

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium

Researching livelihoods and services affected by conflict

# Trading, power and politics in a northern Ugandan marketplace


Report 15

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ODI

Feinstein International Center

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SLRC reports present information, analysis and key policy recommendations on issues relating to livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict affected situations. This and other SLRC reports are available from **www.securelivelihoods.org**. Funded by UK aid from the UK government, Irish Aid and the EC.



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# About us

The **Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC)** aims to generate a stronger evidence base on how people make a living, educate their children, deal with illness and access other basic services in conflict-affected situations (CAS). Providing better access to basic services, social protection and support to livelihoods matters for the human welfare of people affected by conflict, the achievement of development targets such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and international efforts at peace- and state-building.

At the centre of SLRC's research are three core themes, developed over the course of an intensive one-year inception phase:

- State legitimacy: experiences, perceptions and expectations of the state and local governance in conflict-affected situations
- State capacity: building effective states that deliver services and social protection in conflict-affected situations;
- Livelihood trajectories and economic activity under conflict

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is the lead organisation. SLRC partners include the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Sri Lanka, Feinstein International Center (FIC, Tufts University), the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Pakistan, Disaster Studies of Wageningen University (WUR) in the Netherlands, the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

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Primarily, the authors thank all those that took time out of their days to talk to us. We are also indebted to the fantastic research team we worked with in Lira. For peer review and general feedback, we thank David Booth, Paul Harvey, Will Monteith and multiple staff at the African Development Bank (Uganda office), as well as an internal and anonymous SLRC gender reviewer. Gratitude is also paid to Aaron Griffiths for copy editing and Garth Stewart for formatting.

# Contents

# Executive summary

What happens when attempts to modernise and formalise economic activity come into contact with the local realities of how trading, power and politics actually work? It is often assumed that reforms and interventions along these lines will create jobs, improve conditions and boost vendor incomes. But experience suggests they are often met with disappointing results. So what is going on?

Through a case study of one marketplace in Lira town, northern Uganda – a marketplace that has recently undergone a major aid-funded and state-sponsored redevelopment – this study sets out to shed some light on this question. It does so through mixed methods, drawing on semi-structured interviews with vendors and officials, as well as a small-scale survey of just over 200 vendors operating in the regenerated space, between September 2015 and January 2016.

Analysis points to the challenges associated with reordering economic life, particularly in exactly the way intended. And in doing so it raises questions of the capacity of agencies and governments to control processes of local economic development.

The research suggests that economic interventions are subject to forces of the local context. We see this in two senses. First, where intervention logics fail to cohere with the realities of how economic activity works – of how traders operate and of what drives them – they are unlikely to 'fit' perfectly, and are therefore likely to be met with disappointing results. In Lira town, these include rejection by some traders of the new marketplace.

And second, economic spaces are just one of the many arenas in which established routines of power and politics play out. Interventions attempting to reorder them thus become inevitably branded with the features of the local political settlement. This then has the potential to 'derail' such efforts from achieving their desired vision.

There are three lessons for policymakers:

1. Economic development, including that financed by international aid and managed by governments, is neither a neutral nor apolitical process. It is accompanied by conflict, resistance and negotiation. Indeed, interventions may actively create these dynamics.

2. Markets are one of the many sites through which elements of the political settlement are expressed and in which the functions of state power play out. So too are the projects and interventions that attempt to regenerate them.

3. Interventions which fail to (a) reflect the logics of how economic activity actually works at the local level, particularly against a backdrop of chronic livelihood insecurity, and (b) incorporate a consideration of how power and politics function, are likely to be met with at least unintended consequences, and possibly disappointing results. It is suggested that closer consideration of local economic and political dynamics prior to implementation might help mitigate this.

# 1 Introduction: the 28-billion-shilling project 'not for the rich'

It is hard to miss Lira Main Market. Glowing bright orange in the intense northern Ugandan sun, it is easily the largest building in the town's centre, and perhaps one of the most visually striking too. Arriving in town, one gets the distinct impression that this is 'an important place': the size, aesthetic and location of the market all work together to create a sense that this bold structure represents the very heart of economic life in Lira, the country's fourth largest urban area and the sub-region's largest.

Arriving in town a few years ago, however, this would not have been the case. Lira Main Market began its earliest life in 2010, when the African Development Bank (AfDB) awarded the Government of Uganda a sizeable investment loan under the Uganda Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement Programme (MATIP-1). The vast majority of AfDB's funding – fully 97% of the USD 60 million loan – was allocated to the first of the initiative's three components: market infrastructure development. The remaining two components, market management and project coordination, received around USD 1 million and USD 2 million respectively. Although an early project document suggests the funding would be used to redevelop markets across 19 sites nationwide (AfDB, 2009), in the end plans were finalised to construct in seven municipalities, at a cost of roughly USD 47 million (Tentena, 2011). Lira was to be one of them.

The redevelopment of Lira Main Market, and the MATIP-1 project more generally, was part of a wider effort to regenerate and modernise urban economic infrastructure throughout Uganda. A 'feasibility study', carried out in 2008 by the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) and designed to 'assess the infrastructural and operational state of the markets across the country' (AfDB, 2009: v), reported that 'a poorly managed, dilapidated and overwhelmed market infrastructure [was] resulting in a poor working environment nationwide. All markets were found to be overpopulated with vendors well beyond their carrying capacities and lacking in many basic amenities, including toilets, drainage and sewage systems' (ibid.: v).

MATIP-1 was designed to respond to these problems, in the process contributing to 'poverty reduction and economic growth in Uganda' by 'improving marketplace economic and social infrastructure [...], enhancing the incomes of vendors [and] increasing employment' (ibid.: 3). This was to be achieved through an exercise in modernisation and formalisation. In the project's early days, it was decided that the design should both 'reflect critical success factors that contribute towards modern and efficient functioning markets' – a safe and secure space which promotes commercial exchange and social interaction, efficient management practices, and environmental sustainability – and 'conform to international standards' (ibid.: 4). Lessons from past initiatives of a similar nature, including the World Bank-funded Market Infrastructure Development Project, would be incorporated, including the importance of 'appropriate layout and designs suited for different localities' (ibid.: 7). And in 2015, some years after the loan had been granted and construction begun, President Yoweri Museveni reassured Ugandans that the soon-to-open redevelopments, including Lira's own USH 28 billion (USD 8 million) site, were 'for the market vendors, not the rich' (*The Insider*, 2015). He explained:

> ***The rich can go and construct their own working places. We built them [the markets] for those who were in the old markets to better their working conditions and guarantee their security.***

This paper is about trading, local politics and power. It is concerned with understanding what happens when a particular vision of how economic activity ought to work – a vision embodied by a new development intervention, aid-funded and state-sponsored – comes into contact with the local realities of markets and politics. It is often assumed that the modernisation of economic space is in the interests of the 'users' of that space, and that they will become better off as a result. By critically examining this assumption, and trying to understand the factors that might sometimes disturb the cleanliness of its logic, we see that such a harmonisation of interests is not always apparent; embedded patterns of political practice often disrupt the idealised vision of pro-poor development conveyed through official project documents and high-profile public speeches.

Thus, through this research we hope to contribute towards a small but growing literature concerned with the politics and governance of economic development in developing countries. While it has become cliché to argue that politics matters for development, much of the research incorporating and addressing this theme has done so in relation to service delivery and public goods reform (Booth, 2016: 11), with typically less attention given to the more 'impersonal' and 'apolitical' arena of market and economy (see Kabeer, 2012). Where scholars have engaged, again the focus has tended to be confined within particular parameters, the limited literature characterised by a clear preoccupation with governance at the macro level. Research in this field looks at the way in which 'big-picture' politics – leader and elite behaviour, political settlements, state fragility – shapes processes and patterns of economic growth, including large-scale investment, rent distribution and production (Booth, 2016; Kelsall, 2011; Williams et al., 2011). Missing from the picture are more fine-grained analyses of the micro, or everyday, governance of these issues. The influence of power and politics is not restricted to the national level; it is apparent too in the more banal spaces of the municipal marketplace, the dusty town street lined with informal vendors, the makeshift huts and shacks enfolding an inner-city bus park. These are not simply sites of economic exchange, but of social change, conflict and resistance. Recent research shows, for example, that official attempts to formalise, streamline and incorporate urban informal economies often play out differently than anticipated; new measures always rub up against an existing 'rules of the game', meshing in ways that are complex, unexpected and hard to predict (Lindell and Ampaire, 2016; Lindell and Ihalainen, 2014; Lyons and Msoka, 2010; Weng and Kim, 2016). Our intention here is to add to this growing body of work, as part of a broader effort to help expand the lens through which we view and understand the relationship between (state) power and processes of economic development, complementing rather than displacing the more dominant (and of course vital) focus on macro dynamics outlined above.

We do this through mixed-methods research carried out between September 2015 and February 2016. Over this period, we conducted interviews with 27 people (mainly at the beginning and end of that phase). Most of these were with vendors operating inside Lira Main Market, but for triangulation purposes we also talked to vendors currently operating outside the new market and actors involved in the implementation of the project (municipal and political officials, market authorities and members of the allocation committee) (see Annex 1 for full list). Our interviews with these people generally centred on the process of space allocation, life in the new market, and thoughts about the future of the site. In addition to this qualitative element, we also administered a small-scale quantitative survey to 204 vendors operating (at the time of fieldwork) in the market (see Table 1 and Figure 1 for some basic characteristics of the sample). Through the questionnaire, we generated information about vendors' experiences before life in the new site, how business is currently going (and how this compared to previously), the process of allocation, costs and fees involved in operating there, trust in market authorities, and plans for the future. The questionnaire was designed on the basis of our earlier interview material, meaning we could pick up on questions and issues that seemed particularly relevant from the perspective of the actual vendors. (It goes without saying that the information generated through these surveys reflects a snapshot of one particular period of time. That period was soon after the opening of the new marketplace, in which things perhaps had yet to fully settle. We acknowledge this as a caveat of the research, and encourage readers to bear it in mind as they move through the paper.)

Due to uncertainties over the exact size of the universe, the sampling strategy was not randomised. Instead, we attempted to achieve a degree of stratification by administering surveys across a mixture of clusters within the marketplace, thereby capturing vendors operating in a range of trades. We also aimed for gender parity, but ended up with a majority of female respondents (roughly two-thirds of the sample) – a reflection of the fact that, according to the initial MATIP-1 consultations, women constitute between 70 and 80% of the vendor population in a typical Ugandan marketplace (AfDB, 2009: 6). Given the sampling approach, we cannot treat the survey data as representative of all vendors in Lira Main Market. However, we are able to say with some confidence that our dataset covers a substantial share of the relevant population. According to an article in *The Daily Monitor* (Oketch, 2015), the new marketplace has 1,874 stalls and 453 lock-ups, which totals 2,327 individual units. Our sample size of 204 equates to roughly 9% of that figure, but we must assume even higher coverage for two reasons: (1) some individuals own and operate out of more than one unit; and (2) at the time of research the marketplace was clearly underpopulated, with significant numbers of stalls still empty some months after its opening. Thus, in practice, the sampling frame (at the time) would have been markedly smaller than 2,327.

The rest of this paper is split into two analytical parts and one concluding section. We first tell the story of how the early phases of Lira Main Market's operation appear to have unfolded, looking at both the dynamics of space allocation and the experiences of vendors so far. We draw on a combination of survey data, vendor interviews and key informant interviews to build a triangulated picture. Having established this story, we then take a step back in order to work out what we are really seeing here, when the visions and logics of a new development intervention interact with existing social, economic and political norms at the local level. To what extent are such attempts at formalisation, regulation and modernisation really capable of transforming the pre-existing orders of economic life? We try to shed some light. Then finally, we finish with some brief conclusions about the politics of economic development.

**Table 1: Basic characteristics of the survey sample**

| **N=204** | |
|---|---|
| Gender | Female 67.4% / Male 32.6% |
| Average age | 34 |
| Average number of years vending | 11 |
| Proportion not originally from Lira | 53.6% (most common reason given from moving here = economic opportunity) |
| Proportion who traded in the old marketplace (i.e. the previous incarnation of Lira Main Market, on the same site) | 69.6% |

**Figure 1: Trades within the sample**



# 2 Lira Main Market: the story so far

By 2011, the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) had secured contractors for Lira's MATIP-1 initiative, and so began the long process of design, relocation, demolition and construction. The new marketplace officially opened in February 2015, although the project began attracting criticism some time before this. A report published by the Uganda Radio Network in 2011 stated that more than 1,000 vendors from the original market site had petitioned the municipal council over 'what they call unfair charges by a section of local councillors' in exchange for guarantees of space in the future market (Odongo, 2011). In the years since, a string of further regional and national news stories builds a broader picture of manipulation and misdealing throughout the project's implementation phase, including sexual harassment of female vendors (Oketch, 2014), the illicit sale of space to wealthy businessmen (Oyugi, 2014), and bribe demands in the tendering process (Kasasira and Apunyo, 2011).

While it is of course important not to automatically accept these allegations as unassailable truths, they nonetheless imply an air of controversy around the new marketplace. They hint at a climate of wilful mismanagement, and highlight the possibility that this project was infused with political dynamics from its earliest days. Much of the data collected for this study lend support to this general picture, and suggest it is unlikely that the news stories cited above were fabricated out of nothing (as do previous investigations into the dynamics of project implementation in Uganda more broadly – Human Rights Watch, 2013). The purpose of this section is to establish an idea of what life has been like in Lira Main Market since its launch last year (and up until the time of this research), probing further these allegations of illicit activity. We first consider the process of space allocation, before considering how the experiences of ordinary vendors have played out during the months since.

## 2.1 The dynamics of allocation

As part of the survey, we asked vendors about their experiences of the allocation process. The majority of those surveyed (89%) were not new to trading, having previously operated in other areas around Lira town, including Coronation Park – the 'temporary' site to which vendors from the old main marketplace were relocated during the reconstruction period (see Figure 2).

## Figure 2: Lira Main Market and Coronation Park in relation to Lira town centre


**Source:** Adapted from screenshot taken from Google Maps

Similarly, most people (just under two-thirds of the sample) had previously operated in the old marketplace prior to the implementation of MATIP-1. Of those, 79% signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Local Government, which on paper secured them space in the new market once it would be reopened. This was all part of the official procedure for handling the transition from old building to new (AfDB, 2009). However, when asked whether they are currently using the space theoretically guaranteed by the MoU, more than 40% answered no. And by far the most common reason given was because they were never actually given the space they were promised.

Interviews with vendors suggest that, rather than being given no space at all, what may have happened in these cases was that people were allocated space which failed to meet their expectations in some way. For some, this would have been related to the size of the space. According to the Deputy Town Clerk, there was originally a 'one vendor, one space' ruling put in place by the MoLG, whereby all those operating in the new market would be doing so essentially on equal terms.[1] In accordance with the MoLG ruling, some people found themselves being given stalls (simple surfaces on which to display items) when previously they had lock-ups (taller units that would be considered locally more along the lines of a shop),[2] while others were allocated fewer units than they might originally have had. As a result of this perceived injustice, one group of vendors filed an injunction at court, demanding that the ruling be overturned and they be given their rightful space.

In other cases, vendors from the old market found that they had been allocated the same stall as 'newcomers'. This happened to Juliet, a tailor selling women's clothes.[3] According to the MoU, she told us, there was nothing about 'shared space'. But she nonetheless found herself sharing with someone else selling clothes, the daughter of a councillor in nearby Adekokwok sub-county ('that is probably the reason she got the space').[4] In the end, Juliet switched to another part of the market. Moses found himself in a similar position, being provided with an MoU for his shoe trade, but allocated the same space as someone else without an MoU. Moses was initially hopeful that the Market Master would come down on his side through a 'verification process', largely because of the fact that he possessed an MoU while his counterpart did not. But he is still waiting: 'It would appear', he suggested, 'that someone in the authority was paid to give away my stall'.[5] Today, Moses trades outside Lira Main Market, across the road in Coronation Park – just one instance of self-relocation among many.

1 Interview 22 (see Annex 1)

2 21

3 Throughout this report, some names have been changed to protect respondents' anonymity.

4 08

5 25

There have also been numerous disputes and complaints about the precise location of allocated space. This is just one of several ways in which the idea of the revamped Main Market does not quite cohere with the realities of what local traders need or want – or, more broadly even, with the nature of how economic activity and market life actually work in Lira town. Layout and architectural design, as banal as it might seem, is one example. One of the most common problems we were told about was the inequality of positioning within the market. There very much appears to be a consensus around the fact that some areas are better than others for trading in because they are far more visible to customers entering into and walking around the market. And there is similar agreement about where these are: the 'prime locations', as people would refer to them, are first and foremost on the lower floor of the site at ground level. The upper floor, we were told by one vendor, 'is the worst place to be' because customers are much less likely to end up there.[6] On the lower floor, there are again better and worse sections: most preferable are spaces lined along the walkways and around the entrances, where customer footfall is highest and trader visibility most pronounced. Far worse are the 'hidden locations', as they would be called, deep inside the market. There, vendors might find themselves tucked behind corners or struggling for natural light – as we will see in Section 2.2, electricity is in poor supply since the Municipal Council started defaulting on bill payments – and subsequently have great difficulty attracting customers. In many cases, this has resulted in vendors abandoning the new market to go in search of alternative sites.

It is also worth noting that, while this particular issue is less about the type of space *per se* (stall versus lock-up) than it is the geography of space, it tends to be the case that the larger, costlier lock-up units occupy the more favourable physical positions within the market. In a sense, many of those operating out of these units – most of which are widely perceived to have been allocated to the 'big shots' in town (see below)[7] – enjoy a double advantage over many stall traders: larger display space and better visibility combined with easier access to customers.

When asking people more generally about space allocation, the words they used speak to a process gone badly wrong, if not deeply manipulated: 'a mess',[8] a 'struggle',[9] hampered by 'a lot of glitches',[10] 'rigged'.[11] With very few exceptions, the vendors we talked to felt strongly that the allocations had been purposely mismanaged, with the 'prime locations' going either to individuals personally connected to the state or to much bigger, wealthier traders who had the financial means to distort the process – both, as one interviewee put it, types of 'big people'.[12] The survey data lend some support to this: when asked whether they thought space had been allocated fairly and that it did not matter who you are, two-thirds of the sample disagreed.

We often heard that some of the best spots had gone to members of the Municipal Council: 'some of them have five stalls', Anna told us. Many of the political figures originally allocated space are now subsequently trying to distance themselves from the project by selling off their units. This April, in fact, one of the authors of this study was contacted by a councillor asking whether they wanted to purchase his lock-up! It is also political figures, and specifically municipal officials, who vendors feel are really in control of the market rather than the newly created market authorities. As one vendor representative told us, 'The leaders of the new market do not have any powers. It is the municipal leaders who have the power to decide everything. And this is affecting decision making in improving the market.'[13] Another described the market authorities as having only 'pseudo powers'.[14]

At the same time, people felt that most of the other prime locations had been 'sold off' to 'rich businessmen',[15] a widely held view, even among individuals involved in managing the allocation process, such as one member of the allocation committee.[16] This was how many accounted for the fact that newcomers – that is, those not from the old market and therefore lacking possession of an MoU – can now be seen trading in the new market, often in some of the best spots: 'good locations and spaces were sold off expensively to rich people who were never part of the old market, or are not even traders in any way.'[17]

**6** 12
**7** 18
**8** 26
**9** 18
**10** 17
**11** 24
**12** 18
**13** 20
**14** 25
**15** 16
**16** 21
**17** 08

Those final words speak to a slightly different (but closely related) issue: that many of the 'big people' securing the best spaces and largest units – in some cases for as much as USH 12 million, as a number of interviewees alleged[18] – did so exclusively in order to rent them out to actual vendors, rather than trade from the site themselves. In the terms adopted by the market traders, this helped create an uneven system of 'primary' vendors and 'secondary' vendors, with stall or lock-up owners effectively subletting their units to others. We were told they often do so at a high rate, USH 400,000 (c. USD 120) per month being the commonly cited 'secondary' rental fee for a single lock-up. This capitalisation of market space, and the associated creation of a rentier class within the new structure, has clear implications for the livelihoods of less well-off traders wanting to operate in the market: as clothing seller, Sarah, put it, 'Sometimes in a month we don't even make 500,000 [shillings]. And if the rent [charged by the primary vendor] is 300,000 [shillings], *we would simply be making money for the owners* of the shops'.[19]

## 2.2 Doing business in the new marketplace: experiences and perceptions so far

Making it as a trader in northern Uganda is hard. Most people operating in this industry do so on a small scale, plying relatively low-margin everyday items and struggling to carve out their own space in an incredibly saturated and competitive marketplace. The industry is also unreliable for most, with many goods and commodities subject to seasonal slumps.

It would perhaps be unfair to have expected the new Main Market to have all of a sudden boosted vendors' incomes. That said, at the time of our research, most people we talked to and surveyed were not faring well. In most cases, people felt they were actually worse off than before, in whatever site they might have been operating. Looking at the survey data, we see that the mean weekly profit for the sample as a whole comes in at just under USH 180,000, or about USD 50. Obviously, many people will be making less than that. If we take a poverty line of USD 1.25 a day, it emerges that 38% of the sample are living below the threshold (on the basis of their market earnings). And even those above the poverty line are still struggling: 84% report not making enough in the new market to cover their daily costs and expenses (rent, school fees, foot, etc.), and several interviewees reported having to engage in additional economic activities on the side just to support family members. This is another reason some vendors have abandoned the Main Market.

In terms of the comparison, 81% of vendors feel they are making less now than they were in their old site. Most put this down to the fact that there are fewer customers here relative to other markets. As William explained, 'It is a very nice structure, but the business is not there.'[20] Juliet agreed:

> ***Business was good before the new market was constructed. We did better as traders. We were able to make more and we had many customers who knew our location and could easily find us. But today, business is zero. We do not make any money … It is so frustrating. I have even stopped taking my daily record of sales in my book since the fourteenth of September [2015], because I cannot keep writing nothing in my book. It just demoralises a person when you look at all those dates in the book with empty entries. It becomes a waste of time because there is no good in it.***[21]

According to one councillor we interviewed, there are two main reasons accounting for why business in the new market is down, which many vendor testimonies generally align with.[22] First, when vendors initially moved in, they lost parts of their previous customer base – 'they moved to new locations which customers didn't know about.' The logic here is that when the market is so competitive, and there are so many others selling exactly the same thing for pretty much the same price, a shift as simple as relocating a few hundred yards away could be all it takes to send profits into decline. As we were told, 'customers would not take the trouble to look for you when they can find the same goods in an open, easy-to-reach location.'[23]

The second reason the councillor gave was that the vendors *inside* the market are being adversely impacted by the vendors operating *outside* the building, plying their goods in the much more visible and informal space of the street or open-air market. Again, almost all the 'inside vendors' we talked to cited this as a major barrier to doing good business in the new marketplace. There has been quite a lot resistance to the continuation of trading outside the market, and the municipal council has

**18** 08, 24, 27
**19** 12
**20** 23
**21** 08
**22** 15
**23** 08

**Figure 4: Aspects of Lira Main Market: a comparison with vendors' previous sites (n=204)**




already taken measures to forcibly relocate vendors from certain parts of town. Although reports suggest bullets and teargas have occasionally been deployed to this end, as during a recent episode in nearby Juba market (Odongo and Apunyo, 2016), so far these attempts do not seem to have proven effective. Part of the issue here relates to the fact that outside trading places are subject to fewer, or at least different, forms of regulation, which vendors might feel are more conducive to freer economic activity. In a sense, then, the real problem is less to do with the new marketplace itself and more to do with the uneven regulation surrounding it.

These concerns around slow business are related to vendors' perceptions of the viability of the new market as a trading space. Let us look, for example, at the architectural design and layout of Lira Main Market. This was developed in line with a particular notion about how a marketplace should be ordered: a linear, organised set-up containing permanent, fixed structures. In a number of ways, what the project's designers came up with is an improvement on the town's alternatives. It offers shelter from the elements, better hygiene and electricity (although that has proven unreliable). Interviewees often mentioned these physical aspects of the new structure as being beneficial.

When asked about other aspects of the market, however, people's answers were quite different. Figure 3 shows that for all aspects covered by the survey, with the two exceptions of hygiene and security, more vendors thought the new market fares worse than their previous site than those thinking the opposite.

Our interviews build a more complete picture of the problem. One individual described the layout as being 'foreign to vendors',[24] while another said, 'The design of the market does not favour most of the trades that are practised in the market. The walkway is not facing the stalls. Instead, the vendors have their backs to the walkway.'[25] The phrase 'most of the trades' relates to the 'zoned' way in which the market is organised, with vendors selling particular items forced to operate in a particular part of the building (some of which are, as we have seen, better than others). Market rules dictate that mixing trades in a single space is not permitted, which locks vendors into a specific line of products and gives them no opportunity to diversify. Recently, however, some have begun to break this rule out of frustration with slow business. Thus, even seemingly banal aspects of market organisation, such as walkway positioning or zoning, can create objection if they fail to interlock with vendors' own habits and preferences.

But while the set-up of Lira Main Market might not suit everyone trading there, access to the space still requires payment. Although relatively few seem to be paying ground rent, despite the expiration of an initial two-month 'grace period' or amnesty, there is still a range of other payments vendors make in order to operate within the market (Table 2).

**24** 19

**25** 17

**Table 2: What are vendors paying to operate in Lira Main Market? (n=204)**

| Type of payment | Share of sample paying (%) | Mean size of payment (USH) | Share of sample (who make the payment) reporting payment as official (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Water (n=6) | 2.9 | 180 | 50 |
| Electricity (n=4) | 2 | 10,000 | 75 |
| Market dues (n=165) | 81 | 500 | 90 |
| Licence (n=40) | 19.6 | 67,000 | 87.5 |
| Stall hire (n=43) | 21 | 155,000 | 52.4 |
| Ground rent (n=4) | 2 | 287,500 | 75 |
| Toilet use (n=200) | 98 | 300 | 82.5 |
| Garbage collection (n=2) | 0.5 | 200 | 100 |

As we can see, some services are clearly more universally paid than others. Almost everyone pays the small, but strongly enforced, USH 300 charge for toilet use. More than 80% pay the daily market due of USH 500. But for key services, such as water, electricity and garbage collection, very few reported making any payment (3%, 2% and 1%, respectively).

To whom are these sometimes patchy payments being made? In Lira Main Market, multiple actors are involved in the running of the site, and there was often a sense of confusion regarding the specific division of labour between them. In the words of one interviewee, 'There is the market master, then the allocation committee, the market section leaders, the market section leaders, the market vendors' association leaders, the municipal authorities, among others. It seems everyone is doing the same thing.'[26] Nowhere is this more clearly reflected than in the survey data on which actors payments are being made to (Table 3).

The numbers are all over the place. For most services, different vendors seem to be making payments to an array of actors. Take licences, which are paid by around 20% of the sample. Half of those are paying a private contractor – the municipality originally outsourced the collection of market dues to a company, which some people think got the contract because of connections with the authorities[27] – while a third are directly paying the stall owner, a few people are paying either the market manager or another vendor, and 12% are even paying the town clerk. (Indeed, the town clerk appears to be receiving 15% of the revenue across the sample as a whole.) In every case, with the exception of garbage collection (only paid by two people), between four and five different actors are receiving vendor payments. What this speaks to is the absence of a clear organisational framework in practice. While it may exist on paper, there appears to be relatively little structure in the actual marketplace and a lack of clear information running through it – just one-fifth of those surveyed felt the information coming from the market authorities is transparent and clear.

The low number of individuals paying for basic services like water and electricity, as we saw in Table 3, is particularly striking. The official policy is that vendors are expected to contribute towards the provision of water and electricity. One councillor even told us that this was stated in the original MoUs vendors received.[28] But what we are seeing is some fairly widespread resistance to complying with the rule. Testimonies from our interviewees back up a series of media reports about vendors' refusal to pay for services (Odongo, 2015; 2016). The basis for this refusal lies in bad business in the new marketplace, which many vendors seem to interpret as a condition under which their 'contract' with the municipality can be abrogated. And the reasons for slow trade are, in turn, seen to originate from the continued existence of street vendors outside the market, whom market vendors hold

**Table 3: Who are vendors paying fees to? Breakdown by type of payment (percentage) (n=204)**

| Actor receiving payment | Water | Electricity | Market dues | Licence | Stall hire | Ground rent | Toilet | Garbage | Total (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market manager | 10 | 15 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 15.4 | 5 | 0 | 5 |
| Stall owner | 0 | 0 | 5 | 14 | 30 | 23 | 9 | 0 | 9 |
| Private contractor | 20 | 38 | 67 | 36 | 50 | 23 | 63 | 100 | 63 |
| Market vendors | 45 | 23 | 10 | 15 | 3 | 15 | 9 | 0 | 8 |
| Town clerk | 25 | 23 | 13 | 31 | 12 | 23 | 15 | 0 | 15 |

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responsible for taking away sales. The street vendors have thus become a bargaining chip in the ongoing wranglings between traders inside the market and the municipal authorities, with market traders now trying to strike up a new deal: shut down business on the street, and we will start paying for services. As one informant from the market authority told us, 'the vendors said that unless all ungazetted markets are closed, they wouldn't pay.'[29]

One implication of this refusal to meet payments is the undermining of one of the project's original objectives. As we were instructed by the Deputy Town Clerk, the market is, at least in part, about 'boosting revenue for the council to provide services'.[30]

At the time of research, this was clearly not the case. 'No one is benefiting as of now. Not the vendors, not the municipality', one trader told us.[31] Indeed, in March of this year, the Acting Assistant Town Clerk, Emmanuel Oyuku Ocen, was quoted as saying, 'The municipal is yet to receive revenue from market vendors. We have USH 840 million in losses' (Adwar Ping, 2016). As a result of the difficulties involved in generating revenue, the municipality has started defaulting on bill payments, with certain services subsequently being shut down. There have, for example, been reports of power outages and water shortages (Odongo, 2015), and we were told by the assistant town clerk that on occasion the market is 'in constant blackout'.[32]

There are two interconnected issues at play here. On the one hand, the success of the new market project depends, at least in part, on making poor people pay for its running costs. This is problematic in the sense that many vendors' livelihoods are already under strain from the intense pressure and competition that come with the territory; taxing them further probably isn't the most effective way of supporting a process of pro-poor economic development. And on the other hand, people are reacting against what they perceive to be a project that is not (yet) working for them; a project that 90% of our sample felt *was*, in fact, 'for the rich'. Their refusal to comply is bound up within a wider and more complex relationship with formal authority and the state. In a sense, this particular action is wired into a deeper struggle over the way in which power is organised and the economy ordered. Frustration with the current system, with the unfairness and inequality of the political-economic hierarchy (and the sheer difficulty of being able to move further up it), finds expression in acts of resistance, such as rule non-compliance, and mistrust in authority. In one illustration of the economic dynamic of this relationship, we asked respondents whether they trust the market authority to protect them from stall grabbing: 43% said they do. However, wealthier vendors were much more likely to say this than poorer ones: the mean weekly income of those reporting 'never' was half (USH 60,000) of the income earned by those reporting 'completely' (USD 119,000).[33] Likewise, vendors who reported making less in Lira Main Market compared to their previous location were both significantly more likely to report 'never' and less likely to report 'completely'.[34]

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**33** The difference is statistically significant at 5%.

**34** Statistically significant at 5%.

# 3 Regulating economic life: design versus reality

Lira's MATIP-1 project was designed to contribute to poverty reduction and economic growth by improving the working conditions of the town's vendors, increasing their productivity and raising their incomes. This was to be achieved through a modernisation and formalisation of the town's central trading space, an exercise embodying particular notions about how vending ought to work in Uganda's municipal areas. In many ways, these notions speak to a deeper development agenda concerned with cleaning up the order of urban economies, in particular one of their most visible and populous elements: informal street vendors. From this perspective, Lira Main Market is just one of the latest in a long line of attempts across sub-Saharan Africa to 'sanitise' cities through 'urban renewal and the "face-lifting" of problematic areas, such as spaces occupied by people working informally' (Lindell and Ampaire, 2016: 258).

Part of what this entails is 'fixing' the activities of traders to a particular place, where they can be more closely observed and more easily extracted from – Scott's (1999) ideas about legibility are relevant here. Through this process of redefining urban space, certain areas are formally legitimised as acceptable economic space for vendor operation (Lira Main Market), while others are rendered off-limits (Coronation Park, the streets running alongside the new market). A number of methods are used to ensure that vendors successfully relocate to the new space, including a series of incentives around market modernisation (a sheltered premises, better hygiene, tighter security) as well as more coercive acts, such as evictions from newly prohibited sites.

This paper is concerned with the extent to which official exercises in regulation are actually capable of reordering economic life – and with understanding what happens when such interventions meet the contextual realities of trading (behaviours, practices, preferences) and politics (the way in which state power works). Certainly, in some senses, the whole point of the Lira Main Market redevelopment appears sensible. But in reality there are factors which shape the way in which implementation and operation play out, and which then go on to create a series of unintended consequences. In the previous section, we started seeing a degree of incoherence between the trading routines of Lira town's vendors and the vision of economic life put forward by MATIP-1. This section continues to explore what has happened to that vision upon implementation, looking in particular at the ways in which it has been compromised and altered by the power and politics of the context.

The most visible example of this is the political point scoring and contestation which engulfed the marketplace during Uganda's recent election season. During our interviews, there was a clear sense among some traders that this has been, first and foremost, a political project, designed not to support the town's working poor but to win votes. The national election held in February of this year has certainly influenced the way in which people think about the market, with one vendor, Nikanori, remarking, 'The market will just give Museveni votes.'[35] His prediction was not far off: election results show that this has been one of the first years in which the President has been able to secure a substantial share of the vote in Lira. Mayoral elections held around the same time were likewise influenced by the project, with one of the candidates from the ruling National Resistance Movement building part of his campaign around the then-incumbent mayor's alleged involvement in the mismanagement of the new marketplace (the mayor ended up losing the election).

Interviews with municipal officials additionally suggest that attempts to evict traders from the street – something many of the market's vendors desire – have been curtailed by the politics of election season. Put simply, it has been in the interests of some political parties and government figures to *not* frustrate a very large pocket of the electorate – much larger, indeed, than the number of people operating within Lira Main Market. So too do some ascribe the failure to generate market revenue to political processes: in the words of the assistant market master, 'When we tried to collect money from vendors, they [the councillors] stopped us ... They fear if we collect money from vendors without their intervention, it will affect their votes because they [the vendors] are voters'.[36] There are parallels here with the work of Goodfellow and Titeca (2012), who have looked at how apparently marginal groups of informal economic actors in Kampala exert leverage to alter political decisions and secure their own interests.

Just as this new economic space has been infused with the charged politics of election season, so too has it been subject to the deeper, less visible forces of the Ugandan political settlement. In a sense, these have further appropriated the original vision of the project, twisting it into something less idealised – less normative, even – and more reflective of the way in which local power and politics actually work. In short, the project has undergone a process of 'contextualisation'. Let us explain this in greater detail.

Still a somewhat contested and fuzzy concept, political settlements are typically understood to mean the specific arrangement of power that forms the basis of every political regime. This arrangement refers to both the relationships between elites 'at the centre' – to the forms of cooperation and accommodation between them – as well as between elites and their followers (horizontal and vertical relations, respectively) (Laws, 2012).

While some arrangements might prove more stable and inclusive than others – depending, for example, upon whether 'spoilers' are brought to the table – all political settlements are ultimately about how society opts to solve the problem of violence; about, that is, whether competition is managed through politics or force (Kelsall, 2016). The accompanying Box 1 captures a number of key characteristics of the Ugandan political settlement, as identified by a recent study.

**Box 1: Key features of the Ugandan political settlement**

- Deepening levels of competitive clientelism
- Highly personalised forms of public bureaucracy
- Collusive state-business relations
- A ruling coalition that is expensively inclusive at the lower levels

Source: Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2013)

Thomas Parks and William Cole suggest we can further think in terms of primary and secondary political settlements, the former referring to the formal and informal 'configuration of power at the central state level', and the latter, 'the struggle for local control in subnational regions' (Parks and Cole, 2010: 18). This is an analytically useful insight. Much of the thinking and writing on political settlements has been framed at the macro / national / central level, but the suggestion here is that the kinds of political-economic processes we see occurring centrally are also visible in the more local, everyday spaces of state, society and economy. In other words, political settlements create and legitimise certain social and political routines, which then permeate all aspects of life, at all levels.

Following this, it is plausible that the power relations bundled up within a political settlement find expression through both development interventions as well as the local sites of economic activity, such as urban marketplaces. As Naila Kabeer (2012) reminds us, labour markets are not neutral spaces of pure economic

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exchange, but instead embody and reinforce patterns of existing social, economic and political inequality (see also Elson, 1999). In other words, the economic marketplace can be viewed as one of the many arenas through which actors seek to assert, maintain and renegotiate their positions of power.

Our study of the Lira Main Market redevelopment project reveals several moments at which this has been apparent. If we take the allocation process, our evidence suggests that many of the prime locations – bigger units in the best spots – were distributed on the basis of deals made between members of local government and the town's wealthiest businessmen, illustrating an aspect of the *collusive state-business relations* outlined in Box 1. Reports by allocation committee members reveal that their services were rewarded with the opportunity to take whichever market space they wanted, suggesting an additional *personalised dimension to the public bureaucracy* surrounding project implementation. Allegations of key political figures at the local level taking the best spaces for themselves and their relatives ('doing their own work'[37]) echo Booth et al.'s (2014: 56) observation that 'holders of political power [in Uganda] make easy use of public resources to secure opportunities in business sectors.' And the way in which several of these good spaces have apparently been sublet to poorer vendors at inflated prices speaks to the related issue of manipulating public investments for *individual rent-seeking purposes*.

There is also some evidence of *(expensive) inclusion* at the local level. Vendors' resistance to paying service charges has, as discussed previously, resulted in a substantial revenue shortfall for the municipal council. Attempts were initially made by the market authorities to more forcibly collect these payments, but were apparently 'disturbed' by councillors: 'they [the councillors] fear if we collect money from vendors without their intervention, it will affect their votes because these are their voters.'[38] The council, we were told, wanted to close down those trading outside in the 'ungazetted markets' before enforcing the charges inside. Yet, at the same time, attempts to do just that were likewise derailed by a political process. As explained by the Deputy Town Clerk, 'We attempted to push them [the outside traders] in, but were affected by the election process. Politicians use them, say there are their voters and that no one should chase them.'[39]

These simultaneous acts of vendor protection should be viewed against the backdrop of the President's promise last year – that the market is 'not for the rich' but for ordinary vendors – as well as against a recent history of high-level political interventions to secure the support of large groups of urban informal workers (Goodfellow and Titeca, 2012; Lindell and Ampaire, 2016). What we are ultimately seeing here is not only a fight for votes between different groups of political actors – a fight that is playing out through the MATIP-1 project and the supposedly neutral space of the economic marketplace – but also an accommodation of local actors through the selective suspension of rules. With the subsequent loss of municipal revenue, this has become an expensive exercise in political inclusion at the local level.

To say that the political settlement has *distorted* MATIP-1 is to not put it quite the right way. Distortion implies abnormality, or a deviation from the standard. But political settlements, regardless of their 'type' (see Kelsall, 2016), always mediate the nature and effects of reforms. The terms 'branding' or 'imprinting' would capture this better, as policies and interventions effectively assume some of the characteristics or forms of the political settlement. In Lira town, this appropriation then gave way to a series of unintended consequences, to which we now turn our attention.

Williams et al. (2011) argue that there is always a 'politics of growth', referring to three processes in particular: conflict, negotiation and cooperation. We can observe aspects of each in the consequences of this project. Taking the first, we see that, although the new marketplace was intended to improve the livelihoods of Lira's vendors, in practice it has actually helped create a series of divisions and disputes. The most visible is perhaps the fracturing of the town's vending community, with the creation of new rifts between those operating inside the redeveloped marketplace and those continuing to trade outside its confines. While the 'outsiders' feel they have legitimate reason *not* to work inside – namely, the disadvantage at which it is seen to put them – this decision has been met with frustration, and some anger, amongst 'insiders'. Many of the latter feel street traders should be forcibly relocated inside by 'law enforcement officers ... so that everyone will have to go and shop in the new market',[40] with some even alleging that those outside 'are paying off the municipality so they can stay there'.[41] At the same time, a similar view is held by

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Credit: SLRC/Richard Mallett

Walking through Coronation Park

some of those continuing to operate outside: that those inside the market 'are people who bribed their way into getting stalls and lock-ups'.[42] Our interviews also suggest disputes between different elements of local government, in particular between councillors on the one hand and key figureheads such as the mayor and town clerks on the other.[43] It is of course possible that a number of these are not in fact 'new' disputes at all, but simply existing ones which have reproduced themselves through the market project (see Monteith, 2016 for just such a case in Kampala). But the point remains: economic interventions often create distributions of resources which are perceived to be unfair, as well as responses from economic actors which others disagree with.

On the second, negotiation, we see the emergence of various forms of resistance among vendors. Throughout the project's lifespan to date, there have been legal modes of struggle (injunctions taken out by a group of vendors during the disputed allocation process; individual vendors going to court over contraventions of MoU detail) as well as 'greyer', less formal ones (rejection of inside space and the unofficial continuation of street trading; non-compliance with financial rules by insiders; the padlocking of 'ghost' lock-ups owned by rarely seen primary vendors; violation of zoning rules). Again, this diversity of resistance has been previously noted in relation to market redevelopments in Kampala (Lindell and Ampaire, 2016). There, as in Lira town, the objective has been to strike up decisions and deals which meet the specific groups' own economic interests.

Two points are worth highlighting. First, that formal attempts to reorder economic activity and redefine urban economic space are rarely uncontested. Informal workers often assert themselves to make new claims and demands on authority. And second, it is inaccurate to portray a particular group of economic actors – vendors, for example – as always operating in unison: splits can emerge and alternative modes of resistance might be subsequently adopted (see ibid.).

Finally, cooperation. Our study has less to say about this. But the extent to which state-business collusion or the fact that political figures and organisations have 'gone easy' on certain groups of vendors (i.e. legitimising fee non-compliance or derailing the forced relocation of street vendors) count, there is some evidence of cooperation between different groups of political-economic actors.

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# 4 Conclusion

What, then, can we take from all of this? The point of this paper has been to explore how effective formal policies and interventions can be at regulating economic life. The experience of Lira's market redevelopment project suggests there are limits.

Certainly, it has worked in some ways: a new physical marketplace has been constructed, several hundred vendors are operating inside the building, and it features some aspects which are clearly more advantageous than many of the trading alternatives around town. What's more, and to reiterate an earlier point, the project is still in relatively early days. At the same time, however, conflict, negotiation, and indeed ineffectiveness, are also apparent. This finding speaks to a much wider issue concerning the factors which mediate the implementation and impacts of economic interventions.

One of the things we have been most interested in exploring is what happens when a certain normative idea of how something ought to be working economically – an idea, in this particular case, bound up among notions of modernisation and formalisation – grinds up against the local reality of how things actually work. In a sense, one of the principles expressed through and promoted by the project is the ideal of economic fixity – of tying informal vendors to a defined location. But while economic fixity might be in the interests of municipal authorities, it is not necessarily in the interests of informal vendors. Small-scale trading can be a risky and insecure form of work, demanding the need to be flexible, adaptive and open to trying new things. Many of the vendors we interviewed had, in their many years of selling, switched between a variety of trades, constantly in search of a product line that might help them better secure their economic needs. When we asked William, an experienced vendor currently operating in the new marketplace, what the best items to work with are, he simply replied: 'I have tried [many], I am still looking'.[44] The point is, the dynamism of competitive markets requires the ability to adapt. This might mean switching trades or moving between sites on a fairly regular basis. Mobility is central to this requirement, yet is at odds with the logics of Lira's new marketplace.

This tension is seen no more clearly than in the rejection of the new market by some, and their self-relocation to alternative sites in town, including the streets outside. Informal vendor resistance to enforced fixity has been observed in several other contexts, including Nairobi

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across the border. There, it has been argued that 'The widespread return to hawking exposed the poor capacity of the state to regulate urban space as well as the incompleteness of its power' (Lindell and Ihalainen, 2014: 80). Thus, official attempts to fix, formalise and regulate informal economic activity are often met with disappointing results, especially when the surrounding geographic area is subject to uneven forms of regulation. In many ways, this does come down to a question of capacity: of the ability of an actor to steer processes of economic development in a particular direction. And our analysis suggests there are two ways in which this 'capacity to steer' might be compromised.

The first concerns design: when the logics of a reform or intervention fail to adequately cohere with the realities of local life, or which do not really engage with the core issues, the implementer's capacity to change things is undermined from the outset. While Lira Main Market's redevelopment originally set out to try and improve the lives of ordinary vendors, it did so in a way that stopped short of addressing many of the more significant barriers to doing business. Lira town's vendors are faced with an intensely competitive environment, a limited range of range of products in which they can viably trade, generally thin profit margins, a lack of financial capital (and poor access to formal credit systems), the high living costs associated with residence in urban areas ('most traders are so indebted, with daily needs, they run their business at a loss'[45]), an absence of systems for helping them cope with dependents (childcare being one major example), and the continued social expectation to support family members 'back home'. In some senses, life in the new marketplace actually compounds these difficulties, with the enforcement of fees for a variety of services (toilets, electricity, daily dues, ground rent) and the illicit inflation of stall and lock-up rents by a selection of relatively wealthy primary vendors (which, for reasons outlined previously, cannot necessarily be considered surprising). In the words of one vendor, 'having a nice-looking market is not going to change [the real problems]'.[46]

The second way in which attempts to reorder and formalise economic life through reforms and interventions might get compromised concerns power and politics. In a sense, the creation of a rentier class within the Lira market structure cannot be considered all that surprising. Along with many other aspects of how the project has played out, this simply reflects the nature of power relations and political practice we see elsewhere and at other levels in Uganda. Although the design of economic interventions might assume a particular vision of how these things ought to work, in reality they are always subject to the existing rules of the game; in many contexts, these are often moulded around the logics of patronage politics and personalised transactions.

Ultimately, while efforts to improve the livelihoods of informal economic actors are by no means futile, this study suggests they do, at a minimum, need to take certain factors into account. Lira town's market redevelopment is fairly typical of interventions designed to promote economic growth in low-income, post-conflict settings. But, as we have seen, its potential has been undermined by a design which failed to engage seriously with (1) the ways in which local people actually make a living, and (2) the features of the Ugandan political settlement, which infuse not just the macro but also the micro spaces of economic life.

There are no easy answers for how to ensure success with projects such as these, but one step in the right direction would be to start thinking about how these unavoidable realities could be better managed. That might entail the following:

- **Focus less on building things, more on understanding behaviours, incentives and relationships.** In many ways, constraints on local economic activity are related to inequalities of power and the ability of some actors to exploit the position and actions of others. The quality of infrastructure is often secondary to these dynamics. The design of economic interventions would therefore benefit from an explicit prior consideration of: the specific ways in which poorer people are likely to lose out when more powerful actors are able to appropriate and capitalise on the opportunities provided by new investments; the potential ways in which interventions risk creating conflict and division within the economic community (including between traders themselves); and the kinds of measures that might help mitigate capture of newly introduced resources.

- **Being more consultative in the design process.** This appears to have happened, to a degree, with the MATIP-1 project. However, the evidence collected as part of this study suggests it might not have been as effective as hoped. This should not be interpreted as a reason to close off and centralise planning processes. Given that one of the findings of this study

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Credit: LMTP

Street vendors in Lira town

is that problems emerge as a result of dissonance between design and reality, it would seem sensible for similar future interventions to start with properly participatory processes that work with street vendors in order to figure out what the real obstacles they face in (economic) life are – and try to determine what could be done about them.

- **Contextualise the intervention within the broader economic environment of the urban space.** Part of the problem facing Lira's new central marketplace is the uneven system of regulation surrounding it. This is a less an issue with the market per se, but more to do with how it relates to its surroundings. This kind of unevenness is likely to create tensions within the local trading community, so it would be useful to first foresee how that might occur, and then to tailor the design accordingly.

Although such measures might not be capable of overcoming the political constraints associated with economic modernisation and formalisation policies, they may well help navigate some of the initial implementation concerns.

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# Annex 1: List of interviewees

| Interview No. | Date | Name | Gender | Trade / Role |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | 21/09 | Anna | F | Clothing |
| 02 | 22/09 | Patrick | M | Bags |
| 03 | 22/09 | Eric | M | Food (mainly onions) |
| 04 | 23/09 | William | M | Shoes |
| 05 | 23/09 | Sara | F | Fresh food (fruit and veg) |
| 06 | 23/09 | William | M | Fresh food (fruit and veg) |
| 07 | 23/09 | Tonny | M | Kitchen utensils |
| 08 | 23/09 | Juliet | F | Clothing |
| 09 | 24/09 | Chairman of LIMTA | M | Clothing |
| 10 | 24/09 | Santos | M | Clothing |
| 11 | 24/09 | Rafael | M | Clothing |
| 12 | 24/09 | Sarah | F | Clothing |
| 13 | 24/09 | Beatrice | F | Clothing |
| 14 | 02/02 | Patrick | M | Assistant Town Clerk, Ojwina Division |
| 15 | 26/01 | Costa | F | Councillor, LMC |
| 16 | 28/01 | Hudson | M | Journalist |
| 17 | 03/02 | Nancy | F | Vendor |
| 18 | 27/01 | Nikanori | M | Assistant Market Master |
| 19 | 27/01 | Francis | M | Mayoral candidate |
| 20 | 05/02 | Richard | M | Committee Member of Market Vendor Association |
| 21 | 26/01 | Richard | M | Member of the allocation committee and LMM vendor |
| 22 | 28/01 | Deputy Town Clerk | M | Lira Municipal Council |
| 23 | 05/02 | William | M | Vendor / secretary finance market vendors' association |
| 24 | 01/02 | James | M | Vendor outside new market |
| 25 | 02/02 | Ritah | F | Vendor outside new market |
| 26 | 02/02 | Moses | M | Vendor outside new market |
| 27 | 01/02 | Eunice | F | Vendor outside new market |

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium

SLRC reports present information, analysis and key policy recommendations on issues relating to livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict affected situations.
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