Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium

Researching livelihoods and services affected by conflict

Surveying livelihoods, service delivery and governance: baseline evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda

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Richard Mallett, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Rachel Slater and Georgina Sturge

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About us

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) aims to generate a stronger evidence base on how people in conflict-affected situations (CAS) make a living, access basic services like health care, education and water, and perceive and engage with governance at local and national levels. Providing better access to basic services, social protection and support to livelihoods matters for the human welfare of people affected by conflict, the achievement of development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and international efforts at peace building and state building.

At the centre of SLRC's research are three core themes, developed over the course of an intensive one-year inception phase:

- State legitimacy: experiences, perceptions and expectations of the state and local governance in conflict-affected situations
- State capacity: building effective states that deliver services and social protection in conflict-affected situations
- Livelihood trajectories and economic activity in conflict-affected situations

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is the lead organisation. SLRC partners include the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Sri Lanka, the Feinstein International Center (FIC, Tufts University), Focus1000 in Sierra Leone, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction of Wageningen University (WUR) in the Netherlands, the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), and the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Pakistan.

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
Overseas Development Institute
203 Blackfriars Road
London SE1 8NJ, UK

T +44 (0)20 7922 8221
F +44 (0)20 7922 0399
E slrc@odi.org.uk
W www.secureliveilhoods.org

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Executive summary

In 2012/13, the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium designed and implemented the first round of a panel survey in five fragile or conflict-affected countries, generating cross-country data on people's livelihoods, their access to and experience of basic services and their perceptions of government. This paper synthesises the findings of the DRC, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda baseline surveys, which were delivered to a total of 9,769 households in September-October 2012 (for DRC, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and in January 2013 for Uganda.

Drawing on sets of descriptive statistics and regression analyses run at country level, the analysis here sets out to identify key trends, similarities and differences across the five countries, in relation to three broad lines of enquiry:[1] factors associated with better/worse levels of wellbeing and 'livelihood outcomes' (food security, asset ownership); factors associated with having better/worse access to basic services or transfers (health, education, water, social protection, livelihood assistance); factors associated with better/worse satisfaction with these services; and factors associated with holding more positive/negative attitudes towards government.

Six key findings emerge when we look across the five analyses, which – to some extent – challenge some of the received wisdom that shapes development efforts in fragile and conflict-affected areas. In reading them, we should keep in mind that they provide just a snapshot at one moment in time. In 2015, we will be going back to the same respondents and interviewing them for the second round of the panel survey. At that point, we will be able to measure changes in people's livelihoods, their access to services and their perceptions of government over time, and will therefore be able to make stronger statements about the factors that possibly determine these.

First, the findings point to the importance of education: **households with more highly educated heads consistently have better wellbeing outcomes** in terms of both household wealth and food security. Findings suggest primary education makes a difference, but recipients of secondary education clearly have even higher wellbeing outcomes. After the second wave of the panel survey we will be able to unpack the causal mechanisms behind these links.

Second, we find that coverage of **livelihood assistance consistently reaches less than one-third of households** – ranging from 15% to 32% of sampled households across the countries. This initial finding suggests that, contrary to what might be expected, the transition from conflict to post-conflict does not appear to result in renewed efforts to support livelihood rehabilitation. There is an apparent gap in both effective strategies and effective programmes at sufficient levels of scale to support processes of livelihood recovery, provide social protection and stimulate employment and growth. The second round of data collection will expand our understanding of what factors affect households' participation in such programmes.

The third finding, and perhaps one of the most unexpected, is that **levels of satisfaction with basic services are generally quite high**. This does not necessarily mean that households are accessing high-quality services: we are measuring self-reported satisfaction levels based on respondents' experiences of the service. Three possible explanations are: 1) respondents may be expressing positive perceptions owing to a social desirability bias (the tendency of respondents to give the responses others may expect of them); 2) there may be actual post-conflict improvements in services (services may be patchy and of low quality but still better than before); and 3) information asymmetries (people not knowing what is available) might mean people are satisfied with limited services. We will be able to fully explore the

[1] Hyperlinks take you to the relevant chapters.

relevance of *changing* levels of access on satisfaction with services after the second round of the survey.

Fourth, except in Sri Lanka, **respondents have overwhelmingly negative perceptions of local and, particularly, central government**. For instance, only between 4% (Pakistan) and 36% (Uganda) felt the central government cared about their opinion. Except in Sri Lanka and Uganda, at least two-thirds felt the priorities of local government never or almost never reflected their own. These findings do not necessarily suggest central government is doing a 'worse job': local government organisations are in theory more closely connected to local populations, even if they fail to provide much in the way of tangible development gains, and this proximity/visibility may explain the more positive perceptions. It may be the case that the greater physical and hierarchical distance between people and the central layer of government potentially has a limiting effect on its capacity to build legitimacy. Or, in other words, households may associate public goods delivery with whichever level of government is most visible to them, regardless of who delivered them, and their perceptions are shaped accordingly.

The fifth – and strongest – finding is that an individual's overall satisfaction with a service or transfer depends heavily on how well specific aspects of that service are run; access to the service (in terms of distance to a service or transfer receipt) is largely irrelevant. For example, respondents' experience with basic services suggests factors such as 'satisfaction with the availability of medicine' and 'satisfaction with the number of teachers' are strongly and positively associated with higher levels of overall satisfaction with those services. Quality, as opposed to simple presence, is the most important factor. Furthermore, whether or not someone has access to a particular service, social protection transfer or type of livelihood assistance does not appear to matter much in explaining perceptions of the government. Instead, we see **presence of grievance mechanisms and possibilities for civil participation strongly influences perceptions of the government – even if these are not effective in practice**. Taken together, these findings suggest there is potentially something about the way in which public services can act as a channel through which citizens and public authorities interact (Van de Walle and Scott, 2011).

The final finding is that our data show **it is not all about conflict**. The five countries are characterised by a history of conflict, yet historical/current displacement and recent sporadic conflict do not affect wellbeing outcomes, access to services or perceptions of the state in any consistent way. They are also characterised by multiple causes of vulnerability: conflict-related shocks can affect livelihoods, wellbeing outcomes and perceptions of the government, but we find 'non-conflict-related' shocks, such as environmental stresses, natural disasters and health or economic shocks often have equally as dramatic effects on these outcomes. We do find evidence of long-term negative effects of serious (conflict-related) crimes in Uganda, yet in all countries our findings are forcing us to re-examine 'conflict exceptionalism'. Overall, the baseline findings point to the importance of recognising and reflecting in policies and programming, that: 1) the lives of people in fragile and conflict-affected areas are not solely defined by their experiences of war – their livelihood choices and wellbeing are not determined by violent conflict in an absolute sense; and 2) it is necessary to account for the longevity of the effects of conflict, violence and insecurity in forward-looking development and recovery efforts. Findings from our surveys suggest no simple relationship between access to services and people's perceptions of the legitimacy and performance of government. For donors, this suggests a need to be more cautious about claims that supporting services contributes to state-building. That said, it is still absolutely appropriate to support service delivery from a rights- and needs-based perspective: services are critical to eliminating poverty, irrespective of whether they contribute to state legitimacy. But if donors want to support state capacities to deliver services, they may need to pay much more attention to how they are supporting services and be more explicit about how state capacities are being built at what level.

1 Introduction

As a multi-year, cross-country research programme, one of the overarching aims of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) is to contribute towards a better understanding of what processes of livelihood recovery and state-building look like following periods of conflict and how positive outcomes are achieved. Understanding socio-economic change of this nature is only possible when appropriate evidence exists. This, in turn, requires the availability of reliable longitudinal data that are able to measure shifts, fluctuations and consistencies in the performance of a given unit of analysis (an individual, a household, an economy, and so on) against a set of outcome indicators between at least two points in time.

In order to directly address this need for appropriate evidence – evidence which tells us something about processes playing out over time and in more than a single context – SLRC are carrying out panel surveys in five countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda. Designed to produce information on a range of issues – including: people's livelihoods (income-generating activities, asset portfolios, food security, constraining and enabling factors within the broader institutional and geographical context); their access to basic services (education, health, water), social protection and livelihood assistance; exposure to shocks and coping strategies; and their relationships with governance processes and practices (participation in public meetings, experience with grievance mechanisms, perceptions of major political actors) – the surveys are being implemented twice in each country. The first round took place in late 2012 to early 2013, and the second round, where we will attempt to re-interview the same respondents, will take place in 2015.

This paper summarises and synthesises the findings of the DRC, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda surveys. The surveys took place in September-October 2012 (for DRC, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and in January 2013 for Uganda. The smallest country sample size was 1,259 respondents (DRC), and the largest 3,175 (Nepal). It constitutes, in effect, the synthesis baseline report, to be followed up by a subsequent report in 2016 when the second round of the panel survey is complete. This report complements the five other country papers, published separately.

The SLRC conducted a similar study in South Sudan between March and April 2012 which preceded the baseline for the other five countries. It was conducted jointly with the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), which is implementing the "Sustainable Food Security Through Community-Based Livelihood Development and Water Harvesting" project (SFLDP). Their baseline survey is in essence a livelihoods survey, to which we added questions about perceptions of government. As the baseline for the SFLDP project, the survey for South Sudan is somewhat different in content and in objective from the other SLRC surveys, and we have therefore not included the South Sudan findings in this synthesis report. A summary of the findings from the South Sudan survey can be found at the end of the report.

The findings presented here are intended as tentative, preliminary ideas about the forces affecting people's livelihoods and wellbeing, access to and experiences of services, and perceptions of government in these conflict-affected countries. The second wave of the panel survey, which asks the same respondents the same questions after a three-year interval, will put these findings into context and enable us to understand better the processes which underpin the findings. The research will also be complemented with in-depth qualitative research in the five countries.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background to the survey, situating the panel survey in relation to the overarching themes of SLRC's research programme, outlining the objectives of the survey, and presenting the analytical frameworks and hypotheses used to guide the analysis of the survey data. Section 3 presents the survey methodology of the in greater detail, discussing the specific sampling methods used and describing how we have made comparisons across countries. Sections 4-6 constitute the analytical core of the paper, respectively exploring: which factors influence livelihood

status; which factors influence people's access to and experience of services and social protection; and which factors influence people's perceptions of government. Finally, Section 7 concludes and lists some preliminary policy implications.

2 Background, objectives and analytical frameworks

This section is split into three parts. The first provides some background to the survey by situating it in relation to the SLRC's broader research agenda. The second outlines the objectives of carrying out a panel survey. The third describes the basic analytical frameworks used to analyse the survey data.

2.1 Situating the survey within the research programme

The cross-country panel survey is of direct relevance to the first and third themes of SLRC's six-year global research programme:

1. *Legitimacy.* What are people's perceptions, expectations and experiences of the state and of local-level government? How does the way services are delivered and livelihoods are supported affect people's views on the legitimacy of the state?
2. *Capacity.* How do international actors interact with the state and local-level government institutions? How successful are international attempts to build state capacity to deliver social protection, basic services and livelihood assistance?
3. *Livelihood trajectories.* What do livelihood trajectories in conflict-affected situations tell us about the role of governments, aid agencies, markets and the private sector in enabling people to make a secure living?

2.1.1 Legitimacy: people's perceptions of government and the role of service delivery

Establishing, building or strengthening state legitimacy is a major element of state-building. The OECD (2010: 3), for example, notes that, 'State legitimacy matters because it provides the basis for rule by consent rather than by coercion.' For donors, while the steps they can take to influence state legitimacy are few, they do have an interest in developing a clearer understanding of the following: what leads to legitimacy? What, if anything, can they do to strengthen state-society relations? And what might be the (unintended) positive and negative consequences of their programming on state legitimacy if they, for example, route development funding via bodies other than the formal organs of the state?

Because basic services represent a material expression of the social contract that is thought to exist between functioning states and empowered citizens, there has been a 'striking trend toward framing the provision of vital public services – including health, education, water, and sanitation – as a key source of legitimacy' (Mcloughlin, 2014: 2). However, literature reviews carried out during SLRC's inception year found very little evidence for the frequent assertion that improving access to services and social protection in conflict-affected situations contributes to state-building (see, in particular, Carpenter et al., 2012). The relationship between delivering services and state-society relations remains poorly understood. Given the cited importance of legitimacy in state-building processes – as the European Report on Development (2009: 93) notes, 'State-building efforts are bound to fail if, in strengthening institutional capacities, the legitimacy of the state is not restored' – it is both surprising and concerning that we have so little robust knowledge about what leads to state legitimacy.

Despite these gaps, state-building, encompassing both legitimacy and capacity, provides the organising framework for much international engagement in conflict-affected situations. In tackling this question, we are thus taking up the OECD's call for donors to 'seek a much better understanding – through perception surveys, research and local networking – of local people's perceptions and beliefs about what constitutes legitimate political authority and acceptable behaviour' (OECD, 2010: 55).

2.1.2 Livelihood trajectories: tracking change and identifying determinants

Literature reviews carried out during SLRC's inception year identified empirical and longitudinal research on livelihoods in conflict-affected situations as a key evidence gap. Although sometimes good

in-depth case studies can be found on livelihood strategies in particular contexts, these are usually just snapshots. Qualitative case study approaches are also insufficiently linked to quantitative survey data. The reviews also revealed a significant gap in any comparative analysis of the effectiveness and impact of interventions to support livelihoods (see, in particular, Mallett and Slater, 2012). There is some evaluation and academic literature that examines the impact of particular projects or programmes, but very little which looks at the overall significance of aid in people's livelihoods and compares the impact of different approaches. SLRC's research programme aims to fill some of these gaps by building a picture of how people make a living in particular contexts and track how this changes over time.

2.2 Objectives of the panel survey

The panel survey will help us answer parts of our research questions appearing under the first and third themes of the research programme.

Regarding the first theme on legitimacy, our approach is centred on documenting and analysing people's views of government (or the formal state) in conflict-affected situations. In all countries, we collected information on respondents' perceptions of at least two levels of government: local and central. In the case of DRC, information on a wider range of actors was collected, including informal state or non-state agents (e.g. local kings or *mwami* in DRC). A cross-country panel survey incorporating perception-based questions enables an analysis of people's relationship with state authorities, allowing us to investigate difficult-to-measure, subjective issues such as trust and satisfaction, and providing both a comparative snapshot and a longitudinal perspective.

Under the third theme (livelihood trajectories), SLRC is undertaking rigorous, longitudinal livelihoods research. Our aim is to build a picture of how people make a living in particular contexts, track how this changes over time, and shed light on what causes change. We want to know whether people are recovering or starting to build stronger and more secure livelihoods, are stuck in poverty or are sliding into destitution, and how this is affected by the broader political, economic and security environment. Implementing a panel survey that captures both the dynamics and determinants of people's livelihoods enables this.

The SLRC cross-country panel survey therefore combines elements of both perception and livelihoods surveys, enabling a dual focus on government and legitimacy on the one hand and livelihood trajectories on the other. There are five points of added value of conducting a hybrid survey of this kind:

1. It allows us to link perceptions directly with experiences
2. It generates rare panel data in fragile and conflict-affected contexts
3. It allows us to identify similarities and differences between different fragile state contexts
4. It allows us to differentiate between levels of government and different forms of government
5. It generates information on livelihoods beyond simple income measures.

Given the overarching objectives of the panel survey study outlined above, the more specific research questions are as follows:

- Which factors influence livelihoods and wellbeing?
- Which factors influence access to basic services, social protection transfers and livelihood assistance?
- Which factors influence of experience of basic services, social protection transfers and livelihood assistance?
- Which factors influence perceptions of local and central government?

The next section outlines the analytical frameworks that form the basis of the survey and subsequent analysis. We also give a basic set of hypotheses that relate to these frameworks.

2.3 Analytical frameworks

Three basic analytical frameworks emerged from the survey design process, which are outlined below. It should be emphasised that, because this paper is based on the first round of the survey, the analysis is not geared towards identifying and explaining changes over time (which is why we talk about livelihood *status* as opposed to *trajectory* throughout the report). Understanding change will be possible after the second round. Much of the analysis here focuses on producing descriptive baseline statistics and identifying possible correlations and relationships between different sets of factors. The data collected also allows us to explain variations between households across a range of outcomes.

2.3.1 Livelihoods and wellbeing

Livelihoods and wellbeing are broad concepts and cannot be meaningfully captured by a single indicator. We measure livelihoods by asking about the activities, whether paid work or otherwise, that sustain the household. We seek to measure the (changing) importance of specific activities and the access to better livelihood opportunities that particular groups, households or people have. Wellbeing is more complex. We have chosen to measure it in two different ways by looking at:

- Food security (using the Coping Strategies Index)
- Household asset ownership (as a proxy for wealth).

The Coping Strategies Index / food insecurity index is a tool for measuring current food access: the higher the food insecurity index the worse-off the household (Maxwell and Caldwell, 2008). Five coping strategies and their relative severity have been identified to be generally internationally applicable and can be seen as proxies for food insecurity (Maxwell and Caldwell, 2008). The overall score of the insecurity index for each household is calculated by multiplying the number of times in the past week (for Uganda) or past month (for other countries) that each coping strategy was used by the severity of the coping strategy, and summing the products. The final index score is a weighted sum reflecting the frequency with which households have adopted particular behaviours over the course of the previous 30 days. These behaviours are given in Table 1, which replicates the survey question. Even though the food insecurity index was measured in exactly the same way in all countries, we will not be comparing average scores across countries, as the survey was conducted in different seasons. Instead we will be comparing the factors that correlate with changes in the food insecurity index.

Table 1: Composition of coping strategies index, from survey instrument

In the past 30 days, if there have been times when you did not have enough food or money to buy food, how often has your household had to:	**Only one response allowed:** ***1. Never*** ***2. Rarely (once or twice in the past 30 days)*** ***3. Sometimes (three to ten times in the past 30 days)*** ***4. Often (more than ten times in the past 30 days)*** ***5. Always (every day)***
a. Rely on less preferred and less expensive foods?	
b. Borrow food, or rely on help from a friend or relative?	
c. Limit portion size at mealtimes?	
d. Restrict consumption by adults in order for small children to eat?	
e. Reduce number of meals eaten in a day?	

The second outcome indicator, household wealth, is proxied by the assets owned by the household using the Morris Score Index (Morris et al., 1999). The Morris Score Index is a weighted asset indicator that weights each durable asset owned by the household by the share of households owning the asset. What this essentially means is that households are considered better-off when they own assets not owned by most households in the sample. The Morris index includes all productive, household and livestock assets and included different assets in the different countries. The index has been shown to

be a good proxy of household expenditure in rural Africa (ibid) and has been used in many other settings too, for example in transition countries like Albania (Hagen-Zanker and Azzarri, 2010).

Of course, it is also likely that relationships may exist between asset ownership and food security, our respective proxies for livelihood status and wellbeing. For example, while Tschirley and Weber (1994) find that, in previously war-affected parts of Mozambique, landholdings constituted a key determinant of a household's calorie consumption, across the border in southern Zimbabwe, Scoones (1995) reports strong correlations between wealth rankings and livestock ownership, farm asset holdings and crop harvests. Further afield, Takasaki et al. (2001) observe strong associations between levels of household wealth and the kinds of livelihood activities engaged in by households in rural Peru.

Having been through a lengthy process of expert consultation and thorough deliberation, we propose that variations in livelihoods and wellbeing can be explained, at least in part, by the sets of factors outlined below. Some basic hypotheses related to these factors are listed at the end of this sub-section.

i. ***Household factors*. Including demographic characteristics of the household, the dependency ratio, the religion and ethnicity of the household, and education, displacement status and migration characteristics.**

   We know from the existing literature that household composition and identity – and what the individuals within them do – often affect livelihood outcomes at the individual and household level (see de Waal and Whiteside, 2003 and Baulch and McCulloch, 2002 on the role of dependency ratios, Meagher, 2005 on the role of ethnicity, and Kennedy and Peters, 1992 on the role of the gender of the household head), as well as particular defining characteristics such as adult educational attainment – which has, for instance, been found to influence both food security indicators (Garrett and Ruel, 1999) as well as household income levels (Moser, 1998) – and migration and displacement (Collinson, 2009; Ellis, 2003).

While our survey focuses on livelihoods and wellbeing outcomes at the household rather than individual level, we do recognise the importance of individual factors (especially, for example, the intersection of age, gender and ethnicity) and explore these as explanatory variables for particular patterns of livelihoods, asset ownership and food insecurity.

ii. ***Contextual factors*. Including location, indicators accounting for season, the occurrence of conflict (proxied by fighting in the local area), perceptions of safety in the neighbourhood or when moving from place to place.**

   Livelihoods are influenced not only by individual and household-level attributes, but additionally by a broader set of structural and institutional factors (Carr, 2013; De Haan and Zoomers, 2005). Previous studies have observed that livelihood outcomes are sometimes a function of geography (Pain and Lautze, 2002), perceptions of risk in the immediate and surrounding area (Block and Webb, 2001; Rockmore, 2011), and actual exposure to conflict. Indeed, a growing body of evidence tells us that experiences of war and exposure to intense physical violence can have significant detrimental effects on livelihood outcomes, sometimes for many years after the event. For example, several studies show how experiences of conflict are closely associated with lower educational attainment (see Mallett and Slater, 2012: 16-17), which is in turn associated with worse livelihood outcomes in many instances, while others highlight the positive relationship between conflict and asset loss for many households (Annan et al., 2006; Brück, 1997). However, the story is not black and white: exposure to conflict and violence has been found, in some circumstances, to promote more altruistic behaviour (Voors et al., 2012) and to encourage the adoption of more risky yet more profitable agricultural practices (Badiuzzaman et al., 2011) – two behavioural changes that may well have implications for a household's economic recovery following war.

iii. ***Shocks experienced by a household,*** **including natural disasters, economic shocks, as well as crime and conflict.**

The development literature suggests that experience of (short-run) shocks and (long-run) stresses can have sometimes profound effects on the capacities of people to make a living and on their livelihoods trajectories. Aside from the effects of exposure to episodes of conflict and violence, as discussed above, evidence shows that livelihood outcomes at the household level can be shaped by natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes (Kirsch et al., 2012; 2011), by long-term health problems such as HIV and AIDS (Wafula et al., 2013) and by crimes such as cattle rustling (Schilling et al., 2012) or sexual assault (Christian et al., 2011). The effects of such shocks and stresses can either be direct – for example, asset loss through flooding – or indirect, such as when the experience of a particular crime leads to attitudinal and behavioural change amongst affected individuals, which may in turn affect activities and outcomes. As such, we asked detailed questions on health, economic and environmental shocks and crimes in the questionnaire and included these in the analysis.

iv. ***Differential access to basic services, social protection and livelihoods services and the quality of these services / transfers.***

Livelihood outcomes are dependent, to a large degree, on different forms of human and physical capital. The supply of accessible, appropriate and timely services and assistance by governments, NGOs, community groups or other actors can be seen, in many cases, as necessary for ensuring the maintenance and enhancement of human and physical capital stocks at the individuals and household level (for example, through keeping people healthy, increasing their knowledge and capacities through education, and boosting productivity through appropriate livelihood assistance). There is a substantial body of evidence highlighting the protective, preventative and promotive roles that different kinds of support services can play, from cash transfers (Blattman et al., 2013) to agricultural extension programmes (Owens et al., 2003; Anderson and Feder, 2004) – although it must be noted that, in many instances and for one reason or another, such interventions also often fail to produce much in the way of positive impacts.

Nonetheless, the receipt of targeted cash transfers has been linked, in South American contexts, to higher likelihoods of entrepreneurship (Bianchi and Bobba, 2010; Ribas, 2013) and, in South Asia, to improved school attendance (Khandker et al., 2003). The receipt of food aid has a positive bearing on child nutrition which also affects child labour force participation or household livelihood strategies more broadly (Quisumbing, 2003). Agricultural extension and road building has been associated with increased household expenditure in Ethiopia (Dercon et al., 2009). Again, it is unlikely that access to a particular service, such as health care or schooling will have a direct influence on livelihood outcomes such as asset ownership. Rather, a number of mechanisms may explain why, say, poor health care might be associated with lower household wealth or food insecurity (for example, via negative long-term effects on human capital, on a household's dependency ratio, on intra-household resource allocations, and so on). For example, for households in remote areas, even renting a bicycle to enable treatment-seeking can require households to borrow money or sell assets and food stock, affecting household wealth and food security (Obrist et al., 2007). The aim of the quantitative analysis is to estimate if and to what extent the above factors determine the main outcome (wellbeing status).

Box 1: Hypotheses on livelihoods and wellbeing

1 Households with better-educated members have better livelihood and wellbeing outcomes
2 Households that are or have been displaced have worse livelihood and wellbeing outcomes
3 Households that have recently experienced conflict or who are living in (perceived) unsafe locations have worse livelihood and wellbeing outcomes
4 Households that have recently experienced a greater number of shocks and crimes have worse livelihood and wellbeing outcomes
5 Households with worse access to basic services have worse livelihood and wellbeing outcomes
6 Households with access to social protection and livelihood assistance have better livelihood and wellbeing outcomes

2.3.2 Access and experience of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance

We are interested in which factors determine access to and experience of services, social protection and livelihood assistance. Under basic services we focused on access to the health clinic the household uses (in DRC, respondents were also asked about their access to the nearest hospital), to the primary school the household uses, and to the household's main water source.

Because the survey covered a large range of services, we made use of simple, relatively blunt proxies for access. In the case of health, education and water, we considered return journey times (in minutes) to health centres or hospitals, primary schools and water sources. In all cases except Uganda, respondents were asked about the distance to the boys' and girls' school separately (to account for the possibility of boys and girls using different schools); the average (mean) distance was used where appropriate. For social protection and livelihood assistance, we considered whether households had received any form of support in the past year. The survey instrument was tailored to reflect each country's most widespread types of social protection and livelihood assistance programmes (for a list and the frequency of receipt see Annex 2, Tables 21-22). Naturally, many of the programmes target specific groups, for example Nepal's old age allowance or Sri Lanka's Samurdhi cash transfer programme, so by using receipt of a transfer as our measure of access we cannot necessarily rate 'better' or 'worse' access but simply establish which factors make households more likely to be receiving any transfers.

For satisfaction with the health service the indicator used comes from the survey question, 'Overall, how satisfied are you with the quality of the service on the basis of your most recent use of the clinic?' which invited answers on a five-point Likert scale. The same type of measurement was used for satisfaction with the school based on satisfaction with the overall quality of the service. For both of these services, sub-questions collected data on satisfaction with components of the service and these appear among our covariates at the analysis stage. An example of the sub-questions on school quality is given in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Satisfaction with components and overall quality of schooling, taken from Sri Lanka survey instrument

On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the following: ***Very satisfied = 5; Satisfied = 4; Indifferent = 3; Dissatisfied = 2; Very Dissatisfied =1; (Difficult to say = 0)***	**Boys' school**	**Girls' school**
a. Number of teachers		
b. Quality of teaching staff		
c. Teacher attendance (as in opposite to absenteeism)		
d. Class size		
e. Quality of school infrastructure (including presence of toilets)		
f. Quality of equipment (e.g. books, desks, chairs)		
g. Accessibility (travel time, quality of transport, connectivity, road quality)		
h. Medium of language		
i. School admission process		
j. Participation in national sports and cultural events		
Overall, how satisfied are you with the quality of the service? *Very satisfied = 5; Satisfied = 4; Indifferent = 3; Dissatisfied = 2; Very Dissatisfied =1; (Difficult to say = 0)*		

Note: Fewer components were included in other country surveys; a similar structure was followed for health

Satisfaction with water quality was indicated by whether or not the respondent perceived the water as clean and safe. For social protection and livelihood assistance we do not measure satisfaction directly, but rather perception of whether or not the transfer made a positive impact on household expenditure (for social protection) and livelihoods or agricultural production (for livelihood assistance).[2] Since these data were recorded for each transfer that the household received, and households may perceive impacts to be different for different transfer, in each country one type of transfer was chosen for the regression analysis, usually the one with the highest coverage.

For all services, data were captured on the provider of the service and, where appropriate, whether fees (informal or formal) were demanded for the service. These were included among the covariates. In this sub-section we present some basic hypotheses related to these factors.

i. ***Household factors*. Including demographic characteristics of the household, the dependency ratio, the religion and ethnicity of the household, and education and migration characteristics.**

From the existing literature we know that household composition and the attributes of household members can be a predictor of a household's access to services and social protection. For example households with higher dependency ratios (i.e. more elderly and/or children present in the household) are more likely to access social protection services (Adato and Bassett, 2009, offer some examples of, chiefly, child-targeted interventions; Bertrand et al., 2003, illustrate the mechanism behind pension uptake) and many social protection interventions are specifically targeted at households with children or elderly. While social protection programmes are often poverty-targeted, in practice, coverage can be regressive due to programme design or elite capture (e.g. Hossain, 2010), as is the case with many food subsidy programmes for example (e.g. Bastagli, 2014). Wealthy households may also have

[2] In Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda a livelihood transfer had a positive impact if the respondent stated that the transfer helps in any way, as opposed to stating that 'the transfer is too small to make a difference to my life'. The possible ways in which the transfer helped were: 'The transfer helps me a bit: I can buy some extra food', 'The transfer helps me quite a lot: we are rarely of food anymore and I can buy some other household items' and 'The transfer helps me a lot: we are never short of food anymore and I can also pay for school fees or invest in a small business'. In the DRC the question was asked differently, so here a positive impact is identified if the respondent answered 'yes' to the question, 'Did this transfer/service improve your agricultural production/ other livelihood activity?'.

better access to basic services (e.g. ESCAP, 2007). Finally, the literature points to the fact that displaced households or ethnic minority households have worse access and experiences of basic services (e.g. ESCAP, 2007). For example, in Nepal, households from socially excluded groups (low caste groups or ethnic minorities) are shown to have worse access to services (UNDP, 2009; ADB, 2010). Recent evidence from India shows that even within a health insurance programme targeted at socially excluded groups, these particular groups still face discrimination and are less satisfied with the services provided (Sabharwal et al., 2014).

ii. ***Contextual factors*. Including location, the occurrence of conflict, perceptions of safety in the neighbourhood or moving to work.**

It is clear that location matters in determining access to services. For instance, households in remote areas in Nepal have worse access to basic services and services provided are of lower quality (World Bank, 2006; DFID, n.d.). This seems to be the case more broadly (ESCAP, 2007). Intuitively, the occurrence of fighting in the area or the perception of the area being unsafe should have a negative effect on access to services. While there is very little evidence on this relationship, as shown above, the limited data available tend to point towards worse access to and experience of services. As detailed in Slater et al. (2012) based on analysis from Gates et al. (2012), citizens in countries affected by conflict and fragility have visibly worse access to basic services. On the other hand, there is no analysis of the impact of conflict on access to and experience of social protection (Slater et al., 2012).

iii. ***Implementation and performance of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance*. Including regularity of the provision, who provides the service, number of staff, etc.**

There are huge gaps in the literature, but in general it suggests that the efficiency and effectiveness of services affects access to and experience of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance. It is obvious that the regularity and timing of provision affects satisfaction with services. With regard to social protection, recent evidence from Nepal shows that poor implementation of the Child Grant programme both affects access to the programme (eligible households being unable to join) and satisfaction with the programme (Adhikari et al., 2014). Other studies also highlight the importance of timing and regularity of social protection transfers in determining satisfaction (DFID, 2011). Studies on livelihood services show that beneficiaries are less satisfied with services or assistance that is not provided at the time when it is most beneficial for livelihood activities (Levine, S 2013 (pers comm)). Services and social protection in many conflict-affected places are often delivered by non-state actors (Slater et al., 2012), but it is not clear how this affects access to and experience of services. Finally, the way services are implemented (the 'daily encounters', the 'user-friendliness') is likely to determine overall satisfaction with these services, as shown in a study based on Afrobarometer data for Africa (Bratton, 2007).

iv. ***Differential access to basic services (and its effects on people's experience of those services).***

Finally, we expect that distance to basic services is likely to affect experience of services. In Tanzania, long average distances to health care facilities were found to discourage uptake of treatment (Mamdani and Bangser, 2004) and local facilities were generally under-equipped, resulting in low patient satisfaction. Mrisho et al (2009) cite distance to the nearest hospital among the factors resulting in lower satisfaction with pre-natal care, along with staff shortages and quality and availability of equipment and medical supplies. In cases where rapid treatment is needed, such as the provision of anti-malarial drugs, the timeliness of reaching the health facility can affect the efficacy of treatment and the patient's satisfaction (Obrist et al., 2007). In Tajikistan, Shemyakina (2007) finds some evidence that distance to school reduces the

likelihood of attendance, which suggests that it may also affect parents' or other household members' satisfaction with the service or their perception of its utility. A systematic review of evidence linking the distance from a household's water source to the occurrence of diarrhoea found that further distances were associated with a greater health risk (Wang and Hunter, 2010). A less recent study in Sri Lanka noted that distance to water source did not correlate with water consumption but raised the issue of water storage in the home as a possible determinant of contamination and, as such, perceived quality (Mertens et al., 1990). On the whole, the literature suggests that those households who travel greater distances (i.e. have worse access according to our proxy) to basic services have worse experiences with them.

Box 2: Hypotheses on access to and experience of services

1. Wealthier and more educated households have better access to basic services and social protection and livelihood assistance
2. Households that are or have been displaced have worse access to, and experience of, basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance
3. Households that have recently experienced conflict or who are living in (perceived) unsafe locations have worse access to, and experience of, basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance
4. Respondents who are satisfied with how a service or welfare transfer is implemented are more satisfied with the service or welfare transfer in general
5. Households that have worse access to basic services are less satisfied with those services

2.3.3 People's perceptions of state actors

State legitimacy is a complex, multi-dimensional concept. The OECD (2010) identifies four main sources of legitimacy:

- Input or process legitimacy, which refers to the agreed rules of procedure
- Output or performance legitimacy, which is defined in relation to the effectiveness and quality of public goods and services
- Shared beliefs, which refer to a sense of political community
- International legitimacy, which refers to a recognition of the state's external sovereignty

In a recent paper, Teskey et al. (2012: 11) discuss this and other approaches to the conceptualisation of what constitutes legitimacy, and conclude that:

Legitimacy can originate from either performance, including how well the government is maintain security, creating jobs, or delivering water and sanitation services, or from process, including how the government of the day acquired power to how inclusive it is in the process of policy-making.

Given that one of SLRC's overarching objectives is to explore the potential relationship between service delivery and state-building, what we are primarily interested in is the performance aspect or source of state legitimacy. However, a focus on the process dimension of legitimacy is also important. Recent research suggests that it is process factors themselves that help explain what (sometimes) connects service delivery to state legitimacy (Stel et al., 2012; Wild and Mason, 2012). These studies provide some evidence that it is the way in which services are implemented and delivered that matters when it comes to shaping how people feel about the provider; in other words, it is not just about what is being delivered. In order for us to be able to explore these connections through our survey work, it is necessary to generate information on (a) how people rate the quality of what they are getting (the performance dimension), and (b) the way in which services are delivered and decisions about provision made (the process dimension).

These are far from objective things to measure. As Teskey et al. (2012: 11) point out, 'Even if "performance" can be measured objectively, for it to translate into legitimacy, it has to be perceived as such by the population'. What this means more generally is that legitimacy is ultimately a subjective feature (ibid).

Against this backdrop, the existing literature suggests that people's own perceptions constitute a valid proxy measure of state legitimacy (Carter, 2011; Herbert, 2013; Hilker and Kangas, 2011). Thus, in all countries respondents were asked about their perception of local and central government.[3] It must be noted that although the state cannot be reduced to government alone (Boege et al., 2008; Hagmann and Peclard, 2010), local and central government actors still constitute major – and, in most countries, the dominant – formal state structures.

To get at these perceptions, we used two main indicators: 'To what extent do you feel that the decisions of those in power at the local/central government reflect your own priorities?' and 'Do you agree with the following statement: the local/central government cares about my opinions?' Much research and deliberation went into determining which actors constituted local and central government in each country and the country questionnaires were tailored so that it was clear to respondents which level of government was referred to.[4] These perception-based questions tell us something about performance

[3] In DRC, respondents were asked about six different levels of the broader governance structure, including informal local leaders.

[4] In some countries 'local government' was defined in a very specified way: in DRC it referred to the Sector/ Chiefdom; in Nepal to the local elected bodies, Village Development Committee and District Development Committee, regulated by Local Self Governance Act 1999; in Uganda to the government at the District and sub-country level; in Sri Lanka to Provincial Councils / Urban Councils / Pradeshiya Sabas; and in Pakistan to Union Councils, Municipal Committee, Municipal Corporation,

legitimacy. In order to generate information on process legitimacy, we also asked some specific questions about participation in decision-making processes vis-à-vis local service delivery as well as some questions about people's knowledge and use of grievance mechanisms within the services they access. Of course, these do not capture the full range and extent of possible process factors, but they do take us some way towards better understanding the potential connections between service delivery and state legitimacy. It is also worth mentioning that while these questions get at people's views of certain organisations and symbols of the state, they do not assess their deeper belief in the 'idea of the state' (that is, whether the state is considered the normal or natural arrangement of the political community).

Among the covariates in our 'perception of the government' regressions were individual and household factors, access and experience of services, experience of shocks and conflict, and civic participation. We outline below several hypotheses involving these factors.

i. ***Individual and household characteristics and contextual factors,*** **including gender, age, education level and livelihood status of the respondent, and household characteristics and contextual factors as discussed previously.**

   We are including a set of independent variables containing individual and household characteristics, as we know from the literature that the respondent's background influences perceptions of government (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid, 2005; Espinal, Hartlyn and Kelly, 2006). Previous studies have shown that men or women living in different locations have different perceptions of government (see the work by the Asia Foundation, Afrobarometer and Transparency International's 'Corruption Perception Index'). While the literature has shown that various factors matter in explaining perceptions of government, it is divided in terms of the nature of the impact. For instance, while we might expect wealthier households to have more positive perceptions of government, Espinal, Hartlyn and Kelly (2006) show a curvilinear effect between socioeconomic status and trust in government institutions for a number of Latin-American countries, with the poor and wealthy having the most positive perceptions of government. Other evidence has suggested that government corruption creates unfavourable conditions for business and investment, leading to lower perceptions of state legitimacy among the affluent (Rose-Ackerman, 2008). A recent study finds that, regardless of wealth, membership in a civil society organisation increases the propensity to take part in an anti-government protest (Boulding and Nelson-Núñez, 2014). Likewise, the literature is divided on the impact of gender with some showing women have more positive perceptions of government (see Lægreid, 1993, although not in the developing country context; and Ananth Pur and Moore, 2009, in India) and others finding the opposite effect or simply more ambivalence among women (Bratton, 2010; Logan and Bratton, 2006). Studies on sub-Saharan Africa have found that women are less likely to support democracy and to participate in politics, as a likely result of disenfranchisement in the home and wider society (Konte, 2014; Branisa et al., 2013). Hence, we will not make any a-priori assumption on the nature of the effect, but will hypothesise that gender and other individual-level characteristics shape perceptions.

ii. ***Shocks and crimes experienced by the households,*** **including natural disasters, economic shocks, as well as crime and conflict.**

   As we discussed earlier, the experience of (short-run) shocks and (long-run) stresses, can have sometimes profound effects on the capacities of people to make a living. We expect that these shocks and crimes experienced also directly influence perceptions of government. Victims of

Metropolitan Corporation and District Council. In all cases the central government referred to the national level government based in the capital city / seat of government.

crimes such as sexual and gender-based violence during conflict are less inclined to trust the state (Barnett, 2006). Economic shocks may also be drivers of state fragility (Vallings and Torres, 2005). In the absence of a strong central government citizens turn to informal local actors after experiencing shocks and crimes, having no expectation that the public sector will assist them or act in their best interest (Menkhaus, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2005). Confidence in government diminishes among individuals who experience a natural disaster (Arceneaux and Stein, 2006) particularly in fragile states lacking the infrastructure for disaster preparedness.

iii. ***Differential access to basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance.***

We expect that access to basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance positively affects perceptions of government. However, the quality of the services being provided or the experience in using or receiving services and social protection also affects perceptions of government. In particular, having a negative experience is likely to affect perceptions of government actors. A number of studies on the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan have found that access to the programme have improved perceptions of government at all levels (see for example Beath et al., 2012), despite the programme not being government funded. Other studies have shown that access to health services affects people's perceptions and levels of trust in their government (see, for example, Cockcroft et al., 2011 for evidence from Afghanistan and Rockers et al., 2012 for cross-country evidence). On the other hand, not having access may negatively influence perceptions. For instance Osofian's (2011) focus group discussions showed that the Social Safety Net programme in Sierra Leone was subject to elite capture, leading to negative impacts on citizens' perceptions of the government.

iv. ***Quality of and implementation of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance,*** **including satisfaction with the provision, regularity of the provision, who provides the service, number of staff etc.**

The experience and implementation of services, including satisfaction with the service, the waiting time, regularity and costs in accessing services and social protection are likely to determine how state government is perceived by individuals, in particular if the transfer is government provided. Recent research from Nepal shows that weak institutional capacity of the public sector and poor implementation practices (e.g. irregular and partial payments) undermine perceptions of local government (Adhikari et al., 2014). Coming to the question of who provides the service, it might be expected that perceptions of state government only improve for government-provided programmes. But this does not always seem to be the case: household survey data from the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan shows that, even where communities are fully aware of the international origins of the money and the facilitating roles of NGOs, they still give government credit for mobilising the assistance for their benefit (Barakat, 2009). Other studies also find positive impacts on perceptions of government of non-government provided services (see Babajanian et al., 2014; OECD, 2011). A study by Kruk et al. (2010) finds that equitable health care service provision can lead to higher levels of social cohesion and perceived goal alignment between individuals and the state in the context of post-conflict development. Using Afrobarometer data, Bratton (2012) illustrates that access to health and education are positively correlated with satisfaction with democracy, and that so too is satisfaction with the provision of social services. In his model, the positive effect of satisfaction with social services is even large enough to offset the negative effect of poverty on perception of state legitimacy.

According to proponents of the *legitimacy approach* to state-building, efficient public service provision helps to secure mass confidence in government institutions and trust in the political

system as a whole (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Klingemann, 1999). Participation in civil society is thought to be higher among citizens who regard state legitimacy either as very strong or very weak (a U-shaped relationship) (Seligson, 2002) and the direction of causality may be quite fluid. Finkel et al. (2000) also find mixed results regarding the link between civic engagement and trust in government in the Dominican Republic. We expect to see citizens who actively participate in community meetings and make use of feedback channels for government-provided services to hold stronger opinions on the legitimacy of government. On the other hand, exposure to corruption in the provision of public services, such as having to make informal payments for services, is associated with worse perceptions of state legitimacy (Seligson, 2002; Della Porta, 2000; Morris, 1991).

The aim of the quantitative analysis is to estimate if and how much the above factors – and in particular those relating to services – determine the main outcome (perceptions of government). We pay particular attention to how (dis)satisfaction with services, engagement in civil society and use of grievance mechanisms link to perceptions of government.

Box 3: Hypotheses on perceptions of the government

1. The gender and education level of respondents shape their perceptions of the government
2. Respondents living in households that have recently experienced conflict, who live in (perceived) unsafe locations, or who have recently experienced a shock or crime have worse perceptions of the government
3. Respondents living in households that have better access to basic services, social protection or livelihood assistance have more positive perceptions of the government
4. Respondents who have a more positive experience in accessing basic services, social protection or livelihood assistance have more positive perceptions of the government
5. Respondents who have access to grievance mechanisms (in the context of service provision) have more positive perceptions of the government
6. Respondents with higher levels of civic participation have more positive perceptions of the government

3 Research methodology

This section first covers parts of the survey design process, describing the research methodology, before clarifying the sampling methods used and explaining how comparisons will be made.

3.1 Research methodology

The design of the research methodology involved a number of stages. Of particular importance was a two-day workshop in June 2012, which was attended by selected individuals with particular experience and expertise in survey design and implementation, including staff from the Asia Foundation, FAO, the Igarape Institute in Brazil, as well as a number of internal SLRC partners (see SLRC, 2013). A number of design puzzles were discussed at the workshop, before the core ODI survey team developed the research and sampling methodologies and survey instrument further. The generic survey instrument was then tailored to specific country contexts (see more on this below) and tested in the field in each country. We then analysed the pilot data and revised the survey questionnaires accordingly. For more information about the survey development process, see SLRC (2015).

In terms of survey content, a generic questionnaire was developed that was then adjusted to meet the specific research priorities of the country teams and to fit the country context. We did not aim to generate a system of universalist rankings between countries. Instead, the survey was designed to allow us to identify some general trends and identify some similarities or differences between our countries. This means that we had a number of core modules (namely the access and experience of services modules) and some modules that were identical in all countries (notably the food security module) to allow comparability across the different country studies (see Section 3.3 below for a more detailed discussion on comparability). The following modules were included in all surveys: basic household and individual information; assets; livelihood sources and activities; food security; shocks; security shocks and justice services; basic services; social protection; livelihood services and government.

Panel surveys are particularly rare in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Part of the reason for this is they are at risk of attrition – that is, when households drop out of subsequent survey rounds – and it is assumed that because conflict often results in displacement, attrition is especially high in conflict-affected situations. As a result, we substantially increased the sample to account for possible attrition (see Section 3.2). The first round of the panel study was conducted in 2012 and the second round will be conducted in 2015-2016. Attrition may be non-random; that is, some individuals with specific characteristics are more likely to drop out of the survey. This is something we will test once we have collected the second round of data.

The SLRC survey incorporates elements of both a livelihoods and a perception survey, which raises a methodological issue: while the ideal unit of analysis for the livelihoods survey is at the household level, for the perception survey it is at the individual level. Nevertheless, after extensive discussion and consultation, the decision was reached to combine them in one survey, partly due to logistical and budget considerations, and partly in an active effort to link perceptions more directly to real and measurable changes in wellbeing. We opted to sample households, but to specifically seek out a varied range of individuals within households to avoid a strong bias of male household heads for the perception questions. Between 34% (Pakistan) and 63% (Uganda) of the respondents were female. The decision to combine the two surveys has a number of implications and limitations (see SLRC, 2015).

Fieldwork was conducted in 2012-2013 in the locations shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Information on fieldwork

Country	Fieldwork dates	Fieldwork locations
DRC	September-November 2012	South Kivu province
Nepal	September-October 2012	Bardiya, Ilam and Rolpa districts
Pakistan	September-October 2012	Swat and Lower Dir districts
Sri Lanka	September-October 2012	Jaffna, Mannar and Trincomalee districts
Uganda	January 2013	Acholi and Lango sub-regions

3.2 Sampling methods and description of sample

The sampling strategy was designed to select households that are relevant to the main research questions as well as being of national relevance, while also being able to produce statistically significant conclusions at the study and village level. We met these objectives by *combining* purposive and random sampling at different stages of the sampling strategy. The first stages of the sampling process involved purposive sampling, with random sampling only utilised in the last stage of the process. We selected sampling locations purposely (including districts and locations within districts) and then *randomly* selecting households within these locations. While this means that we have a rigorous sample that is geared towards meeting the objectives of the research, the samples are not representative for the case study countries and we cannot draw generalisations for the case countries as a whole, nor for districts. The samples are only representative at the village level.[5]

Sampling locations (sub-regions or districts, sub-districts and villages) were purposively selected, using criteria, such as levels of service provision or levels of conflict, in order to locate the specific groups of interest and to select geographical locations that are relevant to the broader SLRC research areas and of policy relevance at the national level. For instance, we selected locations that experienced high/low levels of conflict and locations with high/low provision of services and tried to include locations that accounted for all possible combinations of selection criteria. We selected survey locations with different characteristics so that we could explore the relevance of conflict affectedness, access to services and variations in geography and livelihoods on our outcome variables. Depending on the administrative structure of the country, this process involved selecting a succession of sampling locations (at increasingly lower administrative units).[6] The specific criteria used in the five countries are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Criteria used to select fieldwork locations

Country	Selection criteria
DRC	Variations in livelihoods / differential access to basic services / different ethnic groups Located in different chiefdoms (*chefferie*) and preferably cover more than one territory There was a focus on rural areas Located at different distances from Bukavu Security considerations
Nepal	Levels of conflict-affectedness Levels of service provision Levels of accessibility Covering different castes and ethnicities
Pakistan	Conflict affectedness and displacement of people during conflict Interventions for rehabilitation of displaced and returnees
Sri Lanka	Concentration of resettled households Concentration of fisher households Accessibility/security considerations

[5] With the exception of Uganda, where the sample is also representative at the sub-region level.
[6] For instance, in Nepal we first selected districts, then Village Development Committees within those districts.

Uganda	Level of war affectedness Levels of service provision

Geographical coverage varied considerably across countries. For example in Nepal and Sri Lanka the survey covered three districts, whereas in Uganda it covered two sub-regions (totalling 15 districts), to ensure greater policy relevance. In DRC, on the other hand, there was no demand for a broader dataset and due to the great geographical, socio-demographic and cultural differences in the two originally selected districts (South Kivu and Equator) any comparison between them would have been difficult and of limited value, hence a decision was made to focus on South Kivu only. The number of research locations varied considerably across countries (see Table 3), depending on the country-specific sampling decisions.[7]

The survey did not attempt to achieve representativeness at the country or district level, but we did aim for representativeness at the sub-district or village level through random sampling (see Table 5 for the level of representativeness per country). Households were randomly selected within villages so that the results are representative and statistically significant at the village level and so that a varied sample was captured. Households were randomly selected using a number of different tools, depending on data availability, such as random selection from vote registers (Nepal), construction of household listings (DRC) and a quasi-random household process that involved walking in a random direction for a random number of minutes (Uganda).

The samples are statistically significant at the survey level and village level (in all countries) and at the district level in Sri Lanka and sub-region level in Uganda. The sample size was calculated to achieve statistical significance at the study and village level, to accommodate the available budget, logistical limitations, and to account for possible attrition between 2012-2015. In a number of countries estimated population data had to be used as recent population data were not available (see SLRC (2013).

The minimum overall sample size required to achieve significance at the study level, given population and average household size across districts, was calculated using a basic sample size calculator at a 95% confidence level and confidence interval of 5. The sample size at the village level was again calculated at the using a 95% confidence level and confidence interval of 5.[8] Finally, the sample was increased by 20% to account for possible attrition between 2012 and 2015, so that the sample size in 2015 is likely to be still statistically significant.

The overall sample required to achieve the sampling objectives in selected districts in each country ranged from 1,259 to 3,175 households. The required sample sizes were achieved in all countries. Response rates were extremely high, as shown in Table 5 (along with some other information on the samples).

Table 5: Description of the samples

Country	Sample size (# of households)	Number of villages	Level of representativeness	Response rate	Share of female respondents
DRC	1,259	9	Groupement & chefferie level	98.73%	57%
Nepal	3,175	24	Ward level	99.94%	56%
Pakistan	2,114	22	Union council level	100%	34%
Sri Lanka	1,377	12	GN division & district level	100%	62%
Uganda	1,844	90	Village & sub-region level	99.94%	63%

[7] The country level sampling processes are discussed in more detail in the country baseline reports, which can be downloaded from www.securelivelihoods.org/content/2261/SLRC-Survey.

[8] With the exception of Uganda, where a somewhat different sampling approach – Population Proportional to Size – was followed, resulting in smaller clusters per village with higher confidence intervals, but being a representative sample at the sub-regional level (see Mazurana et al., 2014).

As discussed in Section 3.1, in order to ensure a varied sample for the perceptions questions, we wanted to avoid interviewing only the heads of households. Instead we aimed to interview varying demographic groups within household. While not strictly part of the sampling (as our sampling unit of analysis is the household), this did have implications for the fieldwork. In all countries we aimed for a particular share of the sample to be female. This share was based on the pilot and hence took account of local cultural sensitivities. The share ranged from 34% in Pakistan to over 60% in two countries, and this share was achieved or exceeded in all countries (see Table 5 for the shares and SLRC (2015) for a discussion of the difficulties of reaching respondents of a particular sex). The share of female participants was monitored throughout the fieldwork and if the share of female participants dropped too low, enumerators were instructed to specifically request female participants the following day. The analyses were not weighted by gender, but we did account for the gender of the respondent, wherever possible.

3.3 Survey comparisons

As discussed in Section 3.1 above, the surveys contained a mix of questions common to all countries (around 80% of the survey instrument) — albeit tailored to make sense in the specific country context — and country-specific questions. Additional modules were added for some countries to address specific research areas of interest. For example, a module on fisheries was added to the Sri Lanka instrument and a detailed module on serious crimes experienced by household members to the Uganda instrument. Further, some questions had to be cut or changed in some countries because they were culturally inappropriate (for example, some questions on specific shocks experienced by households were dropped from the Sri Lanka instrument).

The survey design was informed by the need to produce comparative findings across countries. While we were very clear that we wanted some degree of comparability, non-nationally representative surveys and completely different settings meant that direct comparisons or producing aggregates across countries did not make much sense. Hence, we did not aim to aggregate the data (and make comparisons between, for example, women and men across all countries), nor achieve a uniformity of indicators and values across all countries.

Context is too much of an overriding factor to allow us to aggregate and make such direct comparisons. We instead attempted to design a survey that would allow us to identify some general trends and identify some similarities or differences (with appropriate caveats) between our countries. As a hypothetical example, Figure 1, below, highlights the kind of comparisons we would like to make and the kind to avoid.

Figure 1: SLRC survey comparisons across countries: A hypothetical example of monthly income data



In order to be able to draw comparable findings on the analytical frameworks and hypotheses described in Section 2, very similar regressions were run for all countries. The regression tables are listed in Annex 1.

With regard to the coping strategies / food insecurity index, even though the index was measured in exactly the same way in all countries, we do not compare average scores across countries, as the survey was conducted in different seasons. Instead we will be comparing the factors that correlate with changes in the food insecurity index. The Morris Index is also not comparable between countries because, though it includes all productive, household and livestock assets, these are different across countries and some assets with very low levels of ownership were excluded in some countries in order not to skew the findings.

3.4 Econometric analysis

The analysis this study is based on uses standard regression techniques, described below. As is customary for studies drawing on regression analyses, we outline a number of limitations associated with the econometric analysis. These caveats are standard and common to many econometric studies. We also explain how we have mitigated any limitations.

In order to identify factors which appear to (partially) determine outcomes of various kinds – for example, food security or perceptions of formal state actors – and compare them across countries, it was necessary for SLRC researchers to carry out standardised regression analyses of the survey data. If the analysis were being carried out solely at the country level, what would ordinarily happen is that each country team would make their own decisions – based on theory, existing knowledge and context – about which dependent and independent variables to include in each of their regressions and which specific regression methods to use. In an attempt to generate findings which would usefully tell us something about patterns or discrepancies across countries, it was originally decided that each country team would include a standardised list of independent variables in each of their regressions and use the same regression techniques; this would then enable the global survey team to produce a synthesis based on similar looking analyses at the country level. This list of independent variables is based on the analytical frameworks outlined above.

The nature of the dependent variable determined the type of regression run: for continuous variables, such as the Morris Index or distance to health centre, we use an OLS regression model; for binary

variables, such as receiving or not receiving a social protection transfer, we used a logit regression model; and for categorical variables, such as perception of government, we used a multinomial logit model. A multinomial model was chosen rather than an ordered logit because although there can be said to be an inherent order to an outcome variable where, say, 'Dissatisfied' equals 1, 'Neutral' equals 2, and 'Satisfied' equals 3, these evenly-spaced values do not correspond to evenly-spaced, hierarchical unit. In particular, having a 'neutral' or 'sometimes' category is problematic for ordered logits since the interpretation necessitates there being higher and lower categories. Neutrality may simply reflect apathy rather than, for example, a 'higher' or better view of a service than that of a respondent who claims to be 'dissatisfied'.

Categorical independent variables were included as dummy variables. Questions only addressed to sub-groups within the population were not included in the main regression. For instance, while we are interested in the relationship between experience of education services and perceptions of government, we could not include this variable in our main regression, as this would reduce the regression to households with school-age children. Therefore we did not include any of the education variables in the main regression and instead ran a separate regression for the parents of school-age children sub-group.

In the tests on access to education (distance to school) and satisfaction with education service, we decided to aggregate girls and boys schooling into the same regression. Therefore in the regression on distance to school, for example, the independent variable is the average (mean) distance to school for boys and girls in the household. Given that the regression controls for factors relating to girls' and boys' schooling this means that this regression, and the regression on satisfaction with education, are run only for households in which boys and girls attend school. In the regressions where we looked at satisfaction with social protection and livelihoods, our dependent variable was one type of social protection/ livelihoods assistance transfer. These are formatted red in Tables 21 and Tables 22 in the Annex.

Independent variables were included relating to household factors, context, shocks, access to services, and experience of services (where relevant). Under the category of household factors the regressions controlled for the gender of the household head, average age within the household, education level of adult members, whether the household contained a migrant, remittance receipt, displacement history, and dependency ratio (the ratio of non-working age to working age household members), ethnicity (ethnicity was not used in one country) and religion (religion was not used in four countries). There was considerable variation in precisely how these variables were constructed, depending on the country context. For example: in the case of education level, in Nepal, Pakistan and the DRC the average education of adult household members was used; in Sri Lanka the share of adults completing primary education was used; and in Uganda the education level of the household head was used as a categorical variable.

Under the category of contextual factors the control variables included urban/rural context, experience of conflict in the last three years, access to credit (used only in a few cases), experience of shocks and crimes, perception of safety, and location. Again there was variation between how these indicators were constructed in each country case. In Nepal and Uganda the safety variable referred to perception of safety within the neighbourhood; in the case of Pakistan it referred to safety when moving from place to place; in the DRC both safety at home and in the neighbourhood were included; and in Sri Lanka an aggregate measurement of overall safety was used. We also included locational dummies (e.g. for district) to control for differences in locations (e.g. climate, accessibility). Where variation in terms of conflict varies by location, these location dummies may also pick up on the experience of conflict.

In the access to and experience of services categories the regression generally controlled for the provider of a particular service, satisfaction with particular elements of the service, and formal and informal costs associated with the service. In the regressions on perception of local and central government responsiveness the regressions also controlled for the responsiveness and accountability

of service providers and for participation in community decision-making processes. These controls were also used in certain other regressions and again differed between countries as to exactly which indicators were used.

Following a cross-country approach, however, creates a trade-off. For instance, including a long list of comparable independent variables means including certain variables that for some countries may be less relevant or even collinear.[9] As such, we have tested for multicollinearity in all regressions and have re-specified those which were affected by this problem – at the expense of losing some cross-country comparability. This explains some of the differences in variable specification discussed above.

Other reasons why the results are not completely comparable across countries include: low numbers of responses for some questions or variables, and low levels of variation between responses for some questions and variables. When either situation arose, such variables were not included in the regression analysis. Some dependent variables also had to be redefined in some of the datasets as variation or observations were so low that the originally defined model could not be run. For instance, for some of the countries more than 90% of respondents stated that they never agree with decisions made by the government, making it impossible to run a multinomial logit model owing to lack of variation. In these cases, dependent variables were redefined as a categorical variable with fewer options or as binary variables.

Finally, we would note that there is uncertainty regarding directions of causality as this is the baseline and we are not yet utilising longitudinal data. For example, although we might find significant relationships between variables, we cannot be sure in many cases that it is the dependent variable that is affecting the dependent variable rather than vice versa. Whenever we are unsure of the direction of causality, we note this and hypothesise about possible explanations for the findings. Furthermore, in some cases a third set of factors could explain both outcomes. Again, we will note this whenever we suspect it to be the case.

Box 4: Gender and intersectionality

In this box we briefly outline how gender features in this report. While we recognise the importance of the analysis of gender and other identity characteristics (e.g. ethnicity), we do not focus specifically on them in this report – they will be the focus of the gender synthesis (SLRC, upcoming). There we will also delve into intersectionality issues. However, variables to account for gender and identity characteristics have been included throughout the regressions, for instance gender of the respondent or gender of the household head. The latter has been a challenge at times, as we did not include gender of the head in most of the questionnaires due to measurement and definition difficulties. Instead we used proxies for the gender of the head in the analysis – for instance defining single-parent households with one female adult as female-headed households. On the whole, gender and other identity characteristics were not significant in the regression analysis (for a more detailed discussion see SLRC, forthcoming).

[9] A scenario when two independent or explanatory variables share a strong linear relationship, which biases the results.

4 Which factors influence people's livelihoods and wellbeing?

This section summarises and synthesises the analyses performed to answer the research question: 'which factors influence people's livelihoods and wellbeing?' More specifically, we return to our original hypotheses (Box 1 in Section 2.3.1), drawing on the cross-country findings to investigate the validity of each hypothesis in turn. For the comparative analysis, we have focused on two indexes: the food insecurity index and an asset index (Morris Score Index) (see Section 2.3.1). Additional country-specific analyses also looked at livelihood activities and income sources.

This section is split into three parts. The first provides some basic descriptive statistics from each country in order to illustrate key livelihood characteristics of our sample populations within each country. The second part draws on regression findings from across the country studies to answer whether the hypotheses presented in Box 1 (in Section 2.3.1) hold true. The third part discusses the findings in a more narrative-based way.

4.1 A description of livelihood activities of the sampled populations

This section summarises the key findings on livelihood activities from the country reports,[10] making comparisons across countries using descriptive statistics. The focus is on understanding what livelihood activities households participate in. We then move on to the determinants of wellbeing outcomes in the next section.

Figures 5-9 show which livelihood activities are the main income source of sampled households. The importance of subsistence agriculture in people's livelihoods in immediately apparent. With the exception of Pakistan, subsistence agriculture is the most frequent main income source for the case study countries. Figure 2 shows that subsistence agriculture is the most important income source for as few as 16% of households (Pakistan) to as many as 83% of households (Uganda). These findings are consistent with other studies, which highlight the importance of subsistence agriculture in the case study countries (see Steimann, 2005 for Pakistan; NPC, 2011 for Nepal; McDonagh et al., 2005 for Uganda; Weijs et al., 2012 for DRC, and Fernando and Moonesinghe, 2013 for Sri Lanka).

Figure 2: Households receiving main income from subsistence farming, by country



[10] For more detailed country findings, the reader should consult the country reports, as listed in the reference list.

Subsistence agriculture is the only livelihood activity where we find consistent patterns across all countries. Other primary income sources include:

- Remittances. These play an important role in two of the Asian countries: they are the most important income source for 10% of households in Nepal and 31% of households in Pakistan. Previous research also highlights the growing importance of migration as a livelihood study in these countries (see Steimann, 2005 and CBS and NPCS, 2012).[11]
- Casual labour. This is the most common income source for 11% of households in DRC, 16% of households in Nepal, 23% of households in Pakistan and as many as 37% of households in Sri Lanka – making it the biggest income source in the Sri Lanka sample.
- Petty trade or having your own business is found mostly in Sri Lanka (14% of households) and DRC (7%).

It has been argued that diversification (of income sources) can help households reduce vulnerability to shocks (Ellis, 1998; 2008) but how diversified are the livelihood activities of households in our survey samples? In general, diversification is low, with households having just over two income sources on average (Figure 3). There is limited variation by country with somewhat higher diversification levels in Uganda. Nearly half (47%) of sampled households in Sri Lanka and more than a third (37%) of households in Pakistan had only one income source. However, the remainder of households in our survey samples have more than one income source (Figure 4).

Figure 3: Mean number of income sources per household, by country



Figure 4: Percentage of households with only one income source, out of all households with any income sources, by country.



[11] Further SLRC research conducted in 2013/2014 set out to describe and explain, using mixed methods research, the multi-dimensional process of international labour migration from two post-conflict contexts – Rolpa, Nepal and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan. It has shown that despite the huge financial (and sometimes physical) costs involved, international labour migration is seen as a viable and obvious livelihoods option for those in our case study areas, largely due to the perceived scarcity of other opportunities (see Hagen-Zanker et al., 2014).

The next section focuses on regression analysis through which we examine the determinants of wellbeing.

Figure 5: Main source of household income, DRC (% of households)



Figure 6: Main source of household income, Sri Lanka (% of households)



Figure 7: Main source of household income, Nepal (% of households)



Figure 8: Main source of household income, Uganda (% of households)



Figure 9: Main source of household income, Pakistan (% of households)



4.2 Examining the wellbeing hypotheses

We are interested here in what kinds of variables are associated with better or worse wellbeing outcomes. There are a number of things we might expect to be influential, from various household characteristics – education levels, for example – to certain contextual features, such as (perceived) levels of safety in the local environment. In Section 2.3.1, we outlined a set of six wellbeing hypotheses (Box 1). These hypotheses contained statements regarding the kinds of relationships we would expect to see between wellbeing outcomes and a range of independent variables. In this section, we draw on findings from country-level regression analysis to examine the validity of our hypotheses. We do so by looking across a set of regression tables in an attempt to identify patterns and consistencies (see Annex 1). In the third and final part of this section, we discuss what these findings tell us about livelihoods and wellbeing in conflict-affected places more generally.

Hypothesis 1: Households with more highly educated members have better wellbeing outcomes

In all countries we find that an increase in the average education level of adult household members is strongly associated with greater asset ownership (as indicated by higher MSI values), and this finding is statistically significant.[12] This positive relationship is also found when it comes to food security outcomes: in four countries (DRC being the exception), greater levels of adult educational attainment are associated with lower levels of household food insecurity). In the case of Uganda we control for the education level of the household head (rather than the average in the household) and find that households with a tertiary-educated household head are expected to have by far the highest MSI value and the lowest food insecurity, holding other factors constant. In the case of DRC, it is worth mentioning that, whilst not statistically significant, we still find a positive relationship between education levels and food security. Thus, across both wellbeing outcomes – asset ownership and food security – **there is strong and consistent evidence pointing to the important role of educational attainment within our different countries'** sample populations. Of course, we must also acknowledge the possibility of reverse causality: this might instead be evidence that better off households are likely to be better educated – for example because they are more able to send their members to school for longer.

Hypothesis 2: Households that are or have been displaced at some point have worse wellbeing outcomes

Regression findings suggest that being or having been displaced at some point are not statistically significant in explaining variations in either asset ownership or food insecurity. Only in the case of DRC did we find any sort of clear relationship: households in the South Kivu sample population who had been displaced were both more likely to be poorer (lower levels of asset ownership) and more food insecure, and displacement seems to have a fairly strong link with both outcomes.

Generally speaking, however, **displacement status does not appear to be particularly influential in determining these particular wellbeing outcomes**. This is surprising and we think it can be explained in two ways. The first is that we are not, in some countries (Sri Lanka and Pakistan are the exceptions), able to accurately record the timing of displacement, so it is possible that many other variables have influenced people's livelihoods and wellbeing since displacement took place that create noise in our analysis. Second, there is some variation in how displacement was defined in the different countries. In the DRC and Pakistan we use a variable indicating whether the household has been displaced due to conflict (in the Pakistan case this refers to the specific conflict between 2007 and 2009). In Sri Lanka and Uganda we use a variable indicating whether the household has ever been displaced (regardless of

[12] The decision on which education indicator to include in the regressions was made independently by each partner at the analysis stage, as a result of which the 'average education of household members' variable measures something different in each country sub-sample. In DRC and Pakistan the variable used is mean years of education among adult household members; in Nepal it is the median years of education of adult household members; in Sri Lanka it is the share of adults in the household who have completed primary education; and in Uganda it is the education level of the respondent, in ordinal categories, where the reference category is 'no education'.

reason for displacement). In Nepal we use a variable indicating if the household has ever lived in a different village and followed up with questions about why people moved. (We found the majority of movements were at marriage, rather than for conflict). In Pakistan and Sri Lanka, more than 90% of the sample had been displaced, and in Uganda and Nepal this figure was approaching two-thirds.

Hypothesis 3: Households that have recently experienced conflict or are living in (perceived) unsafe locations have worse wellbeing outcomes

We find little evidence of a relationship between experiences of conflict (in the last three years) and either asset ownership or food insecurity. Statistical associations are non-significant in all cases apart from DRC, where we observe a series of negative associations: a household which has experienced conflict recently is both more likely to own fewer assets and more likely to be food insecure. This result, however, does not mean that we should bring to an end the discussion of how exposure to conflict affects wellbeing and livelihoods. Our survey instrument only asked respondents to recall experience of conflict over a three-year period which did not, in some cases, capture the period in which the country's last major conflict occurred (for example, in Nepal). The three-year recall period, although limiting to our analysis at this stage, was chosen with the second panel wave in mind when three years will have passed since the first round. In the Uganda survey, where we did collect information on long-term exposure to serious crimes (that household members experienced during the conflict), we do find that experiences of serious crimes are associated with lower wealth and worse food insecurity (Mazurana et al., 2014).[13]

On the relationship between wellbeing outcomes and local safety (as proxied by perception-based questions), the picture appears highly mixed. In one case for the Morris Score Index outcome and in two cases for the food security outcome, we find that our safety variables (perceived safety in community; perceived safety when moving around outside) are not significant at all. In others, however, we observe inconsistent associations. For example, respondents in our Pakistan sample population who feel safe when moving around are much more likely to live in poorer households (as measured by asset ownership), while Sri Lankan respondents who feel safe are more likely to live in better-off households. In Uganda, respondents who feel safe in their community are more likely to live in both poorer and more food-insecure households, while respondents in DRC who similarly feel safe in their community are more likely to live in better-off but more food-insecure households. In short, the **regression results are highly inconsistent**, suggesting, at the very least, a non-linear relationship between (perceived) safety and wellbeing outcomes, and one that is very much dependent on the nature of conflict and specific contextual features.

Hypothesis 4: Households that have recently experienced a greater number of shocks and crimes have worse wellbeing outcomes

According to the regression results, there are few consistent patterns regarding the relationship between the number of shocks and crimes experienced and wellbeing outcomes. The survey asked about the household's experience during the last three years of a long list of shocks and crimes, including health shocks, environmental disasters, economic and livelihood shocks, and crimes (for a full list see Annex 2, Table 23). The three-year recall period was chosen for the reasons outlined in the previous sub-section (Hypothesis 3). On asset ownership, we find that in two countries a household experiencing a greater number of shocks in the last three years is more likely to be better off (Pakistan, Uganda). However, this relationship is reversed in Sri Lanka, where households experiencing a greater number of shocks are more likely to be worse off. In two countries we find a positive and statistically significant association between the number of crimes experienced in the last three years and levels of asset ownership (Pakistan, Sri Lanka). The influence of shocks/crimes on asset ownership therefore

[13] Serious crimes include those committed by parties to the conflict that are considered as such under international humanitarian and human rights law.

appears quite unclear; if anything, our evidence suggests that exposure to a greater number of shocks/crimes may in some cases by linked to greater levels of asset ownership. This counter-intuitive result could be a consequence of wealthier households being more likely to be targeted by criminals – so the causality could be the other way. The second wave of the survey may allow us to uncover the processes behind some of these ambiguous results.

The story is slightly clearer when we look at food insecurity. In three of our five countries, we find that the greater the number of shocks experienced, the more food insecure a household is likely to be (DRC, Pakistan, Sri Lanka). With the exception of Pakistan, we observe a similar pattern vis-a-vis the experience of crimes over the last three years (in Uganda, this is only true for households experiencing *serious crimes*; the experience of other crimes appears to be associated with the opposite effect). We find over all in this baseline synthesis that **the experience of shocks and crimes seems to be associated with greater food insecurity** (and – to a lesser extent – with greater asset ownership).

Hypothesis 5: Households with worse access to basic services have worse wellbeing outcomes

On the basis of our regression findings, it is neither possible to accept nor reject this hypothesis. The overall picture is very mixed. In some cases we observe associations between worse access (proxied by distance in minutes to a service – see Section 2.3.2 for a discussion on the choice of proxy) and better wellbeing outcomes: for example, in Nepal a longer travel time to the health clinic is associated with marginally greater levels of asset ownership, while in Pakistan the same independent variable is associated with marginally lower levels of food insecurity. But in other cases we observe the reverse: in both DRC and Uganda a longer travel time to water points is associated with lower levels of asset ownership; in Nepal a longer travel time to the health clinic is associated with higher levels of food insecurity; and in Sri Lanka a longer travel time to water points is associated with higher levels of food insecurity. For most variables in this category, however, there does not appear to be a relationship of any kind. Thus, with the possible exception of distance to water points (which is, in some cases, positively related to both lower asset ownership and greater food insecurity), **there does not seem to be any clear association** between access to services and these particular wellbeing outcomes.

Hypothesis 6: Households with better access to social protection and/or livelihood assistance have better wellbeing outcomes

We also wanted to know whether households with better access to social protection and/or livelihood assistance have better wellbeing outcomes. We find, in fact, that receipt of social protection and receipt of livelihood assistance have different associations with wellbeing outcomes. In terms of social protection, we asked households about receipt of the most common social protection transfers – such as the Samurdhi cash transfer in Sri Lanka, to give just one example (see Annex 2, Table 21 for a list of the transfers included in these variables in each country). Where it is statistically significant, receipt of social protection tends to be associated with *worse* outcomes: in Sri Lanka, access to social protection is associated with lower levels of asset ownership and in Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka it is associated with higher levels of food insecurity. The one opposite relationship here is that asset ownership in Nepal is positively linked with receipt of social protection. Of course, this does not necessarily mean these transfers make households worse off, but instead could be an indication of targeting (more on this below).

Livelihood assistance was again tailored to country context and included agricultural support, e.g. seeds and asset transfers, but also livelihood-specific training and other livelihood assistance (see Annex 2, Table 22 for a list of the transfers included in these variables in each country). Receipt of livelihood assistance is consistently associated with *better* wellbeing outcomes. In every country, we find that households receiving livelihood assistance are likely to be better off in terms of asset ownership. Results are less consistent when looking at food insecurity outcomes: only two countries exhibit a statistically significant relationship (Pakistan, Uganda), but in both cases receipt of livelihood assistance

is associated with lower levels of household food insecurity. It seems quite clear, therefore, that **while receipt of social protection is associated with worse wellbeing outcomes, the opposite is true for receipt of livelihood assistance.**

4.3 What do these findings tell us about livelihoods and wellbeing in conflict-affected places?

What can the SLRC baseline data tell us about what shapes livelihoods and wellbeing in conflict-affected places? While there is a large literature on the determinants of livelihoods and wellbeing in developing countries, far less focuses on conflict-affected places, or looks specifically at the role of conflict.[14] The analysis in this study allows us to make a further contribution to this question. Drawing on the results of cross-country, comparable regressions, we can draw five key findings from the baseline analyses.

First, the findings point to the importance of education in making a living: **households with a higher average level of education[15] consistently have better wellbeing outcomes** in terms of both proxy indicators (household wealth and food insecurity). In other words, the more highly educated the head, the wealthier and less food insecure the household. This is of concern, as it may mean that poorly educated households do not have the education levels necessary to improve their wealth and food security. Findings from some of the country baseline reports suggest that this trend does not look likely to be reversed any time soon. For instance, in Uganda current primary education graduation rates in northern Uganda are at 47%, and access to secondary school in northern Uganda is as low as 15% in the villages (Mazurana et al., 2014).

In the analyses we explicitly examined the role of conflict in determining people's wellbeing, looking at exposure to fighting in the past three years, perceived safety in and around the community, and past or current displacement. We find **little evidence of displacement and conflict affecting wellbeing outcomes** (with the exception of DRC), and inconsistent findings on the relationship with perceived safety. In other words, within our sample populations, recent experiences of conflict does not seem to matter as much as other factors in shaping wellbeing of households in the sampled areas. Given the short (three-year) recall period these regression models may be missing some longer-term effects of conflict which may emerge in the second wave of data analysis. The Uganda data have already shown that experience of serious crimes does have some long-term effects on household's wellbeing and livelihoods (the Uganda survey was tailored to measure the lasting impact of crimes experienced during the conflict which makes it more reasonable to infer causality) (Mazurana et al., 2014). Nevertheless, these findings are forcing us to re-examine the ways in which we carry out SLRC research and to consider how far we are guilty of 'conflict exceptionalism' – that is, explaining everything we find through the lens of conflict, or failing to recognise the other factors and features that are driving change in people's livelihoods and wellbeing just as much as conflict or fragility.

Our third finding is closely related to the second. Generally speaking, households that have experienced a greater number of crimes and shocks are also likely to have worse food insecurity. However, we do not find a clear relationship between shocks or crimes and wealth. These findings on food insecurity are broadly consistent with studies from developing yet largely stable countries (Skoufias, 2003, reviews some studies linking environmental shocks and food insecurity; see Yamano et al., 2003, and Dercon et al., 2005, for Ethiopian examples; see Van den Berg, 2009, on Nicaragua; see Hoddinott, 2006, on Zimbabwe). What is important is that our findings demonstrate that similar effects of shocks can be found in conflict-affected places. Again, these findings reinforce the idea that it is not all about conflict: **households living in conflict-affected places face a wide range of risks and vulnerabilities – not just**

[14] A notable exception is the Households in Conflict Network: www.hicn.org.
[15] See previous footnote on the measurement of education in the regressions.

those associated with violence and conflict – and these appear to affect people's wellbeing just as much as conflict and violence.

Fourth, on the whole**, there is no consistent relationship between access to basic services and wellbeing outcomes**. While better access to water services does seem to have a reliably positive association with wellbeing outcomes, neither access to health nor education has a consistent and statistically significant link. This is somewhat surprising, since we might expect that better access to health or education services would improve wellbeing outcomes in the medium to long run (indirectly, through enhancing human capital). Given that we are looking only at a cross-section here, one explanation might be that wealthier households can afford to live nearer, and choose to live nearer, to these services. Another possible explanation could relate to the nature of our proxy indicators for access to services. Alternatively – or additionally – it could plausibly be the case that it is the quality of services that matters rather than access in a rudimentary sense (as research from Sierra Leone suggests (Sacks and Larizza, 2012). These issues should be explored through further research.

Finally, we examined whether households with better access to social protection and/or livelihood assistance are also more likely to have better wellbeing outcomes. In the first instance, our findings look inconsistent: receipt of social protection tends to be associated with worse wellbeing outcomes. However, rather than showing that social protection transfers are making households worse off, causality may actually be the other way round. Many of the social protection transfers received by beneficiary households are targeted at poor or vulnerable households (for example food aid). Hence, **these findings appear to suggest that social protection is well-targeted**, but at this stage of the analysis we cannot disentangle causality. For livelihood assistance, we are less sure about success of targeting. Here we see a positive correlation with wellbeing outcomes. This suggests two possibilities: livelihood assistance is targeted at viable households that already own some assets (tools, land etc.) in order to increase effectiveness; or alternatively it is intended for poorer households but captured by elites. As the baseline data is only based on one wave and we are looking at a whole range of different interventions, we cannot say which of these more likely. We may be able to explore this issue further using longitudinal data after the second wave and also in ongoing qualitative research. For example, in Uganda, the SLRC team is using qualitative methods to follow up on survey respondents and attempt to understand what has enabled some households to be more successful than others in improving their livelihoods and wellbeing.

5 Which factors influence people's access to and experience of services, social protection and livelihood assistance?

This section summarises and synthesises the analyses performed to answer two research questions:

- Which factors influence access to basic services, social protection transfers and livelihood assistance?
- Which factors influence experience of basic services, social protection transfers and livelihood assistance?

More specifically, we return to the original hypotheses presented in Box 2 in Section 2.3.2, drawing on the cross-country findings to investigate the validity of each hypothesis in turn. For the comparative analysis, we have focused on the regression findings from ten sets of regressions: five measuring the determinants of access to health, education and water services, social protection and livelihood assistance and another five measuring the determinants of the experience of these services or transfers.

We measure access to services in terms of distance in minutes to the closest service provider last used (for health, education and water) and for social protection and livelihood assistance access is defined as someone in the household having received any social protection transfer or livelihood assistance in the past year (12 months).

Experience is based on a range of perceptions question asked to respondents. For health and education, experience is measured in terms of overall satisfaction with the service provided on a scale of 1-5, for water, if clean water is being provided, and for social protection and livelihood assistance in terms of the perceived impact of the transfer (see Section 2.3.2 for a detailed explanation). We have structured and phrased these questions so that these subjective assessments of satisfaction are based on actual experiences with the (service) provider, rather than general perceptions. The independent variables for these analyses are set out in the analytical framework in Section 2.3.2.

This section is split into three parts. The first provides some basic descriptive statistics from each country in order to illustrate key trends of access to and experiences of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance of our sample populations within each country. The second part draws on regression findings from across the country studies to assess whether the hypotheses hold true. The third part discusses the findings in a more narrative-based way.

5.1 Overview of access to and experiences with services, social protection and livelihood assistance

Before delving into the regression findings, we give an overview of some of the key trends of access to and experiences of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance using cross-country descriptive statistics.

Figures 10-12 show access to basic services in terms of our proxy indicator, distance travelled in minutes. This indicator is interpreted as follows: the shorter the travel distance, the better access to the services. As the figures show, o**n the whole, access to basic services is high**, with consistently better access in the three Asian countries and the lowest levels of access in the Uganda sample population.

Access to social protection and livelihood assistance is measured in terms of someone in the household receiving a social protection transfer and/or livelihood assistance. The **majority of households in our sample populations do not receive social protection and livelihood assistance**. Coverage was highest in

Nepal (38%) and lowest in Uganda (4%). Much of this coverage is accounted for by large-scale programmes, although this is not always the case. For example, while 21% of households in the Pakistan sample received the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) cash transfer, in DRC and Uganda a large proportion of transfers were one-off forms of assistance from humanitarian agencies or NGOs. In Uganda, for example, one-third of support received was a one-off transfer (Mazurana et al., 2014). Access to livelihood assistance is ranges from between 15 and 16% of households in DRC, Nepal and Uganda to 32% in Sri Lanka. Seeds and tools are the most frequently form of assistance received across all the countries, with as many as 12% of households in Pakistan receiving such a transfer (see Table 21 in Annex 2 for a breakdown of individual transfer coverage in each country sample).

Figures 14-15 show respondents satisfaction with basic services, livelihood assistance and social protection. It is apparent that satisfaction with basic services is high. More than 57% of respondents are satisfied or very satisfied with the health services provided and satisfaction is consistency high across the countries with the exception of Uganda. With regard to primary schools, we see even higher levels of satisfaction, with 63% of respondents being satisfied or very satisfied, with respondents in the Uganda and DRC sample having lower satisfaction levels. Satisfaction with water, using perception of water quality as a proxy, is also high, again somewhat lower in DRC and Uganda. However, this is a cross-sectional dataset, so the strikingly high satisfaction levels do not tell us much unless we put them into a wider or longitudinal context. What we could be seeing is high satisfaction as a result of services improving (perhaps even only marginally) compared to periods of conflict. With the second round of the panel completed we will be able to identify individuals who changed their perceptions over time and determine which other variables might be responsible. We will also be able to qualify our observation that population average levels of satisfaction are high by comparing their level in the next time period.

The proportions of respondents perceiving that social protection and livelihood assistance had positive impacts are lower, but still fairly high. On average, 64% of respondents perceive that livelihood assistance has had a positive impact, ranging from 43% of respondents in Pakistan to 85% of respondents in Nepal. Between 60% and 66% of respondents perceive that social protection has had a positive impact. There is one major exception, however: only 21% of respondents in the Sri Lanka sample perceived that social protection has had a positive impact. It is not clear why this is the case and it may be linked to the sample of the study (see Mayadunne et al., 2014).

The next section focuses on regression analysis and we examine what the determinants of access to and experiences of basic services, livelihood assistance and social protection are.

Figure 10: Distance to health clinic used (measured by time taken for a return journey), by country



Figure 11: Distance to primary school used (measured by time taken for a return journey), by country



Figure 12: Distance to water source used, (measured by time taken for a return journey), by country



Figure 13: Households receiving social protection and livelihood assistance, by country



Figure 14: Overall satisfaction with health facility used (% of respondents)



Figure 15: Overall satisfaction with primary school used



Figure 16: Perception of water quality, by country



Figure 17: Transfer had any positive impact, by type of transfer and across countries



5.2 Examining the access to and experience of services/transfers hypotheses

We are interested here in what kinds of variables are associated with better or worse access to and experience of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance. There are a number of things we might expect to be influential, from various household characteristics – education levels or wealth levels, for example – to certain contextual features, such as (perceived) levels of safety in the local environment and of course the way in which a service/transfer is implemented. In Section 2.3.1, we outlined a set of five access to and experience of services/transfers hypotheses (Box 2). These hypotheses contained statements regarding the kinds of relationships we would expect to see between access/experience outcomes and a range of independent variables. In this section, we draw on findings from country-level regression analysis to examine the validity of our hypotheses. We do so by looking across a set of regression tables in an attempt to identify patterns and consistencies (see Annex 1 for the full regression findings). In the third and final part of this section, we discuss what these findings tell us about access to and experience of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance in conflict-affected places more generally.

Hypothesis 1: Wealthier and better-educated households have better access to basic services and social protection and livelihood assistance

The regression findings do not fully confirm this hypothesis, providing only partial and weak evidence in support of it. While **households with a higher average education level on the whole have better access to basic services, the relationship between wealth and access to services, social protection and livelihood assistance is generally small and inconsistent**.

The variable measuring the average education level of the adult household members is significant in the regressions considering access to health, education, water and social protection (so not for livelihood assistance), but never for any one sector in all five countries. In general, households with better-educated adult members have better access to health, education and water services (i.e. shorter distance), with the exception of water for DRC, and are less likely to receive social protection in Nepal and Pakistan (but not so for Uganda). The education association is particularly pronounced in the case of health; in Nepal for instance distance to the health centre is four minutes shorter for every one year increase in the median years of education of the household members; in Uganda the time taken to reach the health centre is more than 20 minutes shorter if the household head has a tertiary education. The wealth of the household (as measured by the Morris index, an asset-based measurement) has a much weaker link with access on the other hand, and, where significant, is often close to zero. More wealthy households have better access to health and water for two of the countries, but we also find

worse access (i.e. longer distances to the health centre) for households in Nepal. This may be because wealthier households in Nepal tend to use private health clinics, which are often located at a distance in district capitals. In the case of social protection, we do indeed find that wealthier households in Pakistan are more likely to access social protection, but the coefficient is small. The same holds for access to livelihood assistance, where the Morris index only has a small but significant relationship for Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Hypothesis 2: Households that are or have been displaced have worse access to and experiences of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance

For this hypothesis, we test whether current or past displacement affects access to and experiences of basic services and social protection and livelihood assistance. On the whole, the regression findings do not support this hypothesis. For the education, social protection and livelihood regressions the variable is not significant in four countries. For access to health, the findings show that households that have been displaced face worse access in Pakistan and Sri Lanka and better access (shorter distances) in Nepal.[16] In terms of satisfaction with health, having been displaced reduces the likelihood of being satisfied for Uganda and Sri Lanka but has no statistically significant association in the other countries. In terms of water access, having been displaced was associated with better access to water in DRC and Uganda, but in Sri Lanka it was associated with slightly worse access. For satisfaction with water we find similarly inconsistent patterns: having previously been displaced made it more likely that respondents are satisfied in the case of Uganda, but the opposite holds for Nepal. In short, there are no clear or consistent patterns emerging from the cross-country regressions, perhaps owing to the different patterns of displacement and settlement of displaced persons (for instance, in DRC many displaced persons end up in IDP camps, targeted by relief agencies who bring services directly to them, explaining why distance to the water source is shorter).

In summary, the evidence is mixed and **there is no consistent evidence showing that displaced households have worse access to and experiences of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance**. Instead we see that in some cases displaced households have better access to and experiences of services, social protection and livelihood assistance. There is however some variation in the way that displacement is measured across the five countries which could explain why the results are inconsistent.

Hypothesis 3: Households that have recently experienced conflict or living in (perceived) unsafe locations have worse access to and experiences of basic services and social protection and livelihood assistance

The findings from regression analysis do not support this hypothesis and instead suggest that, **to some extent, households that have experienced conflict or feeling unsafe in the past three years have *better* access to basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance (and to a lesser degree, better experiences**). For instance, households that have experienced fighting have better access to health for Nepal and DRC, much better access to education for DRC, better access to water for Nepal and Uganda and better access to social protection and livelihood services for DRC (and access was not significant in all other cases). The conflict variable is insignificant in four countries on experience of the education and health services and in three countries on impact of social protection,[17] but relates positively and significantly to satisfaction with water quality in DRC. The perceptions of safety variables do not have a significant coefficient in any country for access to health, education, social protection and livelihood assistance. Perceptions of safety are also not significant in explaining experience of the education

[16] In Nepal the proxy used for displacement did not only capture displacement due to conflict but also voluntary mobility, for example for family formation. This may explain why we find better access to services among those who have moved village in Nepal since in some cases an element of choice was involved as to the destination.
[17] For livelihood assistance impact the conflict variable was only included in one country regression but here also showed no significant association.

service in four countries and are insignificant in explaining experience of the health service, water quality, and social protection impacts in three countries. In the cases where perception of safety is significant, it suggests that feeling safe is associated with better access – for instance, those who feel safe have better access to water in Pakistan. There are no clear patterns for experience of services but there are some trends within countries, for example in Nepal feeling safe is associated with better perceptions of the health service and the impact of social protection and livelihood assistance. In summary, perceptions of safety are associated with better access to basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance in a limited number of cases – the perceptions of safety variable is significant for at least one country for seven out of ten outcomes. Surprisingly, having experienced conflict in the past three years is also associated with *better* access and, albeit to a lesser degree, better experiences, but again this effect is only found in a limited number of regressions.

Hypothesis 4: Respondents that are satisfied with how a service/transfer is implemented are more satisfied with the service/transfer overall

Here we are interested in how the specific experiences of using a service affect the overall satisfaction with the service. In order to test this hypothesis, we considered a number of variables: people's specific personal experiences with the service (e.g. length of wait, timeliness of the transfer etc.), formal and informal payments for the service/transfer, and who the service provider is. We consider this an important relationship to examine, as it helps us determine whether the quality of services matters for people's satisfaction. Indeed, it is possible that satisfaction may be high even where quality is poor, as past experiences and low expectations in the first place may shape people's subsequent views quite dramatically. Thus, there is merit in testing the link, even though it may seem initially obvious.

For all regressions that we ran on satisfaction with basic services and livelihood assistance, at least one aspect of how services were implemented is significant and these mostly had a positive coefficient. In other words, respondents being satisfied with the specific experience of health, education (e.g. number of staff), and livelihood assistance (e.g. received on time) had a positive association with their overall satisfaction with the service/transfer. Notable exceptions are satisfaction with aspects of education for Nepal and timeliness of social protection receipt in Nepal and DRC. Nonetheless, on the whole we find evidence in favour of the above hypothesis. For instance, concerning livelihood assistance, respondents in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Uganda who reported receiving the transfer on time were more likely to perceive that the transfer had a positive impact. In this context a positive impact is measured using the proxy of whether the livelihood assistance improved agricultural production or improved another livelihood activity. The variable measuring paying formal or informal fees is significant in two countries for experience of health, significant in one country for experience of education, and significant in four countries for experience of water. For all but two of the significant associations, paying fees decreases the likelihood of satisfaction with the service. The exceptions are that paying formal fees increases the likelihood of satisfaction with health for DRC and Nepal (informal and formal payments), and paying official fees increases satisfaction with water in Uganda. In Pakistan, paying official fees for the school that boys attend decreases satisfaction, while informal fees for the school that girls attend increases the likelihood of satisfaction. The provider of the service has a significant association with overall satisfaction with the service/transfer in two countries for education, health, and livelihood assistance, and in three countries for water (and is significant in the one country in which it was included for experience of social protection). Respondents are more likely to be satisfied with water when they perceived it as being run by the government, an NGO or the community (as opposed to privately or by nobody). Regarding livelihood assistance, in Pakistan respondents were more likely to report an impact if the provider was perceived to be *not* the government and in Uganda respondents were slightly more likely to report an impact if the provider was perceived to be an NGO. This shows that who implements the service, in some cases affects overall satisfaction with the service. In summary, we have partial evidence for this hypothesis, suggesting that, **to some extent, people's specific personal experiences**

with basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance does affect their overall satisfaction with the service/transfer.

Hypothesis 5: Households with worse access to basic services are less satisfied with these services

Finally, we wanted to know if respondents with worse access to basic services (as proxied by distance) are less satisfied with these services. We tested this hypothesis in the regressions on satisfaction with health and education. None of the regressions provide evidence to support this hypothesis (i.e. distance is always insignificant). In other words, **having access to the service does not appear to influence satisfaction with health and education services.** This echoes the finding for Hypothesis 4, which shows that the way a service is implemented and run matters to people's perceptions of services, not the service itself.

5.3 What do these findings tell us about access to and experience of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance in conflict-affected places?

What can the SLRC baseline data tell us about what determines access to and experience of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance in conflict-affected places? We have analysed this question using cross-country, comparable regressions and specifically through testing the five hypotheses that were drawn from our analytical framework. On the whole, the empirical findings only partially support the proposed hypotheses: many of our independent variables are insignificant and inconsistent, suggesting that the determinants of access and experiences are complex and to a large extent context-specific. Nevertheless, we can draw four key findings from our baseline analyses.

Our findings on the role of household wealth in terms of access to services and experiences with services are complex and are not always consistent across countries. In many cases the wealth of a household does not seem to matter at all, with poorer and richer households seemingly having similar access to services. This may be because of the generally high access to basic services (as shown in the first section of this section) or it could be a weakness of our proxy, which only measures distance but not other indicators of access. In other cases patterns are puzzling – for example that richer households in Nepal have worse access (that is they face longer travel distances). Rather than showing worse access, what this finding is probably telling us is that rich and poor households can access services in different ways: poorer households in our sampled areas in Nepal tend to use close-by government schools, whereas richer households tend to use more distant private schools. Also puzzling in first instance is that richer households are more likely to access livelihoods services in Nepal and Sri Lanka. While this seemingly looks like elite capture, these households are probably more likely to own land on which agricultural inputs can be used, suggesting effective targeting if assistance is targeted at viable smallholders. However, as we explained in the previous section, at this stage of the analysis we are unable to disentangle causality. What we can conclude from this is **that wealth may not be as important in accessing services and determining perceptions as we expected. Where it is statistically significant, it appears to affect access and experience in different ways.**

We started this research expecting to find that households that are or have been displaced have worse access to and experiences of basic services and social protection and livelihood assistance. As was shown above, our findings based on our baseline data do not fully support this hypothesis. For some services, in a few countries we do find worse access to services, but in other cases we find that displaced households have *better* access to services and are more satisfied with services, notably in the DRC. One of the reasons why we may be seeing these surprising patterns in DRC (and to a lesser extent in Uganda) is displacement has often resulted in relocation to IDP camps where households are then provided with basic services by humanitarian agencies. The implication is that access measured through our proxy variable – distance – is relatively good. While we do not fully understand these

findings yet and should explore these relationships further using qualitative research, they show that **we should be questioning our implicit assumptions on the effects of displacement on access to services.**

Although there is no consistent set of variables explaining why some respondents are more satisfied with services than others there is some indication that **people's specific personal experiences with the service heavily influences their overall level of satisfaction with basic services and livelihood assistance** (we do not find this for social protection). With very minor exceptions, we found that respondents being satisfied with the specific experience had a positive association with their overall satisfaction with the service/transfer. Regression analysis of respondents' experience with basic services and livelihood assistance suggests that factors such as 'satisfaction with the availability of medicine', 'satisfaction with the waiting time in the clinic', 'satisfaction with the number of teachers' and 'satisfaction with the quality of the teaching staff' are strongly and positively associated with higher levels of overall satisfaction with those services/assistance. That said, we do not observe these relationships across all services for all countries, suggesting people may attach different levels of importance to particular characteristics of different services. Personal characteristics of the respondent appear to matter less; for example, the gender of the respondent is insignificant in all countries for three of the satisfaction with service/transfer regressions and has inconsistent associations in the other two (health and education), but only for Nepal and Pakistan. However, these findings do point to the importance of specific experiences in shaping overall satisfaction with a service/transfer.

Two sets of findings in particular are surprising: first, that **levels of satisfaction with basic services were generally quite high, while access was not consistently high for all services or across all countries** (see Section 5.1); and second, that there seems to be no apparent link between better or worse access to basic services and satisfaction with these services (Hypothesis 5). There are *three* possible explanations for this finding. The first one is simple: respondents may have responded more positively in order to please the interviewer – this is known as the 'social desirability response bias'. We hope to have prevented such a bias through careful introductions to the survey and careful phrasing and ordering of the questions. Second, we may be seeing greater satisfaction as a result of post-conflict recovery: even though services are patchy and of low quality, they may still be better than the services provided before (which may well have been no services at all). We are not in a position to assess access to services prior to the baseline, but, when we have collected longitudinal data for the second round of the survey, we will be able to fully explore the relevance of *changing* levels of access on satisfaction with services.

Finally, what may also explain these findings is that levels of access are still generally low in our sample populations: in other words, exposure to (high or low quality) services is low and people find it difficult to judge their quality, both because of low expectations and lack of experience in using these services. We could be seeing information asymmetries – for instance respondents may be very satisfied with latrine toilets because they have not experienced a flush toilet. The next round of the survey should provide further clues to the relative roles of low expectations, lack of experience and changing levels of service provision in explaining satisfaction with basic services).

6 Which factors explain people's perceptions of the government?

In this final analytical section, we summarise and synthesise the analyses performed to answer the research question: 'which factors influence people's perception of government actors?' More specifically, we return to the original hypotheses presented in Box 3 in Section 2.3.3, drawing on the cross-country findings to investigate the validity of each hypothesis in turn.

In some countries, our survey instruments included questions about people's attitudes towards informal state or non-state actors, such as local kings (*mwami*) in DRC. However, for comparative purposes we focus here on people's views of local and central government. Our surveys primarily measured trust and confidence in government actors through perception-based questions. As such, responses to the following two generic questions formed the dependent variables used in the country-level regression analyses (the findings of which we now draw on):

- To what extent do you feel the decisions of those in power in the local/central government reflect your own priorities? [Respondents were asked to select a single response from five possible responses, which ranged from 'Never / not at all' to 'Completely']
- Do you agree with the following statement: the local/central government cares about my opinions. [Respondents were asked to select either 'Yes', 'No' or 'Don't know']

This means that we have four separate sets of regression analyses to draw upon in this section (that is, the above questions were asked in relation to both local and central government). While our regression models were built around the perceptions data, our surveys also generated other types of evidence on people's relationships with the formal state in each of the focus countries. For example, measures of civic participation – such as participation in public meetings regarding service delivery – constitute another way of investigating what is often termed state–society relations. Although we do not report here on the factors associated with higher or lower levels of civic participation, we do examine whether interactions of this nature help us explain variations in people's attitudes towards the government.

As with the previous ones, this section is split into three parts. The first provides some basic descriptive statistics from each country in order to illustrate some key 'perceptions of government characteristics' of our sample populations within each country. More specifically, we report on levels of civic participation, presence and use of grievance mechanisms within service delivery mechanisms, and perceptions of the government. We then draw on regression findings from across the country studies to answer whether our hypotheses hold true. The third part discusses the findings in a more narrative way.

6.1 Overview of perceptions of government

We now describe perceptions of government across the five countries. Figure 18 shows responses to the two research questions for local and central government. As outlined in Section 2.3.3, much thought was given as to how levels of government should be defined and perceptions measured. Two key findings can be drawn from the responses to the two questions.

First, respondents have overwhelmingly negative perceptions of both levels of government. For instance, for central government, only between 4% (Pakistan) and 44% (Sri Lanka) of respondents perceived that the central government cares about their opinion. With the exceptions of Sri Lanka and Uganda, at least two-thirds of respondents feel that the priorities of local government never or almost never reflect their own. For some countries, more than 90% of respondents feel this way. Whilst it is important to not read too much into the absolute figures (and much more important to see how they change over time), with the possible exception of Sri Lanka, these responses do paint a rather bleak picture of people's perceptions of government. In the next section we will look at the determinants of

people's perception of government – this should provide some tentative insights into why this is the case.

Second, on the whole, perceptions of central government are worse than for local government, and this difference is statistically significant in all countries. The responses to the 'local/central government cares about my opinion' question are more negative for central government in four of the countries. The exception is DRC, where the reverse is true, though the difference is quite small and not statistically significant. A greater share of respondents found that central government's priorities never reflect their own, than for local government, for Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Uganda. For DRC, many more respondents (75%) never or almost never felt that local government reflected their priorities than the equivalent for central government (53%). Future qualitative fieldwork will dig deeper into the question of why this is the case.

Figure 18: Comparisons of perceptions of local and central government

Local government cares about my opinion



Central government cares about my opinion



Statistically significant difference between local and central government for Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda (1% level of significance, with exception of Pakistan where 5%)

Local government decisions reflect my priorities



Central government decisions reflect my priorities



Statistically significant difference between local and central government for DRC, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda (1% level of significance).

6.2 Examining the government hypotheses

We are interested here in what kinds of variables are associated with better or worse perceptions of government responsiveness and legitimacy. There are a number of things we might expect to be influential, from various individual- and household-level characteristics – gender and education levels, for example – to certain contextual features, such as (perceived) levels of safety in the local environment. Given that the existing literature suggests close links between access to or experience of public services and state legitimacy, we might also expect service-related factors to influence people's perceptions of the formal state. In Section 2.3.3 we outlined a set of six government hypotheses (Box 3). These hypotheses contained statements regarding the kinds of relationships we would expect to see

between people's perceptions of the government and a range of independent variables. In this section, we draw on findings from country-level regression analysis to examine the validity of our hypotheses. We do so by looking across a set of regression tables in an attempt to identify patterns and consistencies (see Annex x). In the third and final part of this section, we discuss what these findings tell us about state–society relations in conflict-affected places more generally.

Hypothesis 1: Gender and education level of respondents shape perceptions of government

From our regression analyses, we find **very little evidence that either of these individual-level variables** – gender and education level of respondent – **explain variations in people's perceptions of either the local or central government**. Across all country regressions, there are very few statistically significant associations between these independent variables and the outcome variables. In Uganda, there is evidence to suggest that female respondents are more likely to hold worse perceptions of both the local and central government compared to male respondents – although the regression results were not always statistically significant. Similarly, there is some evidence from Nepal to suggest that better-educated respondents are likely to hold more positive perceptions of local and central government, but again the story is inconsistent. Overall, we find (1) very little consistency within countries vis-à-vis the links between these particular individual-level variables and perceptions of the government; and (2) even less consistency across countries on the same links.

Hypothesis 2: Respondents living in households that have recently experienced conflict, who are living in (perceived) unsafe locations, or who have recently experienced a shock/crime have worse perceptions of the government

There are no clear patterns when we consider the relationships between these independent variables – which measure in different ways levels of local insecurity – and perceptions of government. For every outcome, we find that at least one of these independent variables of interest – perception of safety, having experienced conflict in the last three years and having experienced shocks/crimes – has an inconsistent association with the outcome, perception of government.

Let us first look at the influence of conflict. At the local government level, **experiencing conflict in the last three years does not seem to have much of an link with perceptions of government** except in two cases: in Nepal and DRC, there is some evidence to suggest that such experiences are associated with worse perceptions of local government. There are even fewer clearer patterns at the central government level, although some regression evidence from Uganda suggests that the experience of conflict is associated with lower levels of trust amongst respondents. Furthermore, respondents who experienced serious crimes in Uganda have worse perceptions of the government, regardless of who committed the crimes (Mazurana et al., 2014).

We might expect that respondents who feel safe in their community or when moving around would have greater trust in the government compared to those who feel unsafe. But regression results show a mixed relationship: individuals who feel safe in Pakistan and Sri Lanka are likely to have greater trust in the local government, while the opposite appears true for those in Uganda (and to an extent DRC and Nepal). On the other hand, we find that individuals who report feeling safe are more likely to have a positive perception of the central government in both Sri Lanka and Uganda (while in the other countries there is no significant relationship). So, there is some limited evidence to suggest that greater (perceived) local safety is associated with more positive perceptions of the government in Sri Lanka, but **in the other four countries there is either a mixed pattern or no statistically significant relationship at all.**

Our findings are perhaps most inconsistent when we consider the link between perceptions of government and experience of shocks and crimes. While there is a higher number of statistically significant associations with perceptions of the local/central government, there is great variation in the direction of those relationships. In some cases, the regression results actually contradict each other.

For example, results from the logit regressions suggest that respondents from households experiencing a higher number of shocks are less likely to trust the local government in Nepal. But multinomial regression results suggest that these same individuals are more likely to 'largely' or 'completely' agree that local government decisions reflect their priorities. There is a relatively consistent (and intuitive) association is in Sri Lanka, where greater exposure to shocks or crimes is quite often associated with worse perceptions of the government (at both the local and central government levels). The other consistent relationship we find is that crimes have a negative influence on perceptions of local government (for two countries – for the rest it is not significant). On the whole, however, there appears to be a **no linear relationship between the experience of shocks/crimes and people's attitudes towards the government.**

Hypothesis 3: Respondents living in households that have better access to basic services, social protection, social protection or livelihood assistance have more positive perceptions of the government

On the basis of our country-level regression analyses, there does not appear to be any particularly clear or consistent relationship between access to services/transfers and perceptions of the government. This is true at both the local and central government levels.

With the exception of a few cases of statistical significance, access to basic services (health and water) is not generally associated with levels of trust in the government. Among the few exceptions, in Nepal and Sri Lanka, those facing longer journey times to water sources are less likely to feel the local government cares about their opinions.[18]

Although the story looks very similar for social protection and livelihood assistance, we do find some semblance of a pattern in the results. In one of the multinomial regression outputs, three out of five countries (DRC, Nepal, Sri Lanka) demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between receipt of social protection and agreement with the statement that the central government's decisions reflect respondents' priorities. The association does not hold at the local government level. In addition, there is evidence from Sri Lanka that shows a positive association between receipt of livelihood assistance and more positive perceptions of the government, at both the local and central government level. We do not, however, see this in any other countries.

Hypothesis 4: Respondents who have a more positive experience with basic services have more positive perceptions of the government

In examining this hypothesis, we looked at two things. First, we asked whether levels of satisfaction with basic services (health and water) help explain variation in perceptions of the government. For health, we have satisfaction data in both a general sense ('overall, how satisfied are you with the health clinic?') as well as in a more specific sense ('how satisfied are you with the availability of medicines / with the number of staff at the facility / with waiting times, and so on?'). For water, we have self-reported assessments of whether the water accessed is clean and safe. Second, we ask whether variation in people's perceptions of the government can be partly explained by the number of problems a respondent has experienced with the basic services they use.

On the first, we **find that there is no clear or consistent relationship between respondents' satisfaction with basic services and their perceptions of either the local or central government**. This is true for both their general levels of satisfaction and specific levels of satisfaction (see above). Although there are a number of cases of statistical significance, the directions of coefficients do not always flow in an intuitive way. For example, while respondents reporting satisfaction with health services in Sri Lanka are more likely to think the local government cares about their opinions, respondents reporting the same in

[18] Education variables were not included in the regression models, because households without children do not use schools. Including the variables would mean reducing the number of observations in each country analysis.

Uganda are in fact less likely to think the local government cares about their opinions. There are also some contradictory findings vis-à-vis people's specific experiences with health services and perceptions of government. In Nepal, for example, respondents who are dissatisfied with the number of staff at the health facility are more likely to think that local government decisions 'never' or 'almost never' reflect their priorities, while respondents who are satisfied with the availability of medicine are also more likely to think that local government decisions 'never' or 'almost never' reflect their priorities. It is not clear what might explain these inconsistencies. Again, the importance that different communities attach to different elements or features of service delivery may play a role.

Our regressions also included the provider of the health facility and water source that the respondent used as independent variables. There are significant associations between health provider and perception of government in three countries, although in Nepal the association only exists for local government while in Sri Lanka and Uganda the health provider influences both government levels. Three countries also show significant associations between water quality and perception of government: this only applies for local government in Pakistan but for both levels in Nepal and Uganda. In DRC there were no significant associations for water or health provider. The regressions make it possible to see the significance of different providers; for example, in Uganda we find that respondents more frequently find that the local government's decisions reflect their priorities if it is the government that provides water. If the local health service is government-run, then respondents have more positive perceptions of local government (in Nepal) and central government (in Sri Lanka and for one of the regressions in Uganda).

On the second measure of experience – the number of problems reported with services – a much clearer pattern emerges. We consistently find that **the more problems experienced, the worse perceptions a respondent holds of the government**. This is particularly the case in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Uganda, where logit regression results show that respondents experiencing a greater number of problems with their services are less likely to agree that both the local and central government do not care about their opinions. Moreover, in four out of five countries (Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda), the higher the number of service-related problems experienced, the less likely a respondent is to feel that local government decisions 'very much' or 'always' reflect their priorities. The same relationship holds at the central government level in two countries (Nepal, Sri Lanka).

Hypothesis 5: Respondents who have access to grievance mechanisms within public services have more positive perceptions of government

In order to test this hypothesis, we look at whether the presence of a grievance mechanism (or complaints procedure) within different services explains variation in people's perceptions of the government. Within the country survey instruments, our questions were designed to ask respondents whether they were aware of how to make a complaint. For this particular hypothesis, we are not interested in whether grievance mechanisms have actually been used; we are concerned simply with whether respondents know they exist.[19]

Although not uniform across all countries, in three countries **we find a consistent relationship between the presence of grievance mechanisms** (so long as respondents are aware of them) **and positive perceptions of the government**. In Nepal, Pakistan and Uganda, respondents who know of a way to make a complaint are more likely to agree that the local government cares about their opinions. Results from the local government multinomial regressions lend support to this relationship in Nepal and Pakistan. Concerning the central government, we find exactly the same positive associations in the same countries. Thus, while there is no evidence of a relationship in either DRC or Sri Lanka, there is quite a consistent picture in three of our five countries.

[19] This of course means that our variables are not an objective indicator of whether a grievance mechanism is actually in place.

Hypothesis 6: Respondents with higher levels of civic participation have more positive perceptions of government

For this final hypothesis, we are interested in whether knowledge of or participation in community meetings about service delivery is associated with perceptions of the government. We focus on two independent variables: (1) whether a respondent is aware of such meetings and whether they attended such meetings in the past year; and (2) whether a respondent had been consulted about services in the past year.

Whilst not the case for every country, we find several statistically significant associations between whether a respondent is aware of or participates in community meetings about services and their perceptions of the government. At the local government level, respondents who either knew about or attended such meetings in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Uganda were all more likely to agree that local government cares about their opinion. Results from the multinomial regressions confirm this positive relationship in Sri Lanka and Uganda. This variable also matters at the central government level in Nepal and Sri Lanka (according to logit regression results) and in Uganda (according to multinomial regression results).

There is perhaps an even clearer relationship between whether a respondent was consulted about services and their views towards the government. Respondents who had been consulted in the past year were more likely to agree that local government cares about their opinions in four countries (Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda), and more likely to agree that central government cares about their opinions in three countries (Nepal, Pakistan, Uganda). Multinomial regression results show a very similar pattern.

Thus, on this final hypothesis, **there is fairly clear evidence to suggest that higher levels of participation vis-à-vis service delivery** (or at least greater opportunities to participate) **are associated with better perceptions of the government.**

6.3 What do these findings tell us about people's perceptions of the government?

State legitimacy is a complex, difficult-to-measure concept. We have attempted to generate a series of proxy indicators of state legitimacy by asking respondents in each of our countries' sample populations about their perceptions of government. The existing literature suggests that this is a viable approach to the study of what is ultimately an intangible and fuzzy dimension of statehood (Carter, 2011; Herbert, 2013; Hilker and Kangas, 2011).

The kinds of questions we asked respondents generated information on government performance (as measured by citizens' attitudes) and people's levels of trust and confidence in the government. In terms of our analysis, we are most interested in what kinds of factors explain statistical variation in perceptions – or, in other words, what factors appear to influence the way people think about their government, and whether there are any patterns that emerge from one country to the next regarding these influencing factors.

The first thing to say about our cross-country government data is that it is not directly comparable in a strict sense. We cannot, for example, say with any validity that respondents in our Nepal sample population have more favourable perceptions of the local government than respondents in our DRC sample population: perceptions cannot be viewed in such an absolute and comparable way. However, our data do enable us to identify and analyse common trends and patterns. It is quite clear, for example, that **respondents across all five countries generally think worse of the central level of government relative to the local government** (see Figure 18 above). This suggests a number of things. First, from an analytical point of view, it appears to make sense to separate out different government actors or layers of government; approaching the state or government as a single monolithic entity conceals potential variations in perceived legitimacy from a citizen's perspective. Second, there is

perhaps something to be said of proximity and visibility factors here. Conceptual work by SLRC, drawing extensively on existing governance research by others, suggests that the 'tangibility' of government and public service delivery matters for how people think and feel about the state (Wild et al., 2014). To put it in fairly crude terms, it is thought that if the state is seen to be actively doing stuff – providing services, creating jobs, addressing grievances, and so on – then legitimacy gains may follow. Evidence from the Afrobarometer studies, for example, shows quite clearly that people in sub-Saharan Africa 'judge the quality of local government primarily in terms of whether they think elected leaders "deliver the goods"' (Bratton, 2010: 1). Because local layers of government tend to be more proximal to processes of local development, it perhaps follows that people are more likely to perceive them to be acting in their interests. At the very least, local government organisations are in theory more closely connected to local populations, even if they fail to provide much in the way of tangible development gains. It may be that this idea of connection and geographical proximity has some inherent effect on the way in which people think about the state; the greater physical and hierarchical distance between people and the central layer of government potentially has a limiting effect on its capacity to build legitimacy. Or in other words, when the 'goods are delivered', people are arguably more likely to attach a positive association to the level of government most visible to them.

On a similar point, our survey data suggest that there is no straightforward relationship between access to basic services and welfare transfers and people's attitudes towards the government. One popular way of conceptualising legitimacy is as a performance-based outcome. That is, states become legitimate in the eyes of their citizens by making and meeting promises of social and material improvement (Burnell, 2006). Things like service delivery, job creation and so on then take on an instrumental dimension; while they have a certain intrinsic value, they are conceptualised here as a means to separate ends (state legitimacy). Improvements in service delivery are thus framed as vital components of state-building strategies – we might put this crudely as 'buying legitimacy through giving stuff'. By our measures of access to services and transfers, however, it is clear that **simply 'getting something' is not sufficient to 'buy legitimacy'**. We find no apparent relationship between people's access to health or water services and their views towards either local or central government. That is, those with better access to these services do not tend to be any more likely to have better perceptions of the government. When we look at access to social protection, there is slightly more evidence of a positive relationship, but it does not hold for every country and is only applicable at the central government level. In short, our survey data do not provide convincing evidence that people's views of government legitimacy can be robustly explained by the fact that they are simply receiving *something*.

If we push the analysis further, however, it becomes apparent that the *quality* of what people are getting does in fact matter. Evidence from three countries shows that the **more problems experienced with services over the past year, the worse respondents generally thought about the government**. This suggests that people do care about whether their public services are functioning properly and as they should; in other words, it is false to assume that the simple presence of a health clinic or primary school is sufficient to substantially change the way people think and feel about the government. Our evidence here is in line with findings from other countries. Of particular note is a study by Sacks and Larizza (2012), which involved examining whether decentralisation of service delivery in post-conflict Sierra Leone had any influence at all on citizens' attitudes towards public authority. The authors conclude:

> Local service provision plays a critical role in shaping citizens' attitudes toward political authorities. However, our results also suggest the devolution of power per se is not a sufficient condition for building the trustworthiness of local authorities … Citizens' trust and support is not unconditional. On the contrary, bureaucratic honesty *combined with the quality of local service provision is what really matters to citizens*. (Sacks and Larizza, 2012: 23; emphasis added).

However, we find what are probably the clearest relationships when we consider participation and accountability characteristics of public services. There is fairly strong evidence from our surveys that the inclusiveness of service delivery is often associated with how people view the government. For example,

in three countries we find that the **existence of grievance mechanisms within public services – essentially, complaints procedures – is significantly related to more positive perceptions of the government**. What's more, our findings suggest that actually using the grievance mechanisms does not appear to be a necessary condition for this relationship to hold; their simple presence seems to matter in and of itself. On a very similar note, in every country apart from DRC we observe statistical associations between levels of civic participation vis-à-vis service delivery and perceptions of the government.[20] More specifically, when respondents attended a community meeting about services (or knew of such a meeting), or when they were consulted about services in their community, they were more likely to think better of the government. Taken together, these findings suggest there is potentially something about the way in which public services can act as a channel through which citizens and public authorities interact (Van de Walle and Scott, 2011). Opening up this route – allowing citizens to 'see' their system of government at work in a tangible, everyday manner – appears to influence the way people think about their state. In a sense, this is perhaps less about the services themselves, and more about the kinds of mechanisms that promote engagement and exchange between citizens and formal state. More broadly, our survey findings quite clearly suggest that investigating the detail of service delivery – the specific ways in which services and transfers are designed and implemented – as opposed to simply asking whether people have access to something, appears to be a fruitful line of enquiry.

Beyond these key service-related findings, it has to be said that very little appears to clearly and consistently shape people's perceptions of the government. For example, we might expect there to be variations in accordance with the gender of our respondents. Processes of state formation and state-building are intimately connected to questions of power and its distribution – and there are, in turn, striking gender dimensions to those questions. Research from five conflict-affected countries shows that women were largely excluded from negotiations regarding the post-conflict political settlement, and that the elites controlling those negotiations were often in fierce opposition to improving women's rights and political participation (Castillejo, 2011). In addition, a recent review of the links between gender equality and state-building found that 'the inclusion and presence of women and gender concerns remains marginal and uneven at every stage [of the process]' (Domingo et al., 2013: iv). Yet, **we find no consistent evidence that female respondents have systematically worse perceptions of the government**. If nothing else, this serves to emphasise the importance of looking at intersectional aspects of personal identity as opposed to just simple, one-dimensional identifiers. We also find very little evidence that exposure to conflict and shocks or experience of displacement significantly shape attitudes towards the government, which is consistent with our findings in relation to livelihoods and wellbeing outcomes. Similarly, how well-off a household is – in terms of wealth and food security – does not appear to matter all that much; respondents' perceptions of the government do not seem to be dependent on material wellbeing at the household level.

[20] It is important not to make the assumption that participation in community meetings in DRC necessarily indicate a lively and active civil society. Instead, it must be recognised that since the Mobutu era, participation has been a critical way of getting support (for example food aid) and attending meetings in the hope of receiving support has become embedded in regular activities at community level.

7 Conclusions and initial policy implications

In 2012/13, the SLRC designed and implemented the first round of a panel survey in five conflict-affected countries, generating cross-country data on livelihoods, access to and experience of basic services, exposure to shocks and coping strategies, and people's perceptions of government. This paper synthesised the findings of the DRC Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda surveys, which was delivered to a total of 9,769 households in September-October 2012 (for DRC, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and in January 2013 (for Uganda). The sampling strategy combined purposive and random sampling at different stages in order to select areas that are relevant to the main research questions and of national relevance, while also being able to draw statistically significant conclusions at the study and village level.

In order to address the broader research questions of the SLRC, we wanted some degree of comparability. However, the fact that we have non-nationally representative surveys in completely different settings means we cannot make direct comparisons. Thus, in our analysis we did not aggregate the data and make direct comparisons across all countries, nor did we apply uniform indicators or definitions across all countries – questions, indicators and variables were tailored to the specific country contexts. For example, we were interested in the link between a household's level of wealth and their livelihoods, access to services and perceptions of government, and while we used the same indicator (the Morris index) to measure wealth, the index was composed of different assets across countries. What this survey has enabled us to do is identify some general trends and similarities and differences between our case countries, keeping in mind that the findings are not fully comparable.[21]

In the baseline surveys we considered four specific research questions (see Section 2.2) focusing on the determinants of livelihoods and wellbeing, the determinants of basic services, social protection and livelihood assistance access and experiences and, finally, the factors determining perceptions of local and central government. Comparable analyses were run across countries for the country baseline reports (de Milliano et al., 2015; Mayadunne et al., 2014; Mazarana et al., 2014; Shahbaz et al., 2014; Upreti et al., 2014) and these were utilised in this synthesis report. We mainly drew on descriptive statistics and regression analysis. The latter included OLS regressions, logit regression and multinomial logit regressions.

Rather than giving a detailed summary of the report, in this conclusion we focus on six key findings that have emerged from the synthesis of cross-country findings. These are findings that are particularly interesting and surprising – some challenge the hypotheses that we set out prior to conducting the analysis and, to some extent, also challenge perceived wisdom on fragile and conflict-affected areas. Where possible, we also draw relevant policy lessons.

First, we found that **it is not all about conflict**. While we find long-term effects of serious crimes in Uganda, we find little evidence of conflict in the past three years, past or current displacement and perceptions of safety clearly or consistently affecting wellbeing outcomes, access to services and perceptions of the government in the other countries. In many of the sampled areas conflict is just one risk amongst many. The lives of people in fragile and conflict-affected areas are not *defined* by conflict and their choices and characteristics are not determined by fighting in the absolute sense. People in these places often live in environments characterised by multiple vulnerabilities: conflict-related shocks may be an important part of the landscape, but so too are 'non-conflict related' shocks, such as environmental stresses, natural disasters, health shocks and economic shocks. These findings are

[21] For example even if the same indicator was used, we did not directly compare numerical value across countries, nor did we compare regression coefficients across countries.

forcing us to re-examine 'conflict exceptionalism': while we might intuitively expect conflict to dramatically affect people's livelihoods and wellbeing and perceptions of the government, our findings are showing that other factors are often at least as important in driving outcomes.

There are some policy implications we can draw from this. Peoples' lived experiences do not follow a neat divide between conflict, post-conflict and development phases, but donor and aid programming too often does – with abrupt shifts between different types of funding mechanisms and different types of programming. For donors this implies that transitions between conflict and post-conflict approaches and humanitarian and development funding need to be less abrupt and better layered. In practice this means that policy makers in conflict-affected areas need to be concerned, for example, with health shocks, floods and crop diseases, as well as with conflict-related displacement. It also highlights the weakness of viewing states as either failed or not, or fragile or not, and the need for a more nuanced typology of fragility that recognises that Uganda has more in common with Kenya or Tanzania than with Afghanistan or the Solomon Islands.

Second, the findings point to the importance of education in making a living: **households with more highly educated household heads consistently have better wellbeing outcomes** in terms of both proxy indicators (household wealth and food insecurity). In other words, the more highly educated the head, the wealthier and less food insecure the household. The literature already shows a strong correlation between greater education and improved livelihoods, greater assets and other wellbeing outcomes in developing countries more generally (Collinson, 2009; Ellis, 2003; Garrett and Ruel, 1999; Moser, 1998), and here we show that this pattern also holds in fragile and conflict-affected areas. From a policy point of view this means that a stronger focus should be placed on secondary education. Our findings suggest that primary school education makes a difference to wellbeing outcomes, but recipients of secondary school education clearly have even higher wellbeing outcomes (caution should be exercised in reading causality in this relationship).

Third, our findings on access to livelihood assistance suggest that, paradoxically, the transition from conflict to post-conflict does not appear to result in renewed efforts to support livelihood rehabilitation (with the caveat that at we are not yet able to measure change in access to livelihood assistance). At the baseline, **coverage of livelihood assistance reaches less than one-third of households** – ranging between 15% and 32% of sampled households across the case study countries. There is an apparent gap in both effective strategies and effective programmes at sufficient levels of scale to support processes of livelihoods recovery, provide social protection and stimulate employment and growth. Further SLRC research is exploring whether, in post-conflict periods, donors are focusing on supporting government systems to deliver health and education services at the expense of supporting livelihoods and jobs.

Fourth, and perhaps one of the most unexpected findings, is that **levels of satisfaction with basic services are generally quite high** across the countries (with some minor exceptions). Before trying to understand this finding we would like to note that this does not mean households are in fact accessing high-quality services – we are measuring *self-reported* satisfaction levels based on households' *experiences* of the service. We highlight three possible explanations for this finding here, but there may be others. One is respondents expressing positive perceptions owing to a social desirability bias. There may also be actual post-conflict improvements in services and high levels of satisfaction due to information asymmetries. On the one hand, we may be seeing greater satisfaction as a result of post-conflict recovery: even though services are patchy and, possibly, of low quality, these services may be better than the services provided previously (i.e. from a very low base). We are not in a position to assess access to services prior to the baseline, but we will be able fully explore the relevance of *changing* levels of access on satisfaction with services after the second round of the survey. What may also explain these findings is that levels of access are generally low in our sample populations; in other words, exposure to (high/low quality) services is low and people find it difficult to judge their quality, both because of low expectations and lack of experience in using these services.

Fifth, with the exception of Sri Lanka, **respondents have overwhelmingly negative perceptions of both levels of government, particularly of central government**. For instance, only between 4% (Pakistan) and 36% (Uganda) of respondents perceived that the central government cares about their opinion. With the exceptions of Sri Lanka and Uganda, at least two-thirds of respondents feel that the priorities of local government never or almost never reflect their own. For some countries, more than 90% of respondents feel this way. These findings do not necessarily suggest that central government is doing a 'worse job'. Rather, there is perhaps something to be said of proximity and visibility factors here. Conceptual work by SLRC, drawing extensively on existing government research by others, suggests that the 'tangibility' of government and public service delivery matters for how people think and feel about the state (Wild et al., 2014). To put it in fairly crude terms, it is thought that if the state is seen to be actively doing stuff – providing services, creating jobs, addressing grievances, and so on – then legitimacy gains may follow. At the very least, local government organisations are in theory more closely connected to local populations, even if they fail to provide much in the way of tangible development gains. It may be that this idea of connection and geographical proximity has some inherent effect on the way in which people think about the state; the greater physical and hierarchical distance between people and the central layer of government potentially has a limiting effect on its capacity to build legitimacy. Or, in other words, when the 'goods are / are not delivered', people are arguably more likely to attach a positive / negative association to the level of government most visible to them.

Finally, one of strongest findings that emerged is that '**it ain't what you do, it's how you do it**'. We find that access to basic services, social protection or livelihood assistance on their own determines neither satisfaction with services nor perceptions of the government. Instead what we see is that satisfaction with services is heavily dependent on how well that service is run. For example, respondents' experience with basic services suggests that factors such as 'satisfaction with the availability of medicine', 'satisfaction with the waiting time in the clinic', 'satisfaction with the number of teachers' and 'satisfaction with the quality of the teaching staff' are strongly and positively associated with higher levels of overall satisfaction with those services. Quality, as opposed to simple presence, is the most important factor. Furthermore, whether or not someone has access to a particular service, social protection or livelihood assistance does not appear to matter much in explaining perceptions of the government. Instead we see that the presence of grievance mechanisms and possibilities for participation strongly influences perceptions of the government – even if these are not effective in practice. What's more, our findings suggest that actually using the grievance mechanisms does not appear to be a necessary condition for this relationship to hold; their simple presence seems to matter in and of itself. Taken together, these findings suggest there is potentially something about the way in which public services can act as a channel through which citizens and public authorities interact (Van de Walle and Scott, 2011). Opening up this route – allowing citizens to 'see' their system of government at work in a tangible, everyday manner – appears to influence the way people think about their government. In a sense, this is perhaps less about the services themselves, and more about the kinds of mechanisms that promote engagement and exchange between citizens and government. Additional evidence for this idea comes from a separate cross-country study into multi-stakeholder processes carried out by the Peace, Security and Development Network (Stel et al., 2012). Multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) refer to initiatives which aim to bring together different stakeholders – including the state, civil society, the private sector, beneficiary communities and international organisations – in order to encourage collective action for service delivery. This study found that the impact of MSPs on state legitimacy is 'determined more by their throughput (the multi-stakeholder process) than by their output (improvement of service delivery)' (Stel et al., 2012: 12). Read alongside our baseline survey findings, this research quite clearly suggests that investigating the detail of service delivery – the specific ways in which services and transfers are designed and implemented – as opposed to simply asking whether people have access to something, appears to be a fruitful line of enquiry. In other words, a narrow focus on outputs – what gets delivered – is unlikely to provide us with many insights into the 'quality of the state', as Fukuyama (2013) puts it.

Findings from our surveys find that there is no simple or linear relationship between access to services and peoples' perceptions of the legitimacy and performance of government. For donors this suggests a need to be more cautious about the claims they make that supporting services contributes to state-building. Having said that, it is still absolutely appropriate to support service delivery from a rights- and needs-based perspective: services are critical to eliminating poverty, irrespective of whether they contribute to government legitimacy. But if donors want to support state capacities to deliver services then they may need to pay much more attention to how they are supporting services and more explicit about how government capacities are being built at what level and be more modest about the likely impact of this on people's views about the performance and legitimacy of governments.

While some surprising and interesting findings have emerged from the analysis and synthesis of the SLRC baseline surveys, we should keep in mind that these findings provide just a snapshot at one moment in time. This data does not allow us to draw any conclusions on causality, nor does it allow us to measure changes over time. In 2015 we will be going back to the same households and respondents and interviewing them for wave 2 of our survey. Only then will we be able to measure changes in livelihoods, access to services and perceptions of government over time and be able to make definitive statements about factors that determine these. We will also be exploring some of the findings the SLRC baselines have thrown up through in-depth qualitative research.

Box 5: Key findings from the South Sudan Survey

The survey for South Sudan is somewhat different in content and in objective from the other SLRC surveys, and we have therefore not included its findings in this synthesis report. This box provides a brief summary of the South Sudan baseline report (d'Errico et al., 2014), which focused on in Jonglei and Upper Nile states.

Overall, the population in the sample is very young. There seems to be a 'missing' population cohort of males in the 20-40-year-old group. It is not clear whether this is an impact of the war, the result of labour out-migration from the survey area to seek economic opportunities in other parts of the country, or simply a result of the timing of the survey. Education levels are very low, with only a small proportion of the sample reporting having received any formal education.

Livelihoods in the survey area are severely constrained, with limited options for expansion or diversification. Livestock – and specifically cattle – have been the traditional mainstay of livelihoods in much of the survey area. However, a very high proportion (>50%) of the population now report owning no cattle, and other livestock have not, for the most part, taken the place of cattle. While the survey data do not address this question directly, there is evidence of substantial shifts in livestock ownership in very recent times due to cattle raiding (at least in Jonglei), so until more detailed survey information is available, it is difficult to determine exactly how livestock ownership has shifted and how much this affects livelihood change. Apart from livestock, people face limited options. Well over half the households surveyed reported having no cultivation in the year prior to the survey, and a quarter reported cultivating less than one feddan. Those who report some agricultural activities mostly reported having cultivated only one kind crop in the previous season.

For all of the above reasons, the survey results demonstrate very high levels of household food insecurity. The survey included six different indicators of food insecurity, and while each tells a slightly different story, the overall picture is one in which food insecurity is well above humanitarian emergency thresholds. The nutritional status of children under five years of age corroborates this finding. Limited ownership of livestock and other assets, limited engagement in cultivation, the lack of alternative livelihood activities, the frequency of shocks, and the high prevalence of food insecurity and undernutrition all point to a livelihoods crisis of major dimensions.

Overall views about the quality of governance and about the state were more positive than answers about livelihoods, access to services, or participation in governance functions might suggest. More than 70% of respondents felt that local government never or almost never cares about their opinions, although a minority believed rather strongly that the government does care about their views – and it should be noted that given the mostly mono-ethnic character of the survey sample, this response is not related to a dominant or minority ethnic status. Given the extent to which governance questions about South Sudan are often dominated by narratives about ethnicity, this finding is of note. Overall, the survey data offer little in the way of a demonstrable link between access to services and perceptions of the state. Access to services is not good, but this is not significantly correlated (with a few exceptions) with perceptions of the state.

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Annex 1: Comparative regression tables

Table 1: OLS regression of Morris Index, by country. (Household level)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female-headed household	-9.36**	-4.96***	n/a	-0.47***	-0.56*
	Average age of household	0.12	0.13***	0.13	0.00	0.05***
	Main activity of household	-7.59** (main income source: agriculture)	2.38*** (main income source: own cultivation)	9.45*** (main income source: agriculture)	0.23 (main activity: fishing) 0.26 (main activity: agriculture) -0.46*** (main activity: trading)	Main income source: -0.04 (casual agric.) 0.11 (casual non agric.) 0.60 (exploitation of bush products) 1.29 (other assistance) 0.29 (other economic activity) 2.64*** (own business) -0.25 (own business, market) -0.60 (own fishing) 2.10** (own livestock) -0.33 (paid housework) -0.12 (private/ NGO) 2.27** (government) (ref: none)
	Education level of the adult household members	5.97*** (mean years of education)	4.21*** (median education of adults)	2.05*** (Average education of adults)	0.88*** (share of adults completing primary)	Respondent education: -0.22 (some primary) 0.71* (finished primary) 0.80* (O-level) 2.26*** (A-level) 1.68** (tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a (Only 5 households had a current migrant)	-3.72**	9.54** *	0.36***	1.66
	Household receives remittances	1.28	1.75*	4.19	0.03	0.97**
	Household has been displaced	-10.43**(displaced due to conflict)	-0.92 (lived in village all life)	1.64 (displaced due to conflict)	-0.11 (ever been displaced)	-0.21 (ever been displaced)
	Religion	4.76 (Religious minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	-7.64* (Ethnic minority)	-2.28** (minority)	n/a	-0.02 (minority)	0.82* (Langi) -3.76*** (Iteso) -1.54** (Kumam) -1.80** (Karamojong) -0.97 (Mixed) -2.61*** (Other) (ref: Acholi)
	Dependency ratio	-1.01	-1.47**	-1.05	-0.16	0.00***

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Context	Urban	n/a	2.63***	n/a	0.79***	0.79*
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	-11.92***	-0.69	n/a	n/a	-0.93
	Perception of safety	-4.68 (safe in village) 8.29** (safe at home)	1.89 (safe in neighbourhood)	-6.41*** (safe when moving around)	0.91*** (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.44*** (safe in neighbourhood)
	Household has access to credit	-0.88	4.83***	-10.55*** (household has debt)	0.35**	0.78**
	Location	n/a	7.41*** (Rolpa) 8.94*** (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	4.49*** (Swat) (ref:Lower Dir)	n/a	-0.30 (Sub-region: Langi) (ref: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	1.16	0.07	6.73***	-0.12***	0.10***
	Crimes experienced	1.88	-0.03	3.31***	0.19*	0.01 (crimes) -0.01 (serious crimes)
Access to services and social protection	Access to health	0.01	0.02*	0.02	0.00***	0.00
	Access to water services	-0.19***	0.03	n/a	0.00	-0.01**
	Access to social protection	-3.62	1.93**	0.63	-0.13***	0.40
	Access to livelihood services	9.24**	3.21***	8.42***	0.61***	1.04**
	Quality of health	-0.94 (Satisfied)	-0.67 (satisfied)	6.06***(satisfied)	0.23* (satisfied)	0.41 (fairly satisfied) 0.03 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Quality of water clean	-0.13	-0.04	-2.52	-0.25	0.36
Information about the regression model	R^2	0.11	0.15	0.26	0.28	0.21
	Number of observations	657	2812	2085	1375	1519

Table 2: OLS regression on food insecurity index, by country (Household level)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female-headed household	1.01	-0.81**	n/a	1.78***	-0.34
	Average age of household	-0.10***	-0.05***	-0.02	-0.07***	0.04
	Main activity of household	0.59 (main income source: agriculture)	0.13 (main income source: own cultivation)	-1.04*** (main income: farming) -0.52 (main income: overseas labour)	0.63 (main activity: fishing) -0.57 (main activity: agriculture) -0.52 (main activity: trading)	Main income source: 7.01** (casual agric.) 4.53** (casual non agric.) 3.04 (exploitation of bush products) 4.56 (other assistance) 1.17 (other economic activity) -2.93 (own business) -2.99 (own business, market) -9.53** (own fishing) -2.99** (own livestock) -1.94 (paid housework) -3.34** (private/ NGO) -4.88** (government) (ref: none)
	Education level of the adult household members	-0.34 (mean years of education)	-0.64*** (median education of adults)	-0.22*** (Average education of adults)	-1.92*** (share of adults completing primary)	Respondent educ: -3.80*** (some primary) -3.42**(primary) -3.01** (O level) -2.82 (A level) -5.45*** (Tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	0.57	-1.16**	0.58	2.63
	Household receives remittances	-0.95	-0.36	0.54	0.53	0.96
	Household has been displaced	2.26** (displaced due to conflict)	0.10 (lived in village entire life)	0.06 (displaced due to conflict)	0.84 (ever displaced)	0.72 (ever displaced)
	Religion	-2.68*** (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	0.35 (minority)	1.39*** (minority)	n/a	0.57 (minority)	-2.21 (Langi) -18.58*** (Iteso) -6.06** (Kumam) -14.00*** (Karamojong) -1.45 (Mixed) -10.12*** (Other) (ref: Acholi)
	Dependency ratio	0.24	0.07	0.3**	0.25	n/a
	Morris Index	-0.02**	-0.03***	-0.01***	-0.66***	-0.44***

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Context	Urban	n/a	1.21***	n/a	0.18	-0.46
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	1.96***	0.05	n/a	n/a	1.59
	Perception of safety	1.33** (safe in village) -0.59 (safe while travelling)	-0.98*** (safe in neighbourhood)	0.24 (safe when moving around)	0.59 (safe in neighbourhood)	1.97*** (safe in neighbourhood)
	Household has access to credit	1.72***	-2.62***	1.39*** (owes money)	-1.26**	-2.05**
	Location	n/a	0.38 (Rolpa) 0.84*** (Bardiya) (Ref: Ilam)	1.76*** (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	2.89* (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	0.27*	0.04	0.29**	0.71***	0.10
	Crimes experienced	1.59***	0.10***	-0.46***	1.09**	-0.08* (crimes) 0.26*** (serious crimes)
Access to services and social protection	Access to health	-0.01	0.01***	-0.02***	0.00	0.00
	Access to water services	0.02	0.00	n/a	0.03**	-0.01
	Access to social protection	0.62	0.52***	0.65***	1.04**	-0.39
	Access to livelihood services	0.50	-0.32	-0.45*	-0.16	-2.33***
	Quality of health	-2.01***(satisfied)	0.26** (satisfied)	0.72*** (satisfied)	-0.89** (satisfied)	0.32 (fairly satisfied) 0.03 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Quality of water clean	0.32	-1.31***	-0.27	-1.27**	-1.72**
Information about the regression model	R2	0.28	0.19	0.15	0.13	0.14
	Number of observations	650	2812	2085	1375	1519

Table 3: Comparative analysis on access to health services (Household level)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female-headed household	-3.54	-0.96	1.30 (female respondent)	3.26	-11.42*
	Average age of household	-0.08	0.02	-0.08	-0.34***	0.19
	Main activity of household	6.36 (main income source: agriculture)	9.13*** (main income source: own cultivation)	0.84 (HH head in farming) 2.04 (main income: agriculture) 3.16 (main income: overseas labour)	7.26 (main activity: fishing) -0.64 (main activity: agriculture) 1.13 (main activity: trading)	Main income source: -7.14 (casual labour) -21.73 (casual non-agriculture) -12.73 (exploitation of bush products) 22.58 (other assistance) 12.37 (other economic activity) -10.26 (shop-building) -18.64 (trading) 210.55*** (fishing) -10.40 (livestock) 28.6** (paid housework) 10.51 (private/ NGO) 27.04 (government) (ref: none)
	Education level of the adult household members	-3.25* (mean years of education)	-4.12*** (median education of adults)	-0.15 (Average education of adults)	-8.69** (Share of adults completing primary)	Respondent educ: 19.01** (some primary) 12.17 (primary) 1.42 (O level) -43.24*** (A level) -21.10* (Tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	2.46	8.03* (internal) -2.28 (international)	-8.33***	-18.14
	Household receives remittances	5.09	5.41***	0.29	-0.38	-5.67**
	Household has been displaced	0.42 (displaced due to conflict)	-3.72** (lived in village whole life)	7.55*** (displaced due to conflict)	10.06** (ever displaced)	4.08 (ever displaced)
	Religion	10.47 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	-5.82 (minority)	-5.02** (minority)	n/a	20.94***(minority)	-4.06 (Langi) -54.71*** (Iteso) 23.35 (Kumam) 3.63 (Karamojong) -32.37** (Mixed) -14.11 (Other) (ref: Acholi)
	Dependency ratio	-1.39	0.84	0.39	1.13	0.07**

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
	Morris Index	-0.03	0.11**	-0.73***	-3.66***	-0.96
	Food Security Index	-0.24	0.59***	0.02	0.17	0.13
Context	Urban		-2.67		-17.22***	-31.88***
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	-23.74***	-2.96**	2.26	n/a	8.59
	Perception of safety	-0.64 (safe in village) 5.60 (safe while travelling)	-3.32 (safe in neighbourhood)	1.16 (safe when moving around)	-8.42 (safe in neighbourhood)	-13.49*** (safe in neighbourhood)
	Private form of transportation	-9.10*	6.14*** (man-powered vehicle) -4.39 (petrol powered vehicle)	-4.00 (motorbike) 1.43 (car)	-23.14*** (satisfied with access to transport)	-1.78 (bicycle) -35.74 (cart) -14.34 (car)
	Access to public transportation	-9.27	n/a	n/a		n/a
	Location	n/a	17.33*** (Rolpa) -26.26*** (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	-5.57*** (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	30.82** (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	1.24	0.78***	-0.42	2.13**	-0.81
	Crimes experienced	-2.71	-0.31	-3.61***	0.49	-0.10 (crimes) 2.24*** (serious crimes)
Perception of health services	Number of staff	1.48 (neutral) 0.64 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	1.40 (satisfied) -0.23 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	4.41*** (satisfied)	n/a	16.36* (fairly satisfied) -11.08 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Availability of medicine	2.27 (neutral) -3.13 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	2.25 (satisfied) -5.61 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	0.14 (satisfied)	n/a	n/a
	Waiting times	-2.72 (neutral) -11.30* (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	-7.93*** (satisfied) -0.02 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	2.95*** (satisfied)	n/a	-2.45 (fairly satisfied) 36.92*** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Quality of equipment	n/a	n/a	n/a	9.44***	4.22 (fairly satisfied) 12.85 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Satisfied with overall quality	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.15**	n/a
	Formal Health Costs	-14.00	11.37***	-1.77	-10.75	18.6*
	Informal Health Costs	13.13**	3.44	-0.21	13.31**	-2.42

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
	Provider of health facilities	-2.92 (government)	4.64** (government)	2.73 (Not run by government)	-21.13*** (Run by government)	-14.94 (privately run) 22.24 (religious organisation) -56.43** (NGO) 11.14 (other) (ref: government)
	Community Meeting Held on Health	-1.45	-2.11	11.11***	n/a	-0.31
	Attended Community Meeting on Health	-0.74	7.03**	16.99*	-1.39	n/a
Information about the regression model	R2	0.15	0.24	0.09	0.55	0.15
	Number of observations	527	2973	2114	1352	1438

Table 4: Comparative analysis on access to education services (Household level)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female-headed household	8.34	3.72	2.36** (female respondent)	4.04	-2.18
	Average age of household	0.06	-0.18	-0.11	-0.44	-0.23**
	Main activity of household	16.48** (main income source: agriculture)	2.66 (main income source: own cultivation)	7.17* (farming is main activity) 0.69 (main income: farming) -0.32 (main income: overseas labour)	0.99 (main activity: fishing) 1.60 (main activity: agriculture) -1.18 (main activity: trading)	Main income source: -0.46 (casual labour: agr) 13.29* (casual labour: non-agr) 6.93 (exploitation of bush products) 4.44 (other assistance) -7.15 (other economic activity) 1.55 (own business: shop building) -2.16 (business: home, market) -11.34** (livestock) -11.73 (paid housework) 4.64 (private/NGO) -7.74 (government) (ref: none)
	Education level of the adult household members	0.73 (mean years of education)	-0.88 (respondent education)	0.00 (Average education of adults)	5.19 (share completing primary)	Respondent education -2.69 (some primary) -7.24 (primary) -17.18*** (O level) -15.43* (A level) -21.01*** (Tertiary) (ref: none)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
	Household has migrant	n/a	5.20	-3.88* (internal migrant) -2.81 (international migrant)	-2.89	2.52
	Household receives remittances	5.66	3.41	1.33	8.71	-2.17
	Household has been displaced	9.70 (displaced due to conflict)	1.32 (lived in village all life)	-0.98 (displaced due to conflict)	5.59 (ever displaced)	6.77 (ever displaced)
	Religion	8.97 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	-10.17 (minority)	-3.51(minority)	n/a	13.08*** (minority)	n/a
	Dependency ratio	-1.88	0.28	-3.24*	-6.01**	0.02
	Morris Index	-0.04	0.08	0.01	-3.01*	-0.54*
	Food security index	-0.54	0.08	0.12	0.29	-0.23*
Context	Urban	n/aa	6.00**	n/a	n/a	-18.35***
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	-24.45***	-1.15	-1.95	n/a	-16.09
	Perception of safety	5.28 (safe in village) 3.78 (safe while t ravelling)	3.45 (safe in neighbourhood)	0.78 (safe when moving around)	-7.97 (safe in neighbourhood)	1.85 (safe in neighbourhood)
	Private form of transportation	4.30	-1.36 (man-powered vehicle) -4.98 (petrol-powered vehicle)	0.27 (motorbike) 3.56** (car)	-45.41*** (satisfied with transport: boys) 30.26*** (satisfied with transport: girls)	1.33 (bicycle) -23.76** (cart) -6.40 (car)
	Access to public transportation	13.08	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Location		4.52 (Rolpa) -10.13*** (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	-1.24 (Swat, reference: Lower Dir)	n/a	4.31 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	-0.14	0.27	0.22	1.68	0.08
	Crimes experienced	-3.80	-0.18	-0.70	6.67	-0.15 (crimes) 0.23 (serious crimes)
Perception of education	Number of teachers	1.06 (dissatisfied) 9.56 (neutral) (ref: satisfied)	1.52 (satisfied: boys) -31.15* (dissatisfied: boys) -0.82 (satisfied: girls) 31.35** (dissatisfied: girls) (ref: neutral)	6.38 (neutral: boys) 4.33 (satisfied: boys) 0.44 (neutral: girls) 3.83 (satisfied: girls) (ref: dissatisfied)	4.28 (satisfied: boys) 4.44 (satisfied: girls)	-0.62 (fairly satisfied) 4.05 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Quality of teachers	-10.67 (dissatisfied)	6.48 (satisfied: boys)	n/a	n/a	-1.22 (fairly satisfied)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
		-13.22 (neutral) (ref: satisfied)	3.81 (dissatisfied: boys) -8.92 (satisfied: girls) 3.84 (dissatisfied: girls) (ref: neutral)			5.61 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Attendance of teachers	-0.17 (dissatisfied) 2.58 (neutral) (ref: satisfied)	0.22 (satisfied: boys) 10.36 (dissatisfied: boys) 1.03 (satisfied: girls) -9.67 (dissatisfied: girls) (ref: neutral)	0.35 (neutral: boys) -2.58 (satisfied: boys) 2.22 (neutral: girls) 0.82 (satisfied: girls) (ref: dissatisfied)	n/a	1.99 (fairly satisfied) 5.14 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Size of class	0.30 (dissatisfied) 5.64 (neutral) (ref: satisfied)	-1.58 (satisfied: boys) -15.94 (dissatisfied: boys) 3.57 (satisfied: girls) -3.45 (dissatisfied: girls) (ref: neutral)	5.26** (neutral: boys) 3.24 (satisfied: boys) -8.83*** (neutral: girls) -4.99* (satisfied: girls) (ref: dissatisfied)	n/a	-1.55 (fairly satisfied) 9.92* (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	School infrastructure	-1.74 (dissatisfied) -16.91* (neutral) (ref: satisfied)	-4.81 (satisfied: boys) 4.25 (dissatisfied: boys) 9.13 (satisfied: girls) -5.14 (dissatisfied: girls) (ref: neutral)	-0.29 (neutral: boys) 3.31 (satisfied: boys) -0.27 (neutral: girls) -2.94 (satisfied: girls) (ref: dissatisfied)	n/a	-1.60 (fairly satisfied) -9.21* (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Quality of equipment	-5.83 (dissatisfied) 6.92 (neutral) (ref: satisfied)	5.60 (satisfied: boys) -5.98 (dissatisfied: boys) -10.47 (satisfied: girls) 8.55 (dissatisfied: girls) (ref: neutral)	n/a	-33.79** (satisfied: boys) 34.51** (satisfied: girls)	2.27 (fairly satisfied) 6.50 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Official Fees for School	-1.25	-9.18 (boys) 5.63 (girls)	-2.31 (boys) 3.09* (girls)	38.79** (boys) -29.30 (girls)	n/a
	Informal fees for school	n/a	-0.35 (boys) 6.16 (girls)	-10.20 (boys) 3.73 (girls)	26.79* (boys) -20.54 (girls)	n/a
	Provider	1.78 (government)	-3.69 (government: boys) 0.00 (government: girls)	n/a	-29.26 (government: boys) 3.54 (government: girls)	3.90 (private) 8.06 (religious) 65.00** (NGO) -19.15** (other) (ref: government)
	Community Meeting Held on Education	-18.43*	-6.33	0.47	n/a	-0.70
	Attended Community Meeting on Education	5.29	5.06	n/a	0.86	n/a
Information about the regression model	R2	0.17	0.23	0.14	0.32	0.19
	Number of observations	357	487	535	316	776

Table 5: Comparative analysis on access to water services (Household level)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female-headed household	0.07	0.24	0.30 (female respondent)	-0.23	6.27
	Average age of household	0.05	-0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.03
	Main activity of household	-2.74 (main income source: agriculture)	0.25 (main income source: own cultivation)	-1.01 (HH head in farming) -0.03 (main income: farming) -0.61 (main income: overseas labour)	0.09 (main activity: fishing) 0.38* (main activity: agriculture) 0.50*** (main activity: trading)	Main income source: -0.35 (casual labour: agr) 15.1 (casual labour: non-agr) 6.37 (exploitation of bush products) 97.21** (other assistance) -2.61 (other economic activity) -9.83 (own business: shop) -6.71 (own business: home, market) 12.04 (fishing) -2.76 (livestock) -19.30*** (paid housework) -3.49 (private/ NGO) 4.46 (government) (ref: none)
	Education level of the adult household members	2.13** (mean years of education)	-0.17 (median education of adults)	-0.17*** (Average education of adults)	-0.32** (share of adults completing primary)	Respondent educ: 1.78 (some primary) 4.82 (primary) 0.95 (O level) -5.64 (A level) -0.30 (Tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	0.30	0.58 (internal) -2.93*** (international)	-0.34***	-12.36***
	Household receives remittances	2.02	0.43	3.13***	-0.09	-3.31**
	Household has been displaced	-6.19** (displaced due to conflict)	-0.54 (lived in village all life)	-0.58 (displaced due to conflict)	0.39** (ever displaced)	-6.74** (ever displaced)
	Religion	0.16 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	-4.94** (minority)	0.48 (minority)	n/a	-1.55*** (minority)	8.23* (Langi) 45.11*** (Iteso) 0.96 (Kumam) 75.89 (Karamojong) -5.02 (Mixed) -2.83 (Other) (ref: Acholi)
	Dependency ratio	-0.53	0.44	-0.02	0.20**	0.02*

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
	Morris Index	-0.04**	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.65*
	Food Security Index	0.22	0.05	-0.12***	-0.02**	-0.13
Context	Urban	n/a	-0.24	n/a	-3.33***	-7.34
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	-6.24***	0.53	0.73	n/a	-11.94*
	Perception of safety	1.65 (safe in village) -1.43 (safe while travelling)	0.04 (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.84* (safe when moving around)	0.04 (safe in neighbourhood)	3.02 (safe in neighbourhood)
	Private form of transportation	-0.36	0.59 (man-powered) -0.06 (petrol-powered)	-0.77 (motorbike) 0.39 (car)	0.21** (satisfied with access to transport)	1.34 (bicycle) 2.09 (cart) -8.94** (car)
	Access to public transportation	-2.50	n/a	n/a		
	Location	n/a	12.13 (Rolpa) -2.57 (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	-2.80*** (Swat)	n/a	4.67 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	0.31	0.05	0.33	-0.15***	0.58*
	Crimes experienced	1.12	0.07	0.74**	-0.36**	-0.37*** (crimes) 0.34 (serious crimes)
Perception of health services	Have to Queue for Water	4.93**	2.66	0.01*	0.99***	6.64**
	Official Fees for Water	-13.55***	-0.54	-0.00	0.31**	4.33
	Who runs water	1.68 (committee) 0.14 (NGO) 4.15 (nobody) (ref: government)	-6.21 (committee) -6.42 (NGO) -8.98 (nobody) (ref: government)	-0.28 (not run by government)	0.78*** (government)	3.65 (government) -11.32*** (private) -0.67 (community) 2.90 (NGO) -8.25 (other) (ref: nobody)
	Community Meeting Held on Water	-4.17	2.67	-0.80	n/a	-4.86*
	Attended community Meeting on Water	4.71*	-1.72	-0.66	0.60***	n/a
Information	R2	0.12	0.33	0.06	0.55	0.11

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
about the regression model	Number of observations	745	2982	2114	1374	1478

Table 6: Comparative analysis on access to social protection (Household level)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female-headed household	0.09	0.97***	-0.10 (respondent female)	0.47	-0.19
	Average age of household	-0.01	0.01***	-0.04***	0.02*	0.00
	Main activity of household	-0.34* (main income source: agriculture)	0.23** (main income source: own cultivation)	1.08** (HH head in farming) -0.39** (main income: farming) -0.27 (main income: overseas labour)	1.72*** (main activity: fishing) 0.99** (main activity: agriculture) 0.82** (main activity: trading)	Main income source: 0.10 (exploitation of bush products) 0.83 (other economic activity) -0.99 (business: home, market) 0.73 (own livestock) 0.13 (private/ NGO) -0.03 (work for government) (ref: none)
	Education level of the adult household members	-0.11 (mean years of education)	-0.22*** (median education of adults)	-0.17*** (average education of adults)	0.03 (share of adults completing primary)	Respondent educ: 0.80** (some primary) 0.01 (primary) 0.61 (O level) 0.16 (A level) -0.09 (tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	0.50***	0.07 (internal) -0.45 (international)	0.46**	1.09**
	Household receives remittances	0.35	-0.38***	0.57*	-0.22	0.24
	Household has been displaced	0.46** (displaced due to conflict)	0.03 (lived in village all life)	-0.12 (displaced due to conflict)	-0.25 (ever displaced)	0.43 (ever displaced)
	Number of children	-0.01	0.46***	0.13 (dependency ratio)	0.17**	0.00
	Number of elderly	-0.34	0.64***	n/a	0.02	0.61**
	Religion	-0.01 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	0.66*** (minority)	0.73*** (minority)	n/a	0.34	-0.45 (Langi)
	Morris Index	-0.00	0.00	0.02*	-0.07	0.01

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
	Food Security Index	0.01	0.02*	-0.00	0.03**	-0.01
Context	Urban	n/a	0.10	n/a	2.68***	0.25
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	0.97***	0.12	0.14	n/a	n/a
	Perception of safety	0.13 (safe in village) 0.32 (safe while travelling)	0.07 (safe in neighbourhood)	n/a	1.09 (safe in neighbourhood)	0.11 (safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	n/a	0.25**(Rolpa) 0.16 (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	1.23***	n/a	0.25 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	-0.03	-0.02	0.17**	0.09	-0.03
	Crimes experienced	0.14	0.00	-0.08	0.28	-0.01 (crimes) 0.00 (serious crimes)
	Community Meeting Held (Social Protection)	n/a	0.16	-0.27	n/a	1.23**
	Attended Meeting on Social Protection	n/a	0.23	-0.22	0.00	n/a
Information about the regression model	R2	0.13	0.15	n/a	0.07	n/a
	Number of observations	933	3051	2114	1375	1493

Table 7: Comparative analysis on access to livelihood services (Household level)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female-headed household	0.03	0.04	0.01 (female respondent)	0.10	-0.10
	Average age of household	-0.01	-0.02***	0.01	0.00	0.00
	Main activity of household	-0.57** (main income source: agriculture)	0.17 (main income source: own cultivation)	1.16* (HH head in farming) 0.38* (main income: farming) -0.53*(main income: overseas)	1.50*** (main activity: fishing) 2.52*** (main activity: agriculture) 0.41 (main activity: trading)	Main income source: -0.77 (casual labour: agr) -1.12 (casual labour: non-agr) -0.93 (exploitation of bush products) 1.3 (other assistance) -0.30 (other economic activity) -0.26 (own business: shop building) -0.09 (business: home, market) 1.22*** (own livestock)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
						0.71 (private/NGO) -0.55 (government) (ref: none)
	Education level of the adult household members	-0.11 (mean years of education)	0.07 (median education of adults)	-0.01 (average education of adults)	0.20 (Share of adults completing primary)	Respondent educ: 0.00 (some primary) 0.24 (primary) 0.25 (O level) -0.92 (A level) -0.01 (Tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	-0.04	-0.16 (internal) 0.23 (international)	0.45	0.27
	Household receives remittances	0.79**	0.25*	-0.06	0.16	0.20
	Household has been displaced	0.51* (displaced due to conflict)	-0.06 (lived in village all life)	-0.31 (displaced due to conflict)	0.29 (ever displaced)	0.42 (ever displaced)
	Dependency ratio	0.03	-0.14	-0.09	0.04	0.00
	Household owns land	0.13	0.33	n/a	-0.05	0.03**
	Religion	-0.70* (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	-0.65*** (minority)	0.03 (ethnicity)	n/a	0.20 (minority)	-0.36 (Langi) -0.47 (Kumam) 0.60 (Mixed) -0.96 (Other) (ref: Acholi))
	Morris Index	0.00*	0.01***	-0.02	0.33***	0.03
	Food Security Index	0.00	0.00	0.01***	-0.01	-0.02***
Context	Urban	n/a	-0.08	n/a	-1.04***	-0.26
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	1.83***	0.03	0.27	n/a	-0.94
	Perception of safety	-0.31 (safe in village) -0.02 (safe while travelling)	-0.09 (safe in neighbourhood)	0.00 (safe when moving around)	0.04 (safe in neighbourhood)	0.07 (safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	n/a	0.70***(Rolpa) -0.41***(Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	1.85*** (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	0.87 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	0.04	-0.02	0.01	0.33***	0.04**
	Crimes experienced	0.13	0.03*	0.22***	0.24	0.00 (crimes) 0.01 (serious crimes)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
	Community Meeting Held (Livelihood Services)	n/a	0.25	-0.69	n/a	1.26***
	Attended Meeting on Livelihood	n/a	1.41***	1.02	0.65***	n/a
Information about the regression model	R2	0.14	0.09	0.24	0.24	n/a
	Number of observations	920	3005	2087	1377	1430

Table 8: Comparative analysis on experience of health services. (Satisfied)

Satisfied	Explanatory variable	DRC (satisfied)	Nepal	Pakistan (satisfied)	Sri Lanka (satisfied)	Uganda (satisfied)
Household factors	Female respondent	0.11	(Satisfied is the base category)	-0.39**	-0.19 (male)	0.43* (female head)
	Age of respondent	-0.00	n/a	-0.01	0.00	0.01
	Main activity of household	-0.23 (main income source: agriculture)		-0.40 (main income: farming) -0.25 (main income: overseas labour)	0.18 (respondent is employed)	Main income source: 0.99 (casual labour: agr) 1.58** (casual labour: non-agr) -0.59 (exploitation of bush products) 2.49** (other assistance) 0.79 (other economic activity) -0.10 (own business: shop building) 1.06*** (business: home, market) 23.84*** (fishing) 0.36 (livestock) 22.34*** (paid housework) 0.51 (private/ NGO) 0.80 (work for government) (ref: none)
	Education level of respondent	-0.13 (categorical)		-0.02 (average education of adults)	0.22 (respondent completed primary)	Respondent educ: -0.03 (some primary) 0.02 (primary) -0.45 (O level) -0.04 (A level) 0.05 (tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a		n/a	-0.26	0.64
	Household receives remittances	-0.16		0.35	0.50*	-0.13

Satisfied	Explanatory variable	DRC (satisfied)	Nepal	Pakistan (satisfied)	Sri Lanka (satisfied)	Uganda (satisfied)
	Household has been displaced	0.41 (displaced due to conflict)		-0.37 (displaced due to conflict)	-0.65* (ever displaced)	-0.59** (eve displaced)
	Religion	0.08		n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	-0.25 (minority)		n/a	-0.20 (ethnicity)	-0.42 (Langi) -18.64*** (Iteso) -1.20 (Kumam) -22.04*** (Karamojong) 1.81* (Mixed) -0.92 (Other) (ref: Acholi)
	Dependency ratio	0.08		-0.16	0.24	0.00
	Morris Index	0.00		0.01	0.01	-0.04
	Food Security Index	-0.04*		-0.01	-0.01	0.00
Context	Urban	n/a		n/a	0.83***	-0.17
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	-0.14		0.09	n/a	-0.65
	Perception of safety	-0.43 (safe in village) 0.72* (safe while travelling)		0.33 (safe when moving around)	-0.12 (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.19 (safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	n/a		1.95***	n/a	0.06 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	-0.02		-0.12	0.13*	-0.01
	Crimes experienced	0.18		0.17	0.02	(crimes) 0.01 (serious crimes)
Perception of health services	Distance to health centre	-0.00		n/a	n/a	-0.00**
	Number of staff	2.03*** (neutral) 1.36*** (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)		0.75 (satisfied)	n/a	-2.37*** (fairly satisfied) -1.51*** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Availability of medicine	0.85***(neutral) 1.64*** (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)		2.38*** (satisfied)	2.11*** (satisfied)	
	Waiting times	1.39***(neutral) 1.43***(satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)		1.06*** (satisfied)	2.50*** (satisfied)	-1.17*** (fairly satisfied) -1.73*** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Quality of equipment	n/a		n/a	n/a	-1.85*** (fairly satisfied) -1.76*** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)

Satisfied	Explanatory variable	DRC (satisfied)	Nepal	Pakistan (satisfied)	Sri Lanka (satisfied)	Uganda (satisfied)
	Formal Health Costs	2.60**		-0.17	-0.01	0.53
	Informal Health Costs	-0.75*		n/a	-0.11	-0.42
	Provider of Health Facilities	-0.51 (government)		0.45 (service not run by government)	0.03 (government)	1.43*** (private) 0.76 (religious) 1.38 (NGO) -19.73*** (other) (ref: government)
	Community Meeting Held on Health	0.94**		n/a	n/a	-0.1
	Attended Community Meeting on Health	-1.59***		n/a	0.01	n/a
Information about the regression model	R2	0.45		0.65	0.39	n/a
	Number of observations	512		2062	1352	1407

Table 9: Comparative analysis on experience of health services. (Dissatisfied)

	Explanatory variable	Nepal (neutral)	Nepal (dissatisfied)	Pakistan (Indifferent)	Pakistan (very dissatisfied)	Sri Lanka	Uganda (dissatisfied)
Household factors	Female respondent	-0.07	-0.28	0.64***	0.73*	(Dissatisfied is the base category)	0.17 (female head)
	Age of respondent	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.00		0.01
	Main activity of household	0.21 (main income source: own cultivation)	0.34 (main income source: own cultivation)	-1.03*** (main income: farming) -0.78 (main income: overseas labour)	-0.55 (main income: farming) -0.80 (main income: overseas labour)		Main income source: 0.56 (casual labour: agr) 0.14 (casual labour: non-agr) -0.13 (exploitation of bush products) -20.00*** (other assistance) 2.43*** (other economic activity) -0.49 (own business: shop building) -0.12 (business: home, market) 0.61 (fishing) 0.48 (livestock) 0.43 (paid housework) -0.57 (private/ NGO) -1.25 (work for government) (ref: none)
	Education level of respondent	0.00 (categorical)	-0.04 (categorical)	-0.01 (average education of adults)	-0.02		Respondent educ: -0.02 (some primary) 0.00 (primary) 0.34 (O level) -0.82 (A level) -0.01 (tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	-0.41	0.56				1.08
	Household receives remittances	-0.10	-0.06	0.21	0.3		0.13
	Household has been displaced	0.21 (lived in village all life)	-0.05 (lived in village all life)	-0.58 (displaced due to conflict)	0.21 (displaced due to conflict)		0.27 (ever displaced)
	Ethnicity	0.00 (minority)	-0.17	n/a	n/a		0.01 (Langi) -22.95*** (Iteso) 0.11 (Kumam) -19.61*** (Karamojong) -0.03 (Mixed) -21.02 (Other)

	Explanatory variable	Nepal (neutral)	Nepal (dissatisfied)	Pakistan (Indifferent)	Pakistan (very dissatisfied)	Sri Lanka	Uganda (dissatisfied)
							(ref: Acholi)
	Dependency ratio	0.04	-0.37*	-0.08	-0.25		0.00
	Morris Index	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.04		-0.04
	Food Security Index	0.04***	0.04	0.02	0.02		0.00
Context	Urban	-0.45**	-0.54*	n/a	n/a		-0.14
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	0.32**	0.20	-0.03	0.41		0.32
	Perception of safety	-0.22 (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.74* (safe in neighbourhood)	0.17 (safe when moving around)	-0.45 (safe when moving around)		-0.14 (safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	-0.51** (Rolpa) -0.22 (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	-1.24** (Rolpa) -1.04*** (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	0.92*** (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	-2.22*** (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)		0.26 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	0.05***	0.08***	0.26**	-0.17		0.02
	Crimes experienced	-0.01	0.01	-0.37	0.07		0.00 (crimes) -0.02 (serious crimes)
Perception of health services	Distance to health centre	0.00	0.00	n/a	n/a		0.00
	Number of staff	-2.58*** (satisfied) -0.11 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	-2.28*** (satisfied) 2.31*** (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	0.65*** (satisfied)	-2.92*** (satisfied)		0.19 (fairly satisfied) 1.49*** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Availability of medicine	-2.22*** (satisfied) -0.06 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	-2.03*** (satisfied) 1.91*** (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	0.68*** (satisfied)	-1.35* (satisfied)		n/a
	Waiting times	-1.41*** (satisfied) 0.25 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	-1.21*** (satisfied) 1.30*** (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	0.37** (satisfied)	-0.90 (satisfied)		-0.18 (fairly satisfied) 0.57 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Quality of equipment	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		-0.96** (fairly satisfied) 0.95** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Formal Health Costs	0.33	1.41***	0.16	-0.84		-0.01
	Informal Health Costs	0.28	0.87*	n/a	n/a		0.27
	Provider of Health Facilities	0.45** (government)	1.37*** (government)	-0.86 (not run by government)	-0.84 (not run by government)		-1.73** (private) -0.76 (religious)

	Explanatory variable	Nepal (neutral)	Nepal (dissatisfied)	Pakistan (Indifferent)	Pakistan (very dissatisfied)	Sri Lanka	Uganda (dissatisfied)
							-0.49 (NGO) -19.87*** (other) (ref: government)
	Community Meeting Held on Health	0.30	0.98**	n/a	n/a		-0.29
	Attended Community Meeting on Health	-0.17	-0.53	n/a	n/a		n/a
Information about the regression model	R2	0.53	0.53	0.65	0.65		n/a
	Number of observations	2973	2973	2062	2062		1407

Table 10: Comparative analysis on experience of education service: Satisfied.

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female respondent	-0.02	-1.60**	-0.51 (female respondent)	0.45	-0.12
	Age of respondent	0.03*	-0.03	0.05	-0.06	0.00
	Main activity of household	-0.39 (main income source: agriculture)	-0.52 (main income source: own cultivation)	0.64 (main income: farming) -1.06 (main income: overseas labour)	0.25 (main activity: fishing) 1.83 (main activity: agriculture) 1.11 (main activity: trading)	Main income source: 0.88 (casual labour: agr) -2.30** (casual labour: non-agr) 1.87** (exploitation of bush products) 8.63*** (other assistance) -0.53 (other economic activity) 0.61 (own business: shop building) -1.06 (business: home, market) -2.38*** (own livestock) -19.68*** (paid housework) -0.96 (private sector, NGO) 0.45 (government) (ref: none)
	Education level of respondent	-0.02 (mean years of education)	0.26 (respondent's education)	0.03 (Average education of adults)	-0.88 (share of adults completing primary)	Respondent education: -0.18 (some primary) -0.54 (primary) -0.58 (O level) 0.84 (A level) -0.43 (Tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	-2.82**	-0.06 (internal migrant) -0.02 (international migrant)	-1.13**	-3.08**
	Household receives remittances	0.74	1.83**	0.36	1.58	0.07
	Household has been displaced	-0.47 (displaced due to conflict)	-1.15 (lived in village all life)	0.05 (displaced due to conflict)	-2.93**(ever displaced)	0.44 (ever displaced)
	Religion	-0.26 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	0.04 (minority)	0.72 (minority)	n/a	0.65 (minority)	-0.28 (Langi) 2.51** (Iteso) -22.41*** (Kumam) 11.54*** (Karamojong) -0.39 (Mixed) -19.53*** (other) (ref: Acholi)
	Dependency ratio	-0.14	-0.17	-0.29	-0.57	0.00
	Morris Index	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.05	-0.10**
	Food security index	0.04	0.13**	0.01	-0.02	-0.03*

Context	Urban	n/a	-1.56*	n/a	n/a	0.87
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	0.27	0.98	0.76	n/a	0.48
	Perception of safety	0.44 (safe in village) -0.10 (safe while travelling)	-0.53 (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.41 (safe when moving around)	1.12 (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.62** (Safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	n/a	1.25 (Rolpa) 1.89** (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	1.09** (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	0.62 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	-0.13	0.03	-0.46**	-0.24	-0.03
	Crimes experienced	-0.64***	0.02	0.43	-1.04	-0.07** (crimes) 0.05 (serious crimes)
Perception of education	Distance to school	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00
	Number of teachers	-2.12*** (neutral) -0.80 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)	-1.49 (satisfied: boys) -0.52 (satisfied: girls)	1.41* (satisfied: boys) 1.09 (neutral: girls) 2.54* (satisfied: girls) (ref: dissatisfied)	1.86* (satisfied: boys) 1.02 (satisfied: girls)	-0.93** (fairly satisfied) -0.59 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Quality of teachers	-1.10* (neutral) 0.51 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)	3.96** (satisfied: boys) -6.73*** (satisfied: girls)	n/a	n/a	-1.19*** (fairly satisfied) -1.44 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Attendance of teachers	-0.61 (neutral) -0.59 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)	-2.30* (satisfied: boys) -0.72 (satisfied: girls)	-1.96 (neutral: boys) -2.86 (satisfied: boys) 5.66** (neutral: girls) 6.94** (satisfied: girls) (ref: dissatisfied)	n/a	-1.13*** (fairly satisfied) -2.88*** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Size of class	-0.96** (dissatisfied) -0.24 (satisfied) (ref: neutral)	-1.17 (satisfied: boys) 0.11 (satisfied: girls)	1.39 (neutral: boys) 1.78* (satisfied: boys) -0.39 (neutral: girls) 0.34 (satisfied: girls) (ref: dissatisfied)	n/a	-1.50*** (fairly satisfied) -1.77*** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	School infrastructure	-1.24*** (dissatisfied) -0.42 (satisfied) (ref: neutral)	-1.03 (satisfied: boys) 1.60 (dissatisfied: boys) -1.65 (satisfied: girls) -0.29 (dissatisfied: girs) (ref: neutral)	0.64 (neutral: boys) -0.08 (satisfied: boys) 1.34* (neutral: girls) 3.41*** (satisfied: girls) (ref: dissatisfied)	n/a	-1.87*** (fairly satisfied) -1.89** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Quality of equipment	1.36*** (dissatisfied) 1.99*** (satisfied) (ref: neutral)	-1.62 (satisfied: boys) -1.96 (dissatisfied: boys) -0.80 (satisfied: girls) -1.04 (dissatisfied: girls) (ref: neutral)	n/a	-0.52 (satisfied: boys) 1.77 (satisfied: girls)	-0.05 (fairly satisfied) -2.63*** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Official Fees for School	-0.27	-0.50 (boys) -2.32 (girls)	-1.18* (boys) 1.89** (girls)	13.49 (boys) -12.59 (girls)	n/a
	Informal fees for school	n/a	-0.06 (boys) 0.67 (girls)	0.27 (boys) -0.14 (girls)	2.73 (boys) -1.44 (girls)	n/a
	Provider	-0.38 (government)	2.82* (government: boys) -4.89** (government: girls)	n/a	n/a	1.54** (private) 1.60 (religious)

						40.01*** (NGO) 7.44*** (other) (ref: government)
	Community Meeting Held on Education	-0.35	0.00	0.87	1.01**	1.23***
	Attended Community Meeting on Education	0.10	-0.05	n/a	n/a	n/a
Information about the regression model	R2	0.44	0.66	0.53	0.43	n/a
	Number of observations	400	463	503	306	774

Note: The outcome variable in this case is binary, corresponding to 1 if the respondent is satisfied with the overall quality of the boys' and girls' school. Since the model controls for aspects of boys' and girls' schooling independently we only include households which have both boys and girls enrolled in primary school.

Table 11: Comparative analysis on experience of water services: Water is clean and safe.

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female respondent	0.23	0.22	-0.03	0.13 (male)	0.14 (female head)
	Age of respondent	-0.01	0.01**	0.03	0.02*	0.01
	Main activity of household	0.10 (main income source: agriculture)	-0.17 (main income source: own cultivation)	0.14 (HH head in farming) -0.19 (main income: farming) -0.22 (main income: overseas labour)	-0.29 (respondent employed)	Main income source: 1.81* (casual labour: agr) 0.25 (casual labour: non-agr) 0.24 (exploitation of bush products) -1.36 (other assistance) -0.14 (other economic activity) -1.06** (own business: shop) -0.11 (business: home, market) 0.08 (own livestock) 0.34 (private/ NGO) -0.09 (government)
	Education level of respondent	0.04 (categorical)	0.01 (categorical)	-0.03 (average education of adults)	0.72 (respondent completed primary)	Respondent educ: -0.18 (some primary) -0.18 (primary) -0.30 (O level) -0.43 (A level) 0.114 (Tertiary)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
						(ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	-0.17	0.12 (internal) 0.43 (international)	0.00	-0.05
	Household receives remittances	0.61*	-0.22	-0.38	0.35	0.16
	Household has been displaced	-0.21 (displaced due to conflict)	0.38**(lived in village all life)	0.28 (displaced due to conflict)	-0.62 (ever displaced)	0.39** (ever displaced)
	Religion	0.36 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	1.15*** (minority)	0.27 (minority)	n/a	-0.07 (minority)	0.58 (Langi) 0.43 (Kumam) -0.80 (Karamojong) 1.56 (Mixed) -0.20 (other) (ref: Acholi)
	Dependency ratio	-0.16**	-0.16*	n/a	0.14	0.00
	Morris Index	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.14**	0.04
	Food Security Index	0.02	-0.05***	0.00	-0.03	-0.01**
Context	Urban	n/a	-0.60***	n/a	-0.02	0.53
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	0.52**	0.11	-0.00*	n/a	1.20
	Perception of safety	0.15 (safe in village) -0.03 (safe while travelling)	0.24 (safe in neighbourhood)	0.36* (safe moving around)	0.46 (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.29**(safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	n/a	-0.70*** (Rolpa) -0.56*** (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	-0.95*** (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	-0.16 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07	-0.05	-0.04**
	Crimes experienced	0.18	-0.01	-0.16	-0.66***	0.01 (crimes) 0.00 (serious crimes)
Perception of health services	Have to Queue for Water	-0.68***	-0.26**	-0.85***	-1.33***	0.33
	Official Fees for Water	-0.58**	-0.58***	0.00	-0.58**	1.28***
	Who runs water	-0.92*** (Run by Committee) -0.64** (Run by NGO) -0.22 (Run by Nobody) (Ref: government)	0.85** (Run by government) -0.09 (Run privately) 1.15** (Run by NGO) (ref: Other)	n/a	-0.10 (government)	2.48*** (government) 1.36*** (private) 1.14*** (community) 2.50*** (NGO) (ref: nobody)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
	Community Meeting Held on Water	-0.41	-0.15	-1.14	n/a	0.05
	Attended community Meeting on Water	-0.21	0.28	-0.00	0.26	n/a
Information about the regression model	R2	0.14	0.06	0.04	0.05	n/a
	Number of observations	777	2901	2087	1377	1445

Table 12: Comparative analysis on experience of social protection.

Explanatory variable		DRC (food aid has an impact)	Nepal (Transfer helps a bit)	Nepal (Transfer helps a lot)	Pakistan (Helps a lot)	Sri Lanka (Samurdhi transfer makes some difference)	Uganda
Household factors	Female respondent	-0.14	0.87	0.73	0.54	0.50 (male)	(Not enough observations)
	Age of respondent	-0.00	1.01	1.00	0.01	0.12*	
	Main activity of household	0.10 (main income source: agriculture)	1.11 (main income source: own cultivation)	0.54 (main income source: own cultivation)	0.36 (HH head in farming) 0.35 (main income: farming) 1.6 (main income: overseas labour)	-2.43 (respondent is employed)	
	Education level of respondent	-0.08 (categorical)	1.10 (categorical)	1.25 (categorical)	-0.17*** (average education of adults)	17.52 (respondent completed primary)	
	Household has migrant	n/a	0.33**	1.19	-3.06 (internal) -1.38 (international)	-2.94**	
	Household receives remittances	-0.89	0.93	0.54	0.11	0.96	
	Household has been displaced	0.58 (displaced due to conflict)	0.73 (lived in village all life)	0.64 (lived in village all life)	-1.87*** (displaced due to conflict)	0.95 (ever displaced)	
	Number of children	0.1764*	1.00	0.83	0.19 (dependency ratio)	1.01	
	Number of elderly	-0.06	0.98	1.78	n/a	-2.35	
	Religion	0.77 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
	Ethnicity	-0.78* (minority)	1.31 (minority)	1.27 (minority)	n/a	-19.63 (minority)	
	Morris Index	0.00	1.01	0.98	-0.03**	-1.13*	
	Food Security Index	-0.00	0.98	1.04	0.06	-0.02	
Context	Urban	n/a	1.01	0.83	n/a	2.54	
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	-0.87	0.90	0.74	-0.28	n/a	

Explanatory variable		DRC (food aid has an impact)	Nepal (Transfer helps a bit)	Nepal (Transfer helps a lot)	Pakistan (Helps a lot)	Sri Lanka (Samurdhi transfer makes some difference)	Uganda
	Perception of safety	-0.56 (safe in village) 0.69 (safe while travelling)	2.85** (safe in neighbourhood)	8.34* (safe in neighbourhood)	0.36 (safe moving around)	-2.76 (safe in neighbourhood)	
	Location	n/a	1.37 (Rolpa) 0.50** (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	3.12* (Rolpa) 0.66 (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	-2.89*** (Swat)	n/a	
Shocks	Shocks experienced	0.01	0.91**	0.85	-0.01	-1.38*	
	Crimes experienced	0.07	1.42**	1.65***	0.61	-15.12	
Perception of transfer	Right amount	n/a	0.56 (not always right amount)	3.69 (not always the right amount)	0.11 (right amount)	0.15 (right amount)	
	Received on Time	-3.39*** (on time)	1.16 (sometimes) 0.02*** (never) (ref: always)	0.63 (sometimes) 0.25 (never) (ref: always)	-0.28 (on time)	1.13 (one time)	
	Provider	-1.30** (not an NGO)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
	Community Meeting Held (Social Protection)	n/a	0.60	0.00	6.57***	n/a	
	Attended Meeting on Social Protection	n/a	1.51	0.91	5828.64	0.13	
Information about the regression model	R2	0.25	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.11	
	Number of observations	161	376	376	400	255	

Table 13: Comparative analysis on experience of livelihood services.

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal (seeds and grains transfer improved production)	Pakistan (seeds and tools transfer improved production)	Sri Lanka (Impact of livelihood service on production)	Uganda (has an impact)
Household factors	Female respondent	(Not enough observations of transfer receivers to carry out regression)	0.23	n/a	0.39 (male)	-1.06 (female head)
	Age of respondent		0.00	0.02 (average age of HH)	-0.01	0.01
	Main activity of household		0.96* (main income source: own cultivation)	0.04 (number of activities) -1.84 (ratio of self-employed) 0.62 (ratio of unemployed)	0.07 (respondent is employed)	Main income source: 0.02 (business: home, market) 0.94 (livestock)
	Education level of respondent		-0.40** (categorical)	0.03 (categorical)	-0.22 (respondents completed primary)	Respondent educ: 0.19 (some primary) 0.10 (primary) -0.12 (O level) -0.11 (tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant		0.93	-0.03	0.95**	-0.97
	Household receives remittances		0.36	n/a	-0.12	-0.30
	Household has been displaced		0.28 (lived in village all life)	-0.68 (displaced due to conflict)	0.68 (ever displaced)	0.22 (ever displaced)
	Dependency ratio		-0.28	n/a	-0.18	0.00
	Household owns land		3.50	1.16	0.00	-0.01
	Ethnicity		-0.47 (minority)	n/a	-0.80* (minority)	-0.92 (Langi) -0.02 (Mixed) (ref: Acholi)
	Morris Index		0.05**	-0.00	0.02	0.14**
	Food Security Index		-0.12**	0.03	-0.05*	-0.04**
Context	Urban		1.21	n/a	-0.52	0.90
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years		0.20	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Perception of safety		1.36* (safe in neighbourhood)	n/a	0.53 (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.44 (safe in neighbourhood)
	Location		0.44 (Rolpa)	n/a	n/a	3.15 (Sub-region: Langi)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal (seeds and grains transfer improved production)	Pakistan (seeds and tools transfer improved production)	Sri Lanka (Impact of livelihood service on production)	Uganda (has an impact)
			0.68 (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)			(reference: Acholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced		-0.08	-0.41*	0.05	0.01
	Crimes experienced		-0.03	-0.09	-0.35	0.03 (crimes) 0.01 (serious crimes)
	Barriers to agriculture		n/a	0.21	n/a	n/a
Perception of transfer	Received on time		2.01*** (on time)	n/a	3.14*** (on time)	2.74*** (on time)
	Who provides service		-0.48 (Government) 0.55 (International NGO) (ref: Other)	3.33*** (non-government)	0.52 (government)	0.85* (national NGO) 0.49 (international NGO) 0.95 (community) -0.61 (religious) (ref: government)
	Community Meeting Held (Livelihood Services)		-0.92	n/a	n/a	0.05
	Attended Meeting on Livelihood		-0.01	n/a	1.12**	n/a
Information about the regression model	R2		0.29	0.41	0.27	n/a
	Number of observations		195	2108	446	214

Table 14: Comparative analysis: Local government cares about opinions

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female respondent	-0.22	-0.12	0.23	-0.47 (male)	-0.26*
	Age of respondent	0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01**
	Main activity of household	1.03 (main income source: agriculture)	0.02 (main income source: own cultivation)	0.19 (farming main activity of head) 1.03*** (casual labour main activity of head) 0.80** (casual labour, non-agri, main activity of head) -0.52 (own business main activity of head)	0.13 (respondent is employed)	Respondent livelihood: -0.09 (casual labour: agr) -0.14 (casual labour: non-agr) -0.14 (exploitation of bush products) -0.06 (no activity) 0.02 (other economic activity) -0.41 (own business: shop building) 0.56* (business: home, market) -0.77 (fishing)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
				-1.21*** (head has no activity)		-0.36 (livestock) 0.56 (paid housework) -0.25 (private/ NGO) 0.01 (work for government) (ref: none)
	Education level of respondent	0.14 (categorical)	0.06* (categorical)	-0.42** (head has some education)	0.73* (completed primary)	Respondent educ: 0.17 (some primary) 0.16 (primary) -0.09 (O level) -0.28 (A level) -0.07 (tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	0.16	0.15	-0.12	0.31
	Household receives remittances	0.87	0.34***	-0.08	0.40	0.26
	Household has been displaced	-0.23 (displaced due to conflict)	0.01 (lived in village whole life)	-0.03 (displaced due to conflict)	-0.20 (ever displaced)	-0.20 (ever displaced)
	Dependency ratio	-0.03	0.03	-0.35**	0.05	0.00
	Religion	0.46 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	-0.25 (minority)	-0.16 (minority)	n/a	0.16 (minority)	-0.17 (Langi) 0.15 (Kumam) -1.37** (Mixed) -0.16 (other) (ref: Acholi)
	Morris Index	0.00	0.00**	0.00	-0.04	0.01
	Food Security Index	0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	0.00
Context	Urban	n/a	0.02	n/a	-0.10	-0.10
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	0.64	-0.28**	n/a	n/a	0.23
	Perception of safety	0.31 (safe in village) -0.76 (safe while travelling)	0.02 (safe in neighbourhood)	1.20*** (safe when moving around)	1.19** (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.24*** (safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	n/a	0.07 (Rolpa) -0.69*** (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	0.84** (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	-0.47*(Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Alcholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	0.24	0.02	0.19	-0.07	0.04**
	Crimes experienced	-0.23	-0.05**	-0.09	-0.33*	0.00 (crimes) -0.01 (serious crimes)
Access to	Distance to health	-0.0168*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00**

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
services	Distance to water	0.00	-0.01*	n/a	-0.01**	0.00
	Receives social protection	0.42	0.03	0.18	-0.12	0.30
	Receives livelihood transfer	-0.35	0.20	-0.07	0.03	0.05
Perception of services	Satisfied with health	-0.98 (satisfied)	0.05 (Dissatisfied)	-0.06 (satisfied)	0.38** (satisfied)	-0.47* (fairly satisfied) -0.87*** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Number of staff at health facility	1.34* (neutral) -0.60 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	0.14 (satisfied) -0.16 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	-0.48 (neutral) 1.01* (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	n/a	-0.23 (fairly satisfied) -0.41 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Availability of equipment/ medicine	-0.30 (neutral) -0.17 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	0.28* (satisfied) -0.05 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	-0.24 (neutral) -0.36 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	0.32** (satisfied)	0.10 (fairly satisfied with equipment) 0.34 (dissatisfied with equipment) (ref: satisfied)
	Waiting time at health facility	0.63 (neutral) 2.02*** (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	-0.40*** (satisfied) 0.11 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	0.13 (neutral) -0.26 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	-0.05 (satisfied)	-0.41 (fairly satisfied) -0.64 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Queue for water	0.31	0.17	-1.42***	-0.11	0.24
	Water clean and safe	0.82	-0.15	0.64	0.20	0.01
	Formal fees for health	-0.11	-0.17	-0.41	0.48	-0.35
	Informal fees for health	-1.40*	-0.54**	n/a	-0.02	0.37*
	Fees for water	1.44**	0.03	n/a	-0.87***	0.21
	Provider of health service	0.21 (Government)	0.29** (Government)	-0.42 (not government)	0.41 (Government)	-0.31 (private) -0.29 (religious) -1.20 (NGO) (ref: government)
	Provider of water	-0.32 (Committee) -0.05 (NGO) -0.87 (Nobody) (Ref: government)	0.41* (Government) 0.51** (Private owner) 0.54* (NGO) (ref: other)	0.62* (not government)	-0.16 (Government)	0.43 (government) 0.38 (private) 0.44** (community) 0.68* (NGO) -0.17 (other) (ref: nobody)
Community involvement	Experienced problem with service	-0.13	-0.20***	-0.04	-0.16**	-0.16*** (number of problems)
	Know of way to make a complaint	n/a	0.14***	1.24***	0.01	0.35* (fraction of services in which a complaint was made)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
	Attended meeting on any service	0.01 (Know of meeting on health) 0.32 (Attended meeting on health) 2.47** (Know of meeting on water) -0.76 (Attended meeting on water)	0.00 (Know of meeting) 0.13**(Attended meeting)	-0.72 (know of any meetings) 0.97 (number of meetings attended)	0.53*** (knew of meetings) -0.02 (number of meetings attended)	0.15** (number of meetings)
	Was consulted around any service	n/a	0.11**	0.81***	0.17**	0.19** (number of consultations)
Information about the regression model	R^2	0.28	0.10	n/a	0.18	0.03
	Number of observations	189	2517	2064	1201	1377

Table 15: Comparative analysis: Local government decisions reflect respondent's priorities (Never or almost never).

	Explanatory variable	DRC (Only in some areas)	Nepal (Never or almost never)	Pakistan (Only in some areas)	Sri Lanka	Uganda (Almost never)
Household factors	Female respondent	-0.49	-0.02	-0.19	0.35* (male)	0.13
	Age of respondent	0.01	-0.01	-0.02**	0.02***	0.00
	Main activity of household	-0.77** (main income source: agriculture)	-0.2 (main income source: own cultivation)	1.12** (farming main activity of head) 1.67*** (casual labour main activity of head) 1.69*** (casual labour, non-agri, main activity of head) 0.89 (own business main activity of head) 0.15 (head has no activity)	-0.27 (respondent is employed)	Respondent livelihood: 0.11 (casual labour: agr) 1.28*** (casual labour: non-agr) 0.71* (exploitation of bush products) 0.11 (no activity) 1.20*** (other economic activity) 0.71 (own business: shop building) 0.21 (business: home, market) -20.44*** (fishing) 0.07 (livestock) 0.21 (paid housework) 1.08 (private/ NGO) -0.16 (work for government) (ref: none)
	Education level of respondent	0.00 (categorical)	-0.13 (categorical)	-0.37 (head has some education)	-0.21 (respondent completed primary)	Respondent educ: 0.11 (some primary) 0.47 (primary) 0.67* (O level) 1.55* (A level) 0.84* (tertiary) (ref: none)

	Explanatory variable	DRC (Only in some areas)	Nepal (Never or almost never)	Pakistan (Only in some areas)	Sri Lanka	Uganda (Almost never)
	Household has migrant	n/a	-0.65	-0.28	0.36*	-0.29
	Household receives remittances	0.26	0.09	0.43	-0.12	0.04
	Household has been displaced	0.06 (displaced due to conflict)	0.01 (Lived in village whole life)	-0.12 (displaced due to conflict)	-0.21 (ever displaced)	0.09 (ever displaced)
	Dependency ratio	-0.04	0.02	-0.28	-0.08	0.00
	Religion	0.49 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	-0.69 (minority)	-0.49* (minority)	n/a	-0.92*** (minority)	-0.24 (Langi) -0.54 (Iteso) -0.19 (Kumam) -22.04*** (Karamojong) -0.50 (Mixed) -1.99 (other) (ref: Acholi)
	Morris Index	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11	-0.03*
	Food Security Index	0.06**	-0.01	-0.06*	0.01	0.00
Context	Urban	n/a	0.05	n/a	0.18	-0.48
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	-0.44	0.03	n/a	n/a	-0.10
	Perception of safety	0.78*(safe in village) -0.34 (safe while travelling)	-0.08 (safe in neighbourhood)	0.15 (safe when moving around)	-0.96** (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.26** (safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	n/a	0.44 (Rolpa) 0.05 (Bardya) (ref: Ilam)	1.46*** (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	0.15 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Alcholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	0.02	0.00	-0.09	0.18**	0.05**
	Crimes experienced	-0.30	-0.03	-0.13	0.09	0.00 (crimes) -0.01 (serious crimes)
Access to services	Distance to health	0.00	0.00	-0.01**	0.00	0.00***
	Distance to water	0.00	0.00	n/a	0.01*	0.00
	Receives social protection	0.41	0.13	0.21	-0.10	-0.20
	Receives livelihood transfer	-0.20	0.05	-0.29	-0.55***	0.27

	Explanatory variable	DRC (Only in some areas)	Nepal (Never or almost never)	Pakistan (Only in some areas)	Sri Lanka	Uganda (Almost never)
Perception of services	Satisfied with health service overall	0.53* (satisfied)	1.06*** (Dissatisfied)	-1.00** (satisfied)	-0.22 (satisfied)	-0.02 (fairly satisfied) -0.91* (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Number of staff at health facility	n/a	0.41 (satisfied) 1.22** (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	-2.15*** (neutral) -0.53 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	n/a	0.14 (fairly satisfied) -0.29 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Availability of equipment/ medicine	n/a	0.55* (satisfied) 0.36 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	0.26 (neutral) 0.96* (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	-0.45 (satisfied)	0.22 (fairly satisfied with equipment) -0.49 (dissatisfied with equipment) (ref: satisfied)
	Waiting time at health facility	n/a	-0.34 (satisfied) -0.39 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	-0.48 (neutral) -0.49 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	0.12 (satisfied)	0.01 (fairly satisfied) 0.21 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Queue for water	-0.21	0.49**	-0.99**	0.16	0.22
	Water clean and safe	0.43	-0.06	0.36	-0.57**	0.29
	Formal fees for health	12.67	-0.38	n/a	0.68	0.12
	Informal fees for health	-0.37	0.39	n/a	-0.06	0.14
	Fees for water	0.28	-0.55*	n/a	0.87***	0.52***
	Provider of health service	0.12 (Government)	-0.16 (Government)	n/a	0.82* (Government)	-0.08 (private) -0.72 (religious) -1.84 (NGO) -22.55 (other) (ref: government)
	Provider of water	0.12 (Committee) 0.20 (NGO) -0.87 (Nobody) (Ref: government)	0.71 (Government) 0.37 (Private) -1.63 (NGO) (ref: other)	n/a	-0.36 (Government)	0.21 (government) 0.15 (private) 0.34 (community) 0.00 (NGO) 0.52 (other) (re: nobody)
Community involvement	Experienced problem with service	-0.03	-0.06	-0.11	0.06	-0.05 (number of problems)
	Know of way to make a complaint	n/a	0.07	0.95**	-0.10	-0.12 (fraction of services in which a complaint was made)
	Attended meeting on any service	n/a	0.00 (Know of a meeting) 0.12 (Attended a meeting)	0.00 (know of any meetings) 0.27 (number of meetings attended)	-0.34 (knew of meetings)	0.16* (number of meetings)

	Explanatory variable	DRC (Only in some areas)	Nepal (Never or almost never)	Pakistan (Only in some areas)	Sri Lanka	Uganda (Almost never)
					0.15 (number of meetings attended)	
	Was consulted around any service	n/a	0.16	-11.42	-0.09	-0.26** (number of consultations)
Information about the regression model	R^2	0.13	0.10	n/a	0.28	n/a
	Number of observations	502	1417	2088	1303	1373

Table 16: Comparative analysis: Local government decisions reflect respondent's priorities (Very much/ to a large extent or Always).

	Explanatory variable	DRC (For the most part/ Always)	Nepal (Largely or completely)	Pakistan (Always)	Sri Lanka (Completely)	Uganda (Absolutely/ always)
Household factors	Female respondent	-0.51	-0.3	0.43	-0.29 (male)	-0.12
	Age of respondent	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.02*
	Main activity of household	-0.81** (main income source: agriculture)	0.48 (main income source: own cultivation)	-0.32 (farming main activity of head) 0.47(casual labour main activity of head) 0.24 (casual labour, non-agri, main activity of head) -0.54 (own business main activity of head) -1.23*** (head has no activity)	-0.04 (respondent is employed)	Respondent livelihood: 0.03 (casual labour: agr) 0.09 (casual labour: non-agr) 0.01 (exploitation of bush products) 0.31 (no activity) 0.54 (other economic activity) 0.36 (own business: shop building) 0.71 (business: home, market) 0.15 (fishing) 0.09 (livestock) 0.88 (paid housework) 0.79 (private/ NGO) 1.28** (work for government) (ref: none)
	Education level of respondent	-0.04 (categorical)	0.24** (categorical)	-0.27 (head has some education)	-0.42 (respondent completed primary)	Respondent educ: 0.2 (some primary) 0.36 (primary) -0.21 (O level) 0.72 (A level) -0.21 (tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	-0.32	-0.23	-0.09	0.17

	Explanatory variable	DRC (For the most part/ Always)	Nepal (Largely or completely)	Pakistan (Always)	Sri Lanka (Completely)	Uganda (Absolutely/ always)
	Household receives remittances	-0.10	0.43	-0.24	0.10	-0.24
	Household has been displaced	-0.77 (displaced due to conflict)	-0.1 (Lived in village whole life)	-0.40 (displaced due to conflict)	-0.26 (ever displaced)	0.01 (ever displaced)
	Dependency ratio	0.29**	-0.35	-0.12	0.02	0.00
	Religion	-0.67 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	0.59 (minority)	0.31 (minority)	n/a	-0.72*** (minority)	0.59 (Langi) -21.22*** (Iteso) -0.03 (Kumam) -21.47*** (Karamojong) -0.18 (Mixed) 0.43 (other) (ref: Acholi)
	Morris Index	0.00	0	0.01*	0.01	0.00
	Food Security Index	0.08***	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03**	-0.02**
Context	Urban	n/a	0.2	n/a	0.42**	-0.25
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	-0.92**	-0.14	n/a	n/a	0.32
	Perception of safety	0.33 (safe in village) -0.94** (safe while travelling)	-1.05** (safe in neighbourhood)	1.6** (safe when moving around)	0.90 (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.33** (safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	n/a	0.94 (Rolpa) 1.10** (Bardya) (ref: Ilam)	-0.08 (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	-0.9* (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Alcholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	0.34***	0.10***	0.45**	-0.02	0.05*
	Crimes experienced	-0.47**	-0.14	-0.06	-0.02	-0.01 (crimes) -0.05** (serious crimes)
Access to services	Distance to health	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Distance to water	0.01	-0.01	n/a	0.00	0.00
	Receives social protection	1.01**	0.01	0.24	-0.12	0.53
	Receives livelihood transfer	-0.22	0.59	0.62	-0.29*	0.06
Perception of	Satisfied with health service overall	0.06 (satisfied)	0.16 (dissatisfied)	-0.58 (satisfied)	0.60*** (satisfied)	-0.63 (fairly satisfied) -0.99** (dissatisfied)

	Explanatory variable	DRC (For the most part/ Always)	Nepal (Largely or completely)	Pakistan (Always)	Sri Lanka (Completely)	Uganda (Absolutely/ always)
services						(ref: satisfied)
	Number of staff at health facility	n/a	-0.51 (satisfied) -0.37 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	0.06 (neutral) 0.80 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	n/a	-0.39 (fairly satisfied) -0.68 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Availability of equipment/ medicine	n/a	1.95*** (satisfied) 1.85** (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	-0.50 (neutral) -0.65 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	-0.10 (satisfied)	0.41 (fairly satisfied with equipment) 0.38 (dissatisfied with equipment) (ref: satisfied)
	Waiting time at health facility	n/a	-0.46 (satisfied) -0.34 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	0.19 (neutral) 0.13 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	0.60*** (satisfied)	-0.81* (fairly satisfied) -0.74 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Queue for water	0.27	0.15	-0.85	-0.41	0.17
	Water clean and safe	0.90**	-0.94**	0.59	-0.16	0.08
	Formal fees for health	13.31	-0.33	n/a	0.09	-0.30
	Informal fees for health	-0.37	1.15**	n/a	0.07	-0.01
	Fees for water	-0.13	-0.02	n/a	-0.48**	0.14
	Provider of health service	-0.50 (Government)	0.71* (Government)	n/a	0.44	0.07 (private) -0.41 (religious) -0.76 (NGO) -21.49*** (other) (ref: government)
	Provider of water	-0.02 (Committee) 0.22 (NGO) -0.79 (Nobody) (Ref: government)	-0.7 (Government) -0.92 (Private) -1.52 (NGO) (ref: other)	n/a	-0.08	0.73*** (government) 0.07 (private) 0.32 (community) 0.58 (NGO) -0.32 (other) (ref: nobody)
Community involvement	Experienced problem with service	-0.08	-0.90***	-0.37**	-0.33***	-0.15* (number of problems)
	Know of way to make a complaint	n/a	0.28***	1.18**	0.21	-0.54 (fraction of services in which a complaint was made)
	Attended meeting on any service	n/a	0.00 (Knew of meeting) -0.10 (Attended meeting)	-064 (know of any meetings) 1.13 (number of meetings attended)	0.61*** (knew of meetings) -0.31 (number of meetings attended)	0.39*** (number of meetings)

	Explanatory variable	DRC (For the most part/ Always)	Nepal (Largely or completely)	Pakistan (Always)	Sri Lanka (Completely)	Uganda (Absolutely/ always)
	Was consulted around any service	n/a	0.32**	0.51	0.54***	0.18* (number of consultations)
Information about the regression model	R^2	0.13	0.10	n/a	0.28	n/a
	Number of observations	502	1417	2088	1303	1373

Table 17: Comparative analysis: Central government cares about opinions.

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Household factors	Female respondent	0.01	-0.07	-0.20	-0.33* (male)	-0.03
	Age of respondent	0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01*
	Main activity of household	0.60 (main income source: agriculture)	-0.29** (main income source: own cultivation)	-0.11 (farming main activity of head) -0.09 (casual labour main activity of head) -0.02 (casual labour, non-agri, main activity of head) -0.62(own business main activity of head) -1.31*** (head has no activity)	0.22 (respondent is employed)	Respondent livelihood: -0.45* (casual labour: agr) -0.99*** (casual labour: non-agr) -0.97*** (exploitation of bush products) -0.43 (no activity) (other economic activity) -0.31 (own business: shop building) 0.51 (business: home, market) -1.3 (fishing) -0.78*** (livestock) -0.46 (paid housework) -0.84 (private/ NGO) -0.52* (work for government) (ref: none)
	Education level of respondent	0.41*** (categorical)	0.08** (caegorical)	-0.09 (head has some education)	0.20 (respondent completed primary)	Respondent educ: -0.01 (some primary) 0.22 (primary) -0.35 (O level) -0.19 (A level) -0.25 (tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	0.47**	-0.21	0.05	0.22
	Household receives remittances	0.21	0.12	-0.18	0.21	0.20
	Household has been	-0.86 (displaced due	0.23* (Lived in village whole	0.88 (displaced due to conflict)	-0.46 (ever displaced)	-0.19 (ever displaced)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
	displaced	to conflict)	life)			
	Dependency ratio	0.33*	-0.08	-0.32	0.33**	0.00
	Religion	0.10 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	0.58 (minority)	n/a	n/a	-0.28 (minority)	-0.11 (Langi) 0.63 (Kumam) -0.53 (Mixed) 0.77 (other) (ref: Acholi)
	Morris Index	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00
	Food Security Index	0.06	0.01	-0.09**	0.05***	-0.01
Context	Urban	n/a	0.33**	n/a	-0.03	-0.28
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	0.47	-0.13	n/a	n/a	-0.03
	Perception of safety	-0.39 (safe in village) -0.85 (safe while travelling)	0.30 (Safe in neighbourhood)	0.22 (safe when moving around)	0.69 (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.13 (safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	n/a	0.57*** (Rolpa) -1.00*** (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	0.66* (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	-0.15 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Alcholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	0.18	-0.02	0.20	-0.15**	0.04**
	Crimes experienced	-0.31	-0.01	0.14	-0.40	-0.02 (crimes) -0.02 (serious crimes)
Access to services	Distance to health	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Distance to water	-0.01	0.00	n/a	-0.01	0.00
	Receives social protection	-0.14	0.19	0.49*	-0.22	-0.15
	Receives livelihood transfer	0.21	0.18	-0.44	0.38**	0.08
Perception of services	Satisfied with health service overall	0.60 (satisfied)	0.11 (Dissatisfied)	-0.71 (satisfied)	0.27 (satisfied)	-0.52** (fairly satisfied) -0.83** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Number of staff at health facility	0.68 (neutral) 0.10 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	0.06 (satisfied) -0.18 (dissatisfied)	0.41 (neutral) 1.41** (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	n/a	-0.56*** (fairly satisfied) -0.49** (dissatisfied)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
			(ref: neutral)			(ref: satisfied)
	Availability of equipment/ medicine	-0.60 (neutral) -0.24 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	0.32** (satisfied) 0.03 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	-0.37 (neutral) -0.85** (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	0.23 (satisfied)	0.18 (fairly satisfied with equipment) 0.59** (dissatisfied with equipment) (ref: satisfied)
	Waiting time at health facility	1.97** (neutral) 1.68* (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	-0.27(satisfied) 0.01 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	0.64 (neutral) 0.65 (satisfied) (ref: dissatisfied)	-0.31* (satisfied)	-0.12 (fairly satisfied) -0.66** (waiting time)
	Queue for water	0.28	-0.13	-0.75*	-0.10	0.33**
	Water clean and safe	1.50**	0.08	0.19	-0.40	-0.12
	Formal fees for health	n/a	-0.43**	-0.26	-0.46	-0.14
	Informal fees for health	-1.75*	-0.21	n/a	0.42	0.24
	Fees for water	-0.25	0.07	n/a	-0.99***	0.17
	Provider of health service	-0.38 (Government)	0.17 (Government)	-0.45 (not government)	-0.84 (Government)	-0.31 (private) -0.56 (religious) -1.16 (NGO) (ref: government)
	Provider of water	-0.84 (Committee) -0.19 (NGO) -1.07 (Nobody) (Ref: government)	0.83** (Government) 0.80** (Private owner) 0.86** (NGO) (ref: Other)	0.38 (not government)	-0.02 (Government)	0.37 (government) -0.22 (private) 0.12 (community) 0.39 (NGO) 0.05 (other) (ref: nobody)
Community involvement	Experienced problem with service	-0.22	-0.15**	0.07	-0.32***	-0.10*(number of problems)
	Know of way to make a complaint	n/a	0.13***	1.13***	0.19	0.71*** (fraction of services in which a complaint was made)
	Attended meeting on any service	-0.48 (Know of meeting on health) 0.01 (Attended meeting on health) 1.72 (Know of meeting on water) -1.05 (Attended meeting on water)	0.00 (Know of meeting) 0.13**(Attended meeting)	-0.13 (know of any meetings) 0.40 (number of meetings attended)	-0.25 (knew of meetings) 0.43** (number of meetings attended)	0.06 (number of meetings attended)
	Was consulted around	n/a	0.09*	0.74**	0.07	0.18** (number of consultations)

	Explanatory variable	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
	any service					
Information about the regression model	R^2	0.19	0.13	n/a	0.14	n/a
	Number of observations	181	2393	2064	1016	1368

Table 18: Comparative analysis: Central government decisions reflect respondent's priorities (Never or almost never).

	Explanatory variable	DRC (Only in certain areas)	Nepal (Never/ Almost never)	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda (Almost never)
Household factors	Female respondent	-0.42	0.21	-0.02	0.12 (male)	0.38**
	Age of respondent	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01
	Main activity of household	-0.13 (main income source: agriculture)	-0.36* (main income source: own cultivation)	-0.62 (farming main activity of head) -1.02 (casual labour main activity of head) 0.16 (casual labour, non-agri, main activity of head) 0.13 (own business main activity of head) -1.37*** (head has no activity)	0.15 (respondent is employed)	Respondent livelihood: -0.44 (casual labour: agr) 0. 54 (casual labour: non-agr) -0.13 (exploitation of bush products) -0.95 (no activity) 0.63** (other economic activity) 0.94** (own business: shop building) -0.78 (business: home, market) -0.60 (fishing) -0.22 (livestock) -0.43 (paid housework) -0.15 (private/ NGO) 0.68* (work for government) (ref: none)
	Education level of respondent	-0.02 (categorical)	0.06 (categorical)	-0.07 (head has some education)	0.48 (respondent completed primary)	Respondent educ: 0.55** (some primary) 0.41 (primary) 0.92** (O level) 0.85 (A level) 0.81** (tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	0.28	-1.07*	-0.05	-0.15
	Household receives remittances	0.86	0.2	1.00*	0.19	-0.15
	Household has been	0.63 (displaced due to	0.13 (Lived in village whole	0.59 (displaced due to	0.39 (ever displaced)	0.36 (ever displaced)

	Explanatory variable	DRC (Only in certain areas)	Nepal (Never/ Almost never)	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda (Almost never)
	displaced	conflict)	life)	conflict)		
	Dependency ratio	0.16	-0.01	0.05	-0.19	0.00**
	Religion	0.47 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	-0.80 (minority)	-0.39 (minority)	n/a	-0.13 (minority)	0.13 (Langi) -24.03*** (Iteso) 0.11 (Kumam) -22.24*** (Karamojong) -1.41 (Mixed) -0.96 (other) (ref: Acholi)
	Morris Index	0.01*	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.05***
	Food Security Index	0.02	0.03*	-0.11**	-0.05***	0.01
Context	Urban	n/a	-0.43	n/a	0.40**	0.47
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	-0.12	0.33	n/a	n/a	-23.18***
	Perception of safety	0.13 (safe in village) 0.17 (safe while travelling)	0.18 (safe in neighbourhood)	0.23(safe when moving around)	-1.35** (safe in neighbourhood)	-0.31**(safe in neighbourhood)
	Location	n/a	0.68**(Rolpa) 0.69**(Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	0.35 (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	-0.05 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Alcholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	-0.20**	0.00	0.09	0.31***	0.03
	Crimes experienced	-0.26	-0.03	-0.01	-0.14	0.05** (crimes) -0.10*** (serious crimes)
Access to services	Distance to health	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00**
	Distance to water	0.00	-0.01	n/a	0.02**	0.00*
	Receives social protection	0.33	-0.17	0.06	0.21	-0.13
	Receives livelihood transfer	0.50	-0.1	-0.31	-0.47**	-0.03
Perception of services	Satisfied with health service overall	0.28 (satisfied)	0.82** (Dissatisfied)	n/a	0.04 (satisfied)	-0.01 (fairly satisfied) -0.58 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Number of staff at health facility	n/a	-0.15 (satisfied)	n/a	n/a	-0.11 (fairly satisfied)

	Explanatory variable	DRC (Only in certain areas)	Nepal (Never/ Almost never)	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda (Almost never)
			-0.60 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)			-0.96** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Availability of equipment/ medicine	n/a	0.6** (satisfied) 0.09 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	n/a	-0.27 (satisfied)	0.35 (fairly satisfied with equipment) 0.18 (dissatisfied with equipment) (ref: satisfied)
	Waiting time at health facility	n/a	-0.17 (satisfied) -0.06 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	n/a	-0.16 (satisfied)	-0.31 (fairly satisfied) -0. 34 (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Queue for water	0.14	0.18	n/a	0.35	-0.17
	Water clean and safe	0.18	-0.03	n/a	-0.11	0.26
	Formal fees for health	12.52	n/a	n/a	0.97**	0.36
	Informal fees for health	-0.66	0.71**	n/a	0.45	0.21
	Fees for water	0.54	-0.18	n/a	0.95**	0.37**
	Provider of health service	0.04 (Government)	0.05 (Government)	n/a	1.32*** (Government)	-0.74* (private) -0.72 (religious) -1.16 (NGO) (ref: government)
	Provider of water	-0.22 (Committee) -0.70 (NGO) -0.74 (Nobody) (ref: government)	0.46 (Government) -0.05 (Private) -0.31 (NGO) (ref: other)	n/a	-0.34(Government)	0.54 (government) -0.35 (private) 0.64** (community) 0.69 (NGO) 0.10 (other) (ref: nobody)
Community involvement	Experienced problem with service	0.11	-0.37***	-0.17	0.18**	0.11 (number of problems)
	Know of way to make a complaint	n/a	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.08 (fraction of services in which a complaint was made)
	Attended meeting on any service	n/a	0.00 (Knew of meeting) 0.02 (Attended meeting)	-0.21 (know of any meetings) 0.39 (number of meetings attended)	-0.04 (knew of meetings) -0.01 (number of meetings attended)	0.27*** (number of meetings)

	Explanatory variable	DRC (Only in certain areas)	Nepal (Never/ Almost never)	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda (Almost never)
	Was consulted around any service	n/a	0.24**	0.75	-0.31***	-0.27**(number of consultations)
Information about the regression model	R^2	0.11	0.13	n/a	0.18	n/a
	Number of observations	526	1312	2088	1182	1351

Table 19: Comparative analysis: Central government decisions reflect respondent's priorities (Very much/ to a large extent or Always).

	Explanatory variable	DRC (For the most part/ Always)	Nepal (Largely or completely)	Pakistan (Largely or completely)	Sri Lanka (Completely)	Uganda (To a large extent/ Always)
Household factors	Female respondent	-0.30	0.02	0.33	0.26 (male)	0.12
	Age of respondent	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
	Main activity of household	-0.35 (main income source: agriculture)	1.04** (main income source: own cultivation)	-0.64 (farming main activity of head) -14.84 (casual labour main activity of head) -0.21 (casual labour, non-agri, main activity of head) -1.05 (own business main activity of head) -0.95 (head has no activity)	-0.19 (respondent is employed)	Respondent livelihood: -0.33 (casual labour: agr) -0.41 (casual labour: non-agr) -1.17** (exploitation of bush products) 0.58 (no activity) 0.19 (other economic activity) 0.27 (own business: shop building) 0.73 (business: home, market) 0.17 (fishing) -0.29 (livestock) 0.09 (paid housework) -2.14 (private/ NGO) 0.17 (work for government) (ref: none)
	Education level of respondent	-0.11 (categorical)	-0.07 (categorical)	-0.80* (head has some education)	0.33 (respondent completed primary)	Respondent educ: 0.08 (some primary) 0.10 (primary) -0.60 (O level) -0.08 (A level) -0.08 (tertiary) (ref: none)
	Household has migrant	n/a	-1.23	-0.88	-0.08	-0.15
	Household receives remittances	0.98*	0.8	0.28	-0.05	-19.40***

	Explanatory variable	DRC (For the most part/ Always)	Nepal (Largely or completely)	Pakistan (Largely or completely)	Sri Lanka (Completely)	Uganda (To a large extent/ Always)
	Household has been displaced	-0.84 (displaced due to conflict)	0.03 (Lived in village whole life)	14.12 (displaced due to conflict)	0.04 (ever displaced)	-0.23 (ever displaced)
	Dependency ratio	0.07	-0.63	-0.32	0.19	0.00
	Religion	-1.40 (minority)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Ethnicity	0.54 (minority)	0.31 (minority)	n/a	–0.38 (minority)	0.44 (Langi) -22.65*** (Iteso) -0.15 (Kumam) -20.49*** (Karamojong) -22.10*** (Mixed) 1.16 (other) (ref: Acholi)
	Morris Index	0.00	0.01**	0.02***	0.02	0.01
	Food Security Index	0.06**	0.03	0.00	-0.05**	-0.02**
Context	Urban	n/a	-0.23	n/a	0.68**	n/a
	Household has experienced conflict in past three years	-0.35	-1.13**	n/a	n/a	-0.30
	Perception of safety	0.63 (safe in village) -0.56 (safe while travelling)	-0.78 (safe in neighbourhood)	15.93 (safe when moving around)	-1.12* (safe in neighbourhood)	n/a
	Location	n/a	0.62 (Rolpa) 0.47 (Bardiya) (ref: Ilam)	-1.09* (Swat) (ref: Lower Dir)	n/a	-0.77 (Sub-region: Langi) (reference: Alcholi)
Shocks	Shocks experienced	0.05	-0.13	0.41*	0.03	0.04*
	Crimes experienced	-0.35	-0.34	0.12	-0.37	0.01 (crimes) -0.06** (serious crimes)
Access to services	Distance to health	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Distance to water	0.01	-0.02	n/a	0.01	0.00
	Receives social protection	0.74*	1.04**	-0.28	0.41*	0.69
	Receives livelihood transfer	-0.02	-0.1	-0.37	0.03	0.09
Perception of services	Satisfied with health service overall	0.28 (Satisfied)	-0.39 (Dissatisfied)	n/a	0.26 (satisfied)	-0.96** (fairly satisfied) -0.74* (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)

	Explanatory variable	DRC (For the most part/ Always)	Nepal (Largely or completely)	Pakistan (Largely or completely)	Sri Lanka (Completely)	Uganda (To a large extent/ Always)
	Number of staff at health facility	n/a	1.18 (satisfied) -15.57 (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	n/a	n/a	-0.73*** (fairly satisfied) -1.06*** (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Availability of equipment/ medicine	n/a	1.49 (satisfied) 2.89** (dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	n/a	0.03 (satisfied)	0.67* (fairly satisfied with equipment) 0.56* (dissatisfied with equipment) (ref: satisfied)
	Waiting time at health facility	n/a	-1.08*(satisfied) -0.22(dissatisfied) (ref: neutral)	n/a	0.26 (satisfied)	-0.40 (fairly satisfied) -0.86* (dissatisfied) (ref: satisfied)
	Queue for water	0.17	0.36	n/a	0.15	0.36
	Water clean and safe	0.37	-0.84	n/a	-0.79**	0.24
	Formal fees for health	-0.73	n/a	n/a	0.16	-0.01
	Informal fees for health	0.21	1.46**	n/a	0.57	0.66*
	Fees for water	0.45	1.19*	n/a	-0.13	0.18
	Provider of health service	-0.02 (Government)	0.43 (Government)	n/a	0.20 (Government)	-0.30 (private) -0.87 (religious) -23.19*** (NGO) (ref: government)
	Provider of water	-0.57 (Committee) -0.14 (NGO) -0.16 (Nobody) (ref: government)	-0.57 (Government)	n/a	0.00 (Government)	0.06 (government) -0.69* (private) -0.23(community) 0.16 (NGO) (ref: nobody)
Community involvement	Experienced problem with service	-0.08	-0.68**	-0.27	-0.35***	-0.13 (number of problems)
	Know of way to make a complaint	n/a	0.34***	1.90***	0.06	0.11 (fraction of services in which a complaint was made)

	Explanatory variable	DRC (For the most part/ Always)	Nepal (Largely or completely)	Pakistan (Largely or completely)	Sri Lanka (Completely)	Uganda (To a large extent/ Always)
	Attended meeting on any service	n/a	0.00 (Knew of meeting) 0.15 (Attended meeting	-17.07 (know of any meetings) 17.64 (number of meetings attended)	-0.02 (knew of meetings) 0.07 (number of meetings attended)	0.26** (number of meetings)
	Was consulted around any service	n/a	0.40**	1.02*	0.20**	0.14 (number of consultations)
Information about the regression model	R^2	0.11	0.13	n/a	0.18	n/a
	Number of observations	526	1312	2088	1182	1351

Annex 2: Descriptive tables

Table 1: Households receiving main income from subsistence farming, by country

Country	Subsistence farming	%	Total
DRC	637	70.2	908
Nepal	1,461	46.0	3,173
Pakistan	305	15.7	1,946
Sri Lanka	390	30.6	1,275
Uganda	1,462	83.0	1,762
Total	4,255	46.9	9,064

Table 2: Mean number of income sources per household, by country

Country	n	Mean	Min	Max
DRC	1259	2.30	0	7
Nepal	3174	2.06	0	6
Pakistan	2114	1.84	0	5
Sri Lanka	1377	1.70	0	5
Uganda	1773	2.89	0	8
Total	9697	2.14	0	8

Table 3: Percentage of households with only one income source, out of all households with any income sources, by country

Income diversity	One source (%)	More than one source (%)	Total
DRC	16.2	83.8	100
Nepal	28.2	71.8	100
Pakistan	36.9	63.1	100
Sri Lanka	46.6	53.4	100
Uganda	11.0	89.0	100
Total	28.1	71.9	100

Table 4: Main source of household income, DRC

Livelihood	Freq	%
Subsistence farming	637	70.2
Casual labour (any)	96	10.6
Petty trade	64	7.0
Own business	17	1.9
Private sector (non-agri)	59	6.5
Remittances	9	1.0
Public sector	17	1.9
Other	9	1.0
Total	908	100.0

Note: Other includes domestic work and social protection transfers

Table 5: Main source of household income, Nepal

Livelihood	Freq	%
Subsistence farming	1,461	46.0
Casual labour (any)	515	16.2
Petty trade	95	3.0
Own business	383	12.1
Private sector (non-agri)	143	4.5
Remittances	306	9.6
Public sector	249	7.8
Other	21	0.7
Total	3,173	100

Note: Other includes domestic work and social protection transfers

Table 6: Main source of household income, Pakistan

Livelihood	Freq	%
Subsistence farming	305	15.7
Casual labour (any)	449	23.1
Petty trade	29	1.5
Own business	205	10.5
Private sector (non-agri)	160	8.2
Remittances	605	31.1
Public sector	137	7.0
Other	56	2.9
Total	1,946	100

Note: Other includes domestic work and social protection transfers

Table 7: Main source of household income, Sri Lanka

Livelihood	Freq	%
Subsistence farming	390	30.6
Casual labour (any)	471	36.9
Petty trade	0	0.0
Own business	178	14.0
Private sector (non-agri)	56	4.4
Remittances	40	3.1
Public sector	85	6.7
Other	55	4.3
Total	1,275	100

Note: Other includes domestic work and social protection transfers

Table 8: Main source of household income, Sri Lanka

Livelihood	Freq	%
Subsistence farming	1,462	83.0
Casual labour (any)	25	1.4
Petty trade	27	1.5
Own business	55	3.1
Private sector (non-agri)	71	4.0
Remittances	0	0.0
Public sector	3	0.2
Other	119	6.8
Total	1,762	100

Note: Other includes domestic work and social protection transfers

Table 9: Distance to health clinic (measured by time taken for a return journey), by country

	30 minutes or less		31-60 minutes		61-120 minutes		More than 2 hours		Total	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
DRC	630	51.7	378	31.0	168	13.8	43	3.5	1219	100
Nepal	2081	65.6	685	21.6	296	9.3	111	3.5	3173	100
Pakistan	1416	67.7	480	22.9	176	8.4	21	1.0	2093	100
Sri Lanka	943	68.6	215	15.6	164	11.9	53	3.9	1375	100
Uganda	340	19.4	461	26.3	432	24.6	520	29.7	1753	100
Total	5410	56.3	2219	23.1	1236	12.9	748	7.8	9613	100

Table 10: Distance to primary school (measured by time taken for a return journey), by country

	30 minutes or less		31-60 minutes		61-120 minutes		More than 2 hours		Total	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
DRC	427	47.6	262	29.2	164	18.3	44	4.9	897	100
Nepal	1445	82.8	231	13.2	64	3.7	6	0.3	1746	100
Pakistan	1370	93.4	92	6.3	5	0.3	0	0.0	1467	100
Sri Lanka	706	88.6	49	6.2	30	3.8	12	1.5	797	100
Uganda	454	47.6	286	30.0	164	17.2	49	5.1	953	100
Total	4402	75.1	920	15.7	427	7.3	111	1.9	5860	100

Table 11: Distance to water source (measured by time taken for a return journey), by country

	30 minutes or less		31-60 minutes		61-120 minutes		More than 2 hours		Total	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
DRC	911	75.7	224	18.6	63	5.2	6	0.5	1204	100
Nepal	1058	93.6	62	5.5	10	0.9	1	0.1	1131	100
Pakistan	721	93.8	43	5.6	5	0.7	0	0.0	769	100
Sri Lanka	538	93.6	31	5.4	5	0.9	1	0.2	575	100
Uganda	1033	59.1	468	26.8	187	10.7	61	3.5	1749	100
Total	4261	78.5	828	15.3	270	5.0	69	1.3	5428	100

Table 12: Households receiving social protection and livelihood assistance, by country

	Social protection		Livelihood assistance		Total	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
DRC	280	22.2	208	16.5	1259	100
Nepal	1205	38.0	519	16.3	3174	100
Pakistan	519	24.6	508	24.0	2114	100
Sri Lanka	356	25.9	445	32.4	1375	100
Uganda	69	3.9	273	15.4	1773	100
Total	2429	25.1	1953	20.1	9695	100

Table 13: Satisfaction with health facility used

	Country (***)					
Health facilities	**DRC**	**Nepal**	**Pakistan**	**Sri Lanka**	**Uganda**	**All**
Very dissatisfied	71	40	92	0	0	203
Dissatisfied	156	152	399	538	371	1,616
Neutral/ Fairly satisfied	393	653	145	0	987	2,178
Satisfied	373	1,958	1,203	814	354	4,702
Very satisfied	29	345	272	0	0	646
Total	1,022	3,148	2,111	1,352	1,712	9,345

Note: Significance based on Chi-squared test. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Table 14: Satisfaction with primary school used

	Country (***)						
Education	**DRC**	**Nepal**	**Pakistan girls**	**Pakistan boys**	**Sri Lanka**	**Uganda**	**All**
Very dissatisfied	50	3	30	18	0	0	101
Dissatisfied	212	31	166	150	0	335	894
Neutral/ Fairly satisfied	343	222	46	57	200	642	1,510
Satisfied	257	1,249	542	661	597	298	3,604
Very satisfied	30	236	137	237	0	0	640
Total	892	1,741	921	1,123	797	1,275	6,749

Note: Significance based on Chi-squared test. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Table 15: Perception of water quality, by country

	Country (***)					
Water clean and safe	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda	All
Yes	873	2,758	1,975	1,262	1,321	1,281
No	262	326	139	115	439	8,189
Total	1,135	3,084	2,114	1,377	1,760	9,470

Note: Significance based on Chi-squared test. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Table 16: Transfer had any positive impact, by type of transfer and across countries

	Social protection			Livelihood assistance		
Transfer had any positive impact	Had an impact	%	Total	Had an impact	%	Total
DRC	146	61.6	237	87	62.1	140
Nepal	246	62.3	395	181	84.6	214
Pakistan	268	65.7	408	219	43.1	508
Sri Lanka	55	21.2	259	95	76.6	124
Uganda	15	60.0	25	61	52.6	116
All	730	55.1	1,324	643	58.3	1,102

Table 17: Local government cares about my opinion

Country	No	%	Yes	%	Total
DRC ***	1,087	86.3	172	13.7	1,259
Nepal ***	1,799	66.2	917	33.8	2,716
Pakistan ***	1,996	94.4	118	5.6	2,114
Sri Lanka ***	486	39.8	736	60.2	1,222
Uganda ***	1,029	60.0	687	40.0	1,716

Note: Significance based on T-test of means. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Table 18: Central government cares about my opinion

Country	No	%	Yes	%	Total
DRC ***	1,085	86.2	174	13.8	1,259
Nepal	2,028	78.8	544	21.2	2,572
Pakistan ***	2,030	96.0	84	4.0	2,114
Sri Lanka ***	580	56.0	456	44.0	1,036
Uganda ***	1,097	64.3	609	35.7	1,706

Note: Significance based on T-test of means. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Table 19: Local government decisions reflect my priorities

	Country (***)				
Government decisions reflect my priorities	**DRC**	**Nepal**	**Pakistan**	**Sri Lanka**	**Uganda**
Never	725	1,585	1,911	137	697
Almost never	0	268	79	172	324
In some areas	154	842	75	548	468
To a large extent	90	94	43	246	168
Always/ completely	0	6	6	224	45
Total	969	2795	2,114	1,327	1,702

Note: Significance based on Chi-squared test. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Table 20: Central government decisions reflect my priorities

	Country (***)				
Government decisions reflect my priorities	**DRC**	**Nepal**	**Pakistan**	**Sri Lanka**	**Uganda**
Never	544	1,824	2,005	158	791
Almost never	287	275	39	220	294
In some areas	122	460	42	623	375
To a large extent	78	54	25	138	155
Always/ completely	0	2	3	65	57
Total	1031	2,615	2,114	1,204	1672

Note: Significance based on Chi-squared test. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Table 21: Uptake of social protection, by country and specific transfer

Social protection									
DRC	**%**	**Nepal**	**%**	**Pakistan**	**%**	**Sri Lanka**	**%**	**Uganda**	**%**
A. Food aid	**21**	**A. Old age allowance**	**13**	**A. BISP**	**21**	A. Pension	2	**A. Free food aid or free household items**	1
B. Micro-finance	2	B. Single women/widow allowance	7	B. Zakat from Govt fund	0	B. Old age pension	4	B. School feeding programme	0
		C. Disability grant	1	C. Sadqa / Nazar	0	C. Disability Allowance	1	C. Old age pension	1
		D. Stipend for girls and Dalit Children/Students	16	D. Grant from Baitul Mall	0	D. Fisher pension scheme	1	D. Feeding patients in hospitals	1
		E. Mid-day meal, school uniform, cooking oil for children	7	E. Grant from RSPs (e.g NRSP UC Poverty Program) or other NGOs	0	E. Fisheries loan scheme	2	E. Retirement pension	1
		F. Cash transfers for family whose family member disappeared during or due to conflict	0	F. Pension	2	F. Fisher insurance scheme	1	F. Any other money payment from the government or organisations?	1
		G. Cash transfers for family whose family was killed during/due to conflict	0	G. Zakat from community	1	**G. Samurdhi**	**20**		
		H. Scholarship to children of those families whose family members disappeared or were killed due to conflict	0	H. Compensation for Rehabilitation (housing)	2	H. (Fisher) Housing scheme	0		
				I. Other (specify)		I. Provision of sanitary facilities	0		
						J. Drinking water/Well scheme	1		

Note: Social protection transfers in red are the dependent variables for the regressions on satisfaction with social protection.

Table 22; Uptake of livelihood assistance, by country and specific transfer

Livelihoods									
DRC	**%**	**Nepal**	**%**	**Pakistan**	**%**	**Sri Lanka**	**%**	**Uganda**	**%**
A. Seeds and tools distribution	**12.4**	**A. Seeds and tools distribution**	**7**	**A. seeds and tools distribution**	**12**	**A. Seeds and tools distribution**	**9**	**A. Seeds, fertilizer, pesticide and tools**	**7**
B. Construction materials	4	B. Seed money for revolving fund (saving and credit)	1	B. Agricultural extension	1	B. Extension services	3	B. Agricultural extension, including training and marketing	7
		C. Agricultural extension	2	C. Training provision	1	C. Fertilizer subsidy	8	C. Seed money for revolving fund	6
		D. Fertiliser voucher	1	D. Livestock	4	D. Credit in general	2	D. Non-agricultural services, including training and marketing	1
		E. Goats and pigs for income generation	5	E. Fruit saplings	3	E. Transport of fish harvest to the market-retailer market or whole sale	1	E. Any other projects that are to help you with your livelihood?	3
		F.Skill enhancement trainings	5	F. Poultry	9	F. Market infrastructure	0		
		G. Micro-finance credit system management	1	G. Agriculture inputs	2	G. Ice factories	0		
		H. Teaching women about mobilisation of funds in their areas	1	H. Fodder / vaccination for livestock	1	H. Landing sites/anchorages	0		
		I. Marketing information	1	I. Fertilizer / pesticide	7	I. Roads from-upto landing sites	0		
		J. Exposure visit	1	J. Other (specify)	1	J. Fisher related extension services	4		
		K. Farmers Field School	1			K. Skills training	1		
		L. Others (specify)	0			L. Financial management	1		
						M. Fuel subsidy	12		
						N. Beacon lights	1		

Note: Livelihoods assistance transfers in red are the dependent variables for the regressions on satisfaction with livelihood assistance.

Table 23: List of shocks in survey instrument, by country

DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
Livestock/ crop disease	Livestock/ crop disease	Fire in house	Livestock/ crop disease	Disease of crops or livestock
Earthquake	Earthquake	Sudden health problem or accident	Earthquake	Bad weather
Flood	Flood	Long term health problem	Flood	Fire in house
Drought	Drought	Death of family member	Drought	Sudden health problem or accident
Fire in house	Fire in house	Inflation and price hikes	Fire in house	Long term health problem
Sudden health problem or accident	Sudden health problem or accident	Loss of work of a household member	Sudden health problem or accident	Death of family member
Long term health problem	Long term health problem	Loss of land/ assets	Long term health problem	Inflation and price hikes
Death of family member	Death of family member	Land grabbed assets	Death of family member	Loss of job of a household member
Inflation and price hikes	Inflation and price hikes	Failure or loss of family business	Inflation and price hikes	Land dispute
Loss of job of a household member	Loss of job of a household member	Low market prices for livestock/ crops	Loss of work of a household member	Other (specify)
Loss of land/ assets	Loss of land/ assets	Poor market access	Loss of land/ assets	
Theft of land/ assets	Theft of land/ assets	Loss of crop(s) / livestock	Theft of land/ assets	
Rustling	Other (specify)	Loss of Housing	Other (specify)	
Physical assault		Soil problem/ losing fertility		
Witchcraft		Imprisonment		
Other (specify)		Lost irrigation channel / system		
		Other (specify)		

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Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC)
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
203 Blackfriars Road
London SE1 8NJ
United Kingdom

T +44 (0)20 7922 8249
F +44 (0)20 7922 0399
E slrc@odi.org.uk
www.securelivelihoods.org

AREU Research for a Better Afghanistan

centre for poverty analysis

Focus 1000

Feinstein International Center

SDPI Sustainable Development Policy Institute

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