‘education is a right for every citizen and all levels of
government in South Sudan shall provide access to education without discrimination as to religion, race, ethnicity, HIV status, gender or disability’ (MOEST 2007: 4). It indicates that ‘all levels of government in South Sudan shall promote education at all levels and shall ensure free and compulsory education at the primary level; they shall also provide free illiteracy education programmes’, and also states that ‘The Government of South Sudan shall endeavour to avail the necessary financial resources to make education affordable at secondary and higher levels, including technical and vocational training, in order to bridge the educational gap caused by the collapse of educational services in South Sudan during the years of conflict’ (ibid.: 4).

The government has attempted to increase overall school enrolment in various ways, including school feeding programmes and the creation of alternative education systems for people who missed out on school as a result of the war (UNICEF, 2009). However, many gaps remain. Strides have also been taken towards increasing female basic education rates, as evidenced through the creation of the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs and the Directorate of Gender, Equity and Social Change (Faye, 2010). MoEST has 11 detailed strategies dedicated to improving education for girls, including the provision of scholarships to girls as well as balancing domestic work such that girls may attend school (UNICEF, 2009). So far, there has been no impact assessment on programmes to improve education.

Despite these continued challenges to improving educational services in South Sudan, South Sudan’s education programme has undergone rapid reconstruction since the signing of the CPA (Kim et al., 2011). From 2006 to 2010, South Sudan was able to more than double the number of students at the primary level, from 700,000 in 2006 to 1.6 million in 2010 (ibid.). A critical component of South Sudan’s reconstruction of its basic education has been the development of an Alternative Education System (AES) programme. AES compresses eight years of primary education into four, which allows children to complete school in a shorter period of time (ibid.). AES programmes initially targeted demilitarised soldiers, but now students of all ages are allowed to enrol. Between 2008 and 2009, enrolment in AES nearly tripled, from 81,000 to 217,000 students (ibid.). While the government has collaborated in the development of AES, much of the support for these programmes has been provided by international donors, including UNICEF, WFP, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and USAID (ibid.).

MoH’s Health Policy 2007–11 had a major emphasis on primary health care. Although secondary and tertiary health care are important and will be addressed, primary health care remains the cornerstone of the health system and will receive more political commitment and support to ensure its successful implementation (MOH, 2007). The main objective of this policy is to reduce mortality and morbidity through a strategic approach that takes into consideration the following aims: strengthen health systems and services to provide effective and equitable health care that is accessible, acceptable, affordable, sustainable and cost effective; scale up communicable and communicable disease prevention and control programmes, while recognising unprecedented challenge caused by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; mobilise and effectively use adequate sustainable resources to strengthen the health system; develop effective partnerships with local communities and relevant institutions nationally, regionally and internationally; and strengthen and scale up programmes to reduce the burden of conditions related to pregnancy and child birth (ibid.). There is little knowledge on the impact of the policy.

Specific to Juba, in 2006 the Emergency Rehabilitation Works project was started to improve building infrastructure, roads and water and sanitation facilities (Martin and Mosel, 2011). This government-funded project supported by the World Bank accomplished the ‘restoration of government offices and residential houses and the Juba Teaching Hospital, as well as the creation of a water plant, tarmac roads, a power supply system and generator network, a waste disposal site and a water treatment plant’ (ibid.: 23). However, these infrastructure improvements were focused on officially demarcated areas, and its limited accomplishments are now under further strain as Juba’s population grows.

4.3.2 People-led initiatives

Aside from the initiatives reported above under the livelihoods section, no additional information is available on people-led initiatives on social protection. However, much of the assistance afforded spontaneous returnees could be categorised as either livelihood support or social protection.
4.3.3 Aid agency-led initiatives

Since the signing of the CPA, there have been numerous initiatives to support basic service provision. UNDP’s Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), which began in 2005, has been working to improve basic services in South Sudan through the construction and rehabilitation of health facilities, classrooms, latrines and water systems (UNDP, 2011). A draft independent evaluation of the RRP found it had achieved an immediate positive impact on access to basic services, particularly in the sectors of education, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and health. However, there are concerns about the sustainability of these physical infrastructure investments and questions about the ability of GoSS to take over maintenance and service delivery responsibilities (Poulsen et al., 2010). USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has focused its programme investments in South Sudan on improving access to basic services, particularly in the areas of health and WASH. These interventions are being targeted specifically in returnee locations in South Sudan including Abyei, Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan (OFDA, 2009).

The Basic Services Fund (BSF), funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), was launched in 2005 and finances the delivery of basic services, focusing principally on primary education, primary health and water and sanitation. The main goal is to increase the coverage, access and use of basic services in South Sudan. In 2009, Norway, the Netherlands and Canada joined DFID in funding a second phase of the BSF. The Phase 1 evaluation, conducted in 2009, found that most of the BSF’s Phase 1 targets had been met. However, the evaluation also found that ‘the quality of the education service varied widely […] a significant proportion of boreholes provide water that is only fit for washing and construction […] and] efforts to promote better hygiene seem to have made limited progress’ (Morton et al., 2009; ii).

Particularly important in the context of basic services is Round 2 of the Sudan Recovery Fund (SRF) (September 2009 to March 2011), which had the goal of providing small grants to national organisations and encouraging local partnerships and community capacity building. Round 3 (January 2011 to December 2012) seeks greater community participation and will focus on improving security and scaling up basic services. However, evaluators caution that the creation of the SRF only serves to further complicate the web of funding and pose challenges for coordination (Foster et al., 2010).

In terms of interventions focused on a specific sector, Save the Children Denmark and Save the Children UK provided basic education to conflict-affected communities in Northern Bahr El-Ghazal state in 2000, which became a capacity-building project for local teachers and authorities after 2005 (Bogh, 2010). Recognising that many people were unable to attend school because of years of war, UNICEF has created an Adult Literacy Programme in remote regions for adults with no basic education (ibid.).

WHO proposed the Basic Package of Health Services, which includes five levels of service and facility: community-based health activities; primary health care units; primary health care centres; county hospitals; and county health departments (Rietveld and Waldman, 2006). As of 2003, there were 551 basic primary health care units, 103 comprehensive primary health care centres and 19 hospitals (ibid.). Meanwhile, according to Rietveld and Waldman, USAID’s Health Transformation Project is the only project directly working to strengthen development of the health sector itself rather than focusing just on service provision. This has taken the form of improving local capacity for management and delivery of services, as well as increasing access to and use of high impact services and safe water and sanitation (ibid.). The project was serving about 12 percent of the South Sudanese population by 2008, via support to 25 primary health care centres and 120 primary health care units (Cometto et al., 2010).

As mentioned above, WRAPP is the most notable provider of WASH services in South Sudan. By 2007, WRAPP had provided water and/or sanitation services to as many as 1.4 million people, through the building and rehabilitation of hundreds of boreholes, semi-urban water schemes, public toilets and a rainwater harvesting facility (Welle et al., 2008). Gaps in service are addressed partially by the fact that WRAPP coordinates with other agencies to target the areas most underserved by donors (ibid.). WRAPP’s promotion of water and sanitation has also occurred with the involvement of local partners, most notably by supporting the local South Sudanese drilling market over international options (ibid.). This collaboration with local partners has created strong relationships with community-based organisations through which sustainable water management committees (or user committees) are instructed (ibid.). The impacts of WRAPP for women have included decreased incidence of rape through
not having to travel long distances to fetch water; the elderly and children have also benefited significantly, as they no longer have to migrate long distances during the dry part of the year and no longer risking injury from collapsing holes in dry river beds, respectively (ibid.). Gender is a focus only to the extent of ensuring a certain number of women are members of user committees in community-based water management schemes. Well et al. recommend ways to further incorporate gender into WRAPP, such as by focusing on women’s small-scale use of water as it relates to livelihoods and possible entrepreneurial opportunities.

Several social protection activities are focused on cash for work. A UNDP cash for work programme was implemented in nine urban areas in South Sudan as part of the public works component of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project (RIEP). The objective of this was to provide basic services to urban populations, generate temporary employment opportunities and develop the capacity of governmental and non-governmental institutions. Activities focused mainly on rehabilitating drainage, sanitation facilities, water supply, schools, health facilities and roads. The final evaluation of RIEP found that it ‘made significant progress and tangible achievements’ and that, where it did not meet programme targets, this owed to environmental and weather-related factors that were ‘beyond the control of the programme’ (Nuwakura, 2009). However, the evaluation did not measure the overall impact of the programme rigorously, instead relying exclusively on qualitative methods (reviewing project documents and meeting with project stakeholders).

Save the Children implemented an EU-funded cash transfer pilot project in Baac payam in Northern Bahr El-Ghazal between April 2009 and June 2010. This aimed to build food security and increase household and community assets in a conflict-affected payam that had suffered from high losses of productive assets, widespread displacement and chronic food insecurity. The project provided two types of cash transfers: cash for work, in which beneficiaries received cash transfers for working on community-based projects; and unconditional cash transfers for vulnerable households, which included the elderly, disabled and child-headed households. A total of 1,400 beneficiaries received SDG80 per month, equivalent to approximately 35 percent of their income. The project also provided disaster risk reduction (DRR) and nutrition training in communities.

An evaluation of the programme determined that cash transfer programming is possible in post-conflict settings if appropriate security precautions are taken. Locating distribution sites close to police stations or near markets where money can be spent on the same trip helped to increase the feeling of security among beneficiaries during the project. The evaluation found that beneficiaries did not misuse cash transfers on alcohol or tobacco consumption. Most cash transfer expenditures were for education, health and the acquisition of assets, and beneficiaries were significantly more likely to invest in these areas than non-beneficiaries. From the start of the project, beneficiaries nearly doubled their livestock assets. Challenges related to targeting of beneficiaries were overcome by actively involving community leaders throughout the targeting process and distributing crops cultivated in cash for work projects to non-beneficiaries. The DRR and nutrition training components were not well integrated into the project, which made their relationship to the cash transfer component unclear among beneficiaries, resulting in their limited overall impact. No significant short-term impact on school attendance, disease frequency and dietary diversity was attributable to the project.

**4.3.4 Private sector-led initiatives**

While information on the current role of the oil industry in the development of basic services in South Sudan is limited, some oil companies are implementing community development projects in oil extraction areas. The White Nile Petroleum Operating Company (WNPOC), which is operating in Unity state, has established a Community Development Department which supports community projects in nine areas: water supply; education; capacity building; agricultural development; humanitarian assistance; social sponsorship and support; roads and construction; health services; and livestock development (Fallet, 2010). According to WNPOC data, it has provided water to local communities through water filtration units, wells and water tankers; built schools and trained teachers; supported capacity building of more than 600 people in health care; trained farmers in improved agricultural practices; provided non-food items during floods and supported the evacuation of community members by helicopter; and supported the construction of a total of 147 km of road (ibid.). There has been no evaluation of WNPOC’s community development projects and there is no evidence on community perceptions of its assistance.
Another partially private sector-led initiative is the contractor-managed bilateral BSF, created by DFID in 2006. According to an evaluation of DFID’s programmes in Sudan from 2005 to 2008, this has been one of the more effectively managed initiatives (Foster et al., 2010). The private sector contractor reports to a GoSS-chaired committee, lends assistance to NGOs for investment in basic services and has constructed schools, health posts and water points (ibid.). Significant progress has also been made on the improvement of roads, with an estimated 80 percent reduction in journey times on more than 300 km of roads reported (ibid.).

Finally, often, private-owned pharmacies and veterinary shops seem to prosper in larger markets. However, this is not always the case, as evidenced by the Community-based Health Worker initiative, which demonstrated that community-based veterinary services can be both sustainable and prosperous in rural areas, and that pastoralists and agro-pastoralists are willing to pay for basic veterinary services (Alinovi et al., 2007). Some clients seem to prefer pharmacies where they have to pay for drugs to the mostly free treatment of NGO and church health units. In some remote areas, pharmacies are at times the only health service providers. In terms of education, private secondary schools have been established since the CPA. In Aweil town, for instance, a rather expensive private school has built; this has a good reputation since the teachers are from Kenya and Uganda (Santschi, 2011).
5 Data, evidence and methods

5.1 Data quality and availability

Over the past few years, significant progress has been made in the collection of data on South Sudan. Much of the data has come from a few key surveys and assessments. In particular, there has been better monitoring of vulnerability and needs. Among the grey literature reviewed, it is clear that needs assessments and food security information systems in South Sudan have undergone significant changes over the past several years, which have resulted in more regular monitoring of vulnerability and needs, more available data and a greater emphasis on situation analysis. The ANLA continues to be the principal means for collecting data on vulnerability in South Sudan, with data gathered used by aid agencies for geographic and household targeting of programmes. In the past, the ANLA occurred as a once-a-year assessment, which limited its quality because it was unable to provide ongoing monitoring. Starting in 2011, the approach will shift to a regular food security monitoring system (WFP, 2010) to provide a "continuous stream of information required to adjust programme priorities, serve as an early warning tool and trigger in-depth assessments/surveys in specific areas and themes" (ibid.: 1). It also aims to "generate information during the year which provides a basis for continuous engagement and analysis throughout the year" (ibid.: 2).

The food security monitoring system is being supported by the South Sudan Food Security Technical Secretariat (FSTS), which is part of SSCCSE. FSTS was established in 2008 with technical and financial support from SIFSIA and is responsible for monitoring, analysing and disseminating food security information in South Sudan. However, despite the abundance of information systems and assessments on vulnerability and needs in South Sudan, there are significant differences between these systems in terms of the methodological and analytical approaches they employ and the objectivity of their evidence on needs. This has significant implications for the nature and scale of response decisions, as well as the evidence base underlying donor investments (Poole and Primrose, 2010). The SIFSIA project recently came to a close.

Meanwhile, over the past few years, there have been a series of surveys that have greatly increased the amount of data available. These include the following:

- The first nationally representative household consumption survey, the NBHS, was conducted in Sudan (both South and North) in 2009, by the CBS and SSCCSE, with support from the World Bank. All data from the South were collected separately, so they could be disaggregated by region (World Bank, 2011a). In addition, household surveys have been conducted in South Sudan by WHO, UNDP, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and OCHA.
- The HSBA has been conducted at the household level by the Small Arms Survey (SAS) and the Danish Demining Group since 2006 at various times and in various regions across South Sudan. The HSBA has collected important data on levels of insecurity, crime and armed violence, and on people’s top security concerns.
- The Sudan Household Survey (SHHS) was a joint activity conducted in 2006 by MoH and the CBS. The survey covered key social development indicators including child health, nutrition, reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. It also covered other basic social services such as education, water and sanitation and agriculture (agriculture was written about in a different report). This approach was followed to ensure coherent interventions that would induce synergy in efficiency gains in the national use of resources and enhance the facilitating efforts of all stakeholders. The main objectives were to collect core baseline social indicators for the principal purpose of informing public policy formulation and planning and to provide a strategic point from which progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other quality of life indicators can be measured. The survey was also intended to provide up-to-date information to assess the situation of children and women in particular and to strengthen the institutional capacity needed to carry out some of the aspects of the 2009 census and other subsequent surveys.

However, there are still many weaknesses with regard to data availability and quality:
Utilisation of survey data: Although the amount of data may have increased, it is not yet clear how data will be utilised (Feinstein International Center, 2011).

Lack of original empirical research: Most of the published literature relies heavily on findings from previously published studies (whose conclusions are now outdated), and few studies base their findings on original empirical research. Recently conducted empirical research on livelihood recovery is especially limited; there appears to be a significant gap in published literature on this topic starting from around 2007/08 to the present.23

Lack of comparative livelihoods analysis: Few case studies analyse situations across different livelihood zones. Much of the published literature tends to focus disproportionately on pastoralist livelihoods, whereas the grey literature (especially reports by GoSS and certain donor agencies) emphasises smallholder farmers and agricultural rehabilitation and development. Most case studies covering livelihoods and recovery tending to be very site specific, meaning it is difficult to seek out comprehensive research findings.

Little research specifically on social protection: Social protection is a relatively new concern on the development agenda in South Sudan and, as such, there is relatively little analysis of the need for social protection programmes per se and little on actual programmes or impacts.

Limited work on indigenous initiatives: Although there was considerable research during the OLS period on local ways of coping with vulnerability, there has been relatively less in the post-conflict era (or, for that matter, even in conflict of a more localised nature).

Limited impact assessment: Within the grey literature, there is a wealth of information on needs and vulnerability but very little on impact, especially in terms of post-OLS era programming. The few programme evaluations reviewed tend to focus mainly on operational implementation issues, rather than causal analysis of changes attributed to programmes and lessons learnt which can then be generalised externally.

Translation of data into policy: Although operational changes have helped bring about more consistent monitoring and a stronger focus on the analysis of vulnerability and needs, there are still few data on how these changes have fed into programming and policymaking responses and whether this has in turn produced impact.

5.2 Evidence quality and availability

Quality evidence on programming is lacking because there is little information available on programme impact. In terms of livelihood recovery programmes, other than the impact assessment of livestock interventions by Catley et al. (2005) and the review by Alinovi et al. (2007), none of the systematic evaluations reviewed analyses what programmes have ‘worked’, where and why.24 Even in these two studies, the quality of evidence is now limited because the information is outdated. There is a particular need for new evidence on programming and operational frameworks that have successfully managed to facilitate livelihood recovery and address the longer-term structural causes of vulnerability, in addition to immediate needs.

Beyond evidence on external programming and interventions, recent evidence on people-led recovery strategies is lacking. It is clear that the informal economy in urban and peri-urban areas is the main employer, but no in-depth case studies were reviewed on how entrepreneurial activities and small businesses have developed organically and what might be done to support them. Similar evidence is lacking in rural areas, especially in the context of farmers and traders who are expanding and diversifying their activities.

The quality and availability of evidence on successful livelihood recovery strategies for women-headed households is particularly weak. There is an urgent need to gather evidence on the needs and constraints of such households, especially within the context of agricultural recovery and livelihood recovery in general. The recent SSSA for South Sudan (2011) found that women-headed households were cultivating less land than male-headed households, which could have significant implications for household food security. The intensive labour required for clearing new land is one explanation for this; however, there has been little analysis carried out of women’s needs and constraints in agricultural

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23 We acknowledge that this report has the same deficit.
24 These reports also cover the pre-CPA era.
systems. Most gender assessments in South Sudan have focused on issues of protection related to post-traumatic stress disorder and violence experienced by girls and women as a result of the conflict (CIAT et al., 2005).

5.3 Research methods

Most of the literature reviewed utilised qualitative research methods, mainly through focus group discussions, interviews and secondary data/literature. Many of the studies relied heavily on secondary sources. However, as mentioned above, some household-level qualitative surveys have been conducted. The 2009 NBHS conducted in South Sudan by SSCCSE is considered representative. UNICEF (2009) used a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods in its exploration of barriers to education services and found the two approaches to be mutually reinforcing.

5.4 Gaps in data, evidence and research

As might be expected in a newly independent country which is still experiencing conflict and has very limited infrastructure, there are many remaining gaps in data availability, research and evidence on programme impact. However, it must also be said that great strides have been made in establishing a national database dating back to the OLS period.

While there was a national census in 2008, some authors note a need for better census data in certain areas, such as Juba. While the 2008 census gives an estimate of 372,413 for Juba, this was apparently rejected by GoSS, and since then other estimates have varied between 230,000 and 1 million (Martin and Mosel, 2011). Census data are also needed to estimate service provision relative to these numbers, such as levels of water supply coverage. Improved surveillance of health indicators and the situation of special needs children who may not be accessing schools is also needed.

Data on health indicators are limited and of poor quality, as continuous public health surveillance in the midst of conflict was not possible. The health indicators used in the 2006 USAID report on the health sector (Rietveld and Waldman, 2006) were based on the 2000 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) of the urban centres of Juba, Malakal and Wau as well as the 1999 MICS, which covered rural areas held by the SPLM. The New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation has apparently made efforts to compile all available data from various surveys to establish some baseline estimates of key health indicators (ibid.). There is a lack of health data on HIV/AIDS in Juba, so it is difficult to judge how severe the recent increase in HIV infection rates is, its causes and its distribution among residents of the city (Martin and Mosel, 2011).

There are significant information gaps with respect to nutrition, including data on micronutrient deficiencies; cultural practices related to infant and young child feeding; identification of nutrient-dense foods; and evidence-based programming for different livelihood zones (Harvey and Rogers-Witte, 2007). The absence of a monitoring system to regularly measure the prevalence of global acute malnutrition limits the ability to fully understand nutrition trends and assess the impact of food aid and nutrition programmes. The need for improved nutrition surveillance and improved analysis of nutrition data has been a major gap in South Sudan, one which has been mentioned repeatedly since the 2003 Emergency Operation (EMOP) (Maxwell et al. 2006).

Agricultural data are also lacking in quality and completeness. The 2010 Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) identifies an urgent need for a rigorous agricultural survey in order to establish a baseline for crop production (FAO and WFP, 2010). The 2010 production statistics were affected by the poor quality of some of the data. Data on livestock populations and the status of natural resources are also a critically important need (Fahey, 2007). Current understandings of natural resource conditions are incomplete and issues of overgrazing and desertification have been inadequately researched (ibid.).

There are gaps in the data on the informal sector of South Sudan’s economy. Given its importance for employment and the provision of supplies and services in South Sudan, assessments are needed that compile accurate statistics and gather information that goes beyond anecdotal reports. There is limited evidence on the overall effectiveness and impact of programmes focusing on employment generation.
Poole and Primrose (2010) have identified gaps in the availability of evidence used to analyse needs in South Sudan. For evidence used to analyse ‘development’ needs, the lack of overall baseline data is identified as significant. For chronic needs, there are gaps in baseline data and limited donor coordination. For acute needs, there is no existing universal assessment methodology.

Other specific gaps in information and analysis include the following:

- Regular monitoring/surveillance of the nutritional situation in South Sudan;
- Information on the impacts of food aid on markets and local production;
- Information on how food security information is utilised (or not) by decision makers and how food security information sources (SIFSS, etc.) are integrated (or not);
- Accurate data on urbanisation trends and population data in urban and peri-urban areas;
- Complete and up-to-date information on overall natural resource conditions (and natural resource/environmental conditions by livelihood and agro-ecological zone);
- Accurate agricultural statistics, including crop production baselines;
- Rigorous impact assessments/evaluations of agency and government-led programmes;
- Specific evidence on how land rights are being allocated to returnees in both urban and rural areas, especially for women-headed households;
- Specific evidence and information on successful livelihood recovery strategies by livelihood type and in both rural and urban areas;
- Information on organisational learning among aid agencies;
- Gender-related assessments in the context of agricultural recovery to identify needs and constraints for women-headed households;
- Additional evidence/review of aid instruments and operational frameworks that can successfully address longer-term structural causes of vulnerability in addition to immediate needs (the most recent review was in 2007 by Alinovi et al.);
- Information on how market information systems are being utilised by traders and farmers and the extent to which donor investments in the Management Information System (MIS) are influencing behaviour/responses of policymakers, traders and farmers;
- Statistics and information (beyond the anecdotal) on the informal sector of South Sudan’s economy, in both rural and urban areas; and
- Information on the extent to which GoSS is capable of taking over responsibility for maintaining physical infrastructure and service delivery investments.
Decades of war have left the population of South Sudan with such unfortunate realities as the fact that a 15-year-old girl in the country has a higher chance of dying in childbirth than of completing primary school (The Brenthurst Foundation, 2010). However, it must also be remembered that South Sudan has had to start to rebuild from a position of almost no infrastructure and services. Major achievements have been made over the past six years. There is also some promise that in the next decade such unfortunate statistics may be wiped out.

For many years during the conflict, most service provision functions were carried out by international aid agencies. Much of the work was focused on short- to medium-term responses rather than building sustainable systems for the provision of essential services (Alinovi et al., 2007). Since the signing of the CPA, many donors have shifted their funding away from ‘humanitarian’ to ‘development’ and livelihood recovery programming. Programmes are beginning to emerge that are not only provide basic services but also support social protection initiatives (Poole and Primrose, 2010).

While the increase in longer-term livelihood programmes is positive, there is still a major gap in the ability of aid agencies and GoSS to adequately address what comes in between humanitarian and livelihood programmes, namely, the reintegration of returnees and ex-soldiers. As Shanmugaratnam (2010: 28) argues, ‘reintegration projects have been introduced as an afterthought at a later stage and their conceptual and practical links to livelihood recovery remain weak’.

An estimated 2 million IDPs and refugees have been returning to their area of origin in the South since 2005 and the conflict has changed the demographic landscape to such a degree that ‘reintegration’ may not even be enough. Rather than reintegration, it may be even more accurate to simply speak of ‘integration’, as more diverse communities must learn to coexist and adapt to a new environment (Pantuliano et al., 2008). Returnees and residents express very similar priorities for reintegration, including security (disarmament in particular), improved access to services and strengthened infrastructure and support to livelihoods. However, to date, GoSS’s priority has been more on return than reintegration. Returnees face significant challenges restarting their lives, including very few employment opportunities, especially for unskilled labour; intensive labour and time required to clear farmland; inadequate basic services; and lack of access to credit, land and agricultural inputs (Bailey and Harragin, 2009).

Current programming seems to be dominated by either short-term interventions, such as seed aid distributions, or lengthy ‘development’ approaches, such as USAID’s new agricultural development programme, FARM. Just as short-term responses often do not address the longer-term issues underlying vulnerability, developmental approaches may also be inappropriate responses for livelihood recovery in post-conflict environments (Alinovi et al., 2007). This highlights the need for a new set of interventions and operational frameworks that can bridge the current emergency development programming gap in South Sudan.

In a risk-prone environment such as South Sudan, risk management programming is essential. Such programme should consider not only the risk of natural hazards such as drought or flooding, but also the ever-present manmade hazard of conflict, whether it be localised ethnic or resource conflict, militia activity or cross-border refugee flows, as occurred in the summer of 2011. Conflict continues to be the most damaging hazard for livelihoods and basic food security in South Sudan, and security needs to be viewed as an essential basic service.

But bridging the emergency–development gap requires programming aimed at vulnerability brought about not just by the conflict but also by chronic poverty and limited access to services, which is more or less how social protection would be defined in the South Sudan context. Programmes oriented at social protection are beginning to be implemented in the country but face some resistance, particularly in light of the tendency of many agencies and policymakers to equate this kind of programming with the ‘OLS approach’ of simply making handouts available. This relates largely to the question of dependency, which continues to be raised from time to time in South Sudan and elsewhere, but there is little
evidence to back it up. At face value, the extent to which assistance was being shared between formal recipients and those outside of formal programmes (the so-called ‘spontaneous’ returnees) in 2008 would tend to suggest that assistance was not making people dependent, and a lack of assistance was not preventing people from returning and resettling. But a focus on vulnerability (rather than presuming that it is the returnees who need assistance) may provide a different analysis for social protection programmes. Experience with, for example, cash transfer programming, indicates possibilities for real improvements in people’s livelihoods. However, the knowledge base is very thin, and there has been only limited replication of this type of programming, notwithstanding the apparently successful small-scale programmes piloted.

The question of access to land and natural resources was an underlying factor in the long-running civil war, and is an ongoing source of inter-communal tensions today. How these issues are understood and factored into programmes and policymaking is critical. The changing gender dynamics around resource access, and the way natural resource management systems evolve will be critical to understand and document.

An important trend to understand, particularly with regard to livelihood change, is the apparently rapid pace of urbanisation in South Sudan. A once almost exclusively rural populace is rapidly moving to towns. In the short term, there is stiff competition in the urban labour market — both formal and informal — from relatively large numbers of migrant workers from neighbouring countries. This has implications both for South Sudan’s labour market and for labour relations; it may ultimately have implications for the country’s foreign relations and regional cooperation initiatives as well.

Many other factors affect the recovery process in South Sudan, including the impact of climate, the role of markets and mobility and the value of local traditional social support systems. Research has considered people-led initiatives to only a limited extent. One clear area for further research relates to in-depth studies that compare different livelihood zones using comparable protocols and uniform definitions, to address questions about the way people are rebuilding their livelihoods and accessing services and whether and how the functions of social protection are being fulfilled in the current context. Given the fluid nature of the situation in South Sudan and the major obstacles the country faces, conducting these studies on a longitudinal and representative basis would provide important insight not only into how people are managing livelihood recovery but also into how this is changing over time.

The capacity of South Sudanese institutions for undertaking research has improved quickly in the post-CPA era, but there are still limitations. There are also limitations in the capacity of the nascent bureaucracy to be able to effectively utilise research results and incorporate empirical findings into the development of policies and programmes. As such, the issue of research uptake is one the research policy consortium will have to work on in South Sudan. It is still not uncommon to find multiple foreign consultants all competing for the time and attention of a single South Sudanese senior policymaker.

Nevertheless, the new state currently enjoys widespread popularity and legitimacy with its populace, greatly enhancing the opportunity for informed policy and programmes to have the intended impact. The extent to which this is maintained, and indeed drawn on as a resource for mobilisation, remains to be seen. In the experience of many other countries, patronage soon replaces popular legitimacy in a post-conflict (and post-independence) era. One important set of questions revolves around the issue of independence itself, and how much difference this makes in terms of livelihood recovery and growth. The implications are somewhat contradictory: on the one hand, independence can be expected to provide at least a temporary boost to economic growth and opportunity; on the other, it creates new tensions in border areas and runs the risk of exacerbating already existing tensions. In pastoral areas, for example, it turns old regional boundaries into international borders. These are important questions to investigate, and the results of research will be important to the design and implementation of future policies and programmes.

So far, little impact assessment has been conducted. This is another important area in which the research policy consortium can make a contribution. The evidence on what works is limited, and the utilisation of this information even more so. Many related programmatic choices — beginning from assessment through the selection of a particular response or programmatic option, to targeting and
judging the impact of the intervention — are all based on limited paucity of, or in some cases almost no, information. There is a clear need for good analysis to inform ongoing programmes and to contribute to the knowledge base for new programmes in the future.

During the conflict, almost all the emphasis was on negotiated humanitarian access and the provision of important goods and services by external agencies. The combination of these externally delivered services and the conflict itself greatly inhibited private sector growth and development. This has to become a greater priority in post-independence South Sudan, but how this happens and the extent to which it can enhance sustainable livelihoods at the local level (as opposed to competing with local livelihood systems in the control of resources) is a major question and a major area for policy leadership.

All of these are areas for research policy consortium engagement and research. More specific research questions are below in Annex 1.
Annexes

Annex 1: Future research questions

Considering the scope and content of the literature reviewed, the following research questions listed below emerged as those that could be considered by the research policy consortium.

1 What is actually understood as ‘livelihood recovery’ by affected communities? How are people actually rebuilding their lives and livelihoods in the aftermath of conflict? Specifically:
   i. How do people access basic services?
   ii. Do they have access to market information?
   iii. How are the livelihoods of different groups changing in terms of assets, opportunities, constraints and outcomes?
   iv. Who is vulnerable and to what?
   v. What kind of customary social supports still exist and how have they eroded?
   vi. What social protection programmes (broadly defined and both state- and agency-led) actually reach people?
   vii. What is the gap between the erosion of customary support and state- or agency-led programmes?

2 What is the impact of ongoing conflicts on livelihood recovery and development strategies and programming? What is the impact of new international borders (with a potentially hostile neighbour) on livelihood recovery in border areas in South Sudan? What is the role of cross-border trade in livelihood recovery?

3 What is the impact of return and reintegration programmes on the livelihoods of host communities? What is the ‘trajectory of recovery’ for returnees (refugees or IDPs displaced to Khartoum or a long way away) compared with those who never left or were displaced locally? (The assumption was that the returnees were the ones who needed assistance to recover — has that turned out to be true?)

4 Which groups are emerging as particularly vulnerable in the post-CPA era in South Sudan? What are the unique needs and constraints for these groups? Are there targeted programmes that address these?

5 What constraints do women-headed households have in the context of agricultural recovery and livelihoods recovery more broadly? How are institutions of customary rights (over access to land, inheritance rules, support by the family of the husband and the family of the wife, etc.) changing in this context?

6 There is a great deal of concern about dependency and the ‘OLS approach’ to programming. Are there recent examples of programmes/interventions that have bridged the gap between short-term emergency responses and developmental approaches?

7 How have land tenure practices changed in terms of granting land rights to returnees and other stakeholder groups (government, private sector, etc.)?
   viii. What are the unique challenges and lessons related to this in urban and rural areas?
   ix. To what extent are women being granted land rights?
   x. To what extent are the Land Act and the recently drafted Land Policy actually being operationalised?

8 How can programmes take advantage of urban residents who frequently travel between villages and the city to strengthen urban–rural linkages?

9 To what extent are active militias fighting over livelihoods resources vs. political grievances? Is a lack of livelihood opportunities driving recruitment into the militias?

10 What is the medium-term evidence on rural and urban residency and migration? Were towns a stopping-off point for returnees or a permanent home? Are rural residents still moving to towns? What are the implications of these trends for service provision and employment?

11 Has the increased focus on rural road building improved the delivery of basic services and market integration?
12 How has the informal economy supported basic service provision in locations where public sector service provision is lacking?
13 Is targeting skewed towards urban areas or particular regions?
14 Are there any examples of private sector provision of basic services? Are there any private sector actors willing to pilot innovative service delivery programmes?
15 Is the provision of security considered a basic service in South Sudan? If so, what are the linkages between improvement in security services and livelihood recovery (stabilisation and peace building programmes)?
16 How have outputs from food security information systems in South Sudan actually informed (or not) policy and operational decision making? What is the uptake capacity of government policymakers, aid agencies and donors?
17 How has organisational learning influenced policy and programming among aid agencies and NGOs?
18 How is market information used by farmers and traders and to what extent are donor-funded market information systems influencing behaviour/responses among policymakers, traders and farmers?
19 How is existing information being used to inform government planning and policy?
Annex 2: Terms of reference

Evidence papers protocol

In our general and technical tender for the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) we raised concerns about the current state of literature on fragile states and on service delivery, social protection and livelihoods. We argued that the literature tended to provide generic overviews of issues (sometimes even literature reviews of other literature reviews) rather than more rigorous empirical and context-specific analysis. We identified four core weaknesses:

- A case study focus on small geographical pockets or individual sectors that led to a partial rather than comprehensive portrayal of people’s own lives and livelihoods in fragile and conflict-affected situations;
- A lack of comparable studies due to the use of different methods, definitions and contexts;
- A focus on snapshots or stock-takes of livelihoods, social protection and service delivery and a lack of longitudinal analysis that enables our understanding, particularly at household and community level, to be dynamic instead of static; and
- Research that is isolated from rather than integrated into economic analyses of growth and development

The production of evidence papers during the inception phase of our RPC provides an opportunity to us to test the extent and depth of these weaknesses and to begin to tackle the weaknesses. In the inception phase of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) we will be producing 10 evidence papers (Figure 1):

1. Global synthesis of what we know about growth and livelihoods in fragile and conflict-affected situations
2. Global synthesis of what we know about basic services and social protection in fragile and conflict-affected situations
3. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Nepal
4. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Sri Lanka
5. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Afghanistan
6. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Pakistan
7. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in DRC
8. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in South Sudan
9. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Uganda
10. Gender paper

This paper describes our methodological protocol for the production of the evidence papers. It describes how we will capture elements of the systematic review methodology without carrying out a systematic review. A full systematic review would have limited usefulness given: the large number of questions that we have to answer; the lack of agreed terminology or complexity of many of the themes (and therefore search strings) that our research covers (‘fragile’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘basic services’, ‘livelihoods’, ‘growth’); and that recent reviews have demonstrated that only very small numbers of high quality research outputs are identified by systematic reviews.
Figure 1: Contribution of evidence papers to inception phase

However, our evidence papers will certainly benefit from adapting some of elements of the systematic review, especially because we will have a large team working on the papers, spread across different geographical locations and institutional homes. Benefits include:

- More careful development of research questions (rather than research themes or areas), including deconstruction of research questions in terms of population, intervention, comparator and outcome. This is particularly important given the very broad parameters of our research;
- Ensuring a consistent sampling and interpretation of literature;
- Reducing bias in our analysis of policies and programmes;
- Systematically assessing research quality and using this to identify gaps in research outputs based on quality rather than quantity of outputs; and
- The opportunity to establish a baseline for assessing the current state of research and replicating our process in 5-6 years’ time to assess our impact.

Research questions

Our research questions have been developed in consultation with RPC partners and affiliates and with DFID. They are significantly more complex than typical systematic review questions.

For evidence papers 1-2 (Growth and Livelihoods, Basic Services and Social Protection), authors will be required to answer the following questions:

- **People:** What is known about peoples’ own responses, disaggregated by gender, to conflict and their tactics for making a living and maintaining access to basic services and social protection?
- **Governance:** How do state and society interact in the institutional arrangements that mediate livelihoods, social protection and access to services? What are the gender dimensions of these interactions?
- **Aid:** What aid is being provided and its effectiveness in supporting access to basic services, livelihoods and social protection? What is known about the gendered impact of aid?
- **Private sector:** What is known about the role of the private sector in a) delivering services and social protection and b) stimulating multipliers and growth linkages?
- **Linkages:** What linkages between people-aid-governance determine outcomes in relation to livelihoods and access to social protection and basic services?
- **Data**: What current, gender-disaggregated data exists on poverty levels, livelihoods, growth, access to basic services, access to social protection and key health and nutrition indicators and what quality is it?

- **Quality**: What is the quality of the current evidence (including the extent to which gender is analysed)

- **Methods**: What methods are currently being used to research livelihoods, access to services and social protection

- **Gaps**: What gaps exist in the evidence, research methods and secondary data

For each of evidence papers 3 – 5 (Afghanistan / Pakistan, Sri Lanka / Nepal, Uganda / South Sudan / DRC), authors will be required to answer the same questions:

- **People**: What are peoples’ own responses, disaggregated by gender, to conflict and tactics for making a living and maintaining access to basic services?

- **Governance**: How do state and society interact in the institutional arrangements that mediate livelihoods, social protection and access to services? What are the gender dimensions of these interactions?

- **Aid**: What aid is being provided and its effectiveness in supporting access to basic services, livelihoods and social protection? What is known about the gendered impacts of aid?

- **Linkages**: What linkages between people-aid-governance determine outcomes in relation to livelihoods and access to social protection and basic services?

- **Private sector**: What is known about the role of the private sector in a) delivering services and social protection and b) stimulating multipliers and growth linkages?

- **Data**: What current, gender-disaggregated data exists on poverty levels, livelihoods, growth, access to basic services, access to social protection and key health and nutrition indicators and what quality is it?

- **Quality**: What is the quality of the current evidence (including the extent to which gender is analysed)

- **Methods**: The types of methods currently being used to research livelihoods, access to services and social protection

- **Gaps**: What gaps exist in the evidence, research methods and secondary data

For such a large research programme with multiple outputs, it is difficult to pin down the parameters of research questions as would be the case in a systematic review: there will be no single definition of **population, intervention, comparator and outcome**[25] that makes sense across all questions and countries. Guidelines and regular consultation will be used to ensure that across the team, there is some consistency in setting parameters.

**Searching and recording strategy**

All of the evidence papers will be based on a thorough and systematic literature search. A broad range of relevant academic databases will be searched (see Appendix 1 for an initial list). The London-based team will coordinate the search so that there is no replication of effort across the different teams responsible for papers 1 – 5. For each evidence paper the team will list of databases/ sources to be used and the search terms that will be applied. Criteria will be developed for how to decide on the relevance of sources. The list of databases and sources, search terms and criteria will be shared between the different evidence paper teams to ensure a consistent and replicable approach. The London-based team (evidence papers 1 and 2) will lead on the identification of formal published literature, particularly that found in open and closed access journals. The country-based teams (evidence papers 3–5) will focus on grey literature specific to their respective countries. All teams will regularly share other literature that their searches uncover.

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[25] **Population** - who are you looking at? E.g. All beneficiaries of service delivery? Only poor people receiving services? All poor people? All people in fragile or conflict-affected countries? **Intervention** - what kind of programme/ change are you studying? E.g. receiving social protection, providing separate toilets for girls in schools, ensuring markets are regulated? **Comparator** - what are you comparing the intervention against? E.g. beneficiaries versus non-beneficiaries; cash transfer programmes versus public works programmes, or comparing beneficiary situation before and after receiving services. **Outcome** - what impacts are you looking at? How income changes? How attitudes towards the state change? If girls’ school attendance increases?
A database system (possibly EPPI Reviewer 4 – to be confirmed) will be used to manage and code studies found during the review.

The following will therefore be developed jointly by the research assistants / evidence paper leaders and research directors over the next month:

- A list of databases and sources to be used
- Agreed search terms to be applied and definitions for terms
- Criteria for deciding on the relevance of articles and other literature to be included in the analysis
- An agreed matrix for analysing and classifying the results of these searches

All studies will record the search process and the criteria by which literature is included or excluded (what search terms are used, where results are found, why literature was excluded etc) in a way that will enable the studies to be replicated in 2015 and ensure that the analysis is transparent and objective.

Evidence papers 3–5 will also require a review of the grey literature including policy documents, evaluations and other unpublished documents. This should be gathered in-country and globally by consulting with key stakeholders (donors, aid agencies, government etc) in an iterative process with the stakeholder consultation.

The review will cover both content (what are the key issues raised in the literature) and make judgements about the quality of the evidence and methods used.

**Analysis**

The results from these searches will be systematically analysed using an agreed matrix for classifying results. This will be developed by the London teams for the global syntheses and shared and adapted by the teams working evidence papers 3–5.

The analysis process for the global syntheses will be agreed in week commencing Monday 2\textsuperscript{nd} May. It is anticipated that either

1. Specific sectors will be allocated to the four team members (RS, RM and 2 x research assistants) and each researcher will iteratively build an analysis of that sector with sectoral inputs from sector specialist; or
2. Research themes (especially people-aid-governance) will be divided between the researchers and they will iteratively build an analysis of that theme with inputs for sector leads; or
3. Based on this division of labour the teams will produce a shared analysis of quality and methods. The team for papers 1–2 will produce weekly reports on progress and findings and meet weekly to share results of analysis. These reports will be shared with those working on other evidence papers.

The process (for the global synthesis) will be shared with teams working on evidence papers 3–5 who will adapt it to fit the specific context for their work. It is anticipated that evidence Papers 3–5 will follow the shared outline to maximise comparative findings. A draft outline is proposed below which will be revised based on comments now and discussion with the research teams once the reviews are underway. A decision will need to be made about whether each evidence paper has two-three separate chapters for each countries, or whether each sections includes all (2 or 3) countries.
Box 1: Draft outline for country evidence papers

Introduction – 1 page

Country Contexts – 3 pages

A section outlining the basic social, economic and political context of the two – three countries in question. It should include core indicators such as the percentage of people with access to clean water etc from sources such as the Human Development Index.

Livelihoods and growth – 15 pages

Basic services and social protection – 15 pages

Each of these sections should be broken down into sub-sections on:

**People:** What are peoples’ own responses, disaggregated by gender, to conflict and tactics for making a living and maintaining access to basic services?

**Governance:** How do state and society interact in the institutional arrangements that mediate livelihoods, social protection and access to services? What are the gender dimensions of these interactions?

**Aid:** What aid is being provided and its effectiveness in supporting access to basic services, livelihoods and social protection? What is known about the gendered impacts of aid?

**Linkages:** What linkages between people-aid-governance determine outcomes in relation to livelihoods and access to social protection and basic services?

**Private sector:** What is known about the role of the private sector in a) delivering services and social protection and b) stimulating multipliers and growth linkages?

**Data:** What current, gender-disaggregated data exists on poverty levels, livelihoods, growth, access to basic services, access to social protection and key health and nutrition indicators and what quality is it?

**Quality:** What is the quality of the current evidence (including the extent to which gender is analysed)

**Methods:** The types of methods currently being used to research livelihoods, access to services and social protection

**Gaps:** What gaps exist in the evidence, research methods and secondary data

Conclusions – 6 pages
Annex 2: Literature search

How did we search the existing literature?

In terms of published literature, using a few overview documents on social protection along with the guidance documents for the desired output of this project, the research team brainstormed a list of relevant terms and phrases, along with alternative spellings and names to include in the search. Search ‘strings’, or particular combinations of words and phrases, were used to search potential reservoirs of relevant information. The following combinations were used:

‘south sudan’ ‘southern sudan’

And


The combinations of terms were used to search various academic, publisher and institutional websites for documents of interest. Although most of the documents reviewed were found to use these terms, the research as a whole is not limited to this list; these terms were the starting point for the search, and more detailed searches were carried out as necessary depending on the documents recovered. For example, if a paper on the topic of reintegration of IDPs yielded references to further documents regarding disarmament, a search for ‘disarmament’ AND ‘south sudan’/‘southern sudan’ was performed. The team also searched for documents based on references provided in the paper.

Where did we search?

A wide net was cast in searching for relevant published literature related to livelihoods and social protection. The research team used a variety of academic databases, publisher sites and institutional websites to search for the various strings of relevant words and phrases decided on in advance.

Institutional websites were first searched for location-specific documents (ex. Southern Sudan) to see how many sources a given site had available. In some cases, the number of resources was limited, thus it was unnecessary to narrow down the topic further. In the case of larger institutions (such as the World Bank), the search was narrowed to fit the thematic topics, such as livelihoods, basic services and so on (see list).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional websites searched</th>
<th>Academic and publisher databases searched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Poverty Research Centre (<a href="http://www.chronicpoverty.org/page/publications">http://www.chronicpoverty.org/page/publications</a>)</td>
<td>Academic OneFile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis State Research Centre, London School of Economics</td>
<td>CAB Direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID Research for Development (<a href="http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/">http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/</a>)</td>
<td>EconLit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO (<a href="http://www.fao.org">http://www.fao.org</a>)</td>
<td>Informaworld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feinstein International Center (<a href="http://www.fire-proxy.com/wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Feinstein+International+Center">http://www.fire-proxy.com/wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Feinstein+International+Center</a>)</td>
<td>Ingenta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security Gateway (<a href="http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/">http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/</a>)</td>
<td>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Centre for Research on Women (<a href="http://www.icrw.org/publications">http://www.icrw.org/publications</a>)</td>
<td>JSTOR (African Studies; Population Studies; Public Policy and Administration; Economics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LexisNexis Academic</td>
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<td>Project Muse</td>
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<td>Proquest</td>
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<td>PubMed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sage Journals (Public Administration; Economics and Development; Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Scopus</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SpringerLink</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of acquiring grey literature in South Sudan, a letter of introduction was issued to the lead researcher in charge by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). This letter was taken to the GoSS Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, which sanctioned the whole process. Grey literature was collected from a number of GoSS ministries in Juba, either in soft or in hard form, which was summarised and synthesised.

**How did we prioritise what to summarise and synthesise?**

The initial searches above resulted in the identification of some 400 documents and peer-reviewed articles. These were then prioritised according to the relevance of the paper or document to the study, after a brief reading of the executive summary or abstract. In all, about 116 documents were read and summarised and incorporated into the synthesis this paper represents.

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**Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre** ([www.internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org))

**IFPRI** ([www.ifpri.org](http://www.ifpri.org))

**ILO** ([www.ilo.org](http://www.ilo.org))

**Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development** ([http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1_00.html](http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1_00.html))

**Overseas Development Institute** ([http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/](http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/))

**Poverty Action Lab** ([http://www.povertyactionlab.org/](http://www.povertyactionlab.org/))

**ReliefWeb** ([http://reliefweb.int/](http://reliefweb.int/))

**Save the Children** ([http://www.savethechildren.org](http://www.savethechildren.org))

**Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency** ([http://www.sida.se](http://www.sida.se))

**SAS** ([http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/))


**UNICEF** ([http://www.unicef.org](http://www.unicef.org))

**UNDP** ([http://www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org))


**Wahengna** ([http://www.wahenga.net](http://www.wahenga.net))


**World Food Programme** ([http://www.wfp.org](http://www.wfp.org))

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**Tufts Catalogue**

**Web of Science**

**Wiley Interscience (All Economic; All Development Studies; All Political Science)**
References


SSCCSE (Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation) (2010a) ‘Key Indicators for Southern Sudan’. Juba: SSCCSE.


UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) (2005) ‘Operational Briefing on South Sudan’. Juba: UNHCR.


SLRC Working Papers present research questions, methods, analysis and discussion of research results (from case studies or desk-based research) on issues relating to livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict-affected situations. They are intended to stimulate debate on policy implications of research findings.

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